

# POLITICS & GEOPOLITICS

NEWSLETTER  
Issue 2, October 2014



**National Endowment  
for Democracy**

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## EDITORIAL

# Last peacekeepers or interpretation and transformation of an obsolete mandate



**Eduard  
ȚUGUI,**

IDIS "Viitorul"

The Mixed Peacekeeping Forces (MPF) in the Republic of Moldova and the entire control mechanism of the Security Zone from the Eastern part of the Republic of Moldova is the last of the four peacekeeping missions led by Russia in the post-Soviet space. Two of these missions in Tajikistan and Abkhazia / Georgia, were mandated by some members of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS); the other two, in South Ossetia / Georgia and Transnistria / Moldova were established as a result of bilateral agreements between Russia and Georgia and Russia and the Republic of Moldova. Concerns over the MPF have increased over time and along with the readjustment of the regional security architecture. The evidence of this is that the crisis in Ukraine has revealed new dimensions of Russian military deployed in the CIS, including those of the Russian Federation Military from Transnistria and the military contingent in the MPF. The interest in this mission has grown after officials in Moscow announced that from 17 to 23 October 2014 the planned rotation of Russian military contingent in the MPF would take place, a substitution occurring in an area with 60 km length and 20 km width in the perimeter of the Security Zone. In this interest for the MPF and the Security Zone in the Republic of Moldova difficulties arise from the interpretation, which includes two somewhat competing approaches - explanation and transformation of a mandate, which even if it existed is no longer current.

## MANDATE

The MPF and Security Zone in the Republic of Moldova are not established under a classic international mandate and the parties to the peacekeeping mission are not impartial. Only the consent of the parties,

the third principle of a peacekeeping mission defined by the United Nations (UN), can be seen in the framework of the MPF, which is the *Agreement on principles of Transnistrian military conflict peaceful settlement in the Republic of Moldova* concluded on July 21, 1992. After neglecting the first two principles underpinning international peacekeeping operations, the Agreement of 21 July is the only aspect of legitimacy of the MPF and, at the same time, the constitution for the entire Security Zone.

Thus, the Agreement provides for an immediate cease-fire and separation of conflicting parties by instituting a Security Zone. With a view to ensure implementation of provisions outlined in the Agreement and the security regime in the zone, a Joint Control Commission was set up consisting of representatives of the three parties, participating in the settlement (Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tiraspol administration). The Agreement of 21 July 1992, statute and regulation of the JCC, adopted in compliance with the agreement, provide that the JCC is in charge of the security mechanism in the region, ensures control over the observance of the ceasefire regime, is responsible for implementation of all agreements related to the Security Zone, and contributes to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

By its decisions the JCC instituted subsequently the concrete coordinates of the Security Zone along the Dniester River with a 225 km length and 12-20 km width. Also, under the provisions of the Agreement of 21 July 1992, through the JCC decisions were established and deployed the Mixed Peacekeeping Forces in the Security Zone. The forces consist

of three contingents: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova and Armed Forces of the Tiraspol Administration. After that, to “internationalize” the security mechanism and negotiations, the OSCE and Ukraine received the status of observers in the Security Zone and the negotiation format “3+2” was established.

### INTERPRETATION

Russian diplomacy means another league for CIS diplomacies with peacekeeping missions on their territory, whilst Russia’s military capabilities made the difference in terms of military-strategic plan in the post-Soviet space. Thus, Russia has had no difficulty in interpreting the mandate for these missions over time, at least in Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. In South Ossetia and Transnistria, there were deployed, according to the terminology of international missions, “peace enforcement operations”, (Russia imposed this peace by Sochi Declaration of 24 June 1992 and Moscow Agreement of 21 July 1992), they were officially called “peacekeeping missions” and have turned, over time, into complex “state building” missions. Russia has recognized the independence of Ossetia and that of Abkhazia and is strengthening the unconstitutional regime in Tiraspol, whose representatives are preparing for the recognition of their independence by Moscow. At the same time, Russia has never wanted to negotiate the transformation of these missions under an international civilian mandate.

On October 16, 2014, the Information and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry of Russia stated that some political forces in Europe continue to be obsessed with the idea of transforming the peacekeeping operation in the Republic of Moldova and that it believed that the mandate of the existing peacekeeping mission is far from exhausted. Moreover, the same text seeks to persuade the whole world that Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, and Ukraine, which

joined later, had agreed from the outset that the mission would be transformed only when the appropriate conditions were created for a political agreement on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The statement also says that such conditions existed in 2003, when the Republic of Moldova, under pressure from Brussels and Washington, refused to sign the Kozak Memorandum, but now those calling for the transformation of the existing peacekeeping mission just seek to withdraw the Russian military contingent from the conflict zone.

Also, on October 16, 2014, was made public an information note by the Tiraspol delegation to the JCC, which attempts to interpret the peacekeeping mission mandate in the Security Zone, particularly the JCC mandate. The JCC meetings have not been convened since September because of these repeated interpretations of the mandate and due to the fact that the Tiraspol delegation does not want to accept on the agenda of ordinary meetings issues related to the free movement of persons within the Security Zone, as guaranteed by the Agreement of 21 July 1992 and other subsequent relevant documents. In a previous statement, Tiraspol attempted to limit the prerogatives and functions of the JCC, interpreting art. 5.1 of the Agreement of 21 July 1992, to which Chisinau refers. Tiraspol states that this issue is beyond the Commission powers since it does not make reference only to the free movement of persons but also to the movement of goods and services, freedoms that relate to sectors, which are not within the JCC competence, like transport and telecommunications.

### TRANSFORMATION

We do not know exactly what forces and movements in Europe the document issued by the MFA of Russia refers to, but the transformation of the peacekeeping mission, promoted by a large part of civil society in the Republic of Moldova, including IDIS Viitorul, does not seek to withdraw the Russian military contingent

from the conflict zone. **The goal is to find a peaceful settlement to a conflict in Europe**, as provided for by article 7 of the Agreement of 21 July 1992. To make this achievable, it is required, in the short term, to fully comply with the text of the Agreement, and, in the medium and long term, to gradually transform the MPF, in the framework of a complex process of the Transnistrian conflict settlement.

Gradual transformation of the Security Zone control mechanism, including the gradual replacement of MPF with an International Civilian Mission is a precondition for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, a means and not an end in itself. Areas with special legal status, such as security zones, are temporary jurisdictions in a world divided into nation-states; therefore the peacekeeping mission in such a zone can not be deployed forever. Either it is a successful mission and it fulfils its mandate till the end, or it is declared incapable and is replaced by another, or it is transformed from a military into a civilian one, which, in turn, is deployed until its self-liquidation. This is the idea underpinning the call of the civil society in the Republic of Moldova for the MPF transformation and therefore this is a call on the Republic of Moldova partners in the Transnistrian conflict settlement:

- ◆ *Russian Federation.* Like the Russian MFA, we do believe that the immediate withdrawal, at any cost, of the Russian military contingent from the MPF will not lead to the stabilization of the Security Zone and the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, especially if Russia does not want this. On the contrary, first we call on Russia to comply with the provisions of the Agreement of 21 July 1992, and afterwards to participate in the process of transforming the peacekeeping mission. Even if Russian diplomats have imposed on the Republic of Moldova an interpretable document, in which the notions of “parties” and “conflicting parties” are easily

substituted, the Agreement of 21 July 1992 is a document concluded between Russia and Moldova and therefore they are primarily responsible for the situation in the Security Zone. Russia and the Republic of Moldova have committed to settle peacefully the military conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova gradually engaging into this process the Tiraspol administration, OSCE, Ukraine, and later the US and EU. Today, Russia disclaims any responsibility for the Security Zone and conflict settlement, boycotting, together with Tiraspol, the “5 + 2” talks and JCC meetings, while the only active negotiation format are the bilateral talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol, without the official participation of Russia. Russia carries out the rotation of the military contingent in the MPF and, at the same time, limits, through Tiraspol’s voice, the JCC powers, the institution, which under article 2.4 of the Agreement of 21 July 1992, is responsible for the breach of all provisions of the document. Moreover, Russia does not exclude the likelihood of recognizing the independence of Transnistria, and on October 1, 2014, Yevgeny Shevchuk and Dmitry Rogozin opened the exhibition “Transnistria - Russian border” in the premises of the Russian Central Armed Forces Museum. Under the 1992 Agreement, the military contingent has to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and not to protect the establishment of a border within the Security Zone, while the non-participation in the “5+2” talks and JCC meetings is contrary to the existing agreements and improper for the state that claims the status of a stabilizing civilization centre in a multipolar world.

- ◆ *Tiraspol administration.* We understand the new regional context in which Transnistria found itself and the potential impact of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine participation in a free trade area

with the EU. But the delicate situation of this region is caused largely by its self-isolation, while handling the situation by hostile action against the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, by establishing new checkpoints in the ZS, by terrorizing schools under the jurisdiction of Chisinau or interpreting CUC status, can not be sustainable. Moldova and Ukraine are independent states that have chosen a European future, it is their right, and you can not ask these states for recognition of the independence within borders drawn by a “presidential decree” of June 10, 2013. Ukraine and Moldova signed a Treaty on the State Border of August 18, 1999, while a joint Moldovan-Ukrainian Commission, which has already met in 56 sessions, manages the Moldovan-Ukrainian border demarcation. The “civilized divorce” you ask for the Civil Status Office in Moscow can not be based on that “Law on State Border”. How do you see this divorce in Bender, a district with increased security regime, beyond the desire to move the Supreme Soviet there, how do you see Dubasari district and Moldovan farmers’ agricultural lands along Tiraspol-CamenCa road and how could a divorce be civilized in the case of Romanian-language schools in Transnistria? Irrespective of the way the Transnistrian conflict is settled and whose outcome is unknown to you, what we need is much caution in actions and statements, particularly since the peaceful, complex and constructive negotiations are the only rational approach in such a context.

- ♦ *Society of the Transnistrian region.* We share the worries of society in Transnistria, faced by many citizens on the right bank, about the tense situation in the region and in the Republic of Moldova. In this context, we call on civil society organizations in Transnistria, those that since 2006 have been participating in joint projects with partners from the right bank, to contribute to soothing the warlike spirit of the left bank, not to fuel it. The only rational thing civil society can do is calling the decision makers for calm and reason, through a message that clearly expresses our citizens’ desire not to repeat the military phase of the conflict.
- ♦ *Euro-Atlantic partners.* We call on Euro-Atlantic partners to update their commitments for the Transnistrian conflict settlement, taking into account this complex and troublesome context for the Republic of Moldova. Negotiations on the conflict in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova are no longer merely an internal problem of the Moldovan state and the Association Agreement is not just a trade option of the Republic of Moldova. The Euro-Atlantic world has to defend the values it promotes in the region, while a strong and lasting partnership with Moldova must mean a solid commitment to security as well, including a more active engagement in the transformation of the peacekeeping mission. 🌐

## POLITICS

# The issue of the European Union in the discourse of pro-European parties on the eve of 2014 parliamentary elections



**Cornel  
CIUREA,**

*political analyst,  
IDIS "Viitorul"*

## 1. GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE IN THE APPROACH OF PRO-EUROPEAN PARTIES IN MOLDOVA

The signing and ratification of the Association Agreement with the European Union occurs in a geopolitical context, which, for the time being, has benefited Chisinau - the crisis in Ukraine has accelerated the process of signing the document. The current geopolitical situation favours further promotion of European integration, but requires, at the same time, diplomatic ability to maintain cooperation with Russia.

Meanwhile, the conflict between the authorities in Kiev and insurgents in south-eastern Ukraine, backed unofficially by Russian troops, trigger new challenges to the political parties in the Republic of Moldova. During the election campaign, each party will have to clarify its stance towards hostilities in the region. The major difficulty lies in the inability to formulate a clear-cut position on various issues related to this war. Moldovan parties are constrained to support unequivocally the Ukrainian authorities because this conflict has striking similarities with the Transnistrian conflict, forcing Moldova to provide support to the party aggressed by Russia. At the same time, a radical anti-Russian position carries the risk of unnecessarily irritating Moscow, given that Moldova is poorly prepared to face economic and political sanctions imposed by Russia. The trenchant position of President Timofti at the summit in Minsk against Russian economic sanctions does not seem to describe the typical behaviour of pro-European political parties in Moldova.

Putin's impressive popularity, seen in public opinion polls conducted in the Republic of Moldova, is another major obstacle to the formulation of a clear-cut pro-Ukrainian position. Thus, the pro-European parties' messages to the electorate of RM will include criticism of Russia's economic sanctions imposed against Moldovan products but they will also express the hope that these relations will improve after elections, owing to negotiations with the Russian Federation, including on economic issues.

## 2. THE PARADOX OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT - NECESSARY BUT UNPOPULAR

The pro/anti-European rhetoric of political parties in the Republic of Moldova is quite diverse in the current electoral campaign. The PLDM expresses unconditional support for the implementation of the Association Agreement, irreversibility of European integration and continuation of the course towards achieving full membership of the EU. The PCRM pleads for the renegotiation of the Association Agreement, and is, overall, favourable to European integration as a process of modernization of the country, but refuses ratification of the Association Agreement. The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova rejects categorically the implementation of the Association Agreement and advocates integration of our country in the Eastern space. The Liberal Party supports European integration but mainly sees it as a process of getting closer to Romania. The PDM position on European integration is one of the middle, being traditionally moderate.

The camp of opponents of the European idea has enlarged due to a spectacular increase in voters' preferences for Renato Usatî and the party led by him. This political appearance considerably strengthens the pro-Russian team and is a major risk for pro-European parties from two points of view - as a potential future ally of a pro-Russian coalition and as a powerful pro-Russian messenger during the electoral campaign.

Promotion of the Association Agreement is an extremely difficult task for pro-European parties for various reasons:

- It is a technical and hardly intelligible document.
- Does not describe the way in which Moldova will benefit from funding.
- Has difficulties in entering into force and creates a multitude of bureaucratic structures (Association Council,

committees and subcommittees).

- Brings into discussion issues on relations with Russia and the entire post-Soviet space.

NGO's experience in promoting and explaining the Association Agreement among population and local public authorities demonstrates that the interest in this document is rather low and in some regions (Balti, Comrat) there is an overt manifestation of aggressiveness towards this document. For this reason, this issue will not be among the main topics under discussion for certain pro-European parties, they preferring to focus on internal ones - relations between parties, social policies, future projects, reform in education and others. Thus, although the Association Agreement divides all parties into two opposite camps, the electoral campaign will not be focused only on this issue. 🌐

## GEOPOLITICS

# The Republic of Moldova and reshaping the „cordon sanitaire” between the West and Russia



**Alexandru  
BALTAG,**  
independent  
expert

The breakup of the USSR led to a significant decrease in the surface of Russia's territory in the western and southern parts, which made Moscow, as Halford Mackinder mentioned, completely lose control over the Heartland, which was "its own garrison in Soviet times." Currently it seeks to strengthen, more or less, the same Heartland, by totally influencing the ex-Soviet territories in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, which is one of the main geopolitical dramas on the European continent.

Russia's tumultuous history made it have a more geographical than political thinking<sup>1</sup>, while lack of secure borders (the absence of any natural barriers, such as sea or mountain) in the West and South determines it to be always expanding. Otherwise, Moscow risks to be invaded. Likewise, Russia, which currently is facing economic and socio-demographic decline, strives to conceal this setback by an aggressive foreign policy, often influenced by Karl Haushofer's geopolitical concepts, who says that "only

<sup>1</sup> From the report of Grigore Gafencu, Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Moscow, addressed to Mihail Manoilescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania (1940): "Soviet foreign policy, with more diligence and fewer scruples than any other, is "realistic", closely follows changes and takes advantage of almost all occasions. We have been educated like this - diplomacy, is about saying, according to circumstances, good or bad words. None approach is appropriate here. We fight with arguments, they await occasions. They are not discussing, they are lurking. What do we have to do? All heads of missions, neighbours with Russia, Asians and Scandinavians, have confessed to me their fear of amazing expansion power of the Soviet Union. In opposition - with the crowd whose standard of living has not increased and whose shabby appearance remained the same, the Soviet state is strengthening and growing."

weak nations in decline seek to have stable borders." The concept of "Russian world", which represents the state policy of Moscow, perfectly fits into this logic, that borders are only some temporary (and / or formal) impediments to domination. Therefore, we should seriously consider what George N. Curzon said that border wars will increase in number, the stage where "the ambitions of a state will reach the point of an acute and irreconcilable conflict with those of another state", events that we are currently witnessing in Eastern European and Caucasian space.

Mackinder, the British geographer and follower of Woodrow Wilson's idealism, considered that in order to keep a balance of power in Eurasia, what is needed is a belt-buffer made up of independent states in Eastern Europe, which would protect the rest of Europe from Russia and vice versa, which would drive Russia away from the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, including the space of western influence that is embodied by "freedom and prosperity". Nowadays we see that EU policy in Europe is based on this idea, that balanced power but not domination determines the safety and peace between Russia and the West, which implies the establishment of a "buffer zone" between these two great powers and civilizations. The current confrontation between the West and Russia is the result of eastward expansion of Western ideology to the East (NATO and EU enlargement), which bumped into Russian civilization, which leads to rethinking order in Europe through reshaping hegemony spaces by great economic, political and military powers.

As for the „buffer zone”, mentioned above, under definition it is made up of one or several states and is a space between two rival superpowers, which aims to prevent a conflict between them. In the classic sense of the definition, the state or states, which are part of the buffer zone, must have a real independence and a neutral foreign policy, which make it different from that of the satellite states. But in the context of the current confrontation between West and Russia in Eastern Europe, the concept of “buffer zone” is interpreted differently in Moscow and Western capitals. Russia further claims to have vital interests in this area (especially in Ukraine and Belarus), positioning itself as a state leader of Slavic civilization.

What is happening in Ukraine and in Moldova as well, is a struggle between civilization (*Western civilization vs. Slavic civilization*), overlapping, in fact, the rivalry between the two superpowers. However, reason dictates that political powers stop the confrontation between East and West and, in the short and medium term rebuild a new order in Europe to meet new realities. This requires the establishment of a “buffer zone”, which, in reality, can not exist as defined above and, therefore, will be replaced by the concept of “satellite state”, which refers to a country that is formally independent but, in practice, is subject to foreign domination. The latest events in Ukraine and Moldova show that, in the short and medium term, we could witness the transformation of this area into a “sanitary cordon” with subservient regimes, which will extend the political and economic transition in Moldova and ensure apparent geopolitical stability for a certain period of time.

I say for a certain period of time, because this „sanitary cordon” will continue to be a battlefield between East and West, the active phase being postponed to a later period, because limited vital natural resources, overpopulation of the planet, technological advances, including those

military, make competition and struggle for space be “eternal”. As for us, citizens of the RM, we must understand that geography, rather than idealism and sentimentalism, is the primary means to assess dangers and opportunities of a country. American geostrategic Nicholas Spykman mentioned in this regard that “*international society does not have a central authority to maintain law and order*”.

Moldovan elite must understand that the country will not be able to survive long if it plays the role of “cordon sanitaire” between two great powers, because both the US and the EU and Russia are fully aware that, to maintain their status, they must always be on the move and expand their influence, which automatically turns the “sanitary cordon” into a “battlefield” with unpredictable consequences (*suppressing the so-called “buffer zone” between East and West*). Washington, Moscow, Berlin and Brussels understand that otherwise it is impossible to assert yourself as global and continental leader. In this context it is appropriate to quote the American political analyst John Mearsheimer, who wrote that “*to maintain that expansion is inherently a mistake, is the same as saying that all great powers have misunderstood, over the past 350 years, how the international system functions.*”

Therefore, currently, when a new “cordon sanitaire” between the West and Russia is being reshaped, in the aftermath of the situation in Ukraine, the RM has to make use of all opportunities and resources so that to be cut out of this zone and included in the sphere of influence of the West, and the so-called “buffer zone” between East and West will narrow to fit the borders of Ukraine and Belarus. Sooner or later this “cordon sanitaire” will be re-divided between the West and Russia without our participation and with a high risk of not being in our favour. In addition, this redistribution of spheres of influence is necessary for Moscow to ensure its own security, because Russia’s

tumultuous history and the bloody battles for freedom against nomadic conquerors have implanted in Russians a “paranoid fear to the notion of invasion”.

Geography and history demonstrate that Russia should never be neglected, since, in comparison with other empires, it has continuously expanded, collapsed and revived several times. Russia, unlike other world powers, most often waged wars with enemies on its own territory or in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, Russians are a nation that, in one way or another, is always at war with someone. Having security grounds, currently, the Russian political elite has not abandoned the idea of a new cycle of expansion, especially in order to rehabilitate after losses following the dissolution of the USSR and the economic collapse of the 90s. Eurasianism that replaced communist ideology means a new expansion policy of Moscow for ex-Soviet nations, which aims at suppressing the differences between various ex-Soviet areas. In this context, Russians seem to accept the state of “deep militarization” of their society (*under Putin the military budget increased by 4 times*) and “endless search of security by creating a land empire.” Similarly, Russia will never give up its position in Europe (*2/3 of Russia’s population live in its European part*). For this reason, its expansion to Ukraine and Moldova will not stop until

it collides with the boundary line of the zone of influence of the EU and NATO and Western civilization itself.

Therefore, the RM must now take concrete and courageous steps so that, in the short term, to be included in the Western sphere of influence and cut out of the map of the potential “buffer zone”, which is taking shape between West and East. The first steps of Moldova to this end could be:

- Persuade the EU (Germany) to revert, together with Russia, to the provisions of Meseberg Memorandum (2010) relating to the Transnistrian conflict. This case is one of the least difficult in the former Soviet space and Eastern Europe and it could be an opportunity for West and Russia to restore lost trust. Similarly, an eventual success of this action, would open new avenues for compromise between East and West in relation to the situation in Ukraine and stabilize the situation in the area.
- The goal of Moldova to integrate into Western structures and break away from the so-called “buffer zone” must not depend on the Transnistrian conflict settlement, carrying out this task implying even the freezing of the conflict and securing border on the Dniester, a scenario similar to that in Cyprus. 🌐

## INTERVIEW

# Integration policy of ethnic minorities must be systemic and consistent



**Dr. Svetlana MIRONOVA,**

Head of the  
Centre for  
Human Rights,  
Comrat

*- On 18 September, the first Forum of ethnic minorities from the Republic of Moldova was held. What are, in your opinion, the results of this forum on the integration of ethnic minorities?*

- We must emphasize the fact that organizing regular events like this is mandatory, because it is difficult to achieve the desired results only by organizing conferences and debates, because only a limited number of participants take part in this kind of events and subsequently they do not communicate the results of these discussions to all representatives of their own ethnicities. It is required to hold more large scale events throughout the country, namely the days of Ukrainian, Gagauz or Russian culture.

Convening regular forums is not enough for solving the problem of integrating ethnic minorities in Moldovan society. Ethnicities do not receive objective information about the activities of other ethnicities, which explains this feeling of mistrust.

*- How could such events help solve the problem of integrating the Gagauz?*

If these activities are held systematically over a long period, and the results of these events are reflected at length in society and we see the implementation of the results of those actions then it will be appropriate to talk about some achievements and progress. At the moment, we can say that the activities that would lead to the integration of ethnic minorities are not organized systematically and lack consistency. This activity was transferred to the political area, which added negative nuances in interethnic relations.

It is important to speak about Gagauz as about a very industrious people and this information should be spread everywhere. At the moment, it seems that central authorities have not honoured their promises on resolving the inconsistency between the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia and national legislation. Over the last 20 years, there were no tangible results in terms of legislation harmonization on the Gagauz autonomy. Authorities only make electoral promises, which subsequently are not realized. Secondly, the autonomy is becoming a bargaining chip in the political struggle.

*- What are the problems that prevent the Gagauz integration in Moldovan society?*

- First of all, insufficient information and the actions of some political leaders that oppose the Gagauz to the rest of Moldovan society are defining elements impeding the integration of the Gagauz. Secondly, a major problem remains to be the issue of language. The Gagauz have been subjected to Russification. The Russian Federation is now virtually the only country that has a huge impact on the population of the Gagauz region (the results of the referendum of February 2, 2014 in which about 98% of those who voted supported the idea of joining the Customs Union is evidence of this assertion).

However, we must not overlook the migration of population from Moldovan villages to Comrat, Vilcanesti or other large Gagauz localities. Meanwhile, the Gagauz migrate to the Russian Federation, being replaced by Moldovans in Gagauzia. This process could be a windfall for central

authorities. In about 5-8 years, it will no longer be needed to carry out any activities for the integration of the Gagauz as they could be assimilated (probably).

***- What policy on ethnic minorities should the government have?***

- The state policy on the integration of Gagauz should be systematic and consistent. Ultimately, it is needed to ratify the Charter for ethnic minorities and ethnic minorities' languages and consider concrete steps to

implement them. It is required to offer guarantees on further functioning of the law on languages spoken on the territory of the state and of the legislation on the respect of the rights of ethnic minorities. The activities must be based not only on the attitude of mutual tolerance, but also on the development of friendly relations and avoidance of self-isolation of ethnic groups. The linguistic policy must be balanced and ensure qualitative teaching of the state language to ethnic groups' representatives. 

This newsletter was produced by IDIS "Viitorul" with financial support of National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the frame of the project "Gagauzia and Transnistria regions under the scrutiny of the civil society in the context of European integration process".

The Project aims to anticipate and perform policy analysis leading to policy warning of the policy-makers, various stakeholders on prospective or latent crises, on policy opportunity windows and options, and on immediate risks and challenges in most important areas of socio-political life in the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia regions).



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