




EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

AMBASADA REPUBLICII LETONIA
ÎN REPUBLICA MOLDOVA

LETONIA SĂRBĂTOREȘTE



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**Discussions Synthesis
of the seminar on
*“Comprehensive Approach to the Fight Against Disinformation”***

CHIȘINAU
NOVEMBER 8, 2018

Discussions Synthesis

of the seminar on

“Comprehensive Approach to the Fight Against Disinformation”

Chişinau

November 8, 2018

This material / publication is based on the materials presented at the “Comprehensive Approach to the Fight Against Disinformation”

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Introduction

On 8 November 2018, the Embassy of Latvia in Moldova in association with the Development and Social Initiatives Institute of Moldova (IDIS) held a seminar on “Comprehensive Approach to the Fight Against Disinformation”. Taking part in the event were experts from the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, Solvita Denisa-Liepniece and Mārtiņš Mūrnieks, as well as the Deputy Director and researcher of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Kārlis Bukovskis. In his opening remarks for the seminar, Chairman of the Administrative Board at IDIS, Igor Munteanu, congratulated Latvia on its centenary and underlined that the ability to counter disinformation under present-day conditions was one of the key elements in resilience of any country. The Embassy’s Chargé d’Affaires a.i., Kristaps Purmalis, stressed in his address that it was important for Latvia and Moldova to share their experience with a view to overcoming disinformation-related challenges, special attention being paid to the strengthening of media environment and promoting media literacy and critical thinking. In the two panel discussions, “Media Literacy and Disinformation” and “External and Internal Propaganda. How Can We Fight It?”, experts from both countries presented their experience in strengthening media environment and fostering cooperation between different actors. The seminar brought together institutional, academic and civic actors from Latvia - Baltic Center for Media Excellence and Institute of International Affairs of Latvia and the Republic of Moldova - IDIS „Viitorul”, InterNews in Moldova, Freedom House, StopFals.md, WatchDogs.md and other, with advanced expertise in Strategic Communication and Journalism, combating of fake news, audio-visual activity, etc. Mārtiņš Mūrnieks, whilst giving the audience an example of coordination between the public and non-governmental sectors ahead of the 13th parliamentary elections in Latvia, noted: “Successful strategic communication is built on a comprehensive approach.” Critical thinking was highlighted as a vital facet in countering disinformation. In that context, Solvita Denisa-Liepniece mentioned one of the main challenges: the ability

“Comprehensive Approach to the Fight Against Disinformation”

to distinguish true information from fake news. “Television, being the most widespread source of information, poses serious problems as it is the most difficult to debunk disinformation in that format,” said Ludmila Barba, a Moldovan TVM1 journalist. Solvita Denisa-Liepniece for her part called the attention of those present to threat caused by the use of audio-visual technologies to generate fake news. The participants of the discussions agreed that the only way to respond to propaganda was to tell the truth. It was underlined that freedom of expression should not be compromised while seeking to deal with challenges. The seminar was held as part of the Foreign Ministry’s Public Diplomacy Programme that marks the centenary of the Latvian state abroad. The events was organised by the Embassy of Latvia in Moldova together with the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and the Development and Social Initiatives Institute of Moldova (IDIS).

Media literacy: Five challenges

Solvita Denisa-Liepniece, Dr. sc. comm., Expert from the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence

The five main challenges listed below should be taken into account by different stakeholders, when dealing with societal resilience, strategic communication and education. These five challenges foresee developing a network of experts sharing their knowledge on different issues starting from behavioural science and emotion-checking and moving to the ongoing foreign influence activities.

Media literacy should become proactive and future-oriented. At the same time, media and informational literacy should have a very clear case studies to engage different target audiences from children to seniors.

The first challenge: the gap between StratCom media literacy and media literacy as it is understood by media educators.

In StratCom related professional environment media literacy is perceived as a logical step to protect society, together with resilience and even counter activities. Media literacy implemented and recommended to school curriculum frequently is a story about creation of the content and not critical evaluation of content.

Two weeks ago I was participating in UNESCO media and information literacy world's conference. They also used the phrase "media literacy", talking about teachers, high school students and even participation of journalists in media literacy activities. Some keynote speakers were quite sceptical about the idea of protection.

How do we try to solve this problem? We developed an online platform called Full Thought. And we are creating content in a teacher friendly style (video lectures, manuals, ppt), where issues of qualitative journalism/media/manipulations are discussed.

What kind of literacy or literacies do we need to protect democracy? Challenges - low political trust; nostalgia for Soviet time; integration of ethnic minorities; low level of civic participation.

The second challenge: Media literacy against something or media literacy for something.

Countering false information is mainly associated with Kremlin and connecting this battle (disinformation) with media literacy is used against media literacy itself. This is especially actual when working with specific Russian language audience, who perceive media literacy as one-way literacy against Russia. Government backed media literacy activities sometimes are being associated with exclusively anti-Kremlin activities. In other words - media literacy against Russia.

Though Kremlin activities are among the main threats, these are not the only manipulations media literacy can solve/protect. We had a series of radio programs “Pure facts”, designed to specific audience of adults and seniors. Manipulative techniques previously discovered in Kremlin propaganda were “interpreted” into the language of “everyday life”. We discussed health issues, medical environment, marketing and political marketing and the role of entertainment.

We are addressing this challenge with the following concept: We need media literacy for smart decision-making.

The third challenge: oversimplification of the problem - fake news.

It took two years for the Government of the UK to stop using the phrase “fake news” and to name the problem - disinformation and misinformation. Together with “fake news” also “media literacy” became a buzzword. At the same time, there is evidence that in Kremlin influence operations, disinformation is only a tiny part of influence activities. Journalists should be informed not only about disinformation steps, but also to have overall understanding of tools and activities used.

We need to show a broad perspective, to show the landscape of and for manipulations. With this knowledge, sharing is possible to check vulnerabilities of journalists and editorial rooms. For general public it is also important to check their ability to detect manipulations, for example in the store, while buying goods. Who and why influences me? Who is using what to influence me? This is media literacy at an individual level, focusing on self-literacy and self-responsibility.

The fourth challenge: global corporations are allies, enemies or between.

Global corporations, like Google, have become very supportive of media literacy activities, they support newsrooms, including technical support. At the same time Google news application (with settings in Russian) still brings news about the Baltic States referring to, for example, RIA Novosti, TVZvezda . Another example - in Lithuania the TV channel Russia is banned, but on youtube the popularity of the content is extremely high. Evidence? Commercials. While watching “Vecher s Solovjevim”, you are interrupted by commercials about 20 times. Rossija content earns money for Google and “minds and hearts” for Kremlin.

The fifth challenge: the era of deep-fake is coming.

Deep-fake means new audiovisual manipulations, for example when you see pre-recorded video of a politician X, and someone is changing his words online, “putting your words in his lips”. This photoshop of video is a forthcoming reality and we need to work both with journalists, to show them keys to find the manipulation, and with audiences, to protect them. Video Face Swap from Hollywood comes to our phones. MIT technology review warns us that we are moving to the new era when these innovations are mixed with Generative adversarial networks, which means that systems try to find the fake and to make the networks clear enough to avoid digital forensics.

Summing up, media literacy should not just follow the steps of manipulators, but also predict the future of manipulations. One of key elements will still be qualitative journalism, media literacy not only in school or the system of education, but overwhelming media literacy and emotion checking.

Mārtiņš Mūrnieks, Head of the EaP Program, Baltic Centre for Media Excellence

When considering external and internal nature of propaganda, particularly, the situation in Latvia, one of the most effective ways is to approach it as an integrated process – paying attention and working on both of them simultaneously through different channels.

In case of Latvia the biggest external propaganda risks are associated with the Russian TV channels. Their content is being broadcasted in Latvia but produced in Russia. For instance, 4 out of 10 most popular TV channels in Latvia are broadcasting in Russian language, with majority of the content produced in Russia. Latvia’s ability to influence this broadcasting is limited. Since all these channels are registered in EU countries, also common EU regulations apply when limiting or closing down the broadcasting of such propaganda channels. The most efficient way to address these challenges is working together with other EU partners on a common EU position and changes in the EU regulations. This is complex, long-term and also lengthy and slow process.

Individual countries have much more freedom to conduct their activities regarding limiting influence of “internal propaganda”. In most cases these activities are solely subject to national law, which can be changed and adopted in a more flexible manner.

The situation in Latvia shows that there is a wide range of different actors and activities involved in tackling the internal propaganda issues. These activities range from governmental up to individual initiatives, which supplement each other, but which are not managed or coordinated by a single authority. There is a wide spectrum of actors who collaborate horizontally but aren’t a part of any vertically subordinated chain.

Below are several examples of actors and activities being conducted in Latvia and directly or indirectly concerning internal and external propaganda:

- Special coordination office within the State Chancellery with a special

mission to coordinate state institutions' activities preventing and countering meddling into the Latvian Parliament elections, which were held in October, 2018. This activity was initiated by the Latvian Government.

- Special section entitled "Lie Detector" on the Public Broadcaster's web platform. This section with regularity conducts fact-checking of some of assertions or announcements of public figures and afterwards publishes results. The "Lie Detector" reveals, which parts of statements are true and which are false or partly true. This product is initiated by the Public Broadcaster's on-line platform www.lsm.lv.
- Regular series of publications entitled "Deception – Case of Latvia" published on the most popular on-line media portal in Latvia "Delfi.lv". These series reveal some of disinformation examples produced and distributed by Kremlin's controlled media or outlets. This product is a joint initiative of the portal "Delfi.lv" (private media company) and the think-tank "Centre for East European Policy Studies".
- Investigative journalism initiatives revealing money and operational routes and schemes of Kremlin's disinformation efforts in the Baltic countries. These products are initiated and produced by Investigative Journalism Centre "Re:Baltica", which is an independent NGO.
- Individual bloggers – these are initiatives of civically active individuals, who in an attractive format reveal mechanisms and actors who are engaged in disinformation activities in Latvia – either related or unrelated to Russian propaganda.
- Open grant competitions designed for Latvian media and NGOs to apply with projects aimed at strengthening the information space of Latvia. These projects are mostly related to the media addressing content and capacities issues. Funds for the grants are provided from the state budget and administered by non-political professional bodies/agencies. Applicants can be as well public as private media outlets with both – national and regional character.
- NGOs, research institutions, think tanks and associations, which play an active role through their projects that address propaganda issues. One of

very visible examples is the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME). The Centre supports and facilitates professional and independent journalism as an important instrument how to address also propaganda issues. BCME’s program and projects include the following activities:

- Advocacy activities working with decision makers and opinion leaders to support professional and independent media;
- Media literacy projects for consumers;
- Capacity increasing projects for journalists;
- Program enhancing impact of donors’ contributions in the Eastern Partnership countries’ independent media environment.

The example of Latvia shows that there is an overall understanding and consensus across different sectors – starting from political establishments up to smaller NGOs - about the risks caused by disinformation for Latvian national interests. There is also an understanding about a need to commit resources, including state budget money, to address these issues.

Strategic narratives of Russia in the Republic of Moldova: distribution channels, impact and solutions to counter its impact

Paşa Valeriu, Expert, WatchDogs.md

Until February 2018, Russian Federation's official media has held a dominant position on the Moldovan media market in the information section on international politics and "foreign news" in general. The main role was played by the televisions which were broadcasting newscasts and analytical programs produced in the Russian Federation (Prime TV, RTR Moldova and NTV Moldova). It is well known that television is the main source of information in the Republic of Moldova. However, the local TV outlets do not devote sufficient attention to information on international topics; therefore the presence of the three Russian TV stations effectively ensures a dominant position on the media market. On the basis of the monitoring carried out in September 2017 and January 2018 by Watchdog MD, we found that, for example, the activity of world state leaders (news about them) was provided primarily (over 60%) by the Russian TV stations.

This situation has allowed Moscow's strategic visions and narratives on state leaders to be imposed on a large part of the Moldovan population. Comparing the news' quantity and the amount of audiences of positive and negative news about certain political leaders, with the results of sociological research, there can be noticed a visible link. The large number of positive news about Russian President and the lack of alternative news allowed for a very positive image of him among Moldovan voters. In contrast, Western leaders have a more negative degree of trust among Moldovan population, and the number of news about them in Moldova's media outlets is very small. By comparison, we can assume that similar mechanisms have worked in the formation of views on geo-political orientation options.

After the approval of the "anti-propaganda law", the share of Russian televisions fell sharply, but there was not drastic reduction of propaganda influence on the

formation of geo-political views in Moldova. RTR Moldova continues to distribute manipulative news produced in the Russian Federation (although in a smaller volume). In order to recover from its capacity of influence, the Russian Federation has recently invested money into Moldova’s affiliated resources - primarily the Sputnik branch. This way, Russian propaganda is shown less on television, but more online and on the radio.

Current government policies are neither effective nor sustainable to effectively counteract the impact of anti-European manipulations; some of Russia’s basic narratives are even amplified by the media outlets affiliated to the moldovan political elite

However, this phenomenon could be counteracted by implementing more strict editorial policies and by enhancing the capacity of the independent media. Apart from PublikaTV and Moldova 1, no other TV station has an external news journalist team. Because of this, these media sources do not create an overview of what is happening in the world. Moreover the two mentioned TV channels (because of being politically controlled) do not present all the realities (for example, we will not see any news about the corruption acts happening under Putin’s regime). Under these conditions, even a more modest presence in the Moldovan media space allows Russia to dominate the formation of opinions on international politics.

Our recommendation for the external donors is to invest in the forming of international news subdivisions in the independent media outlets, to provide subscriptions to bigger global media agencies in order to have more sources of information, and lastly to provide complex information programs on world’s realities (primarily in the EU and in Russia).

Rosian Vasiloi, Security and Military Analyst, IDIS „Viitorul”

The subject of disinformation, propaganda and the informational space in Moldova is very important, especially under the pressure of hybrid threats. First of all, because these threats methodically hit each one of us who can easily become a victim of manipulations that take place within the national information space. At the same time we are the ones who analyze what is happening in the media, in order to protect ourselves against manipulation. These challenges are often interpreted as external challenges, but in fact they are not only external challenges. They are also a systematic abuse of the information space through propaganda tools, by means of restricting the public space, by monopolizing and controlling some means of mass media. This creates a deficit of active democracy. According to international scores, RM is increasingly exposed to such threats. I will focus on practical experience in the fight against Russian propaganda and the information warfare. What are the lessons learned, the most effective solutions and measures, the difficulties and deficiencies remaining at a national level?

In this regard I will plot out at least two aspects. The first is Russian propaganda. As I said the external one and the second one is the internal propaganda, through media holdings, which is strongly promoted by several Moldovan political parties.

With respect to how we defend ourselves from the Russian propaganda or the information warfare? In the last period at the national level some legislative acts were adopted and policy documents like the famous “anti-propaganda law”, the new audiovisual code, the Information Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova. I will not give any appreciation to these documents, which, although approved, remain on paper rather than being implemented, with no clear policy and effective measures. In Moldova, there is no clear mechanism at the national level that would make the fight against Russian propaganda an effective one, as it is at least in Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, the Baltic States, etc. Obviously, these implemented practices can be questioned, but it is certain that these countries

have also adapted, from the legislative and practical point of view, to the risks and threats of Russian propaganda and the informational warfare. Throughout this event, we will see what these practices are, what is an opportunity to make this exchange of experiences.

Propaganda can not be replaced by another type of propaganda, which would be set up by more restrictive legislation, but above all by positive examples, as the Baltic States do. “We can not treat tuberculosis with cancer,” as some experts say. In this respect, I appreciate the approach of the Baltic States, particularly Lithuania, which have been successful in combating propaganda not by restrictive legislation with direct reference to combating propaganda, but by legislation that combats hate speech and incitement to violence, through clear and efficient mechanisms, including operational ones at the EU or NATO level. Moldova also has such provisions in our legislation, but they are not implemented. There is not a clearly established mechanism at the national level. Moldova does not have a clearly defined and operationalized concept on Strategic Communication. I was talking about the Information Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova, which establishes that the Information and Security Service, within the limits of its competencies, exercises the attributions of the national authority for coordinating the activity of the public authorities in the area of information security. It seems to me absurd that an Intelligence Institution is the one to be coordinating this area. This is the fact which proves that one year after the Concept was adopted, nothing had happened, nothing moved – the cart remained in the same place. Meanwhile, the information space in the Republic of Moldova is invaded by several narratives that contribute to Russia’s influence in the Republic of Moldova, as well as specific to the Eastern Partnership countries and beyond. Let me take a look at some of these:

1. Russki Mir. Russki Mir “bemoans the loss of previous (imperial, Soviet) greatness and names the USSR collapse as “a geopolitical catastrophe” only to a geopolitical mission for certain groups, individuals, states, populations, religious groups, regardless of costs. Here we can add the narrative about

Russian compatriots abroad, which is more commonly referred to as a policy of the responsibility of the Russian state to protect its interests by any available means, which re-formulates a kind of “responsibility to protect”. We cannot keep silent about the Russian Language - the second language. Over the years pro-Russian activists have urged authorities to recognize Russian as the second official language in the Republic of Moldova, arguing that Russian language is limited to official use, education and public communication. They argue that “Moldova loses its sovereignty by accepting the „Romanianization of the Moldovan language”, which is a form of “cultural expansion” organized by Romania. The Orthodox Church is constantly growing as a silent major political power. By refusing internal modernization, Orthodox clergy deals with the effects of economic globalization, social migration, disunity and frustration, despite ideas and technologies.

2. The next narrative is the systemic construction of a distorted picture of Western countries. The denigration of the leaders of these countries is a central priority - they are presented as inefficient, aggressive, arrogant, etc. It builds the image of the “west of rottenness” with an incapable leadership that has only one purpose in life - to abuse Russia’s “natural” interests. Pro-Western states are presented as being dominated by domestic economic and social problems, with an exponential increase in extremist (fascist) movements. In contrast, the Russian Federation, through its leader Vladimir Putin, is presented as the only world pacifier. In addition to shaping the amount of negative news about western and positive leaders, respectively, about Vladimir Putin, the general picture induced by the Russian press is the result of a strategic approach to messages. The main narrative present is building a true cult of Vladimir Putin’s personality. He is presented as the perfect leader. This also applies to Moldovan? party media that promote the image of its leaders
3. The West intends to destroy Russia. The most popular narrative of Russian propagandists is that Russia, who wants to rise from its knees, is now

punished by the West, who would prefer to enslave it, to rob people of their resources and their past. The idea of an assailant force has been widely used in recent decades to describe Transnistria as a military outpost.

4. The next narrative is building a distorted image of the quality of life and government in Russia. Typical for state-controlled media in Russia is avoiding uncomfortable issues for government. No corruption investigations, no scandals related to dignitaries' abuses, no news of military or government failures will come to Russian newsletters. This also applies to Moldovan? party media
5. Another is the anti-NATO narrative that had been taken over by news agencies controlled by the Russian government. An important role in promoting this narrative is played by the media, including both the traditional media (TV, radio, press - as well as online (portals, blogs, social networks, etc.). By using the “fake expert” method, the anti-Western press affiliated to the pro-Russian parties in the Republic of Moldova more effectively promotes any discourse against Chisinau's collaboration with the Alliance.
6. And the last thing I want to say is the narrative that was described by our colleague and friend Sergiy Gerasymchuk. This narrative could be divided into two components for the Republic of Moldova. The first is for the right bank of the Dniester and the second for the left bank, but they have the same essence. People are told that if the government is not stable then a situation similar to that in Ukraine will be achieved. This narrative is used by the authorities, including the self-proclaimed authorities of Transnistria, to tell people that they now have to unite around the idea of a common destiny, the idea of Russia, otherwise it will reach Maidan, blood spitting, the final fall of the economy. Such discourse will continue to be exploited because it is a part of the Russian propaganda toolkit that successfully implements its goals, including in the Transnistrian region. Unfortunately, this narrative has been promoted lately by members of the Government of the Republic of Moldova in the media of the Republic of Moldova.

In brief about what other actors do in Moldova. I refer to NGOs (IDIS “Viitorul”, “WatchDog.MD”, EPA, etc.) and professional associations of journalists (API, CJI etc.). Just a few examples that I think deserve to be talked about. InterNews Moldova carries out several initiatives that focus on providing local, relevant information, because propaganda coming from outside can not provide it. This strengthens local media organizations that provide balanced and professional information from those efforts to inform partners, inform citizens, especially those who do not have this information. Another aspect is media literacy. In collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the Center for Independent Journalism there is a pilot course this year for the primary level in several schools in the country, with the support of DW Akademie. They are working on the curriculum at the gymnasium and lyceum level. Another level is the community level, through Novateca - a network of libraries, becoming community centers in those localities. Librarians have been trained how to talk about media literacy, how to educate communities about what’s false information. We’ll be floating on this segment and are working to develop this mechanism in other communities.

Another example is the activity of journalists’ professional associations. First, the activities promoted by the Independent Press Association to combat propaganda and false news and portals that promote these news. Lately, the issue of ghost sites that infect computer space has become more acute and citizens become victims of this informational warfare. Through various projects such as MEDIACRITICA, STOPFALS, etc., it has been demonstrated that media fakes and clone portals are recorded outside the Republic of Moldova but are trying to discredit credible media organizations. All of these portals have the same features, being created in the same ZIP on the same servers either in Romania or in the US. By a closer analysis, we realize that it is rather an attempt to sabotage the opposition online, that is, if we are to refer to internal propaganda. Journalists and editors of some media institutions are solidarizing against the falsifiers of reality and conducting accurate information to the public about the phenomenon of “false news” to help citizens not become victims of informational manipulation by people and

groups of political or other nature. This solidarity must be extended internally and externally.

In our turn, IDIS “Viitorul” has many projects in common with the EU, NATO, Romania, Baltic States to come up with expertise in this field. One of our examples is the EU-STRAT project (<http://eu-strat.eu/>) funded with the support of the European Union, where a comparative research of two external actors and their speeches on the national audience of RM, the EU and the Russian Federation. The study was conducted in 3 Eastern Partnership countries - Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. What did this research look like? Together with the partners, we tried to find the answer to the following questions: EU and Russia speech, messages and channels of influence in EaP (3 states examined by comparison). What kind of messages are transmitted: speech policy, concepts, ideas, discourse? Who transmits, who facilitates or multiplies the message? What is the impact of the media? How do citizens perceive the external actors mentioned? Is the EU a soft, normative or a transformative power?

I will not give a description of the results of this project that is in progress until April 2019, but for sure it is a project that helps us find the answers to the questions we ask, including the proposed mechanisms to cope with Russian propaganda and actions to counter the information warfare in the Republic of Moldova.

Finally, some conclusions: (1) there is a visible asymmetry in the strategic resources of the information warfare in the Eastern Europe and, in particular, the Republic of Moldova. (2) More than ever, we must support and create networks of local and international organizations in the region, that is now the place of a new type of ideological competition.

POLICY AND MEASURES TO CURB DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

I. Quick actions –

#1 Measure – Codification of propaganda and disinformation into existing laws. As a threat, Disinformation & Propaganda must be reflected in to the National Strategy on Security, as well as in the Strategy on Foreign Affairs, Strategy on Informational Security in Moldova.

#2 Measure – RM must adopt an active policy in preventing disinformation and other related threats, not as a victim, but as a provider of solutions to the complex web of risks. This shall be seen and addressed as a threat of collective security, threat among other East European states.

#3 Measure – Parliamentary Committee, as well as the Supreme Security Council (SSC) must convene for a regular monitoring of the implementation of laws and documents of the adopted policies in fighting propaganda, Strategic Communication Guidelines must be adopted as a Policy document by the Government, MoD, MFA, etc.

4#Measure – Appoint a high-level governmental official as a National Coordinator for the policies on fighting disinformation and propaganda in Moldova. Increased cooperation with must be achieved. Professional reports must address the way of financing Russian media hubs in Moldova, aligning the work of the central government bodies to the standards recommended by the EEAS East Stratcom Task Force and NATO Stratcom Centre.

II. Structural measures

#1 Measure – Civil society organizations must shame and blame the ‘proxies’, used by Kremlin along its vast campaign of propaganda, recruited among politicians and other opinion formatters. This policy has long-term preventive effects, recovering society from its infestation. Disinformation must be called as ‘hostile action’, and

tolerance of the regulators shall not? be allowed.

#2 Measure – National Security bodies must investigate personal and financial links between some politicians with subversive operations, such as ‘laundromat’, using proxy-groups connected to the Tiraspol administration, thus, creating outstanding perils to the national security. This effort must be assisted by the Parliamentary committee on Defence, Security and Public Order.

#3 Measure – Civil society will provide an oversight on positions and actions of entities serving Russian aims in Moldova. However, this will require additional capabilities and interdisciplinary research. Populist politicians must know their statements are monitored, and their trips to Moscow or Donbas or Crimea will be contextualized. All personal links and financial ties shall be revealed. Freedom of expression must enable media to investigate the sources of income for political activities. Also, civil society can inaugurate a registry of public lies and disinformation, based on media conducting disinformation activities, as well as of the talking heads, communicating them.

#4 Measure – State policies aimed at fighting disinformation and foreign propaganda must create a certain national consensus around the issue. Think tanks and free media associations must engage with popular politicians to communicate with the general public, and make the issue popular, not exclusivist. Civil society need to bring to accountability the structures and toolkits of disinformation, using local examples as well as the EU examples

