

MOLDOVA ON ITS WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY

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MOLDOVA ON THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY

From the Post-Soviet Space towards
the World of Democratic Values



CARTIER

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The study “Moldova on the Way to Democracy and Stability: from the Post-Soviet Space towards the World of Democratic Values, published with the support of GMF (German Marshall Fund of the United States of America), seeks to offer its readers the possibility to understand the structure and the character of the security risks facing a society in the period of transition, based on the example of the Republic of Moldova. The book designs and explores a series of analytical tools and concepts widely used in international specialty literature.

The study reunites a number of authors known for their articles and their professional performance: Nicolae Chirtoaca, Iulian Chifu, Igor Munteanu, Dan Dungaciu and Valeriu Prohnitchi, Iulian Fruntasu, Radu Gorincioi and Boris Asarov. Their presence in this anthology of topical papers dealing with various aspects of home affairs and international security issues comes as a prologue to a series of important efforts towards strengthening the rule of law in Moldova. These efforts stems from a considerable rethinking of the security sector reform, including policy-making and policy-design, public education and public awareness activities, aiming to ensure public, individual, economic and political security, which is so needed by the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

Among the solutions forwarded by the authors are, undeniably, fast, total and consistent integration of the Republic of Moldova into the main western institutions, the de-Sovetization of public, civil and military institutions of the state, the reform of the public sector, which should produce more clarifications regarding the role of the state, political elites and public service, in formulating the state priorities, as well as some efficient policies of social and economic development.

This way we thank all those who have contributed to the writing of this study, all the colleagues and friends, reviewers and partners, who had a constructive influence upon its current shape.

PREFACE

Since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, Republic of Moldova has made clear progress towards the consolidation of its state, of its military and civil institutions, making itself notable on the geopolitical map of Europe. However, Moldova seems to be still scarcely present on the mental maps of the decision-makers from the West. Unlike the Baltic nations, that embedded themselves into the mind of the European public as a cohesive group of free nations, distinct from their poorer neighbors (Belorussians, Russians or Ukrainians, with their more violent history after the disintegration of the Soviet Union), Moldova was approached with prudence if not completely neglected so that when important EU officials have remembered, after 2003, about the post-soviet origins of this republic, the Chisinau diplomacy felt offended.

Frankly speaking, the policy of forgiving and the ambiguity were the main ways of treatment through which the West has avoided any similarity between the path of the Republic of Moldova and of the 3 Baltic countries even since their detachment from the USSR and the restoration of their formerly bourgeois statehoods, destroyed by the Soviets after the Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact. But these are all the similarities that could be made between the path followed by Chisinau and those adopted in Vilnius, Riga or Tallinn. After the recovery of independence by these states, the West has not tolerated the presence of Russian troops on their territory a single day while for Moldova, even the acknowledgement of its independence was conditioned, in the autumn of 1991, by the signing of a peace treaty with the Russian Federation and the adherence to the CIS. The most important institutions of the Western community (EU, CECS, UN) have remained in expectance even when the foreign mercenaries and military forces of the Russian federation were openly and massively involving into the support of a bloody military rebellion in the Republic of Moldova during March-July combat hostilities against a state, which was recognized by the UN only some days before that.

The sudden dissolution of the USSR has caused the effect of a massive “decentralization” of political and military powers in the former soviet republics, at the same time creating the impression of a security vacuum, deprived of any kind of stability guarantees. Unlike the Baltic Nations, who managed to rapidly and elastically take the control over basic elements of the state sovereignty in their countries with the enthusiastic, full and unconditioned support of the West, which that allowed them to evacuate permanently all the foreign military

troops off their sovereign territory, in less than 2 years and without victims, becoming, this way, truly free and open towards the integration into Western institutions, Moldova has faced a heavy military resistance in its Eastern territories, strongly supported by influent groups from Russia and Ukraine. The easy access to the weapon dumps and arsenals, as well as the integral transfer of certain combat units, tanks, rocket launchers, fighter planes and helicopters, to the paramilitary militias of the separatist movement rapidly leaned the technical superiority balance in favor of Transnistrian para-military guards and other security offsprings. On July 21st, 1992, presidents Eltin and Snegur signed a cease-fire agreement, drawn up between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova, putting the end to the military hostilities in the region. This act has eloquently proved that the violence and hostilities caused during the military conflict in Transnistria were started and managed through direct orders from Moscow.

Ignored by the West and internally weakened by the lack of an attractive identity of its statehood, Republic of Moldova has unsuccessfully sought to be heard in different European capitals, but in which figured only two unconditioned priorities: the diminishing of the atomic threat, associated with the fast demoralization of the former soviet strategic military units, and the emancipation of Baltic states, the soviet regime of which has never been recognized by the West. The uncertain situation from the ex-soviet territories, the internal conflicts and the interethnic tensions of different intensity have aggravated the general economic crisis and the conflicts related to the change of forms of property in Moldova. The economic assistance given initially as a placebo for the (supposed or real!) launched reforms has become, in time, an “unemployment” assistance. The little experience in public administration has soon become the fief of a clientesque and rapacious bureaucracy, while the strong public confidence in the political elites has become, at the end of the 90s, a burden for the latter, who became too divided and vulnerable to their past, and too distant from the citizens.

Thus, Republic of Moldova has become a hostage of its unsolved problems, among which, the “frozen” conflict in Transnistria is on the first place. Nonetheless the security context for Moldova has recently changed essentially. Three important changes have been made at different levels of the security scale: (1) pan-European security architecture, determined by the dual process of NATO and EU enlargement, which influences the change of Russia’s policies in the “common neighbourhood”, (2) the specific regional context, which appeared as a consequence of two successful revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, concomitantly with the melt-down in the relations with Romania, and,

(3) the radical shift in the orientation of Moldovan foreign policy following the Parliamentary elections of March 2005.

A favorable regional context is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the defeat of structural vulnerabilities, some of which are related to other security scales, among which one shall emphasize on the frozen reforms of the most important institutions related to defense, public order and security, as well as to – and not in the last place – the interaction between the external and domestic politics.

These observations have encouraged us to launch this research on the conditions, concepts and the effects of state security policies, especially on the way in which these threats influence the officials of civil and military institutions in the Republic of Moldova, the extent and the big danger of residual risks and the influence of external factors as accelerators or decelerators of the political system crises.

Chapter I is based on the analysis of concepts operated within this study, showing through significant examples and arguments the evolution of the security domain into a democratic state. The chapter makes numerous references to the coordination system and the security ‘terminology’ used in the EU and NATO, analyzing the security sectors of certain NATO member states and the tremendous transformations suffered in the last decade by certain emerging democracies.

Chapter II analyzes the evolution of the security sector reform in Republic of Moldova, relating the risks and dangers, common to the countries in the period of transition, to our country’s particularity. The civil – military cooperation and the development of the legislative framework, of civil and military capabilities, represents the reason why the author asks himself whether the reformation of this sector could become a big advantage for the Republic of Moldova in a wider mainframe of the European and Euro-Atlantic enlargement.

Chapter III amplifies an analysis of security risks for the Republic of Moldova, rendering a picture of external threats, as well as priorities which have to be followed by the actors of the certain sector. The author is dedicating enough space to the transfer of options and dilemmas which have to be confronted by the public authorities to a bigger mainframe of the European and Euro-Atlantic enlargement.

Chapter IV outlines the major concerns related to the Domestic Affairs business, painting out the punctual division of labor between the Ministry of Interior and other agencies of the state, dealing with individual security, public order and human rights. The general conclusion is that the reform is still in the backyard of political agenda, and more efforts are to be placed into this issue.

Chapter V represents a tentative to approach the system of security of the Republic of Moldova from an economic perspective, subject to certain concepts, analysis tools used by it, such as the concept of “economic security”, not often greeted by the adepts of economic neo-liberalism, because the monitoring and assurance of the economic order could imply precautionary actions from the state, which could affect certain business interests. The author draws interesting remarks about the effects of illegal activities upon the quality of governance and democratic options of large.

Chapter VI approaches the problems of the “frozen” conflict from the left bank of the Dniestr River, which represents by all accounts the most severe security threat of Moldova’s post-soviet legacy. The author describes in full details when and how the Transnistrian separatist regime emerged as a privileged recipient of assistance provided by the Russian Federation throughout the last decade, as a result of the ‘neglect’ from the international community, but also due to inherent weakness of Moldova’s ‘unfinished transition’. With the latest developments in the region, the author makes several important recommendations and specific proposals which, to his opinion, could bring the process of conflict settlement into a framework regulated by law and human rights primacy. The Chapter inspires also a new strategic rethinking on the external and home affairs priorities, in which the armed forces and the civil society have an increasing role.

Chapter VII continues the topic of decading the roots and scape of the aggressive separatism in Transnistria further analyzing the factors, trends and elements which feed the secession. The author unveils the existence of some cases of political suppression and dissidents expelled from the region that stand against the regime, on the background of aggressive privatizations, and intense production of weapons that contradict the stipulation of the Cease-Fire Agreement of July 21st, 1992 and the process of regulation of the conflict, as agreed between Moldova and Russia.

Chapter VIII tries to explain the equation of security in the so-called wider Black Sea region. The idea of this text is that, even if the interest for the region has massively increased lately, only the *premises* for outlining and implementing of a decisive strategy in this area exist as yet. The text below should be read for this reason, too: it is aimed to outline the premises and the mainframe of such a strategy.

Chapter IX summarizes the increasing role of the Black Sea Area in the economy and security of the EU and NATO, through a thorough analysis of the opposing strategies and old rivalries that describe the current status of coopera-

tion among countries that meet in the area. It underlines also the fact that the hinterland of the area is a second driving force, its by instrumental role after the Caspian oil-extraction capabilities, that is very much promising to become one the most sophisticated and dynamic pieces of the EU's Wider Europe.

Chapter X provides an overview of the geopolitics that affects the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova, through a complex overview of the latest developments and inter-positioning. It does provide a number of interesting explanations and forecasts as per the intensity of relations between Moldova and its neighbors, international organizations and other stakeholders having a relevant power on the democratic choice for the Moldovan society.

The last chapter aims to provide a synthesis of the main opinion flows regarding the matter of security problems in the Republic of Moldova. The opinions were collected with the help of linear interviews, carried out in June–July, 2005.

The book provides a conceptual and analytic foundation for addressing the agenda of the security sector reform in Moldova. Given the tremendous tasks that have challenged Moldova in the last decade we all expect that the energy and commitment of its political, economic and cultural elites will be at least equivalent to it. By “anatomyzing”, these crisis-prone issues have invited us to reflect upon their complex interdependence, as well as towards effective policies in Moldova.

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Chapter I.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND ITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICATIONS

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1.1. About the taxonomy of the security concept

The concept of “security” is a multidimensional term, which includes a wide variety of aspects and elements that are not only related to political and military aspects, but also to the economic, cultural, ecological and even the demographic ones. Probably, the fear and concerns caused by the existence of an unknown enemy, were, traditionally, the base of all the security concepts which ever appeared in the political theory and practice.

The anticipation of possible attacks was the key stone of the security related field. But anyway, paradoxically, these concepts have been constantly contradicting themselves over the question, what an attack means, where they could come from and what could be done to prevent them? This is the reason why “security”, “freedom” and “equality” are among the most debatable concepts of political theories and thought¹. The different meanings attributed to this concept are not usually determined by the so-called “irreconcilable differences” between the political extremities, by the “protestant” or “orthodox spirits” of the “jiggers” of these concepts, but these rather depend on cultural, socio-political factors, and even on the socio-professional circumstance in which these concepts are put across.

The common element which characterizes them is mainly based upon the fear for attacks that could be launched upon the public authority, the people or the properties. The traditional political-military meaning of the “security” term is bound up with conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the survival of certain entities, like states, governments, territories and the society. The special nature of the threats that could subvert them, calls for the implementation of several extraordinary means to prevent or to solve them. This is

¹ Barry Buzan, *Peoples, State and Fear, An agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1991, 2nd ed., p. 7

the reason why the appeal to some superior state reasons/argument (“raison d’être” of any political regime) usually has been necessary to legitimate the use of force and to mobilize additional forces by the state or to request certain high authorities, to tackle the “security risks”.

All the medieval princes and philosophers were constantly frightened of the aggression of certain foreign powers and the home conspiracy and even Machiavelli identifies numerous common things between those two threats, because in the everyday practice, peace with neighbours strengthens home stability and vice-versa. Applying to security reasons a governor could call for general mobilization, using his (unwritten or constitutional) right to use all the means to stop an undesired evolution. Especially from the middle of the 19th century, simultaneously with the development of certain more or less evaluated systems of auto-limitation of states, some alternate judicial space which is meant to defend a certain political system from extreme types of insecurity, appeared.

The classic argument according to which, in some specific cases, the government can use all the necessary methods appears in its strongest form through the force of the “state security” argument, although aiming for the percept risks, dangers and threats to represent the constant concern of the executives legally acceded to the power. But how we separate these “existential” security dangers from the minor or the less important ones? How can we protect ourselves from certain tyrannies, frightened by their own survival, which will use the presence of imaginary or less imaginary dangers to unstopably assert their control over the society and the state as a whole?

In his famous book, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, Barry Buzan, offers us alongside Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde a rational and simple framework of evaluation of these terms. He says that, adding certain problems on the security agenda actually shows the attempt to treat them by some other rules, different from conventional ones. “Securitization” – means taking-up some practices of drawing out from normality of certain problems which have to be solved through political, economic or cultural means, just by using the reason that these can mean “an existential danger”. In other words, the logic of those who use the tool of securitization is as follows: “if we don’t solve this problem, nothing else matters!”² This is the reason why we have to analyze seriously the reasons appealed to by those who use the rhetoric of some “existen-

² Barry Buzan, alongside Ole Waever și Jaap de Wilde, “Security: A New Framwrok for Analysis”, Library of US Congress, p.24

tial dangers” to apply to some conditions which otherwise would be linked with normal political phenomena.

Concluding, it should not be asserted – “more security – the better” – because labeling a certain topic as being related to “national security” actually means a failure to treat something by the means of public debates. In theory, any problem could be normatively transferred: from its normal habit into the area of “security-related problems”, from everyday problems into existential subjects, which labels these subjects with near mythological dimensions, and the debates upon them – with a strong neurotic load.

The states differ a lot in defining “securitization”, its social degree of acknowledgement and assimilated traditions. Some states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Burma) over-politicize religion, meanwhile in other states, the religion is separated from the state. Some states focus on the conservation of national identity as the central element of their security sector (after an accentuated public concern to keep intact the national language (ex-USSR)), or on the right of a distinct ethnic identity (Macedonia). In this case the securitization of some things and phenomena is an essential inter-subjective process. Different states and nations have contradictory opinions on the degrees of “threat” to their security. The index of foreign emigration serves us as an example: meanwhile the Finish people seem to be very concerned about their 0.3% annual rate of emigration, the Swiss people live with an emigration index of 14.7%. It is although evident that when states and nations decide to “securitize” a certain phenomena it is a political decision, which will determine this actor to act in a certain way, different from if it haven’t made this decision.

Along the factors that lead to the “securization” of certain issues, there are other things that matter. Very important is how the people percieve or how they assimilate the decisions to “securise” aspects of social life. Sometimes the reasons and the effects of some “securitization”-related decisions can seem paranoid for the opponents to the rules of a political system. As example are the perceptions of the West upon the USSR’s official policies on “pop music” and “jeans”.

Certainly, there are dangers that cannot be solved by political means, as the invasion of a foreign enemy. In general, de-securitization of certain problems and their transfer to the “average” political options seems to be the best solution to optimize the settlement of certain conflicts or subjects that are difficult for the society. Exactly on this reason, the security policy represents a functional political practice subject to certain assessment of the special importance of a problem, of its dimension for a certain political community. The actors (and those who accept them as being actors!) use political language to build a relation of causality between certain perceived dangers and the ten-

sioned situation of the community to which it refers. It is necessary, though, for some problems transferred from the public domain into the security one to be accepted, asserted and executed according to certain legal procedures, because, most of the times, the special treatment applied to some “existential” security problems also implies the use of important public resources, and the use of public money has to answer some clear questions about the reasons and expedience of spending them.

Even the discussion on the limits of the security sector is a battlefield between the state and sociologic theories, which debate upon the conventional thinking that the state is the only subject of the security system. From an economic perspective, these hypothetical contradictions could be explained by the effects of their extremities: when the securitization of the environmental sector is little, we could confront with a much higher degree of tolerance to the environmental crimes, to the pollution or the destruction of the fauna or flora, or the forests unprotected by the law. On the other hand, when the security sector is too wide – excluding some much more conventional problems of the public sector – we could face some serious problems linked with the protectionist policy and the state’s rough intervention into the market economy.

Despite the contradictions and the existing opinions on the types of security risks there is a wide consensus on the fact that security is fundamental for the prosperity and stability of the human community, assuring the reduction of poverty, and instantly transferred into terms related to individual security, to the access to social services and political processes. Security is a main responsibility of each government, this being the main condition for a political regime to protect the rights and freedom of its citizens, ensuring the necessary conditions for social and economic development of the society. The UN and OECD give a special importance to the concept of security, searching to diversify its connotations: from traditional security assistance through defense, special services and police to ensure the security of living and the social organization³. This way, the security system includes: the armed forces, police and other order maintaining troops, special services, penal and judicial institutions, as well as public authorities responsible for the supervision and exercise of control over the actors of this sector (the Parliament, Government, and Ministry of resort).

The security sector is a sector of competition. Generally, some of its referential actors are privileged upon the others. The state is considered to be

³ OECD, Security System Reform and Governance, OECD, 2005, isbn 92-64-00786-5.

the actor naturally invested with security attributes and resources allocated for this aim, in no case the only one, because social relations are built realities. Even the things that didn't seem to be a true security sector subject: the internet, high technologies transfer – all of a sudden becomes a sensitive area for the public order. And on the contrary, certain responsibilities which were previously considered to be inherently linked with the power of the regime (cinemas, computer, mobile telephony) have been strongly decentralized and privatized. From this perspective it is necessary to spot the existence of a relationship between:

- Referent objects: things that can be threatened in an existential way and require safeguards;
- Actors that are securitizing: the actors that are changing the quality of referent objects declaring them as being “objects regarding somebody's security (state or national)”;
- Functional actors: are those actors who can influence the situation of the “securitized” domain in their favor.

In this analysis, the sovereignty of a state is a “referent object”, and the identity is the referent objective for an ethnic group or a nation, which has the sentiment of a direct or indirect threat that could contribute to the scouring out or even the dissolution of this (ethnic, national, linguistic) community, because the survival of this community depends on the perpetuation of traditions, language, culture, and the way of life. The transfer of a referent object in the center of political concerns – because what threatens us becomes immediately a priority of auto-conservation – could also have other objectives, not just those related to the “good” of the citadel, but rather to the survival of certain unclosed social or administrative structures. The example of the failed “putsch” from august 1991 (GKCP) in the USSR, represents this way a failure attempt to freeze (through securitization) the course of political events in the former union republics, which lead to – the pact of those three leaders of the Slavonic republics: Eltsin, Kravciuc and Shushkevich (Bjelovejsk) and the fall of the USSR.

At another level, besides the attempts to take over the power of the state by force there are other types of attempts of “securitization” of certain problems of group interest. Limitation of public-related information, suspension of the access to governmental sessions, unauthorized interception of phone calls are, hereby, false attempts to use “securitization” tools for some misunderstood aims. Following the above mentioned logic we will notice, though, numerous attempts to advance some other referent objects to the altitude of “indispensable elements of security”.

Excessive securitization regards mental structures, habits and biases to take the entire control over the society, so that often the discussions over a supposed “security” problem reflects the inability of some groups or institutions to solve this problem in a “normal way” that is political.

Speaking about the reverse side of the coin, besides the effects of the excessive securitization there is a real danger of un-securitization of really tough problems, this leading to huge material and human losses (proliferation of radioactive weapons, terrorist acts, human traffic, etc), but in all of the cases placing a problem on the security constellation is not strictly a technical problem, but a political and social one, asserting a tight relationship between the actor, who “securitizes” it (transfers it from between the political ones to the survival related vital subjects) and the audience (poll, nation, a states political community), initiating coordinated practices in this direction.

The authorities that can “securitize” a domain or certain topics are, usually, government officials, members of the parliament, or groups that through public declamations plead in favor of the “exceptional” importance of this very topic. Usually the actors who broadcast these declamations to the public are: political leaders, public servants, central or local governments, different board groups, acting more like facilitators of “securitization” than as “referent objects”. These actors, different in their importance and distinct interests compete for the competence to “securitize” the public space. Actually, they compete in their actions to represent a single “referent object” – public wealth. Referred to, the key question is: who can provide the best security and in whose name?

Insecurity has a lot of aspects and faces. There are more typologies known, that are internationally established through the attempt to organize the existent risks and threats⁴, although we have to acknowledge that the attempts to organize this dynamic sector of security risks and threats is a very tough thing to do. Through dissociation and reference the security adds in certain key sectors: military, political, economic and environmental, but each of these sectors has its own agenda. Further let’s give examples of that which represent these security agendas.

The military security agenda is prevalently structured upon states and the relationship between them (with the notable exception of cases when cer-

⁴ Bigo, Didier (1994), *Polices en réseaux: l’expérience européenne*. Paris; Presses de Sciences Po.; Buzan Barry, *National Security in the PostCold War third World*, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 1994; John Chipman (1992) *The future of strategic studies, beyond grand strategy, survival*.

tain states fail or are disintegrated, which is a subject for active intervention of the security and military international community, the case of mostly Albanian populated region – Kosovo, or Bosnia Herzegovina). In practice, the military security agenda demonstrates the ability of central governments to resist against potential home or foreign threats, involving the use of military forces against some non-military threats believed to threaten the existence of the state (rival ideologies, drugs or illegal emigration). With the development of national states, we have contemplated the rigorous separation of functions and the appearance of certain agencies responsible for the public security (national police, on one hand and national armies on the other). It is not by accident that modern states have jelled themselves through disarmament of the citizens in order to follow an ideal model of functioning, in which the state alone has the legitimate force in the society, on the basis of complex procedure and legal guaranties on the instruments of power. This comes in contrast with the functionality of feudal states, in which the use of force represents a decentralized right at more levels: cities, markets, mercenaries, famous vassals, etc.⁵, substituted in time with the reference of uniform application of rights and the state's sovereignty.

Economical agenda of security: the economic sector has numerous referent objects, starting with individuals, social groups and states to more complex and abstract systems of global market. For individuals, the economic security appears clearer in terms of basic biological necessities (real food, clothes, shelter, education, protection). The term “security” is often used in economic affairs especially regarding the guarantee of operated investments in certain countries or sectors. For states, the economic security equals to the individual biologic necessities, but when national economies depend on vital resources, these very resources are to be legally securitized. Unlike firms – which can disappear after a bankruptcy, – the states cannot, ending up, in the worst case “externally administered”, by the means of special missions (IMF, World Bank) the emergency supervisors of certain sectors of economy (Foreign Administration by the Federal Bank of Germany of National Bank of Bulgaria). National economies can experience losses as a result of preferential policies which give them a

⁵ There are notable exceptions for this example: the case of the USA is a chrestomathy model of deviation from the ideal westphalian state, guaranteeing by constitution the right of port-arm to its citizens, and its states to keep their militias as a means of defense against the hegemony of the federal government. In the same group, Switzerland, Israel and South Africa have kept till today the structural elements of “armed citizens” connected to diverse territorial self defense units and the last ones to the conditions of individual security.

disadvantage, or as result of certain boycotts on the international scale (Libya, Iraq), or of unwanted nationalizations (Kuwait, Russia). In addition to securitizing the numerous foreign threats, the actors can securitize domestic reforms, vital for avoiding devastating effects as a result of a recession, debt increase, lost investments, or the fluctuation of national currency, which lets us claim that most of the times, the rationale of economic security is accepted because of the effects that it can have upon other sectors.

Societal agenda of security: Being strongly related to the stability of the political system (organizational stability of the states, the efficiency of the government system and the ideologies that credit the legitimate government), societal security needs a separate approach. The fundamental element of the societal security is the “identity”, namely – “self image” of the national communities and individuals who are reported to these communities. The established authors of the analyzed domain warn about the danger of the confusive use of the term “societal” instead of “social”⁶. This is because social security regards the individuals’ well-being in economic values, while societal security regards the collectivities and their identity, including the actions meant to defend that of “what we are” from the others in normative TERMS. The concept of national identity includes a series of objective factors, such as: spoken language, thus representing a personal and political choice when certain individuals prefer to determine their own identity as part of one or other ethnic/linguistic community. The dangers that can be perceived as being fundamental for the survival of a certain community are as follows: depopulation, ethnic assimilation, loss of traditional way of living, or deprivation of the linguistic space necessary for the cultural continuity of that very group, so that certain minorities can loose the ability to reproduce their culture, or in other cases, when the cultural prints of a minority are immortalized as an effect of the decolonization process. However, we have to mention that societies are vulnerable in different ways, this depending on the way their identities are built: the Irish remain to be Irish despite the fact that all of them are speaking English, while in other cases the loss of national language deprives the members of these communities from primary ethnic loyalty.

Political agenda of security: refers exclusively to the stability of social order, framing the threat to the state’s sovereignty as one of the key dangers. The increase of foreign trade and massive proliferation of communications has radically changed the paradigm of the threats to the modern states. The

⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp de Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, Rienner, 1998, pp.120.

only problem related to this sector is its conceptual wideness and, at the same time, the fact that most of other security sub-sectors have direct effects over the political security⁷. Let's take for example the principle of sovereignty – as a distinct element of the international judicial system, but as well as a minimal condition for the functionality of the framework of domestic rules over the territory and the population of a state. As a general regulatory of interstate relations, sovereignty is a necessary and sufficient condition for the states not to degrade under the pressure of abuses and illegalities. At the same time, the sovereignty has become the aim of some huge home and foreign pressures: as a result of hegemonic policies of some large states that want to control their neighbors, or of some objective integration processes including the result of the EU expansion on one hand; and as a result of the acceleration of modern communications, bringing to the opening of national borders, “natural” limits of the pre-modern states, on the other hand. Without doubt, in the field of international relations, sovereignty is about authority and power; about who decides, what is decided and in whose name?⁸ Ensuring a basic principle which guarantees the right of national communities to live independently, autonomously and without foreign intervention, sovereignty was a fertile soil for the ideas related to the nature of international law, because the traditional separation from the roman law between “jus naturale, jus gentium and jus civile” could not serve as sufficient levers for interstate relations. That's why sovereignty appeared as a political and judicial concept, capable of separating home authority (governed by an autonomous normative structure) and foreign authority which exists just through cooperation. According to this logic, sovereignty is the central concept of collective systems of security, regardless of their shape, form and duration. Although, governments represent the legitimate voice of the state, sometimes these seek to make abuse of the securitizing rhetoric when they feel the danger to be substituted by other elites.

Environmental agenda of security: widely debated in the political theory and practice, the environmental movement became extremely vocal mostly with the help of international organizations (UN, EU), applying simultaneously two different extremities – its scientific dimension and its political one.

⁷ Jahn, Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Waeber, *Concepts of Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects*, Copenhagen Papers, No.1, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research (1987).

⁸ Hinsley, *The concept of sovereignty and the relations between states*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, pp. 285.

Concepts like the poverty of resources and sustainability have shed important resources of foreign donors to poor countries. But even people's opinion becomes a political decision when it is supported by the government. A series of real disasters like those from Chernobyl or Bhopal dictate certain actions to prevent other from happening. However, there exist certain different perceptions about what is a security threat: in the absence of other ways of solving its nutritional problems, etc., a poor nation could consider the intensive use of its natural resources as a good thing, and even building certain air polluting industries could be an acceptable solution for the people just to have jobs and nutritious food. In general, the ecologist agenda includes: the threat of climate change, lose of biodiversity, deforestation and the appearance of new deserts, land erosion, the end of natural resources, but also demographic problems, related to epidemics and low living conditions, the downfall of people's literacy, uncontrolled migration, etc.

1.2. About ways of measuring the security risks

The collapse of the old bi-polar system has completely changed the conflict paradigm and the conventional threats toward countries and nations. Conventional routes of weapon trade, more or less monitored by international agencies, have undergone changes too, supplying a huge demand market, including from some fundamentalist, extremist, anarchical, and Marxist groups. Some might say, that, alongside liberalization of the ex-Soviet economies, the world's weapon market was liberalized too, and this resulted in an unprecedented increase of illegal trade with illicit substances by-passing international conventions, and the loss of control over the arming process of certain countries, so called "the Patriarch", as a result of their refusal to cooperate with international disarmament and non-proliferation agents of WMD.

The increase of the instability degree on the regional level was immediately interpreted as the attempt of some governments to protect their countries independently of the weapons non-proliferation treaties, by producing weapons by their selves, or creating new political and military alliances. As a result of the new security risks, sometimes called "unconventional", asymmetric, that may be armed or non-armed operations, but which tend to affect the national security of a country by provoking some direct or indirect consequences on its social and economic life, the entire foreign affairs system realized it is pressed by a range of some especially dangerous tendencies, among which we will mention the following:

- Conflict proliferation that tries to take the control over the gas and oil resources, to ensure the access to the limited sources of drinking water that pass through one or several countries, or to establish the monopoly on the mineral and natural resource export;
- The spread of military disputes between tribes, ethnic or religious groups, as a result of the state structures' breakdown, this kind of disputes result in serious threats toward certain national communities or central authorities, their goal being not only of military interest, but also to take political control over local communities;
- The tolerance of crimes, apparently justified by "collateral loses", emphasizing here that almost 4 million people died in the last decade (1990–2000), 90% of which were civilians, and about 18 million people were forced to take refugee as a result of the conflicts;
- The increase of the conventional weapon trade, light and tactical weapons, being used in several conflict, without being registered by the specialized international institutions;
- The increase of the potential risk of radioactive material usage (the so called "dirty bombs"), consisting of radioactive and biological substances;
- The appearance of explicit nuclear risks, as a result of the initiated nuclear programs by some countries, North Korea as an instance, or because they ignored the international embargo, imposed on countries like Iran.

Authors that worked systematically on the security concept considered that the individual insecurity and the instability of the institutions, deprive the political power of trust and hope, elements that offer stability to any political regime. Traditionally, we consider that hard threats are of foreign nature, coming from outside the national borders. This approach is submitted to a cruel test nowadays, because today this kind of threat can originate both from outside and inside the national states. Security becomes a broad and multidimensional concept, which in fact reflects the changes at the security structures' level, including energetic crises that affected EU after 1970. Traditionally, security was analyzed and monitored from a strict national point of view, as a part of collective alliance commitments. Nowadays, the geographical dimension of the issues related to security extended to the inclusion of some under-national and global levels. In this very way, the goal of this concept extended from its military meaning to much larger aspects of a political, economic, social and environmental nature. This is why the concept of "security" is often used in

broad contexts and meanings; from vital needs to obtain basic products, to the security of citizens and the assurance of peace on a global level.

Especially in the Western Europe of the last decades, the convergence of the two aspects of security – domestic and foreign – became a common and indisputable place. New types of threats emerged, while other older became less frequent, if not eliminated for good. In this way, the risks related to the environment or to the balance of the social protection systems are nowadays regarded as security threats, this approach being already considered during international conventions, like Helsinki Final Act (1973). Later, these shy elements of new security concepts were also integrated in the Unique European Act⁹. Addressing their security problems, the countries that were part of the former USSR must learn that the national sovereignty and state building means more than copying a state institution, on behalf of their tired of politics, population and much more than the rules to justify only the political forces. Sovereignty means the insurance of unity, integrity and indivisibility conditions of the political nation, the sole subject that can assure legitimacy to institutions and dynamic stability of the political process.

As an effect of globalization, these threats can vary a lot under both the aspect of their intervention domain and their geographical position. In opposition to the hard type threats, the rest can be logically regarded as soft that means they are more easily to be monitored, more “domestic”, based on the resources they use and the potential impact they might have had at that very moment. If previously, it was considered that hard threats can be only of military nature, today, we must affirm that this approach needs some fundamental changes, also including aspects related to civil domains. Terrorist attacks are illustrative to show the major damages and destructions that can be caused by civil means. Even the implications of these threats are different, because of the impact and the effects that different threats bring are rather different.

⁹ Article nr. 30.6 (a) of the Unique European Act states: “The high contracting Parties consider that a closer cooperation in issues related to European security would contribute to the development of a European identity in foreign affairs matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions in different political and economic aspects of security.”

Traditional threats	New threats	
Origins	Foreign	Foreign/local/electronic
Aspect	Especially military	Military and civil
The main actor	State powers	State and non-state actors
Implication	Direct	Direct and indirect

Hard conventional threats might have direct consequences/results, especially if they imply military means. But today, the effects of this kind of actions can indirect, too. For example, the attack on a very important infrastructure can be cause chain effects on other economic infrastructures of a country, causing a break down (national energetic systems) or the destruction of vital elements for the functioning of a modern national community. Among these asymmetric/non-conventional threats we can distinguish the following:

- Transnational and international terrorism, including its biologic and cybernetic aspects;
- The attempts to take control over home or international transport systems;
- Individual or collective threatening actions against the communication systems stability;
- Focused actions that pursue to affect the international image of a country;
- Economic or financial aggressions aimed at destabilizing the economic system;
- Deliberate made ecological accidents;

Terrorism, that become the major issue of all security forums in the last years, especially after the dramatic event of September 11, 2001, came to be considered a “hard” threat recently, being previously mentioned among other local, territorial problems, in certain countries. The organized crime was also regarded in the same way, as being an exclusively home threat, and only in the last two years, due to its spread abroad, it became a strategic problem on the international security agenda. We could have noticed two important tendencies of the traditional security concept change in the last decade: the first related to dramatic reduction of the potential conventional military attack against Western Europe, as a result of USSR collapse, that means also the blurring of the difference between foreign and local threats. Previously, the foreign threat was defined only as a result of the invasion of a hostile power, while the home security risks were, traditionally, thought to be sabotage acts or threats against public order. International terrorism became immediately a visible factor of

the conflicts between countries, being at the top of the most dangerous security risks known up till today, among which the following can be mentioned:

- Ethnic tensions;
- Drugs, radioactive material and human trafficking;
- International organized crime;
- Political instability as a systematic and creation factor of political systems;
- Reestablishment of the spheres of influence;
- The increasing number of small vulnerable countries, characterized by a corrupt and inefficient government.

On the other side, the “soft” risks, considered to be more and more important for the regional security and the stability in the EU “neighborhood”, refer to the civil matters and other common threats which require cooperative answers. EU security strategy identifies the new global threats as being complex. “Europe faces a range of new threats which are more spread, less visible and less predictable”. Neither country is able to assure by itself solutions for complex problems it faces. The vast aggressions of some countries against other countries are improbable¹⁰. Generally, The EU Security strategy identifies 11 global threats, among which:

Category	Maximum priority	Major priority
Terrorism	√	
WMD ¹¹ proliferation	√	
Regional conflicts	√	
Failed states	√	
Organized crime		√
Poverty		√
Diseases		√
Demographic growth		√
Resource dependence		√
Limited resources		√
Climate changes		√

Some of the threats listed in the EU Strategy are closer to the meaning of what we perceive as “hard” threats: weapon of mass destruction proliferation (WMD), regional conflicts and failed states.

¹⁰ A Secure Europe in a better world. European security Strategy, 2003

¹¹ WMD – weapons of mass destruction.

The Common Foreign and Security Affairs (CFSA); the Amsterdam Treaty established the object of “the security consolidation by all means” as one of the 5 fundamental objectives of the Foreign and security Affairs. The treaty includes the EUO “Petersberg” tasks (humanitarian and rescue aid tasks, peace-enforcement missions and crisis management tasks, including peace-keeping) in the text of the EU Treaty.

The specialized literature comprises typologies (Moorof) which divide the “soft threats” in 4 main types; (1) the individual level, affected by the environment, criminal, and health threatening, (2) society level, which refers to matters related to the identity and the status of minorities, (3) community level, which refers to threats related to the concept of sovereignty and the activity of the public administration and government system, but also the specific lacks (corruption, inefficiency), and (4), regional level, which refer to the regional stability and the coherence of the relations between countries and nations. It is well known, that “soft” threats are left behind on the international agenda, because of the military issues, or those described as “hard” from the point of view of security, fact that imposes natural compensations in order to make the “soft” problems to be regularly advanced, having an institutionalized position. In the end, though the “soft” threats are usually included among the aspects of some policies which refer to the social management, caused by the division between “minor” and “major” policies; “soft” threats regard the quality and the intensity of the country’s existential matters.

It is useful, in this context, to examine the types of threats which are considered by the legislation Republic of Moldova as being fundamental for the national security of the country. We underline that, according to the National Security Concept (No. 445-XIII of 05.05.95), by national security we understand:

“The protection of the individual, society, country, and their rights and interests, established by the Constitution and other RM laws against foreign and home threats”,

specifying that these threats represent the intensions of some hostile forces, manifested in different forms, or factors of ecologic, technical or other types, the realization or influence of which may constitute a threat for people, society, and the country”. The Concept formulates a list of these threats, as follows:

- Direct aggression and territorial claims of other states;
- Local or regional conflicts that occur very close to the borders Republic of Moldova;

- Uncontrolled transportation of weapons, as well as components of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and near its borders;
- Actions performed to change the constitutional order using violence, undermining or liquidation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic;
- Actions performed to undermine or liquidate the economic, technical-scientific and defensive potential of the country, or to create dangerous ecological situations;
- Actions performed to strain the social situation and to provoke social conflicts;
- Terrorism and organized crime, drugs trafficking and illegal immigration;
- Actions the goal of which is to undermine the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens.

In comparison, the Lithuanian legislation establishes a more complex structure of dangers and risks, which the institutions connected to the national security sector of their country, must deal with. In this way, the law from December 19, 1996, signed by Algirdas Brazauskas mentions 5 types of threats:

- Political: political pressure and dictate, attempting to establish areas of special interest and to assure social rights that will not permit Lithuania to obtain international security guarantees, threats from foreign states to use force under the pretext of defending their interests and the attempts to force Lithuania to accept different dangerous and discriminating agreements.
- Military: the use of military capacity in the neighbourhood of the Lithuanian borders, military transit on the national territory, illegal creation of armed groups or their invasion on the national territory, brutal and open aggression;
- Specific: Espionage, subversive activities on behalf of foreign secret services, including through the establishing of some under cover organizations' activities, organization of diversions and assaults upon the lives of some Lithuanian citizens, direct or indirect interference in the home affairs of Lithuania, attempts to influence state authorities, home affairs and social processes, illegal and transit immigration, refugee influx, to incite ethnic hate and unfaithful behaviour toward the Lithuanian state, attempts of some countries to impose on Lithuania principles of double citizenship.

- Economic: economic pressure, blockade or other economic hostile actions, investments with political purposes by buying up properties, energy supply systems and other enterprises, communication facilities, railways, gas network systems, credit and financial companies, dependence on energetic systems or dependence on one or a group of foreign countries, energetic vulnerability, foreign debts, destabilizing interventions against banking and financial systems in order to take over their control.
- Criminal transnational organizations: activities of underworld organized structures, illegal business and smuggling, terrorist infiltrations abroad and illegal activities on national territories, illegal transit or trade of weapons, drugs, radioactive and other dangerous material, the production and circulation of forged money, money laundering gained as a result of some illegal activities.

When attentively comparing it with other country's legislation, we will notice that the RM law puts a bigger stress on the "military" character of the actions that assure national security, while the Baltic countries' laws accentuate the civil, preventive character. It is very illustrative the manner in which the legislation of national security is placed in the ideological and national context of the legislation of these very states. In this way, in the preamble of the Lithuanian law it is stipulated even from the very beginning that,

"The Lithuanian state, created many centuries ago, on a Christian unifying fundament for Europe, represents an integral part of the community of European nations. The Lithuanian nation never accepted any kind of conquest or subjugation, resisting in all possible ways in order to free itself, and this nation will remain unchanged. The aspirations of the Lithuanian nation were and still are related to the defense of freedom, the guarantee of a free and stable development of its ethnic community, the development of its natural creative force and the progress in the world. The Lithuanian democratic and independent state must assure a safe existence of the nation and its free development, because the state security represents a condition necessary for its democratic development"¹².

The law No. RT I 2001, 7, 17, approved on December 20, 2000 by the Estonian parliament, and that came into force on March 1, 2001, defines from the very beginning that:

¹² The basics of national security of Lithuania, Law No VIII-49, december 19, 1996.

“The objective of the activity of all security authorities is to assure the national security and constitutional order by non-military means, of prevention accumulation and processing of information necessary for the formulation of security and national defense policies.”

The same law stipulates the competence of the information service in Estonia, establishes the manner of creation and operation of the Security Council, while in the Republic of Moldova it is created by a presidential decree (20.08.1991), being presided by the head of the state. The law of national security of Lithuania establishes as its major objective “the creation of conditions for free and democratic development of the nation and state, the protection and defense of the independence of the Lithuanian state, of its territorial integrity and constitutional order.”

The second general remark is related to the very precise and rigorous character of the structure of the adopted legislation, in which the competences allocated to the public authorities holding offices in the security sector of the country are found in all their details. The law on national security of Lithuania specifies all the competences of the following structures: Saeima (the Parliament), the commission for parliament security, National Security Council, the President, the Prime Minister, the Government Ministers, the Minister of Defense, the supreme head of armed forces, The Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of security services, other state ministries and services, local public authorities, other public organizations. There is a tendency of integration of the legislation regarding the national security in all Baltic countries, in distinction to RM, which has a much more fragmented legislation. In the Lithuanian law we can find the structure of competences, the legal base and the objectives of all actors invested with public authority in this domain.

The third remark can be made in relation to the dangers considered to be grave, from the point of view of the functioning of the country’s security system. Listing the major dangers for the state and society, the Latvian law continues with the concise and exact description of the assumed competences by the authorities, while the RM legislation is limited to the enumeration of some “general principles for the assurance of security”.

The fourth remark is related to the express and repeated mentioning of the fact that the authority staff that have responsibilities in the security sector are a part of the general system of public service, thus, limits and provisions common for any other categories of public officials being applied to them as well. (Chapter III of the law on Estonian national security, December 20, 2000.)

It is useful to underline that, according to the legislation of the Baltic countries, the institutions of the security sector are not left “to take care of

themselves”, but have the responsibility to present some periodic reports to the legislative, so that every year the Parliament would adopt the Annual Plan of Defense, entitled “Analysis of Threats Against the State” (Section 26, the law on national security of Latvia), which represent a comprehensive evaluation of all types of risks and dangers. In Latvia, this general estimation is presented at the same time by the administration of the information and security institutions, and by the Constitution defence bureau, after the examination made by the National Security Council, following to be approved by the government, annually. We underline that the same procedure is also followed by the authorities with the function of national defence in Latvia so that these institutions would annually present an assessment of military dangers, coordinated beforehand with the National Security Council and the Constitution defence bureau, further being approved by the Government. Moreover, based on these assessments that are presented in the Parliament, two annual plans are approved – one of defense and another of security.

The Latvian Annual Plan of defence is an assessment of a broader plan of development of the armed forces, requesting active involvement of the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and the General Commander, as a result of the consultations with all the important actors of society. The Latvian law also stipulates the existence of some complementary plans of mobilisation in case of accidents, emergency situations, war, civil protection. Article 5 of the Latvian law (December 19, 1996, No. VIII–49) on national security stipulates the clear responsibility of the government, to prepare a long term plan and the corresponding programs for the development of the national security, to establish training procedures and their implementation based on foreign legislation by presenting them to the Seimas (the Parliament) for approval.

Finally, we should mention the value layer on which the security sector is built in Baltic countries. This way, in the cases of Lithuania the law stipulates that

“National defence and security of Lithuania will be developed as indivisible parts tied to the Common European transatlantic defence and security systems”. The consolidation of the security of the Lithuanian state is the only objective of the foreign security and defence and policies of the country.”

The only legal base for the functioning of the security sector is the Lithuanian legislation, the Constitution, the democratic and independent character of the country (art. 1), the sovereignty (art. 3), and the sanctions for any usurpation of the state power or of the national territory (art. 8) being directly mentioned. Again, the Lithuanian legislation establishes the EU, EUO, and NATO integration with full rights as being the most important way to assure the national security,

while the legislation of the R. of M. ignores the establishment of normative commitments based on the law. The maximum that the Moldovan legislators can afford, in the Law on national defence of RM (345-XV of 25.07.2003) is to announce in its first article that “the national defence is the will of the entire population”.

In Latvia, its competences are related, generally, to the coordination of a unified state policy in the field of national security, implemented by the state institutions and the supervision of their fulfilment, as well as of the plans and concepts related to the national security, according to the law. The Supreme National Council will propose Saeima, i.e. the Parliament, the appointment and dismissal of the Director of the Bureau for the protection of the Latvian Constitution, but all the decisions of SNC, with some exceptions, will have a consultative character, that will not allow state officials to deny their responsibility over the decisions that they have taken (section 20, Law on Latvian National Security, December 29th, 2000).

In the Republic of Moldova, the Supreme Security Council (SSC) is a consultative body which analyses the activity of the ministries and departments in the field of assurance national security, presenting recommendation to the president of the Republic of Moldova on problems related to foreign and domestic affairs of the state. SSC is active in the fields related to the assurance of: state security, public security, military, economic, ecological security, and other important issues. The reason why the SSC didn't engage since its creation and untill very recently in sensible matters, like the problem of Transnistrian separatism, is because it has regarded this problem as an exclusively political one¹³, excusing itself from one of its major functions.

This can be deduced from the fact that, according to the National Strategy Concept of security, the actors of the security sector – obviously including SSC – assures the protection of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Republic of Moldova, its constitutional regime, the economic, technical-scientific and defensive potential, assures the fact that legal rights and interests of individuals against informative and subversive actions of special services and foreign organizations, or criminal attacks of some individuals or groups” are guaranteed...¹⁴ Only on July 21, 2004, the first working session of the SSC, on

¹³ Vadim Enicov, report at the conference organized by IPP in Chisinau “SSC in the system of assurance of national security in the R. of M.: its role, needs and possibilities of improvement”, July, 2005.

¹⁴ The Parliament's decision on the approval of the Concept of national security of the R. of M. at the creation of the Coordinative Council for the elaboration of projects of law and other normative acts which will regulate the construction, preparing and use of Armed Forces, No. 445-XIII of May 5th, 1995, Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova No. 35/399 of June 29th, 1995.

the problem of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict took place (!), during which the decision to interrupt the negotiations and seek other solutions to settle the conflict (ban on export, obstruction of the financial flows, involvement of international organizations), etc. appeared as a result of a decree of President Snegur, on August 20th, 1991, and further undertaken in the Law on defense (art. 8), in which the SSC, was sometimes mistakenly qualified as “one of those 4 public authorities with competence in the field of assurance of state security, the rest of them being: the Parliament, the head of the state, and the government”¹⁵, not being an authority stipulated by the Constitution of the R. of M.

The regulation on the functioning of the SSC, adopted on October 8th, 1997 (No. 331-II), stipulates its attribution to present to the head of the state suggestions on different foreign and home affairs matters, but also the examination of some plans of action on essential problems for the security sector: plan of the creation of Armed Forces, plan on weapons and military equipment supply, mobilization of armed forces, mobilization of the national economy in case of war, a plan of an interaction between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the SIS, the Department of Civil Protection, etc., but we find out that none of these elements accomplished the objective of deliberations and technical elaboration in the last decade. In exchange, on October 6th, 2001, international terrorism was included on the SSC agenda (including the participation of sappers in different international operations of disarming arms), cases of selling the military patrimony from the National Army warehouses (December 13th, 2001), but also the presentation of a Concept for the reorganization of the National Army and modernization (May 13th, 2004).

1.3. Defining the security sector and structural reforms

The general objective of the security sector reform is to create a safe environment for development, prosperity and democracy. This ideal objective is based on two important principles: (1) the ability of the state to generate conditions that will reduce the vulnerabilities that its citizens are exposed to; and (2) the ability of the state to use more effectively the tools of home affairs that it has and to prevent and approach different security risks that affect the society. We can not avoid the changes that the traditional concept paradigm of security has undergone:¹⁶

¹⁵ Vedim Enicov, idem

¹⁶ DAC, Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence.

- The security policy is spread today from the exclusive stress on the protection of state stability and political regime to aspects related to the welfare of the population and human rights;
- Security and development are closely connected, so that the reform of the security sector can not remain a “taboo” area for the citizen anymore, being regarded as a public political matter and an issue of good governance, a fact that leads to a larger openness of the sector to the public control;
- The role of the state institutions that were elected to monitor the security sector is re-assessed today. The military factor is just one of the political tools of security, along other tools (legal, social, economic), also important and of impact.

The origins of most conflicts that exist today are caused, from the point of view of most researchers, by the poor organization of the state institutions, by corruption and abuse of power, the weak institutions and limited responsibility of the officials for their obligations, facts that destroy the quality of the state administration and feed the individual and regional insecurity. From this point of view, many countries freed from the foreign trusteeship (as a result of the last waves of decolonization in the '70s–'80s, or as a result of the collapse of the ex-socialistic blocks – Yugoslavian and Soviet) didn't succeed to establish durable states, a fact that caused the stimulation of home risks, inter-ethnic tensions, and poverty of the population.

There are three main principles that can reduce the security threats in case of weak countries: democracy, a good governance, and the rule of law. These principles are based on the fundamental characteristics of the security system of global level, starting from the premise that the existence of differences is not a reason to use force as a method to settle the conflicts. The general objective of the reform in this sector is usually defined as “the transformation of the security institutions, so that they play a more efficient, legal and democratic role in the assurance of home and foreign security for the citizens of that country”.¹⁷ This transformation requires strengthening of the civil control over the security sector, professionalizing the security forces, demilitarization and strengthening of civil functions of the institutions in this sector; strengthening the rule of law. What do we understand by these indispensable elements for the reform of the security sector?

¹⁷ Towards a better practice framework in security sector reform, NIIRC, Occasional SSR Paper No. 1 August 2002.

- a). Strengthening the civil control and the supervision of the security sector

This implies an effective reform of the central government institutions and of the non-governmental sector for the consolidation of the abilities of these entities in the field of supervision, management, and control over the security sector so that the relevant institutions from this sector would exist and function according to their role in a democratic society. Specifically, this supposes:

- Reforming and professionalization of the Ministries of Defence and Home Affairs; the establishment of ombudsman bureaus; the creation of consultative councils for problems related to policies issued in this domain; strengthening of the relations of legislative supervision over the functioning of these ministries, the creation of functional entities for internal audit;
- The strengthening the ability to participate in the reform of the security sector reform of the NGOs, professional associations, research institutions and advocacy, universities;
- Supporting the efforts related to strengthening the belief among military men that the civil institutions are able to assess efficiently the challenges and the special technical requirements of the security sector, assuming the responsibility for the decisions taken or proposed in this field.

- b). Profesionalization of the security forces

The goal of this element is to contribute to the growth of the degree training of the forces that are responsible for the protection of the society, state and individual, in order to fulfil their specific roles, including by:

- Military assistance programs in order to train military men to understand the roles and limits stipulated by the legislation in a democratic society (training from the point of view of responsibility for respecting the population, human rights, international humanitarian right, national minorities in a civil state, etc);
- Technical training programs to modern performance standards, including through the acquisition of new military equipment;
- Strengthening the effective abilities of the police to assure public order and the use of national legislation.

c). Demilitarization and peacekeeping

This element is meant to limit the access to the weapon market and to re-qualify in a professional way those military groups that leave the security forces entities for some civil professions. Generally, demilitarization implies programs like:

- Disarmament – the reduction of the access to conventional weapons in the post-conflict societies;
- Demobilization – (also called “decommission” – term used in Great Britain regarding the paramilitary entities of IRA in the North Ireland) – meaning to the same extent the breaking of armed groups in the process of reconciliation and strengthening of peace;
- Reintegration – the involvement of former paramilitary soldiers within civic activities.

d). Consolidation of the rule of law

The process of reorganization of the security sector wouldn't be complete if the consolidation of an independent and viable legal framework isn't done. That would assure a civil-democratic control over the security forces. According to the previous experience, this element comprises:

- The creation of an efficient and unbiased judicial system, having the political support of the reform in law and the existence of some comprehensive programs of consolidation of capacities for judicial and legislative powers;
- The creation of a law free from the influence of political factors.

The problem of the democratic control over the security sector apparently is not new at all, even if it reappeared as a positive condition for the developing states. Let us try to further examine the nature of this control, its ways of expressing, types of control and its normative base. From the very beginning, we should mention that the problem of this control reappeared over and over again during centuries, its meanings being different depending on the existent type of society, historical conditions and basic ideologies.

Niccolo Machiavelli is one of those who firmly pleaded in his works for the establishment of public control over the army, declaring that “the military force must be subordinated to the power of the citizens who can use it only in defensive purpose”...¹⁸ In his turn, another important representative of po-

¹⁸ Niccolo Machiavelli, *Dell'arte della guerra*, Opere, ed. By Sergio Bertelli and Franco Gaeta (Feltrinelli), 1960.

litical thought, Carl von Clausewitz, stated that “the subordination of the political will to the military one would be absurd, because politics generated the war, it is the intelligence, and war is only its instrument and not vice a versa. So it is only possible to subordinate the military will to the political one”...¹⁹ The idea of subordination of the military factor to the political one appeared during the American revolution as an indispensable attribute of freedom, and respectively, of democracy and rule of law. Because “from the point of view of law, rule of law and democracy represent two faces of the same political reality”, declared Jean Gicquel, “establishing the conditions that not only permit, but even impose in modern conditions the effective mechanisms of civil control over the armed forces”.²⁰

The established characteristics of the rule of law are, generally, described as: separation of the powers in the state, election by the citizen, by a universal, direct and secret vote elements related to the state power, adoption of a real legislative framework, doubled by the mechanisms that assure the observance of the law; equality of citizens from the point of view of law, conditions of the appropriate use of law in the interest of the citizen, clear delimiting between the state and the political parties, the enforcement of human rights and, at last, taking military forces and police under the civil authorities’ control, these bodies being responsible to them for their actions. It is generally believed that a representative democracy, together with the rule of law and a mature civil society, can generate stability of the social structures and can avoid conflicts, including those that might involve military men. All this is because of the nature of their mission, “the high degree of professionalism of the military men can lead to their isolation from the rest of society, military men having the tendency to develop a corporatist auto-reflexive medium, that might want to interfere “to correct the course of events» to equal extent as the degree of breaking the legitimacy of the political system, or when the dominant ideologies of the state differ from the missions military men have”... (Jean Blondel)²¹

This way, the democratic control over armed forces, together with the political control, represents the right of the political society to supervise the way

¹⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *About war*, Military Publishing house, Bucharest, 1982, p. 613, Niccolò Machiavelli, *Dell’arte della guerra*, Opere, ed. By Sergio Bertelli and Franco Gaeta (Feltrinelli), 1960.

²⁰ Jean Gicquel, *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques*, Montchrestien, Paris, 1989, p. 219.

²¹ Jean Blondel, *The military and its role in the political process*, An introduction to comparative government, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979, pp. 413-432.

in which the armed forces, police and the security bodies are performing the missions they were given, namely protecting society from potential risks, and they don't obstruct the constitutional liberties that are found at the basis of the rule of law. The efficiency of the parliamentary control represents a reliable binder between the political society and the civil society. The same constitutional key factors must assure the impossibility of transfer of dominant positions within the political system to wards the military, and the use of force must be performed only under the direct authority of the leaders, elected in a democratic way. Let us see some useful events:

The US Constitution contains essential provisions over the competences and attributes of the state institutes in the field of civil control over armed forces. Article II, par.2 stipulates that "the president will be the supreme commander of the armed forces and USA ships, also of the state militias, when these are called to serve the USA". Though it appoints the president with important control competences, the Congress keeps its power to declare war, to organize and keep the army, war navy, and to adopt law to command and regulate the military forces²².

In France, the general organization of defense is in the competence of the Council of ministers, and the decisions related to the general command of defense are taken within the Defense Committee, the president of which is at the same time the president of France, vice-president being the Prime-minister. The Minister of Defense is directly responsible in front of the Prime-minister for carrying out the military policy, particularly, for the organization, monitoring and preparation of the armed forces, having the competence to issue orders and instructions, which underline the directives of the defense field made by the prime-minister.

In Great Britain, the Government has the role to plan in the field of security and defense, including by allocating money necessary to fulfil military plans that include the structure of forces, their level of training to fight, necessary modifications in the investment program. The general military program that was created as a result of this assessment process is annually revised by the government and, depending on the requirements to balance the public expenditure, establishes the military expenses in the end. The problems of na-

²² The remark made by historian David F. Trask is interesting "the civil leader of the american executive is at the same time the leader of the military hierarchy, the civil control over armed forces is assured in this way" – Civil control over the USA armed forces, US Information Agency, April 1993, p. 3.

tional defence are discussed in the parliament, at least 6 days per year – one day for each category of armed forces, two days for the budget and one for defence and foreign affairs problems.

In Lithuania, the democratic control over armed forces and other institutions of the security sector is stipulated in a separate chapter (chap.8) of the law on national security. The chapter clearly states the fact that “all decisions related to defence policy and armed forces must be taken by civil governments democratically elected, and these policies and defence expenses must be presented to the public”. Like the legislation, the Parliament controls the armed forces and other institutions of the security sector, auditioning their administration and adopting their functioning budgets. Only civil people must be appointed for the positions of Minister of National Defence, Minister of Home Affairs and his vice-ministers, director of the State department of Security. The phrase “usually civilians” is used in the legislation of RM, leaving a large possibility of manoeuvres to the political authorities who select and forward to the parliament the candidates who will rule these ministries or public authorities.

In Slovenia, “the civil control over the armed forces and, respectively, over the security system, was one of the basic ideas of creating an independent state” and only after the reorganization of its security forces, Slovenia managed to leave behind the former federal system dominated by the Yugoslavian Federal Army and the secret police.

The Latvian legislation dedicated a principle to underline the importance of the civil control over the armed forces. The Law on national security of Latvia of December 29th, 2000, establishes that “the operation of the national security system is based on civil-military cooperation, used to plan and coordinate the activities of state authorities, public authorities and forces of the national army, in order to settle the threats that can endanger the state stability. The basic principles of civil-military cooperation are: effective coordination and cooperation, the unified understanding of common goals and the responsibilities assumed to reach these goals.” The Latvian legislation stipulates that “the national security is based on the activities of state institutions and the participation of each citizen of the country, on the cooperation with the civil society that is opened and aware of the existing dangers and responsibilities, democratically oriented and prepared to protect the freedom of Latvia”.

The legislation of the Republic of Moldova has almost no references to the methods, utility and practical forms needed to achieve public control over the security sector. Article 20 of the Law on SIS states “the presentation of periodical reports on the activities developed in front of the legislative”, it also mentions that in this way” the parliamentary control is carried out by the Commission

for national security, according to this regulation (The Regulation of the Parliament), and the financial control is performed by the Court of Account.²³

The only reference to citizens in the Parliament's decision from 1995 on National security concept stipulates "their possibility to join associations of public order maintenance and the assurance of security in their places of residence, to create community groups close by to military and special entities, to offer assistance to the bodies that assure national security as part-time workers". In addition to the fact that these provisions are free of any civil control, this list of rights is, in fact, an open way to recruit people for secret services, respectively, a part of absolutely different matter, having nothing in common with the standards considered by ECDO as being vital for a good functioning of the security sector. In this context we will mention that the Latvian law forbids in its law on national security strategy the creation of "paramilitary associations, close by to different military or/and special entities", considering this a repetition of the old mentality and of the regime of political police.

Generally, by "security sector" we understand all organizations that have authority to use, command, or threaten with the use of force in order to protect the state and its citizens, and also of those civil structures that are responsible for general management and supervision of the elements of this system. From this point of view, the security sector consists of three elements:²⁴

- Groups that have the mandate to monitor force instruments (legal violence) – military or paramilitary men, public forces;
- Institutions that have a clear role in monitoring and supervision of the security sector- civil ministries, parliaments and civil society;
- Public authorities responsible for the functioning of the rule of law – justice, people's lawyers, penitentiaries.

Due to the fact that the process of reform of the security sector (military forces, police, security services, law and supervision authorities) is very complex and relatively new for most of the countries that appeared as a result of the collapse of the old empires, numerous efforts are required from the behalf of international communities. In special ECDO, The World Bank, UN and EU are known as being the most active organizations in the assistance of security

²³ Law on SIS, No. 753-XIV of December 23rd, 1999.

²⁴ Hendrickson, Dylan. A review of the Security Sector Reform, London, The Conflict, Security and Development Group funded by DFID, Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, September 1999, p. 29.

sectors' reform, and this is because in the absence of security and stability, the most important development objectives can not be reached.²⁵

Frequently, the international community has a fundamental role in conditioning the creation of this sector in the new countries, through projects of technical assistance and modernization, but also by transferring recommendations that come from the already existent standards within the western democracies. ECDO believes there exists a set of principles and norms that guide the efforts of consolidation of the security sector, to some extent these are applied in the EU member-states:

1. The Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be focused on the concern and interests of the citizens and the sector must be understood and credible on a local level, it must be established on unconditioned respect of democratic norms and most known international principles in the field of human rights, contributing to the creation of an open environment toward freedom and not fear.
2. SSR must be regarded as a decisional framework able to respond to different security threats in a systematic, fast and efficient way.
3. SSR must be monitored according to the same responsibility principles (accountability) and transparency that can be also applied to the entire public sector, including by facilitating some important public involvements in the process of assurance of security.

The analyses performed by DAC show that, in most ex-socialistic countries, SSR is perceived in a more restricted way, and because the most important stimulant for reform was the desire to integrate in NATO and EU. The reform activities confined with the strengthening of the border security, to strengthening regional stability and civil-military relationships. Generally, the biggest concern of the SSR authors was frequently related to the transfer of the western norms and values and administration techniques in this field, the fact which resulted, in the opinion of western authors, in "the cover up of the reform".²⁶ Another conclusion stated by the DAC researches is that, frequently, the SSR concept and specific terminology of this sector is by far not known among the officials and authorities responsible for institutions that will undergo the reform. A lot of countries started to use the SSR concept just to justify

²⁵ OECD, Security issues and Development Co-operation: a conceptual framework for enhancing policy coherence, DCD (2000), 4/REV2, Paris, OECD, December 2000.

²⁶ Overview of Regional Survey Findings and Policy Implications for Donors, Dylan Hendrickson, King's College London, OCED, 2005.

the policies of reduction of the costs for specific institutions that can not find their place within the political regime.

Especially, in the ex-soviet area, the biggest problem that SSR must face is related to the influence of the old staff of the secret and military police that competes with the promoters of new reforms, in order to take control over the state institutions.²⁷ Their situation is complicated also because reform of the police, army and special services takes place concomitantly with the strengthening of the legality in these states. The increase of the role of an independent judicial system, and the creation of a mature civil society. It is interesting to note that, especially in the countries in which that showed their will to integrate into NATO or EU, military men become real “engines” of SSR reform, also because the positive auto-perception and the rediscovered legitimacy to have an important role within the process of joining Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Baltic States and Slovenia are an example, they were accepted, on March 29th, 2004, as members of North-Atlantic Alliance and in May 2004, members of EU, they also managed to get in front of other CIS and SEE countries from the point of view of SSR reform. In most of these countries, the approach regarding the absolute power of the security system that is situated above any law and normative acts shows the remaining features still not erased from the period of the party-state.

1.4. The international context in dynamic change

The year 2001 was marked by terrorist attacks on New York, causing an unprecedented mobilization of the Western world, the attack of the international coalition led by the USA against religious groups from Afghanistan and the intervention in Iraq. The war in Iraq aimed at stopping the oppressive dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, using a concept of pre-emptive attacks (made public on September 20th, 2002), but which didn't succeed in much stability in the Middle East, though a lot of resources were invested in order to destroy the terrorist groups and to establish military bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. Though there existed sophisticated collective security arrangements, UN, OSCE showed themselves as being unprepared to face the violence of the conflicts from the Balkan Peninsula, or in other regions of the former USSR, being frequently compared to the inefficiency that culminated in the general destabilization of the League of Nations in 1930.

²⁷ Tanja Petovar, Overview of regional survey findings and policy implications for donors, OECD, 2005, p. 125.

This is because neither UN nor OSCE could resist military operation at a large scale, for example an imaginary invasion of Russia into Baltic States or Caucasus. It is clear that these collective institutions are rather ready for an institutionalized dialogue or, in the worst case, for monitoring missions for human rights, of reduced intensity, unable to assure the functioning of a collective security system in the Wilson's sense of the word²⁸. The only institutions that have the necessary ability to prevent major destabilizations in any European region are EU and NATO.

The disappearance of "critical foreign threat" at the end of the cold war required a reconfiguration of the "security triangle", called in this way after the relation established between NATO, WEU and EU. On the basis of its specific mandate, NATO could be able to offer only a political-military contribution for the increasing challenges of a dynamic European security environment: collective defence, peacekeeping operations, partnerships and political-military dialogues. The implementation of the WEU Common Concept (1985) was the first attempt to create a different European security strategy that would be able to face the changes in this field. At the same time, because of the fratricidal war in Balkans, the implementation of a new method of approach of the treats with local European character, was required in addition to the security umbrella, guaranteed by the USA.

The creation of a European security dimension after 1998 would confirm the importance given by the EU to the development of its own foreign and security policy,²⁹ also including the idea of a common defense policy (well formulated in the Amsterdam Treaty). The slim progress in this field was the result of reduced abilities or lack of resources, rather of internal "disturbances" of EU and because of the EU's decisions to complete a range of institutional reforms, partially caused by the spread, but also by the split related to specific European polarizations. This policy of "Europeanization" of the EU security stimulates and continues to feed a lot of speculative contradictions. To understand the nature of these debates, we will further analyze some of the known approaches, which describe different security "cultures", following relatively different logical models.

²⁸ Charalambos Papsotiriou, *the Problem of European Security*, in *Security Dilemmas in Eurasia*, Nereus Ed., IIR, 1999

²⁹ Javier Solana, *A secure Europe in a Better World*, Thessaloniki European Council, June 20, 2003, www.eu.int

The European Union: Starting with May 1st, 2004, EU is defined as a union consisting of 25 countries, with around 450 million people, which produces almost 25% of the GDP, the fact that motivates a natural ambition to be regarded not only as an important economic actor on the international level, but also on the level of global security. This concern of the Europeans to play a more important role on the global level is due to the complex increase of the interdependencies on the foreign affairs level. Even if there exists the temptation to attribute to the US the role of ruler of a monopolist global power, the international realities are much more complicated, which offers an essential role to institutionalized cooperation and dialogue structures, by involving some international organizations in defining the dangers and threats at a global level. At the macro-decisional level of EU, a clear distinction is made between the “internal security” culture (police) and the “internal security” (which implies the activity of the diplomatic and military expertise service). The approach that dominates the WEU and EO discourses, especially after the Copenhagen European Council (June 1993), was an exclusive one. This approach is manifested through the integrity of the parties as a basic method to “structural conflict management and their prevention” within EU, hoping that any kind of conflict can be settled by including them in a system of cooperative relations³⁰.

The East Ward enlargement of EU in two successive waves, and from 2003, the emergence of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), confirms the implementation of this approach in the settlement of structural conflicts, described also by the elliptic phrase of the President of the European Commission, who said that EU must be bordered by a “circle of friends”. The creation of a military group within NATO was not only accepted, but even actively encouraged by NATO. The development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) represents a project that still evolves. Like European enlargement, it will have an essential role in determining the future outlines of the future union, having as an object the consolidation of the foreign abilities of the union in order to act through strengthening civil and military capacities for the prevention of conflicts and crisis management.

In case this policy is constantly supported by the EU members, it will create a common identity promoting the integration between members. ESDP actually means the key to EU unification. But what do ESDP consist of? Being an older ambition of the EU, starting from the abandoned plan to establish a

³⁰ Changes in the security concept and the JHA agenda, www.libertysecurity.org

European Defense Community (1954), this policy could be outlined only with the adoption of the EU Maastricht Treaty (1993), which established a common foreign security policy for the first time, stating the progressive creation of a common defense policy, that could lead to a “common defence”. Balkan crises constantly stimulated this tendency, and the decisions of the heads of states and governments at the Council of Nice (1993 and 2000) contributed to the creation of political and military structures, which would be responsible for taking decisions during crises.

NATO: according to the North-Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the UN Charter, NATO mission is based on the protection of the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. Since its creation, NATO promoted just and long-lasting peacekeeping in Europe, based on democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, objective that obtained new meanings after the “iron curtain” was dropped and at the end of the “cold war”, consolidating the Trans-Atlantic cooperation base between North America and European states. The security and the cohesion within the Alliance contribute to the fact that each of its member states will not depend only on national efforts in solving its security problems.

Especially because of this reason, the Alliance represents an association of states, determined to assure security through mutual guarantees and stable relations between them, by means of collective security and mutual assistance.

After 1990, NATO has played the key role in maintaining and consolidating the Euro-Atlantic security, immediately after the Cold War was over, this being possible because of political and military partnerships, cooperation and consolidation of dialogue between the old enemies, members of opposing military blocks rivals. Opportunities were opened for new member states to join. NATO reaffirmed the commitment to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and crises management, including through peacekeeping operations (Balkans). The Atlantic Alliance remains today the most stable and safe security structure of Western Europe and the US, a fact which is confirmed by the WEU countries, and by the Maastricht European Council leaders.

The hope expressed in the EU Treaty that WEU will form the armed hand of EU must not be regarded as an attempt to substitute NATO and the American military presence in Europe, but as a “personalization” initiative of the European presence in NATO.

During the still unfinished process of redefining its goals, NATO engaged in the last years in security tasks that exceed its original mission, which was related to the defence of its member states from foreign attacks. The importance of NATO for the European security was confirmed by the crucial role the Al-

liance has played with its military intervention in Bosnia, this mission being given to European commandment. The enlargement of the North-Atlantic Alliance towards East was a real test of the resistance of the post-war commitments and of NATO's ability to show its relevance in the condition of major changes of international relations. Many of the observers didn't believe in this ability, considering that NATO was not able to face changes. With the disappearance of its historical rival, USSR, NATO found itself facing the security challenges of its member states and, in spite of competitive priorities, NATO kept its ability of inter-operability, fast reaction and convergence between the founding members.

The UN: through the Security Council, UN has showed its character of being the most important actor of the international dialogue on subjects related to security and stability in the world. In December 2005, UN General Assembly intends to extend the membership of UN Security Council. This is not well perceived by the USA, which considers this a fact that will diminish its efficiency, will reduce the influence of the actual SC members and will introduce in SC a group of countries that voted several times against some of the US initiatives.³¹

The OSCE: OSCE kept its general function as regional institution of international security, including all European states, Canada and the USA; fact that allowed it to play an important role in promoting peace and stability, in consolidating security through cooperation and promoting democracy, human rights, and social stability. The Helsinki Final Document (1992) stipulates the possibility of OSCE implication in peacekeeping actions, establishing whether these operations represent an extremely important element of the organization in order to prevent conflicts and crises management. But never up till now, had OSCE monitored on its own responsibility peacekeeping operations.

Nonetheless, the existence of important specialized international organization in peacekeeping and conflict settlement didn't prevent the breakout of 56 military conflicts in over 44 places on earth, only between 1990 and 2000.³² During this period, only 3 conflicts have involved world-known states

³¹ According to some analysis, the candidate states to become members of SC or UN (Brazil, Germany, India, Egypt, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa) were several times against rather than supporting the initiatives launched by USA. Just Japan and Germany voted several times to support USA (50% and respectively 55%). Nigeria and South Africa voted against USA initiatives more than 80% between 2000-2004. Source: Department of State, "US Priorities for a Stronger, More Effective UN", June 17, 2005.

³² Armed Conflicts Report, 2001, Project Ploughshares, Waterloo, Ontario, 2002.

as main characters: Iraq against Kuwait (1990), India against Pakistan (2000), Eritrea against Ethiopia (2000). In other 53 analyzed cases, the conflict generators were rebel forces that tried and sometimes succeeded to seize the power through coup d'état, or foreign military interventions within local conflicts.

At the end of 1980s, EU agencies for regulation and Europol policy-makers developed a security concept that combines broad categories of activities with an increased degree of risk: terrorism, drug trafficking, organized and trans-border crime, illegal immigration, refugees and ethnic minorities. The analysis of these risks led to a reconsideration of the role given to strategic information gatherers, police agencies, in redefining the role and coordination of police agencies. Globalization process and the informational boom limited the existent distinctions, but kept them on the security agenda of EU, in which the terrorist attacks are treated together with conventional threats. It is not surprising at all that most important decisions related to the limits of Schengen zone, the debates on Europol and on new European Security Bureau entered the EU working agenda, being also kept in the agenda of the Justice and Home Affairs.

Mentioning the military ability, EU established the task to create in 2003 a force of about 60.000 soldiers, for at least 60 days, in order to engage in humanitarian and rescue actions, peacekeeping crises management missions. We must mention that the military and defense dimension of EU do not include territorial defense. Conflict prevention and crises management require a combination of civil and military instruments. EU decided that the Lisbon European Council (2000) will assure the creation in 2003 of an entity consisting of 5000 police officers for different international missions. On April 11, 2002, the European Commission adopted several recommendations that will improve the civil capacity to prevent conflicts, and in November 2001, this commission adopted an official statement on financing these operations.

The feeling of fragmentation and relative inefficiency of efforts to prevent conflicts has substantially modified in the last years the cooperation agenda between NATO, EU, UN, in order to achieve a better coordination at a global level. Many people explain the EU expansion to East as a project motivated firstly by security concerns, so it is a project that wants to strengthen peace, to end historical divisions between East and West, between east and west Europeans. The perception of a common identity constantly motivated the efforts of the partners from East to take part in different EU open programs, and the same thing is valid for Balkan countries, or the countries situated at the outskirts of the former USSR (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus), which intend or prepare themselves to obtain the status of candidate-country.

The initiation and development of common strategies or monitoring procedures of the crises within EU are clear coordination examples. The example of cooperation between NATO and EU in lower Serbia (Kosovo) or in Bosnia, illustrates the real cooperation mechanisms, though there exist formal EU–NATO inter-operable agreements. Article 3 of the EU treaty requires close cooperation between its institutes in order to assure military security. The European Council is the authority that elaborates strategic directions for the EU security policy, based on proposals from the Council of Europe and European Commission, the coordination of their efforts being stipulated in EPSD.

There is a strong link within EU between foreign and local security aspects. The most important political and security fields in EU are related to: the supply with raw materials and energy resources for all its members, a Single European Sky, GALILEO, the protection of vital infrastructures for EU members, cyber-crime and the security of air transportation means. All these fields are essential for EU, though they are not specially mentioned within ESPD/ESPC. Actions against international terrorism represent a similar example in this sense. An important element of EU Commission is related to non-proliferation and disarmament including common actions with Russia, monitoring missions of weapon export, etc.

Chapter II.

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN MOLDOVA

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Introduction

Like in most transitional countries of the Eastern Europe the intersection of democracy, market and security aspects of Moldovan way toward the competitive economy and open society is extraordinarily fragile, endangered by changing external peril and internal incapacity to identify priorities and to meet the challenges of this complex nature of the modernisation process. The lack of security and stability is still a major obstacle to the democratic stabilization of Moldova, which has already negative consequences for individuals, state and the Moldovan society as a whole. The geographic location is also important for Moldovan national security. The country lies on the crossroads of three distinct geo-political zones: South-Eastern Europe, Central Europe and Euro-Asian Region. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union Moldova did not break the relationship with former soviet republics mostly because of the economic reasons in the effort to keep the foreign markets and guaranteed supply of energy sources and raw materials. But the membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States did not allow Moldova to solve the difficult problems related to the national security.

The very quick geopolitical changes in former post-Soviet periphery, proliferation of the new risks and dangers, especially of non-military character and the unsettled and frozen conflicts in the Black Sea – Caspian Sea region have already a direct impact on the security and stability in the Eastern part of the European continent. Therefore one of the main transitional challenges Moldova is still facing is the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The very quick geopolitical changes, proliferation of the new risks and dangers, which heavily impact the whole post-war order and the value systems, make this task more difficult especially for the small states that recently appeared on the political map of Europe.

The weakness of Moldova as a transitional state on one side and the post-imperial syndrome of Russia's policy in the so-called "nearest abroad" on

the other side creates a dangerous mixture generating permanent instability and growing risks. Over the past years with little international notice and even less action, the situation in Transnistrian part of Moldova controlled by the pro-Russian separatists has degraded to the point of challenging the security interests and democratic values of the enlarged Euro-Atlantic community. The process of the EU and NATO eastward enlargement transforms the western border of Moldova in to the Eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic community of states. Moldova accounts for an almost 500 kilometres long sector of the new Euro-Atlantic border in Eastern Europe. The fact that the neighboring Romania is already the full-fledged member of the Alliance, as well as the unambiguous declarations by Ukraine concerning its membership in NATO, has changed the distribution of power in the region. Thus more active cooperation with NATO becomes, in a way, a natural need for broader perception of the National Security Concept in Moldova.

Therefore, it is so actual and important to estimate how the enlargement of EU and NATO processes may involve the country and its neighbours, to examine what a changing security environment implies for them and what kind of security and defence arrangements are in the offer. The emerging new European security order requires more efficient actions and efforts in addressing the new risks and threats, closer cooperation with Moldova and efficient assistance in stabilizing the situation alongside the new EU borderland. Yet there is no indication of this being done or seriously planned.

2.1. Assessments of Risks and Dangers

Despite the radical decrease of the pure military dangers for the majority of the European nations after the end of the Cold War, the Republic of Moldova continues to face risks and threats in the area of “hard security.” Political and territorial separatism remains one of the main concerns and the obstacle in the process of state building and on the way of reintegrating the Moldovan society.

The military, financial and political support provided by the Russian Federation to the so-called «Moldovan Transnistrian Republic» over the past fifteen years has strengthened the military potential of separatists that is now practically equal with Moldova’s Armed Forces potential.

The presence of the Russian troops on the left bank of the Nistru River against the will of the Moldovan people and the decisions of the international organizations are a real threat to the country’s national security. The control of separatists over the Eastern border with neighbouring Ukraine and different forms of smuggling activities, as well as large-scale money laundering remain

the main sources for the financial support of the paramilitary formations of Transnistria, separatist's procurement of armament, weapons and other military material.

Because of the foreign involvement and geopolitical dimension of the Transnistrian conflict Moldova does not have the political and military potential to address these security issues in a proper and adequate way. The country urgently needs assistance and help in working out a reliable and long-lasting strategy for the efforts to counter these hard security risks. Like other countries from South Eastern Europe that have not succeeded in finalizing the market-oriented reforms, Moldova faces a wide range of non-military security threats and risks. These include:

- organized international crime that operates the majority of the illegal and criminal business and has a trans-national character and forms of organization;
- trafficking of human beings, deeply rooted in the social and economic crises and in the rapid development of illegal trans-border activities, as well as in a growing external demand for such kind of "services";
- growth of arms smuggling as a result of the lack of efficient arms control on the Transnistrian part of Moldova;
- illegal migration that derives from substantial unemployment and ongoing economic and social stagnation in the country;
- political manipulation of territorial and ethnic conflicts in order to maintain the instability and uncertainty of the situation and to blackmail the legal government of the country;
- insecurity of energy supply routes and infrastructures that are still connected to the networks controlled by the separatists and possible economic and energy blockade used by Russia to put pressure on RM.

To a large extent, these "soft threats" – whether they originate in the ex-Soviet countries or not – are spilling over into the EU through its new direct frontier and remain real challenges for stability and security of the enlarged Europe. The main official documents that contain the principals and directions of the state activities in the field of national security and defence is the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova adopted by the parliament of the country on June 6, 1995. The Doctrine has not been changed since its approval by the supreme court more than seven years ago. This document mentions the democratic control over defence sphere as one of the main principal of the new kind of civil-military relations, asserts the supremacy of the political control of the elected bodies of the public authorities over the military institutions and structures of the state and the Armed Forces as a whole.

According to the Doctrine the existing military dangers to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are considered the following:

- Territorial claims or pretensions of other countries;
- attempts to interfere in the home affairs, to destabilise the domestic situation in the country;
- presence of foreign troops on the territory of the state against the will of the people;
- subversive activity of separatist organisations, attempts oriented to the armed violation of the territorial integrity of the country;
- creation of illegal military forces on the national territory.

Another document that contains the definition of priorities concerning the national security is the National Security Concept adopted officially by the parliament in 1995. According to this concept the threat to the state security is understood as actions, conditions and the factors presenting danger to the state, society and citizen and are considered as following:

- actions directed to a violent change of the constitutional order, to undermine or destroy the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country;
- activity, directly or indirectly promoting expansion of military operations against the country or causing civil war;
- armed or other violent actions undermining the state foundations;
- espionage, transfer of data, containing state secret to other states, illegal reception or storage of the data classified as state secret, with the purpose to transfer it to other states or anti-constitutional structures;
- treachery expressed in assistance to other state in realisation of hostile activity against the Republic of Moldova;
- actions with the purpose of infringement of constitutional laws and freedom of the citizens causing threat to the state security;
- preparing and committing acts of terrorism, and also endangering the life, health and inviolability of high officials, representatives of state power of foreign states during their stay in the Republic of Moldova;
- actions that contribute to the appearance of emergency situations on the transportation system, communication, life-support and economy infrastructure;
- plunder and smuggling of weapons, ammunition, combat material, explosive, radioactive, poisoning, narcotic, toxic and other substances, their illegal manufacture, use, transportation and storage if the interests of state security are affected;

- creation of illegal organisations or groups presenting threat to state security, or participation in their activity.

On July 26, 2002 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova approved the Concept of the Military Reform. The officials explained the necessity of this document by a need to solve a range of problems the Armed Forces have been facing during the last years of change. The establishment of a new efficient and flexible system of military security able to guarantee the defence of territory, sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and integrity of the state are considered the main objective of the reform. The necessity of the reformation of the army is explained by the following factors:

- imperfection of the present system of the military security of the state;
- the declared permanent neutrality status of the country and the necessity of foreign policy adjustment to this principle;
- the present geopolitical situation and to the new realities, risks and missions generated by the changes on the international arena;
- the insufficiency of financial resources and the need to correlate the military security system of the state with the present possibilities and the perspectives of economic development of the country;
- relatively low defence potential of the Armed Forces and reduced military capacities of the country.

The Concept highlights that Republic of Moldova does not have enemies and, therefore, the probability of a major threat to the military security of the state is a minor one for the time being. The main sources of threats are considered to be the regional instability and the emergence of a large diversity of non-military risks. For the first time the cross-border risks such as organised crime, illegal drug, weapon and strategic material smuggling and trafficking are listed in the official document. The Concept of the Military Reform contains the following hierarchy of the main regional risks:

- the strategic imbalances of the military potentials in the region;
- the existence of certain degree of military tension and conflicts that can spread off; territorial separatism and the internal political, social and economic conditions that can have a negative impact on the military potential capable to diminish the power and authority of the public administration;
- the appearance of dysfunction in the financial, informational, energetic, communication and telecommunication systems of the states;
- politico-military rivalries between newly formed states.

During Soviet time Moldova did not have any important technological and industrial military capacities on its territory. Some of the production units and plants of the former military-industrial complex are not functioning any more or are undergoing radical restructuring on the base of conversion. Consequently, Moldova cannot be a source of transfer of military goods. All procurements of arms and munitions are controlled by the state. A special Government Commission was created to monitor such activity on the territory of the country. Moldova has joint all the international agreements regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons. On the territories controlled by separatists', light artillery systems like «Grad» are produced as well as weapons (Kalashnikov machine guns etc), mine launchers for the needs of local paramilitary units and exported to different "hot spots" on commercial basis.

The alienation of the public power from the population and the decline in society's spiritual-moral potential, imperfect legislation and inefficient state policy are the main factors that block the sporadic efforts of public power to reduce the negative impact of these phenomena on the societal life. There are real dangers to the civilian security system in Moldova:

- human rights abuses in the Eastern region of Moldova under the control of separatists;
- widespread corruption and the absence of efficient anti-corruption strategy and mechanisms;
- low tempo of reformation of the justice system and of the law-enforcing and security agencies;
- high level of political parties influence on the local mass media and as a result the manipulation with public opinion especially within the electorate campaign.

Over the past years it became clear that the economic factor is decisive for the national security and durable development of the country. Only stabilisation and growth of the Moldovan economy will be able to satisfy the interests of citizens, society and state, to solve problems associated with a deficiency of resources necessary for the stabilisation of nome situation as well as for the resolution of national security problems. At this extend the non-military threats linked with specific aspects of the radical socio-economic reforms are as follows:

- possible failure of the democratic and liberal reforms due to the Moldova's governing circles incapacity to ensure the steady transition to the market economy;

- high cost of macroeconomic stabilisation without a visible impact on the real economy and life standards. Possible destabilisation of the situation in the society, radicalisation of the political regime;
- growing role of the «shadow economy», corrupt governance and as a result, a chronically weak and inefficient state;
- organised crime involvement in the community's life, its transitional character becoming a source of regional instability.

The territorial separatism remains one of the most acute dangers for the Moldovan state and its future. The recent years have been marked by continuous efforts made by the Moldovan government aimed to find a peaceful solution to the conflicts which oppose the legal authorities of the country and the leaders of separatist formations from the left bank of the Nistru river known also as “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic”. Despite the concrete steps and unilateral concessions made by the government and the active involvement of the OSCE and international mediators the conflict is far from being settled.

The social and economic vulnerability of the society and its members remains, political instability and political-territorial separatism remain main home threats. The unfinished market reforms, social and political polarisation of the society, the growth of corruption and organised crime, deterioration in inter-communal and inter-ethnic relations create a wide range of home and foreign risks to the country's security. Mistakes made in the initial stage of democratic reforms have weakened law-enforcement institutions as well as state regulation and monitoring thus provoking the decline of the role of the state and reduction of its efficiency in addressing the security problems.

2.2. Security Sector Definition and Integration Concept

The growing powers and responsibilities of the institutions in the security sector objectively require a better co-operation between civilian servants and military, the efficient democratic oversight and control. The human and financial resources invested in the security sector require more efficient use of created capacities. It increases the need for co-ordination among institutions in the security sector based on the explicitly formulated strategy followed by coherent actions and responsible attitude of the governing circles and of the society as a whole.

In Moldova the discussions regarding the need as well as the main goals and objectives of Security Sector Reform are generated from time to time by the change of government or after the new head of state is elected that try to implement some electorate and political promises. The absence of a qualified

debate on what are the fundamental characteristics of SSR, raises quite serious issues about the effectiveness and the concrete ways the current situation can be improved. Despite the rapid expansion of international co-operation in the field of security and defence in the last decade, there has been little analysis of the nature, content and consequences of this sector reformation especially in the post-socialist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The difficulties in assessing the commonly accepted definition of SSR derive also from the fact that the sector itself is at the same time the building block of strategy and a tool driving democracy in the field of security and defence. The absence of a common understanding as to what are the goals and instruments of the of SSR has produced already the following consequences:

First, SSR is defined in a broader context of democratic reforms and adjustment of the armed forces and security services of the state to the new geopolitical realities and threats. This holistic way concerns mostly good governance, conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction, and proliferation of non-military threats, political control over the military as well as the democratisation of the civil-military relations. The growing number of issues that are included within the area of security sector reform leads to a loss of focus and finally risks to diminish the efficiency of the reforms.

Second, there are real conservative trends in the attempts to address the new challenges existing already in the security sector on the basis of old approaches and policies without re-evaluating what needs exist and thus to make them relevant to the circumstances in the country and at the regional and sub-regional levels.

Third, the new kind of civil-military relations is understood mainly as a need to correspond to the international requirements imposed from outside the country by the multilateral organisations Moldova is a member of. In the absence of the adequate understanding about the fundamental democratic norms that regulate the new relationship between civilians and armed forces, that form the checks and balances system, it is premature to speak about a concrete model of democratic and efficient control over the military to be implemented in the country. This is one of sources of confusion in terms of exactly what policies, ideas and values should be considered as a basis for the reformation of the existing security and defence system.

Fourth, within a broad SSR agenda and without shared conceptions and common strategic approach to the SSR different stake holders like government, civil society representatives and international institutions pursue different objectives and therefore provide sometime conflicting policies being focused on different aspects and priorities of the same processes.

Despite a certain degree of confusion in Moldovan society concerning the real content and the ways of SSR implementation there are already the key policy instruments in this field. The security sector encompasses all those institutions, organisations and units that have authority to use force or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight. The security sector in Moldova includes:

- a) Central public authorities responsible for the management and oversight of the security sector;
- b) Armed forces – military and paramilitary formations;
- c) Police forces – the Interior Ministry troops “carabineries”;
- d) Border guards and customs services;
- e) Security and intelligence service;
- f) Judicial and penal systems and their institutions;

Over the years of Moldova existence as an independent country, a legal division of authority between the state institutions responsible for national security has been gradually established according the generally recognised democratic norms and principals. The following public authorities and institutions are involved in developing and ensuring the national security of the Republic of Moldova:

- The President of the RM: according the Constitution the president of the state assumes full responsibility for the national security and defence. He is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and has personal responsibility for defensive capability of the country and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The head of the state directs the state agencies and mobilise resources for ensuring the implementation of this constitutional task. He has also the rights to define the main directions of the country's domestic and foreign policy that finally should be approved by the parliament of the country;
- The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova that develops and forms the legislative framework in order to ensure national security, as well as the democratic control over the military and the monitoring on the current activity of the armed forces and law-enforcing agencies. The legislators also adopt the state budget that includes the expenses related to the national security and defence;
- The Government of the Republic of Moldova, as the central body of the executive authority, is responsible for national security as a whole

and for the defensive capability of the country in particular within the limits of its constitutional power. The government directs and monitors the activities of the state authorities and agencies directly operating in the field of national security and defence. The executive branch of the power take care of the defensive capabilities of the country, of the Armed Forces provision with armament, ammunitions, military equipment and different kind of material resources. The government acts strictly in accordance the decisions of the parliament and the decrees of the president related to this specific area of its responsibility. The government co-ordinates also the activities of central executive authorities (ministries, state departments and agencies) as well as of the local executive authorities, designs state budget for implementing specific programmes in the area of national security and defence;

- The Supreme Security Council is an advisory body for the President of the country and its main task is to develop the general directions in organisation and maintenance the country's security and defensive capability and military construction. The Council assists the head of state in identification and assessment of threats to national security, drafts operational decisions to prevent them and monitors the implementation of decisions in this area by central and local executive authorities;

Despite the existing legal division of powers and responsibilities between different state authorities and structures, the necessity to achieve synergy between the specific institutions of armed forces and security services as well as to increase the level of general awareness by setting priorities using co-ordination as a tool remains one of the main problem. The common understanding of these issues by all the actors and the need for a legal framework and respective regulations remain important.

The lack of efficient co-ordination leads to overlaps especially in the activity of the structures of the Ministry of Interior and other special services of the state. The need for efficient co-operation in the field of national security derives also from the very nature of the new threats and their different impact on the national security. In the Republic of Moldova, there are three state structures of executive power specialised in state security maintenance: the Information and Security Service (ISS), the Service of the State Protection and the Boarder-Guard Troops Department. Relatively recently, the fourth one has been created: the Centre for Countering Organised Crime and Corruption. According to the legislation, these institutions form the system of the agencies of state security of the Republic of Moldova in which the leading part is played by the ISS. Such a situation explains a high demand of co-ordination,

but also of governmental and parliamentary management and oversight. The appropriate and flexible response implies bridging the gap in activities of different forces, services and agencies.

It is commonly accepted the leading role of the armed forces within the security arrangement in the state. The army bears a major strain and has for the third time in a decade to be reorganised in order to meet the new challenges and the new threats. One of the main objectives of the latest army reform concept is to transform it in a flexible, movable, and sustainable forces able to be the leading force in any crisis management with well determined tasks. One of the main goals of the current Concept of Military Reform consists on changing the existing approach to the defence planning through the adjustment of the Armed Forces to the modern requirements. Despite the fact that this document has been developed exclusively within the framework of the MoD and therefore has a certain departmental character its authors tackle the role and duties of the military the concept has all the features of the national security concept representing a complex of ideas, objectives and directions of activities followed by the assertion of force structure, mechanisms and budgeting procedures. One of the strategy goals is to raise the level of co-operation in the field of defence and national security. The document contains also the idea of the system's planning part that includes the following elements:

- geopolitical situation, possible sources of potential crises, external risks and threats;
- sources of internal instability and risks;
- economic situation of the country and its potential for the armed forces maintenance at the required level of combat readiness including the financial resources that can be allocated to the military sphere;
- structure and capacity of the armed forces for addressing the problems including the country's participation in European security and stability arrangements (possible participation in blocks, alliances, armed forces participation in peacekeeping operations, etc.)

In this way the concept of the military reform creates the basis for better co-ordination of the state policy in the field of national defence and security by connecting external and internal factors as well as different state agencies responsible for foreign policy, internal stability and security, international co-operation. Programs and activities in the military and security area are planned according the financial capacity and economic resources of the country. The concept determines the national requirements in defence area, establishes objectives of the military policy, and develops tasks for the armed

forces and security agencies. On the basis of the Concept, programs should be developed by the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Department of Border Guards, and by the Service for Information and Security. The planning will be carried out under the guidance of the Government and the final paper will be approved by the Parliament as a state program of activity.

2.3. SSR in Key Areas of Civil-Military and Inter-agency Co-operation

Over the years of Moldova existence as an independent country a legal division of authority between the state institutions responsible for national security has been gradually established according the generally recognized democratic norms and principals. The parliament has done its job in approving the long-term principles and priorities of Moldova's foreign and security policy, mainly through the adoption of the Military Doctrine and of the National Security Concept. The other major constitutional role of the legislature like controlling and correcting the national security policy and strategy and the budgeting process has been exercised with modest success. The regular activity of the standing parliamentary committees on defense and national security as well as on the foreign policy is not marked by big achievements from the strategic point of view. Anyway the regular hearings and discussions within the respective committees have contributed to the raise of degree of transparency to the decision-making process in this field of state responsibilities.

In terms of civil-military relations, the principle of democratic (civilian) control over the armed forces has been recognized as a rule of the democratic play and partly institutionalized. Over the years of independence, Moldovan society has gained some experience in democratizing the military. Some efforts to raise public awareness concerning the national defense planning and military budget approval have been made. Within the society, there is already an understanding of the necessity to ensure the accountability of the military, security services and law enforcers to the elected public authorities.

The lack of democratic traditions from one side and the creation of the national army from the scratch, on the basis of the officer corps and personnel inherited from the red army on the other side are still real challenges for the new independent state. However, the real test for the civilian control is still to come with the practical implementation of a delayed and painful restructuring and adjustment of the armed forces to the real threats and to the dynamic of cooperation with the emerging collective (cooperative) security system in Europe. In

these circumstances the military leadership made efforts to protect and preserve the military system, relying mostly on the old experience and being tempted to restore the former infrastructure and the ways of military organisation. These trends have been reinforced by the limited democratic experience of the military as well as by the lack of competence and expertise of new civilian governments.

At the same time, the military doctrine of the country stipulates that different institutions and units of the National Army can be used to assist the frontier guard and the interior troops (“carabineries”) in the protection of the population against armed violence, in the localization and blockage of the potential conflict areas, in the prevention of armed clashes, the armed protection of important objects and civil units, in the liquidation of the consequences of natural disasters, damages and catastrophes, in accordance with the legislation.

In some cases the Armed Forces can be used in peace-time, in order to assure the military security of the state. In accordance with the National Security Concept approved by the Parliament, the main tasks of the military security include, along with the defense of the state against external aggression, the localization of armed conflicts and the neutralization of illegal military activity in the immediate vicinity of the country’s borders, the support given to the state bodies and units during the implementation of the missions aimed at the re-establishment of national security.

The Concept of Military Reform, approved by the Parliament in 2002, specifies the reasons for the use of the Armed Forces in the above mentioned situations. It stipulates that, during the crises, the Armed Forces can participate in accordance with the law, and in co-operation with other states, in the following actions: prevention of destabilizing actions, neutralization of terrorist elements and other illegal armed groupings, prevention of proliferation of conventional and mass-destruction arms, intervention in crises situations in order to protect citizens and basic infrastructures of the state. The armed forces may be used in cases of natural disasters, damages and catastrophes at the solicitation of the Government, in accordance with the existing laws.

The main restriction related to this chapter is stated in the Law on Armed Forces and gives the Parliament the special right to limit the use of armed forces in the situation that are not related directly to state defense and protection. In cases of states of emergency, the decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova is required in such cases. There is still a certain misunderstanding concerning the similarity of the legal provisions that determine “exceptional situation” and the constitutional notion “state of emergency”.

A frequently neglected aspect of democratic control over the armed forces in Moldova is the issue of whether the government is actually competent to

decide on and implement a security sector reform and direct the course of military reform. More exactly, it is a problem of the weak state that is not yet able to develop the body of civilian expertise in defense issues, which is needed to ensure balance and to provide competent and adequate advice. The rapid turnover of governments in Moldova like in the majority of the Eastern European countries compounded this lack of expertise. When governments are reliant on the military for advice on defense issues, it is the armed forces, and not the government, which effectively decide policy. This state of affairs still persists in Moldova, despite the existence on paper and in law of what pretends otherwise be adequate mechanisms for democratic control.

From one point of view, the institutional and law making issues such as the drafting and approval of new normative acts and re-definition of the lines of responsibility of the military and security structures have been successfully accomplished. Whilst new public power structures and institutions have emerged rather rapidly created by the decisions of the law makers, attitudinal change appears to be taking place over a longer time period than institutional or legal change. The effective operation of institutions and procedures in the field of the national security can be ensured altogether with an important attitudinal change, the acquisition of shared norms and values by civilians and military aware of the existing and verified norms of the countries with long democratic experience.

Moldova like many other Eastern European countries finds it exceptionally difficult to evaluate successful model of civil-military relations within the framework of the on going reformation of the national security system. Therefore the objective analysis of the current state of the democratization of the national army in general and of the civil-military relations in particular is so important for Moldova especially taking into consideration the need to ensure the cost-saving and efficient inter-agency co-operation. The willingness of the political elite as well as of the governance to reintegrate the country into the Europe and to conclude in the nearest future the process of transition toward the democracy of market economy create good precondition to reach this objective.

2.4. SSR: Current State and Action Plan

The security sector reform agenda put forward in the Concept of the Military Reform describes concrete goals which the government and the respective ministries should strive to achieve. There is only the problem of the central agency of the state that will assume all the responsibility for the reform imple-

mentation. According to the Concept the president of the country and the presidency as institution should play the essential role in the security sector reform involving in this process the government and its structures. The problem consists in the lack of real and reliable mechanisms capable to allow to the head of state to put into practice the main ideas of the reform and to monitor the process itself. The Supreme Security Council of the state is not instrumental and has not human or logistical resources to play an active role. More than that the SSR is not a high priority for the governing majority that is concentrated mostly on the stabilisation of the economic and social situation in the country.

The MoD can play the key role in this situation but there is a risk that this ministry will try to pursue its own corporate interests without paying too much attention to the interests and co-operation with other state power structures involved in the process of reform. In favour of the special role the MoD should play is the fact that the military forces will be a key part of security sector reform. At the same time, without clear mechanisms for accountability, armed forces potentially can constitute a threat to democratic governance and can consume a much more resources than other parts of the security sector. Another key priority of security sector reform is to ensure that military forces are oriented exclusively towards those tasks for which they are most appropriate.

Effective police forces under the civilian control and management is another essential element in establishing the conditions for community security, in enhancing the economic and social stability. The governing political majority try to take under full political control the police forces and to use them in the struggle against the radical opposition. At the same time the organised crime is interested to infiltrate the law enforcing agencies provoking the antagonistic relationship between the police and different sections of the citizenry. Building the capacity of police forces according to the democratic is particularly important in the current situation.

Judicial reform is not yet finished in Moldova and this element of democratic transition of the country is included in the list of priorities monitored by the Council of Europe. Judicial appointments are frequently politicised and influenced by the political power, trials can be subject to long delays, and corruption is a real problem. Effective and impartial judicial and penal systems can play a key role in reducing crime and in consolidation of justice and social stability. Building the capacity of judicial and penal systems, encourage reform in this area should be real priorities of the SSR agenda.

It is evident that security sector reform involves fundamental issues of governance. The problems Moldova is still confronted with is a result mainly

of poor governance and the lack of capacity of the state to respond in adequate way to the new challenges as a whole and to the changing structure of risks and threats in particular. The steady improvement of the conceptual approach to the problem this sector has to address is not followed by the concrete activities. The inertia of old approaches and the conservative tendencies remain very visible in decision-making process concerning the defence and security. There are several elements of the further reformation of the national security that can be considered essential for Moldova.

First, to strengthen the civilian oversight and management of the armed and security forces through raising the level of their professionalism and of degree of their accountability to civilian authorities. Without doubt larger civilian involvement in the security policy development and the civilian management is the key element of responsible governance in this sector. The competence and the professionalism of the civilian expertise as well as efficient independent institutions can ensure civilian leadership for the security sector to function according to the democratic norms and principles. Low quality of the civilian expertise and control is one of the major obstacles in establishing a good governance in the security sector and to ensure the efficient civilian management. The reforms agenda in this area should include:

- strengthening civilian expertise in the Ministries of Defence of Internal Affairs of Justice and special services through the formation of experts and specialists and the transfer of knowledge;
- raising the decision-making capacity and competence of the standing parliamentary committees that monitor defence, internal affairs, policing and secret services;
- developing the concrete model of the civil-military relations and of the democratic oversight of the military according the democratic norms and the concrete environment and situation existing in the country;
- establishing independent research institutes (think-tanks) specialised in the problems of national security and defence that will work in direct contact with the decision-making structures.

Second, to raise the level of transparency in security sector planning, management, and budgeting. The Military and especially the Security forces are often unwilling to share information with civilians, and there are limited possibilities to form specialists that will be in the future independent analyst in this area. A lack of transparency creates the dangerous trend toward the high politicisation and abusive use of the military and security services by the authorities or by the political groupings that control the power. Such a situation

can undermine a country's long-term economic and political stability as well as to put under question the democratic development of the country.

Theoretically such situations are regulated by the Moldovan legislature. The concrete categories of information about the security sector that are considered confidential and are stipulated in the Law "On the State Secret", but the rest can be made public without the risk of compromising state security. In practice there is still big inertia of the old times to make secret much more information and data than the legal norms allow to. The development of increased transparency, in line with best practice of the countries with long term democratic traditions can contribute to the democratisation of the sector

Third, to involve more actively the institutions and organisations of civil society in monitoring the security sector and in developing the defence and national security policy, budget policy and resource allocation. The associative sector institutions and organisations in transitional societies like Moldova require more assistance from the state and from the international agencies to play more visible role and to carry out these activities. Efficient monitoring that involves the civil society organisations and media is able to raise the efficiency of civilian control over the security sector organisations. These steps can be introduced in the SSR agenda in Moldova. Increased transparency in budgeting and improved auditing mechanisms can help to reduce the level of corruption and waste of resources in security sector programmes.

Fourth, to develop the international co-operation that promotes regional and sub-regional peace and security by actively involving countries into partnership, based on the European norms and principals in the security area. Both governmental and non-governmental sectors can play an active role in enhancing mutual security, so that local problems do not become regional. Such a co-operation can play the role of the knowledge transfer and contribute to the change of mentality of the involved in common projects Moldovan civilians and military, is able to reinforce balanced civil-military relations.

Promoting regional confidence-building mechanisms within the framework of existing security arrangements like Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and NATO Partnership for Peace Program can enhance mutual understanding between governments and reduce the risk of inter-state conflict. More attention should also be given to including civil society in regional dialogues.

Fifth, to consider as a priority the conflict settlement and the post-conflict transformation including the reintegration of the eastern part of the country, currently controlled by the separatist regime. The settlement of the Transd-

neutr conflict can considerably enhance local and regional security by removing the source of destabilisation and the surplus of armament, weapons and munitions that are not under the control of the Moldovan authorities. The normalisation of the situation in the Eastern part of Moldova can tackle cross-border proliferation of small arms. These efforts should be followed by concrete measures aimed at enhancing border controls as an integral part of security development programmes.

Respect for human rights and rule of law by the security sector organisations can be ensured by relevant training helping the police and other security forces to get the appropriate knowledge and the understanding of the code of conduct in the democratic society. Programmes of external assistance in this area aim to provide the behavioural changes can play a role of catalysts.

2.5. Euro-Atlantic Enlargement and SSR in Moldova

Moldova, like the majority of the “New Eastern EU” and NATO neighbors are objectively interested in a stronger and more unified Europe that complements NATO and does not compete with or undermine the alliance when addressing pressing security challenges. These transitional states will need to set security and foreign policies that will be more effectively harmonized with those of the EU, assuming that Brussels can develop a coherent and unified policy of its own. Of course, the military capabilities of all new Eastern neighbors remain limited and overstretched amid budgetary cutbacks and the growing primacy of social and economic priorities.

Moldova like other new neighbors interested in European integration supports the Brussels efforts to enhance Europe’s capacity to speak with one voice on important policy issues, being aware of the risk that one voice may ultimately become a formal compromise between 25 European capitals that could further undercut the EU’s policy in relations with them. Like many other CEE states Moldova still consider a connection with the United States to be one of the key security relationship in the post-Soviet world. Although the EU was once envisaged as primarily an economic alliance, it has since gained increased political importance and may play a bigger role in democratic stabilization of its immediate Eastern vicinity.

But at least for now, the general feeling in the Chisinau, however, is that we must continue to cooperate responsively and carefully with Washington and Brussels. Objectively Moldova is interested in strong U.S. influence in Eastern Europe, as the support of this global superpower is of crucial importance for the process of conflict settlement in various unstable regions and “frozen

conflicts”. Coupled with appropriate economic and financial benefits, political and diplomatic support on issues that are a priorities for the new East European democracies, this policy may help guarantee more durable commitments to the transatlantic relationship on the part of Washington’s new allies.

In terms of EU and NATO enlargement and its implications for the National Security Strategy, Moldova needs efficient international assistance to deal with its hard and soft security risks. These threats are actual, clear and present, and in some cases existential. They stem from troops entrenched in other countries, seizures of territory, border changes de facto, “peacekeeping” that cements the outcome of military interventions, and creation of proxy statelets with troops that have long since been upgraded from para-military guerrilla to conventional combat-ready military.

Taking into consideration the recent geopolitical evolutions and the strategy of NATO focused on counting the wider range of military and non military threats and risks s the new concept and framework for RM-NATO cooperation in needed. A permanent framework for cooperation planning and review can work out recommendations and real assistance concerning the following security and defense aspects:

- Political, military and diplomatic joint actions aimed at the settlement of the TN conflict;
- Security Sector and Defense Reform;
- Cooperation planning and review activities;
- Comprehensive strategy for further RM integration with Euro-Atlantic structures.

It is necessary to develop proposals to further tailor Individual Partnership to tackle key thematic issues and individual Partners' needs and capabilities, to promote defense reform which encourages military transformation and interoperability, and to enhance regional cooperation and mutual support. These new measures should allow for more focused and deeper practical cooperation. Partnership for Peace can be an increasingly effective instrument of cooperation in such areas as peace-support operations and the fight against organized crime, terrorism and territorial separatism. It is clear now that the PfP should be refocused in order to reflect its post-enlargement dimensions and the Alliance's capabilities to address the new threats.

Thus, an evolving Euro-Atlantic strategy for this region should bridge the disjunction between security policy priorities and actual security threats. It needs to refocus attention toward the persistent “old-type” threats and reorder its priorities accordingly.

International institutions should launch a broad-based effort to stabilize “the ‘Wider Europe’ by encompassing economic integration, preventive diplomacy and collective security. Active involvement of the region in international institutions and initiatives would be the best means to that end. The coordination of the efforts of regional and global institutions active in new Central Europe to prevent inefficient redundancies and contradictory policies is urgently needed. To that end, collaborative mechanisms between the EU, NATO, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the sub-regional co-operative arrangements like GUAM combined with efficient assistance of the international financial institutions can be an efficient tool to stabilize entire region from the Baltic to the Caspian Sea.

2.6. Conclusion

One of the main strategic goals of the Moldovan state consists in stabilisation of the situation and escaping from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, corruption, criminalisation and underdevelopment are mutually complementing and reinforcing. The complexity of this stabilisation agenda and of the long term and adequate strategy development means that the socio-economic, governance and security dimensions of the reforms must be tackled simultaneously. Therefore the systematic consideration of what constitutes the main goals of the planned reforms is of paramount importance for the success of this endeavour. Not of the less importance is the compatibility of the democratic rules and principals in SSR area with each country’s particular background and political and social environment. The central objective is to ensure good and competent governance and the efficient co-operation with the international partners that understand the nature of the transformations the transitional countries are undergoing.

The interdependence of the SSR and other modernisation agendas like democratisation, separation of powers (checks and balances), democratic control of the armed forces and security services, rule of law, transparency, protection of human rights, an equitable and independent judiciary, the active participation of civil society institutions and organisations requires much broader approach in comparison with the existent one. The lack of generally applicable norms and criteria on SSR and its elements makes the problem even more difficult.

An internally weak state like Moldova, facing serious obstacles to overcome the social and economic crisis, to conclude the democratization process in the nearest future is unlikely to provide a strong basis for the development of effective SSR. Formal commitments of the government to the internationally

agreed SSR objectives have little chances to lead to the success in this complex area. It is much more difficult to involve the governing forces in the reform design and development without external pressure and without the active participation of the multilateral organizations. Incorporating security sector problems into political dialogue should give the reforms a high priority in its ongoing political co-operation with leading continental and Euro-Atlantic organisations. This can also provide a mechanism through which EU and NATO governments define which external support might be appropriate in the particular circumstances of individual country.

One of the main tasks in insuring the good governance in the area of national security and defense consists in training the civilians and military in order to form the skills of joint efforts and allowing them to work successfully together in dealing with the respective problems especially at the strategic level. What is really important for good governance is that both civilians and military work closer and in the spirit of team on defense problems avoiding the counter productive rivalry.

The external influence and the existence of outside “agency of change” could be a realistic solution for the countries with limited internal potential for democratic change. From that point of view the international cooperation of the country in transition with the international organizations and on the bilateral bases can contribute substantially to the advancement of reforms. The external expertise turns to be a key element for these societies that are in the argent need for assistance and help in gradual adjusting the existing security and defense systems to the democratic rules and requirements.

Chapter III.

INSECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Dr Iulian Chifu

It is common to claim that Republic of Moldova is vulnerable and generally an 'unsafe and instable place', jeopardized by multifarious and strenuous security risks. On the other hand, anybody who visits Chisinau, not mentioning smaller cities or the rural area, has the feeling of "stopped time", or a space where nothing happens. What is the real dimension of security risks and which are the insecurity challenges in the Republic of Moldova today? We tried to present briefly the real situation of the security threats and to find out which might be the options of solving these problem in the nearest future and on medium term.

12 Fundamental security threats and risks of the society in the Republic of Moldova

The Republic of Moldova adopted the first National Security Strategy and that of Defence – documents that are still in force today – in 1995. The two documents are completely outdated and do not comply to exigencies of this kind of document. In a period of 10 years, when the countries changed several times their own strategies: USA 3 times, Romania revised it once in 4 years and the last time after September 11th, the Republic of Moldova **still remained in an empty phraseology without being able to elaborate administrative plans and force directions** in preparing the state for the biggest challenges of the century. Between neutrality and non-affiliation to military structures of CIS a lot of agreements were signed, in which the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Civil Protection Commandment (latest of the "Emmergency situations"), Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of National Security (later SIS), joined the same institutions from the ex-soviet space. Neither this tendency supplied the need of security of the Republic of Moldova.

Putting down today, even telegraphic ally, the amount of threats against national security of the contemporary Moldovan society is a difficult and broad activity. We believe that, even today, all necessary assessments to identify critic tendencies and parameters are not available, so that full approaches

would be done. The fact that the first **shy steps** are done today at the level of civil protection and the subject of critical infrastructure protection, was for the first time discussed at the meeting of partner countries representatives in Chisinau represents just a beginning in the direction of a coherent and fundamental document. Until then, the only solution is to make use of other models by imitating them, a solution that is better in a way than the existent one. We don't want to cover this subject but we have selected 12 extremely vital points for the security of the Republic of Moldova in an attempt to create the first breaches in the formalism and sufficiency of inherited bodies from the old society and that have a lot of reform generations behind in order to become satisfactory for Moldovan citizens. The approach to these essential directions today is considered a new activity, a benefic beginning.

3.1. Transnistria

Certainly that we cannot begin the approach to this subject without putting in focus the threats against national security related to Transnistria. The situation of separatism in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova represents a key-security challenge because of several reasons. First, **the existence of Republic of Moldova is questioned as a state**, which, since its independence, couldn't control its entire territory, population, and the central administrative structures haven't reached the separatist region. The risks related to this phenomenon are the transformation of Moldova in a weak state or even a failed one, without the possibility to exercise its power and to manage its territory.

The first point in this subject is the one which refers to the presence in this region of some **foreign military groups that don't have a status**, without having the approbation of the government; there are also immense stores of weapons, illegal corrupt structures, characterized by organized crime, **paramilitary enforcement bodies**, separatist units of militia, security service or other, as well as the bodies of former state plants collective groups – OSTK. This subject is on top of the security challenges list because the situation makes possible the majority of other risks to threaten Moldovan society. The perspective of conflict settlement, of the separatist situation and of the retreat of the Russian troops is still unclear, though this subject is very often found on the political agenda of the NATO member states, EU and former Soviet countries. Keeping this subject in focus may create substantial possibilities to reunite all resources and to make the decisive step in solving the situation.

But maybe the most dangerous thing is that the existence of separatism is related to – in the opinion of its own population, the European one or of dif-

ferent experts – the **absence of political will** in Moldova to solve the conflict. The unanimous adoption of documents on this subject – as it happened after the Kozak memorandum and especially this summer, in Parliament plenum, with the law on principles for solving the Nistru conflict – it is an extremely important step. But it cannot replace **the lack of credibility of the measure** when the separatist leaders have properties, newspapers and profitable businesses on the right bank of Nistru, together with politicians from Chisinau, without respecting the state or paying their taxes. When separatist leaders find support and business partners to finance separatism. When the sums that circulate in the narrow space of Transnistria as incomes or benefits substantially exceed the efficiency of the institutions that respect the law and with which they compete in Chisinau. And finally, when there exist **agreements and commitments that keep the privileges** and the possibility of the separatists or of the firms registered in Transnistria of any nationality, **to falsify the rules adopted** in Chisinau, for the profit of some politicians from the Parliament or Chisinau Government.

This situation stops any possibility **to draw the support of international communities to a final, just and longlasting regulation** of the separatist problem, as long as the lack of credibility exists – and, in consequence, lack of legitimacy – in concrete actions for developing the existent situation and to take back the state control over the separatist region.

3.2. Non-viable solutions of the Dniestr conflict, which weaken the state

We moved to the second position in the challenges of security and security risks, the adoption of a non-viable solution of the Nistru conflict which might weaken the Republic of Moldova. Our option is clear, because **questioning the integrity of the state** is one the of most important threats against the national security of any state.

Questioning the viability of the state can have 4 directions: keeping a foreign troop that doesn't have a status/with undetermined mandate on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, especially when a multinational troop is not mentioned, but the troops of another country – especially if it was a former ruler, Russia, involved in the conflict – and judged by the international community, see ECHR vs. Ilashku and others versus Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova case. The second circumstance would be the implementation of a solution that imposes **the control of the separatist region over the**

security, defense and foreign affairs decisions of the Republic of Moldova. The “Kozak plan” was a similar formula that could block through the representatives of the separatist region any option of the Republic of Moldova, including the strategic ones, or joining EU or other settlement of security problems by joining NATO.

The third principle would subsidiarily suppose that accepting the immediate separation of the Nistru region from the Republic of Moldova and surviving in a separatist area, such as the enclave between Moldova and the Ukraine, with control over all economic agents and non-regulated relations in the region, trafficking and trans-border crime threat, the unpredictability and lack of stability in the region, and maintaining a centre of instability sine die.

This step has 2 components, the eternal security threat through the transfer of instability and crime, but may be more important, the questioning of the legality of a state that doesn't want to monitor problems of one of its regions. There are no other countries like this in Europe. We place here risky models that will not lead to a just and long-term solution of the Nistru problem, but contrary to this, will make this problem appear constantly in the agenda. In this sense the previous experience led to a range of lessons learned by the international community. Let's examine these models:

The “Kosovo Model”

Promoted more by Tiraspol and Moscow, a so-called ‘Kosovo model’ is met today in Romanian academical circles quite frequently – for instance see the plan launched in public by the Social-Democratic Institute “Ovidiu Sincai’, and personally supported by Prof. Adrian Severin – but also in open debates in the Republic of Moldova. Actually, the Kosovo case belongs to a state, restricted Yugoslavia, sanctioned by the International community (UN minus Russia, in case of the resolution regarding the intervention) because it caused a genocide against a group of minorities, in a certain region of the country. The law was outside of the international legislation, and this was the reason why UN took over the administration of the region for a certain period of time, having to establish further a way of an administrative settlement. There was a military intervention against **an aggressor state and then the long-term international administration was established**. Then a long-term solution needed to be found, but it is not found yet.

Actually there is no such thing as Kosovo model. There are 7 different opinions and no defined solution, more than that, the Kosovo case is a failure. It started with no solution, hoping that later the best centre-periphery relations

will be found. The responsibility of the international community requires that several forces be immobilized in this region for almost 6 years, a settlement solution not been found yet. It is even worse than in the Crimea case – when there was also no final plan from the very beginning and the arrangements were not the best ones; Kiev is not pleased with the solution, but it was still accepted – and even worse than Iraq case from the point of view of perspectives – in the case of Iraq, a parliament and a government is voted, a constitution and a federal arrangement between the three communities (kurdish, sunit, shiit) was agreed upon, and after the validation referendum, it will be possible to move to another constitutional election in order to establish legal bodies that will be able to administer the state.

The Transnistria case is ostensibly different from the Kosovo case, because the state is the one who respects the international legislation and rules, but the separatist region is outlawed, with banned leaders in EU and USA, because of facts of supposing international crime. In Transnistria, there is no dominant ethnic minority, other than that of the state there are more Russian and Ukrainian ethnic representatives in the capital of the Republic of Moldova, Municipality of Chisinau, than on the whole right bank of the river than in Transnistria – and the international community imposed no forced sanctions upon the behaviour of the state, it was only a conflict between separatists – supported by a foreign country – and the legal state that is internationally recognized. So there is no Kosovo solution, and by no means the future relation between the centre and the regional leadership can be applied in Transnistria.

The “Cyprus Model”

It is the second idiosyncrasy of the researchers in relation to a possible solution in the Nistru crises. Actually, there is no ‘Cyprus model’, too, as long as the **Cypriot crisis is not solved** ! Moreover, the exception made by the EU led to a strange situation when the solution negotiated by local political authorities and heavily supported by the UN and EU was rejected by Greece, the country that is almost a part of EU, while the Turkish region voted for the reunifying solution! The Cyprus case is a failure; too, that is why this model cannot be applied today, in a EU with much more problems and more « orthodox » in respecting rules by future candidates.

There is no reason to talk about comparative situation in the Greek regions of Cyprus and of the right bank of the river in the Republic of Moldova. The difference is enormous, and the joining conditions of Cyprus are very different from those of Moldova today. More over, if Turkey has important prospec-

tive to enter EU – it was about to do that, but the war in Cyprus stopped the process, and today the beginning of negotiations is expected – in the case of Russia, the one that has the role of supporter of the separatist region, and there is no prospective of that kind in the predictable future! The model cannot be applied in its initial form, just for the reason that there are no credible means of pressure and persuasion of the separatist party to accept the reintegration plan, like the case of Turkey with EU. Actually, the only acceptable solution would be the direct support through expertise, reform and administrative capacity of the state power and of the legal state of the Republic of Moldova and to retake the control over the separatist party, respecting the qualified and well expressed will of the population from the Eastern bank of Nistru to have a local administration or an autonomous region, in broader or narrower limits.

3.3. Energy security

In order not to devote too much space to the **economic security** in all its components, I have chosen the most essential element for the Republic of Moldova – **the energy security**. The Republic of Moldova is completely dependent – especially the import of oil and gas – on the supply of goods from Russian Federation. Apart from known Moscow pressures on the policy of ex-soviet states through energy mechanisms, Republic of Moldova continues to have a **reduced payment capacity** for the consumed gas or oil. Although through excising these imports should become important sources of income to the state budget, the lack of payment ability of small consumers, but also of industrial consumers, doubled by the tax dodging and smuggling at a large scale of these products, all these lead to an extremely delicate situation.

The fact that Moldova is forced to pay the «world» price as Russian Federation requests, leads to big **problems of supply** especially because **the lack of an alternative source**, the fact that permits the existence of any kind of prices, no matter how prohibitive they might be. In fact, the Republic of Moldova pays today the same prices as the rest of European countries do – with the exception of the special supplies. In relation to **electric power**, the biggest productive capacity remains the Kuciurgan thermo-power plant, situated on the left bank of Nistru and under the control of separatists. This situation can be compensated only by imports from Ukraine or Romania, but in the first case the **resources are limited** – with the exception of those that come from far-away and the cost of which is raised because of the shipment – and the second one has European prices.

If until recently Chsinau was threatened by the prospective of remaining without resources of gas or electricity, because of blocked supplying lines that

cross separatist Transnistria, today the Republic of Moldova is a little bit relieved, after the **commitment taken by Bucharest**, by president Traian Basescu personally, that he will not allow Chisinau to be blackmailed because of energy. This does not mean that any kind of energy consumption must not be paid, and the Republic of Moldova still has an unpaid debt for more than 5 years.

A solution must be identified on **medium or long term**. In case of oil, the things become clearer after Azpetrol took control of the Giurgiulesti terminal. A solution for gas supply will not be elaborated soon, on short term, but there is a possibility of a gas pipeline that will make a detour of Russia, with Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan being the starting points, then going and supplying gas to Ukraine and then continuing through Central Europe: this could be an alternative. The possibility of an Egyptian gas pipeline that will reach Turkey is still worked on; the project is going to be put into practice after long years.

In the matter of electric power, the Republic of Moldova has an immediate solution – the investments in the third group of the atomic-electric power station from Cernavoda. Once, Chisinau was invited to take part in investments in the second group, a form of foreign loan was even established to perform the payment, but Andrei Sangheli, the agrarian Prime-minister of the Republic of Moldova at that time, rejected the offer. The second group is going to be put into operation very soon now, so that would have been a solution already. At least the investment in the third group should be done, that is somewhat reduced as the one needed for a chain of micro hydro-electric power stations, the cost/profit efficiency of which is lower.

No matter what the solution is, a medium-term solution is very necessary, in the circumstances of **constant shortages on the Moldovan market**. And not last, the big investors in the energy filed will not be able to approach the Republic of Moldova as long as there exists unfaithful competition of the tax dodgers and smugglers that are tolerated by the authorities work, or the state's interventionism on a free market.

3.4. Organized crime

The organized crime is the forth on the challenges list against the national security because it **directly affects the population**, and is extremely **visible**, especially when criminals settle their conflicts in public spaces. This subject becomes more important as it speaks about politicians, businessmen that work together with different types of criminals. It is important also to mention the **white collar mafia** that works with the so called **legal thieves**, the one who obtain, hierarchically, the trusteeship over an area or another of the territory or

economy of the Republic of Moldova, requesting protection taxes from businessmen and controlling a certain part of the economy. The lack of a direct solution that will lead to an **end of this type of activity** – and not to an agreement between the state and these mafia men – draws away both the foreign investors and the real resources of the state's budget, with enormous costs for a correct functioning of the state.

3.5. Trafficking

Trafficking is another threat against the security of the Republic of Moldova, because of its diversity, of its **trans-border relevance** and of the maintenance of the separatist area as a source of trafficking products but also as a safety heaven for different criminals, involved in these operations. The most dangerous is human trafficking – with its components of **body organ trafficking** for illegal transplant, trafficking of children for illegal adoptions, trafficking in women for prostitution and, of illegal labor force trafficking; **drugs trafficking, trafficking in radioactive substances** (in possible components for an atomic or dirty bombs), **small arms trafficking** (produced in Transnistria, without serial numbers or identifying elements and launched in war zones or that are under embargo), but also the trafficking/**smuggling of products** – especially those excisable (tobacco, alcohol, perfumes), or imitations brought from the countries that do not respect the rules of intellectual property protection – China, Singapore, Taiwan, etc. – which directly affect the national economy, especially the competition with the original goods, in the Republic of Moldova or on the markets where these products may arrive, especially in EU. Letting this problem without a solution may **strain the relations with EU countries** and with multinational firms producers of registered brands, and the effect may be much important than of other threats that are more visible and with greater impact over the population.

3.6. Emerging oligarchies

A very important problem in the ex-soviet area is the emergence of **oligarchs that have multibillion fortunes**, who can afford **buying political decisions** and influencing them. The Republic of Moldova is not an oil country, and does not possess resources that would permit it to get rich in a fast and uncontrolled way, in the absence of some market regulations. But there have emerged some rich individuals that showed their influence in this field lately. It is for example Boris Birstein or Igor Smirnov, or other rising oligarchs, as well

as the accumulation of enormous fortunes and the tendency to control politics field through immense and uncontrolled funds or mixing political positions with economic interest can lead to big problems in the balance and democratic control of the country. This problem also requires adoption of some rules that imply **loyal competition, equal access to chances and opportunities**. Also there is a need for **anticorruption legislation** based on defining the **conflict of interests** and the **control of the fortunes** of the public officials, the declaration of interests by public officials and **withdrawal from their businesses or to refrain from taking decisions** that are in conflict with the state's interest.

3.7. Lack of administrative ability and of fundamental elements of the rule of law

This is one of the most important chapters marking the risks against national security. It consists of aspects related to crime, lack of market regulation and the emergence of oligarchs through unfaithful competition and the incapacity to apply the legislation – **the administrative incapacity to support the rule of law**. Also mentioned here are large-scale violation of law, corruption, tax dodging, illegal work or violation of legislation by economic agents – natural and legal persons, but also the state – and the **lack of the capacity to apply the existent law** or the **impossibility to apply the legislation equally**, no matter the judge or law! There is an entire legislative and administrative reform, starting from the one applied to **public officials** to that of the law at all levels, but also the **elimination of good will** in the activity of the legal bodies. The risk of neglecting these aspects is related to the **prestige of the law and of legal bodies**, to the **credibility** of these institutions and **cooperation** given by citizens to those two institutions in the process of implementation of the legal documents or in the public administration of some domains. The lack of this contribution of the population makes the activity of the enforcement and legal institutions inefficient and abusive in the administrative fields; it **produces non-participation** of citizens in the decision-making and makes almost impossible to put the present regulations, law norms and legislation into use.

3.8. The emerging “Prut wall” between Moldova and Romania

I have included this one in the list of 12 risk and threats against the security of the Republic of Moldova. It is generically called “the Prut wall” because of the costs of the second phase of the Shoengen agreement by Romania, in the nearest future. In the absence of radical and direct solutions, the Republic of

Moldova may face a real wall built near Prut, before Romania joins the European Union. It is necessary that Republic of Moldova establishes itself the goal of obtaining **free movement of its citizen in the EU countries**. The **elimination of visas** (even the one with Romania that will soon be introduced), has several steps to pass, and Romania has a favourable experience in this domain, because it succeeded to remove visas on January 1, 2002, 5 years before joining the EU! In order to accomplish this, the Republic of Moldova, must get rid of European Council monitoring by adopting necessary provisions according to the recommendation from 2002 in the first place. At the same time, it must start debates with the EU on the subject of **signing rejoining treaties** with member and associated states, the implementation of a proper law and the issue of secured identity documents, and the strict monitoring of population, for further implementation of necessary legislation and to put into practice the provisions of an efficient control of its borders, especially the Eastern ones. The removal of visas or the rejection to introduce them – for the population of European and associated states is a new step that will be well received by the European citizens. And a deep European **solution for products and people control**, on the right bank of Nistru, can only strengthen the image that there exist political decisions to settle the conflict and for the elimination of crime import from Transnistria in the rest of Moldovan territories.

3.9. Failure of reforms – loosing hope

I had identified among major risks against the security of the Republic of Moldova the failure/delay of democratic reforms and of market economy. It is obvious that this kind of phenomenon will lead to the sine die failure/delay of setting closer to the EU. A very special mention comes after the identification of the main threat against the security of the Republic of Moldova – Nistru separatism and the presence of foreign troops on this territory. This reality doesn't have to be a reason to delay reforms, but contrary to this, the changes on the right side of Nistru can make the right bank look more attractive for the population from the separatist region. More than that, the failure to solve the Nistru problem will never be regarded by the international community as an excuse to slow/block the reforms. A second component is the loss of trust and public support. Today, there is a major people's support for the joining EU. Not using this ace in time can lead to the loss of trust, the loss of people's hope and reversibility of the integration direction towards the Western world and democratic values, but the extremist and antidemocratic groups can gain advantage.

3.10. Reforms, consolidation of the independent statehood, democratization and civilian control over the security sector actors

It is almost impossible to expect the emergence of a democratical environment, rule of law and effective market economy in Moldova unless the security environment (domestic and foreign) will be shaped up to reflect these values and priorities as well. The main obstacle at this point is to give a clear sense of strategic priorities in reforming the so-called “force structures” of the state. It is all about a range of successive phenomena that are related to:

- **army reform** – determining special domains in order to develop complementary abilities of strategic partners, international cooperation in operation areas under diverse aegis, profesionalization and appropriate equipment supply in order to be able to respond to the security challenges on its territory;
- **police reform** – the transformation out of a repressive body into one that serves population, police demilitarization, to make it serve community indeed, as a public service, etc.;
- **information services reform** – to transform it from a repressive security body, a body of judicial inquiry and prosecuting, into one that will deliver classified information to people who have access to it, it is important to make it a non-political body, with no double-subordination, to establish a strict control over the employees in order to accomplish a real national informational service, etc.

Democratization and civil control over these institutions, a real parliamentary control and judicial control over the actions that can lead to reaching human rights. It is no use to insist on these priorities. The lack of a national independent informational service creates dependency on other states, the lack of civil control leads to the possibility of independent and oppressive actions against citizens or the possibility **to assume control over political and economic life**, or a discretionary use by the police, people or groups of interest, of **information exodus** to unauthorized people.

3.11. Reconciliation with the past

An important subject for the **reestablishment of real, trustful and respectful relations** between the repressive in the past enforcement bodies and the contemporary democratic society, the citizens once oppressed. It is the **need to forget the past**, to offer **access to the archives** and personal files of

politically chased people and to sentence those who worked in the **political police** and who destroyed a lot of human lives. The reconciliation with the past is difficult, but the 16 years that passed since we achieved sovereignty and 14 since we gained independence may allow this step, too. By solving **cases of political police** and eliminating from the new information service of those who had performed illegal activity, it is absolutely important in order **to restart the construction of a trustful basis** between society, citizens and informational systems. This kind of **moral reform** will bring a lot of benefit to information services that can start the institutional reconstruction on new bases. The experience of ex-socialist countries from Eastern and Central Europe – today members of EU and NATO – show that the process ended without public executions or excessive transparency by revealing state secrets, but contributed to a **re-launch of new information services** that are credible for Western partners. The lack of fears regarding illegal interception of telephone, internet and fax information, illegal surveillance with political goals, can determine a raise of consumption in the field of telecommunication and of the trust in the security of these types of communications, and the increase of the trust in the respect of human rights by the state.

3.12. Social security: identity problem

Social security is a security element, defined this way by the Copenhagen school, the one which redefined the concept of security in the case of NATO. This component must also be settled by renouncing to/passing from the Wilson type of identity (associated to the century old political realism, that presupposes the impossibility of legitimacy of a state without identifying a single entitled nation, that will justify the existence of the state) to the identity of modern type, respectively, to take oneself a real identity, the Romanian one, of the majority of Moldovan population and the elimination of frustration and complexes that led to the so called “Moldovan soviet type” pseudo-identity. That, as stated many times before, affects both the relations with Romania, and those with the Ukraine, both its neighbours.

Chapter IV.

POLICE REFORM AND HUMAN SECURITY IN MOLODVA

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Introduction

Policing and the police are at the outset of the criminal justice system. Policing activities range from the routine provision of administrative services to citizenry, through systematic or ad hoc patrolling of certain areas, to criminal investigation, recovery of stolen property and bringing to justice of suspects. It also includes certain functions of punishment such as arrest, detention for limited periods of time, and the administration of fines. Obviously, in different criminal justice systems the police have different functions. Yet, in most of the systems policing is a mix of preventive, administrative and repressive functions.

In most of the systems the police are the first criminal justice agency which citizens get into contact with and, in turn, form opinions about the whole justice system. To many the police are the primary reference and symbol of state power. It is a subsystem of justice under continuous scrutiny by the citizenry and the object of frequent political debate regarding powers of control, issues of privacy and issues of crime prevention and control priorities. Often the real or perceived failures on the part of the police to meet the real or perceived as important needs and interests of the community or social interest groups lead to the development of alternative policing styles. Policing is indeed the most targeted process in the continuous evaluative process of the justice system.

It is no surprise, then, that of all the subsystems of justice, it was policing that aroused major interest in, and a need to show that things are indeed changing in the post-communist countries following the fall of the Berlin Wall. A number of reforms were and are still directed towards police. Most probably the major share of international assistance and donors efforts in the justice sector went into the policing area. This paper provides an overview of the challenges of reforming the structures and processes of policing in the context of the democratic transition in Moldova. It begins with a discussion of the concept of democratic policing as the perceived goal of police reform in a state under democratization, and then outlines the general parameters of

police reform in Moldova, including some of the main obstacles and problems that have been encountered. Finally, it outlines some directions for future research on crime control and police reform in the country.

4.1. Democratic policing

Democratic policing is characterized by an orientation to service for civil society, rather than the state; transparency and accountability; integrity management as a central function of police administration; a semi-autonomous status of the police organization and system; the treatment of police as citizens; and the possession of skills needed to perform allocated tasks efficiently and effectively, as indicated by the degree of professionalism at all ranks of the organization and across specific functional tasks (e.g., managerial skills at the higher ranks, technical skills in investigations, or people skills by street level police in encounters with citizens).

Striving to achieve these values is seen as essential for work performance of the police which can be labeled democratic. The most difficult transitions, given the legacy of socialist policing policies, cultures and values, include integrity management, that is operational policies which actively and persistently enforce stated normative standards to prevent corruption and abuses of power; semi-autonomy which refers to the need and capacity by the police to balance responsiveness to state and civic society demands with the requirement that the police to enforce the law impartially, professionally and without bias; internal democracy within the police organization; and accountability by the police to relevant state legislative, executive and judicial organizations and to civic society.

If effectively implemented, core values will lead to enhanced performance which ensures the personal safety of the population and public order balanced against the demands that policing be attuned to professional, integrity and service oriented priorities. Accountable police are transparent in their procedures and operations and are subject to both internal and external control mechanisms that ensure the police are performing their functions in a way that respects rule of law and the human and civil rights of the people they serve. Police who enjoy public legitimacy are viewed both by state actors and the public as representing significant and legitimate interests in society, hence as acting fundamentally in the public interest and effectively fulfilling their duties in a trustworthy and just manner.

The key to the concept of legitimacy is consent. Liberal democracies uphold the value of consent of the governed, which bestows legitimacy and the moral right of government to govern, a function which includes the provision

of basic public services such as security and order. The need for consent is especially true of police, who exert much potential power, both intrusive and coercive, over citizens. Public consent and legitimacy of policing in democracies are based on the general belief that police adhere to the law and due process, are subject to control, are accountable and transparent, are politically neutral, and seek to protect human and civil rights.

4.2. Challenge of police reform in Moldova

The structure and functioning of socialist police continue to influence the development of post-socialist Moldovan police and criminal justice systems. Policing in Moldova was based on the model developed and applied in the entire Soviet Union. The Marxist-Leninist state was ideologically framed as a socialist state of the people and also their political organization. Since the function of the state was to facilitate the transition to an ideal Communist society where all means of production would be communally owned, it justified exercising control and coercion to that end. As a result, criminal law was intended to protect both citizens and the socialist state from criminal acts, and 'to help propel the system toward Communism'. Police were a key instrument in protecting both the state and citizens, and fostering development of socialist consciousness by enforcing conformity with state ideology.

While the Soviet-style militia gradually evolved from a militarized body that suppressed political opposition to a law enforcement body responsible for ensuring public order (and relying on the complicity of citizens in their own control), it remained an authoritarian police force closely tied to the party-state. Common to all socialist systems, the mission of the police (militia) was essentially political – i.e. to further progress towards communism under the leadership of the communist party. The authority of the police derived from policies determined by the party central committee and police were in practice subordinate to the party and expected to execute the will of the party. Party influence was omnipresent, with political indoctrination of recruits (recruitment was often influenced by the degree of ideological commitment of the applicant), and most police were party members. Socialist-era police were also highly centralized, with high degrees of supervision over daily activities and decisions, and had a militarized administrative style based on the strict obedience of orders.

Centralized control also prevented the development of administrative autonomy of local police. Given the tightly constrained decision-making power of individual policemen who normally had to seek approval from higher-ups on most decisions, the development of individual powers of judgment and dis-

cretion among individual police officers was inhibited. Socialist-era police also lacked transparency, and the existence of classified laws and regulations that reached into areas of daily life meant that the state's authority as exercised by the police was both overarching and unknown to citizens. Furthermore, the Party functioned above the law, with a prohibition against investigating and prosecuting Party members unless authorized by the Party itself. Manipulation of the legal process was thus enabled by the blurring of political, judicial and law enforcement powers and close links between Party, prosecutor's office and police.

While Western European democracies underwent a process of liberalization in their criminal justice and penal policies after World War II, which included abolition of the death penalty and the development of alternatives to imprisonment, the criminal justice systems of Communist countries did not experience the same type or degree of liberalisation. Compared to Western European states, official crime rates were very low. Since state socialist ideology stated that crime was by definition a capitalist phenomenon that was supposed to disappear with the achievement of communism, a lower crime rate confirmed the superiority of the communist system over the capitalist system. As a result, officials tended to actively discourage the reporting of crime, with the result that crime rates were artificially low levels and are considered unreliable by analysts. At the same time, socialist criminal policy was harsh in comparison to that in Western Europe, and rates of incarceration were high through convictions in criminal cases and by the use of psychiatric evaluations for unsocialist thoughts and acts.

For example, whereas Western Europe relied heavily on fines in terms of penal sanctions (often comprising over 80 percent of penal sanctions in many European countries), Moldova relied predominantly on the punishment of imprisonment. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova faced the task of building a criminal justice system that was more democratic and transparent. Crimes had to be redefined, depoliticised, and penalties diversified and made less harsh. Criminal justice system transformation included removing references to socialist rule of law, introducing due process guarantees, eliminating the categories of ideological crimes and crimes by analogy, abolishing the death penalty and introducing softer sentencing as well as reducing the reliance on imprisonment by introducing alternative forms of penalties and non-custodial sanctions such as fines, while also improving living conditions in prisons.

The post-1991 social context was one of growing levels of poverty, unemployment and extremes of social differentiation, while privatization of state assets and market reforms were transforming the economy. Policing was often severely under-resourced, and understaffing due to the departure of many

personnel from police structures (for better paying private employ in private security firms or as muscle for organized crime), low levels of public trust and prestige accorded the police, and serious morale problems left the police structures weakened and less able to fulfill their functions in an ever more challenging environment. Moldova, like all post-socialist societies experienced an explosion of regular and transnational organized crime involved in smuggling drugs, people, arms, or conventional contraband such as cars, and in some areas, the criminalisation of the economy through growth of the shadow economy and links between organised crime and corrupt state officials.

The impact of crime rise on citizen attitudes has been significant. Moldovan citizens have demonstrated high levels of fear of crime and feelings of insecurity. At the same time, they generally continue to perceive the police as corrupt or as serving the interests of the state or private interests rather than those of the community. The widespread fear of crime is not only a result of the actual increase in crime rates, but also in part a function of the liberalisation of the media in Moldova and their transformation from 'good news media' which censored domestically troubling news items, to 'bad news media' operating on the assumption that crime and exposés of corruption and ineffectiveness of state officials, including the police and criminal justice system, sells more papers. Another major difference between Western Europe countries and Moldova is in attitudes towards the police. Victims of crime in Moldova remain less likely to report the crimes to police. Reluctance to report crimes in Moldova may also result from fear of revenge by the organized gangs responsible for certain types of crimes.

The growth in public fear of crime in Moldova has significance for politics and policy. In contexts where public fear of crime reaches high levels, public, media and political parties can create pressure for punitive crime control policies as 'law and order politics' comes to dominate the political agenda, leading to calls from certain political parties, media and members of the public for more punitive crime control policies. In Moldova the emergence of state-organized crime syndicates engaged in smuggling of all kinds of goods and people, a traffic protected by violence and fear, undermined much of the impetus for reform and increased public demands to crack down on crime.

Thus, the Moldovan society encountered significant challenges in transforming its policing structures. The country faces the legacy of a decades-long experience as a state socialist regime which used the Soviet model of policing based on police that remained subject to Party control. Moreover, Moldova experienced sharp increases in crime and pervasive public fear of crime and the perception that police were unable to adequately assure their personal safety

and protect their property. These factors also contributed to the widespread emergence of private police and security firms, a theme to which I will return later in the paper.

4.3. Experiences in Moldovan police reform

Fundamental and sustained reform of the regular policing system has proven one of the more difficult tasks faced by Moldova. While many changes have been made in police organisation in terms of the declaratory statements of policing officials, legal frameworks and symbolic and structural reforms implemented (such as changing the name of the organisation from militia to police, changing uniforms and rank structures), they have often proven superficial and do not yet appear to have succeeded in fundamentally changing the working values, habits and practices of the police to the point where they could be said to fully embody democratic policing. The police cannot yet be said to adopt a service mentality and the relationship between citizens and police must still undergo fundamental change before it can be said that police are accountable and enjoy public consent and legitimacy. Chronic under funding and lack of effectiveness in combating crime contribute to the lack of public trust and confidence in police organisations throughout the region.

Moldova has been active in reforming police structures and legislation but continue to experience problems with police use of excessive force and mistreatment of detainees and continuing police accountability problems. Police reform in Moldova not only confronts the legacy of state socialism, but also lingering aftermaths in terms of organized criminal networks, widespread trafficking and corruption.

Achieving democratic policing throughout the country is vital for long-term reform efforts.

Police organisation in Moldova continues to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies, and remains more militarised, centralised and politicised than is generally the case in Western societies. The problems of police transformation must be seen in the broader context of corruption and organised crime that pervade Moldova. In certain cases police continue to exhibit serious problems of abuse of power, corruption, mistreatment and even torture of detainees and prisoners. One legacy of the Soviet system is the highly centralised plans and a culture that discouraged initiative and the development of personal discretion among officers. This has had a lingering effect on leadership and management in Moldova, including in the policing field. Moldova has a system of legal education that tends to be highly theoretical, without adequate teaching

of practical skills. The training of police managers in Moldova tends to heavily emphasize learning the legal framework and theoretical issues, rather than practical and effective management techniques.

Moreover, centralised control and party oversight, led to a fear of discretion at the lower ranks. Police working the street were reluctant to take any action not directly specified or sanctioned by their superiors, leading to vast inefficiencies and massive corruption as officers went in search of directions whenever an unusual situation occurred, rather than use their discretion to arrive at a situationally justified solution, or sought to solve the problem faced by intimidation and corrupt means. Of course, the willingness to make decisions which are not precisely spelled out by law or organisational regulations is a fundamental aspect of democratic policing.

The transformation in policing involves a fundamental shift in how policing – and security more generally – is being governed. Not only is the authority to produce security being transferred to groups within states, but this authority is being handed upwards (supranationalisation) to international political actors such as the United Nations and European Union, but also to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, regional actors such as the OSCE and OECD, and foreign assistance agencies within states, who are increasingly becoming concerned with state spending on security and the relationship between economic and political development and reform of the security sector. This transformation suggests the need for governance of policing and security at transnational levels.

Multilateralisation of both the auspices and providers of policing is evident in Moldova. Public fear of crime escalated dramatically while police lacked adequate resources and know-how to combat the surge in crime. Additionally, policing capacity was undermined as many members of the regular police and state security agencies left the services for private sector employment with private security companies. The police were perceived as unable to provide public security, and as a result those who could afford to turned increasingly to private security agencies. These agencies have become providers of many functions traditionally performed by the state, including law enforcement, but also administering justice, resolving disputes, protecting people and property, debt enforcement and intelligence-gathering.

In Moldova the emergence of a ‘shadow state’ and underground, largely criminalised, economy controlled by organised crime groupings led to a system of private and brutal enforcement and protection, or policing, of that economy, and spilled over into the legal economy as legitimate domestic and international firms were pressured into buying protection for their personnel and properties

against criminal acts from the very people most likely to do them. The state police could do little to protect companies against such extortion and demands for participation by organised crime in their legitimate activities.

The Moldovan transition from state socialism involving rapid privatization and economic liberalization from 1992-1996 also triggered important structural changes in the provision of law enforcement, security and justice. The transition created a broad array of new economic actors who required protection in an environment rife with extortion and criminal groups. However, such protection was not provided adequately by the state security and law enforcement services, which experienced personnel loss and diminishing efficiency as the state deliberately sought to decrease the power of state security and law enforcement structures by decentralizing them and creating multiple agencies with overlapping areas of jurisdiction. As a general result of these reforms, state control over organized coercion and administration of justice became increasingly fragmented. The vacuum in protection resulted in a surge in growth of private protection and enforcement agencies that drew on the personnel of state security structures and offered services based on special relationships with those state structures. What has become visible in Moldova is a 'hybrid sector' of private security firms that exist between the private sector and the state.

These profit-driven firms sell protection and contract enforcement services, drawing especially on their links with state security organs to not only provide protection, but to engage directly in the sphere of business transactions through informal negotiations with other enforcers in case of breach of contract or failure to service a debt. The chiefs of private protection companies openly admit what they call mutually beneficial cooperation with the state organs, meaning an exchange of operative information for money or equipment. The Moldovan state encouraged the formation of such firms through legislation that made it easy to set up such agencies, particularly if an individual had professional experience in state law enforcement or security organs. In such a way, creating space for the establishment of private security firms was a means of facilitating the reemployment of former security and police officers in the private sector.

Private security agencies in the country have close links to state police and security agencies, due in part to having absorbed large numbers of former secret service, police and army officials, and communist-era high officials. Furthermore, the police routinely direct victims of certain crimes to look for private protection and assistance or else, through inaction, tacitly encourage other victims to seek private means of redress. The situation in Moldova, with its diverse range of security auspices and providers, is suggestive of a weak state which has difficulty meeting the security needs of its citizens. Neverthe-

less, some experts on the dynamics of weak and failing states maintain that international donors have over-relied on the state as the main authorizer and provider of security. Rather, they suggest that reforming the governance of security in weak and failing states requires drawing on local knowledge and creative mobilisation of a broad range of non-state actors and resources, both domestic and transnational. Creative partnerships in security governance, including those between state and non-state actors, is being advanced as a potential means of serving local public security needs while relieving pressure on state agencies and enabling them to emerge or regenerate.

4.4. Conclusions

The effects of Soviet-type policing continue to be felt in Moldova, although it is expected that with the passage of time, post-socialist conditions will fade and a more distinct national system of policing will become evident. The homogenising effects of international norms and EU standards as well as the impact of international donor assistance must also be taken into account as factors shaping the future development of the Moldovan policing system.

Despite the structural and procedural reforms implemented in the policing organisation across Moldova, the overall results are not yet satisfactory, especially when one takes into account the views of citizens and crime victims. The continuing low rate of public confidence and satisfaction in the police and reluctance to report crime, along with the generally elevated fear of crime and feelings of insecurity throughout the country, speak to an urgent need for improving police performance in crime prevention and control and changing the relationship between the police and local communities. The record of the past fifteen years indicates that the transformation from authoritarian to democratic policing is not something that can be quickly achieved, but is a long-term process requiring years of reform and investment.

Finally, new forms of security provision have emerged throughout the country. Private security companies have become suppliers of services previously provided by the state. The proliferation of private security companies and their ambiguous links with state police and security institutions require further study, with special attention to implications for security governance.

As noted earlier, crime and fear of crime are powerful political issues which are easily exploited for partisan and personal gains. The temptation to use crime and the police as political symbols and issues is ever present. Only when that temptation is resisted by political leaders and community activists can reform of policing systems begin to move toward democratic norms and forms.

Chapter V.

ECONOMIC SECURITY OF MOLDOVA: A LOOK INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

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5.1. Economic security in the period of globalization

The economic security is a concept that has little acceptance between the adepts of economic neo-liberalism. This tendency serves as an ideological base for the economic policies implemented in many developed countries and for recommendations made to underdeveloped countries' governments by the international financial institutions. The economic security is not included in this mainstream of contemporary economic thinking. The main cause resides in the fact that the monitoring and assurance of the economic security involves prevention, interdiction and penalization actions from the government, which are oriented towards various "objects" that may undermine the security. Obviously, this necessity cannot be seen in a good light by those who recommend the stepping down of the state from the game of market forces and the assumption by it of the role of arbiter in this game.

These precisions are necessary for understanding the double difficulty faced by the "subject" that formulates the economic security strategies, especially in the case of countries which do not enjoy a big freedom in taking decisions in relation to foreign players (other countries, regional and international organizations). On one hand, the subject must convince the public and foreign partners that we must think seriously about the matter of economic security. On the other hand, he must really think and ensure this security.

There are very many definitions of economic security, because the concept itself is rather permissive, even ambiguous¹. Economic security can be regarded in relation to different categories of security objects: of the producers, consumers, production factors' owners, of the state². In the context of this study we will define the economic security as the totality of necessary conditions for

¹ Buzan, 2000.

² Prohntichi, 2002.

the realization of a normal economic development of the country and for the recuperation of differences in development compared to the European countries, for the integration to which the Republic of Moldova has an orientation.

The title of this study, which aims at having “a look in the 21st century”, does not intend to be a pathetic title. The 21st century will be characterized by a globalization of the economic activities at an even larger scale. The intensification of the globalization of markets will bring about a series of benefits and expenditures, risks and advantages. The understanding of these consequences implies a fundamental rethinking of the economic security. The governments of Moldova, which will try to ensure a higher security for the society they govern, will face major dilemmas. On one hand, the more profound integration of the country in the global economic body will commit us to a broader opening. The state boundaries will not longer be economic boundaries, and the abilities of the government to influence the system by economic policies will progressively decrease.

On the other hand, the whole humankind will begin to face new risks, for the defiance of which it is not yet prepared: 1) natural and ecological disasters produced by the impact of the activity of hydrocarbons; 2) the depletion, and together with this, the markup of natural resources, especially of hydrocarbons; 3) the increasingly unlinear and unpredictable evolving character of international markets, which threatens to degenerate in a global economic crisis, of the same level as that from 1929-1933; 4) the intensification of social protests and the appearance of some pressing, eventually terrorist, groupings, better organized than nowadays, and which will fight against globalization.

Openly or indirectly, at a larger or smaller scale, Moldova will face new risks, too. These will impose the development of a strategy for ensuring economic security, a strategy that does not exist in the present time. The given strategy must allow the attenuation of present economic vulnerabilities of Moldova, which today derive from: 1) major social and economic expenditures involved in illegal economic or even criminal activities, 2) the outdated structure of external commerce and the commercial dependencies determined by it, 3) economic and political pressures, which can be planned for the Republic of Moldova through foreign investments, but also the deficit of direct foreign investments, 4) badly assured energetic security and 5) quantitative and qualitative penury risk of human resources as a result of the demographic crisis and the emigration of the labour force.

5.2. Economy of illegal activities

Evasions

Evasions can be legal and illegal, the latter being analyzed in this study. In the Republic of Moldova the main types of evasions with major financial impact are the fiscal (non-payment of taxes) and custom (contraband, including elements of fiscal and currency evasion) evasions. Their immediate impact is obvious: firstly, public budgets suffer loss, secondly, economic agents who want to activate legally are affected. If there are not taken measures for the counteraction of evasions, the economic logic will tell those who activate legally to chose from: transferring more and more activities to the illegal sphere or leaving the market. The long-term impact on the economic security is also clear: the authority of the state is broken down as a supreme exponent of the economic policy and the financial resources that should be used for redistribution to poor and vulnerable social classes are reduced. As a result, the indices of poverty increase and efficiency of social protection policies decreases.

The governments of Moldova should be prepared for the fact that in the future the temptations for making these evasions will grow. This fact is determined by: 1) the implementation of informational technologies on a larger scale by the economic agents (particularly the application of e-commerce, especially difficult to be monitored by the custom, monetary and fiscal authorities) and 2) the more profound integration of national economic agents in international production and commercial networks. For counteracting, the government needs to endow itself adequately from the point of view of informational technologies, to participate at the international agreements of fighting evasions and crime and to contribute to the adequate monitoring of activities in off-shore regions on an international scale.

Custom evasions

The information about economic infractions offered now to the public is dozed. Nonetheless, on the basis of the existent studies and of the information made public by the Center for Counteracting Economic Crimes and Corruption, it could be affirmed that the custom and fiscal evasions involving oil products are present in the category of those which have the most disastrous impact on public finance and fair competition. The authors of one study show that in 2002 the oil products illegally brought to the country made up 15-16%

of the actual total consumption.³ The oil merchandise contraband is closely associated with fiscal evasion. The sale of contraband oil products has impeded the accumulation of VAT and excise income of 120 million lei in the budget! According to the same assessment, 60% of the total imports are made through enterprises recorded in off-shore regions, a situation that leads to the loss of huge budgetary income.

The custom evasions are possible due to the following main causes:

- The business culture that dominates the Moldovan society;
- The corruption of customs officials and the lack of transparency in the functioning of the customs system; the complexity of the legal framework that regulates the customs procedures;
- The discretion which can be exerted by customs officials during the fulfillment of their responsibilities;
- The opacity of employment procedures, the lack of an efficient public control and the big monetary costs for being recruited as a customs official;
- The lack of operative information regarding the international prices for imported merchandise at the disposal of customs officials;
- The lack of an efficient frontier between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine of the Transnistrian segment and the “porosity” of the frontier of the rest of the perimeter between the two countries.

Most of these cases are institutionally inflicted, and they must be approached from a neo-institutional perspective. The administrative and monitoring capacities of the customs system must be consolidated. Firstly, the informational integration of the national customs service in a single system and of the national system in other European systems is needed. In the next decade, together with the advance of affairs between Moldova and the EU, the problems of the customs system and of customs evasions will be among the most important ones, which Moldova will have to solve for the achievement of a more favorable image in the eyes of Europeans. As well, the solution of the Transnistrian problem in a manner that would allow Chisinau to establish an efficient control over its internationally recognized Eastern border will significantly decrease the number of evasions.

³ Roscovan and others.

Fiscal evasions

Fiscal evasions are increasingly difficult to assess, given their obscure nature. Nevertheless, on the basis of some indirect evidence, qualitative measurements and of some reports of Transparency International – Moldova, and of activity reports of the Main State Fiscal Inspectorate, we conclude that the fiscal evasions are often encountered as a phenomenon and imply an enormous financial cost for the public budgets. According to the estimations made by specialists, in 2002 the frequency of fiscal evasions (practiced by 64% of the contributable legal persons), was higher than in 1994 (53%).⁴

An index of the spreading of fiscal evasion is that the number of economic agents who submit fiscal reports is considerably smaller than the one registered in Inter-administrative National Register of the Republic of Moldova (RENIM). This way, according to the records of RENIM, in 2004 there were almost 122 thousand economic agents in Moldova.⁵ Among these, only one fifth was economically active, submitting fiscal reports.⁶ Some of those who were not submitting fiscal reports just did not activate, others activated, but only in the dark sector, and others were the so-called ghost-enterprises. Namely the economic agents from the last two categories are those who practice fiscal evasions in rather big proportions.⁷ Nonetheless, fiscal evasions are practiced by those who submit fiscal reports, too. According to the made estimations, evasions have increased from 632 million lei in 1999 to 1413 million lei in 2002.⁸ There were taken some actions that reduced the number of ghost-enterprises, including the raise of the amount starting with which economic agents can register as VAT payers.

Fiscal evasions are possible because of the following:

- Business culture and the lack of social responsibility of the entrepreneurs;
- Complexity and ambiguity of the fiscal legal framework;

⁴ Carasciuc and others.

⁵ “Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Moldova, 2004, NSL, February 2005, electronic version.

⁶ According to the declarations of the former minister of Economy of the Republic of Moldova, Mr. Marian Lupu, made at the “Development of Business and of Small and Medium Enterprises in Moldova” International Conference (June 29th – 30th, 2004).

⁷ According to the declarations of State Inspectorate officials, at the end of 2002 only in Chisinau municipality activated over 1500 ghost-enterprises (“PSFI seeks new ways of fighting ghost-enterprises” news, Infotag, December 13th, 2002).

⁸ Carasciuc and others.

- Rather reduced capacities of fiscal administration of state authorities in this field;
- Disintegration of the system: along with the Main State Fiscal Inspectorate, the fiscal functions are fulfilled by customs bodies and by the Center for Counteracting Economic Crimes and Corruption. As well, the State Fiscal Inspectorate is subordinated to the Ministry of Finances, while the Customs Service is not.
- Possibilities of easy corruption of fiscal officials who have very small salaries comparative to those paid in the private sector; the reports of the Accounting Court show that, after the fiscal inspectors and customs officials offered some unjustified facilities to economic agents, the public budgets loose income of hundreds of million lei⁹;
- The discretion of fiscal inspectors;

The opacity of employment procedures, the lack of an efficient public control and high costs for being recruited as a customs official. Fiscal evasions influence the economic security by the same means as the customs evasions, generating considerable budgetary loss and affecting the institution of fair competition.

Corruption

The empirical data show that there exists a link between the level of economic development of the country and the perceived level of corruption.¹⁰ A higher level of corruption is associated with a lower level of per capita income, which in its turn consolidates the vicious circle of corruption. Moldova is one of the most corrupted and poor states of Europe. Corruption is an institutional element that can undermine the economic system and this happens because it generates a whole set of macroeconomic and structural distortions, reduces the economic efficiency in using factors of production and highlights social inequalities.¹¹

A high level of corruption is always associated with a bigger proportion of dark economy.¹² To our opinion, in Moldova corruption is responsible of:

⁹ Decision no. 47 of June 14th, 2004 of the Accounting Court “Regarding the report of the Accounting Court on the administration and use of public financial resources in 2003” (MO no. 138-146/23 from August 13th, 2004).

¹⁰ Prohnitchi, 2003.

¹¹ Idem.

¹² Piculescu.

- The languor of direct foreign investments;
- The big part of dark economy;
- The inefficient allocation of public expenditures between sectors (priority is given to big, complex projects) and inside sectors (priority is given to capital investments instead of maintenance expenses) and even the dilapidation of public financial means;¹³
- The increase of costs for entering the market and of transactional costs;
- The organization of some inefficient public tenders, expensive for public budgets;
- Providing some not qualitative public services.

All the national and international reports on corruption denote that in Moldova the public perceives this phenomenon as being widely spread. Its costs are very high, even if we take into consideration only the administrative corruption, which affects the economic agents. In 2002 the economic agents have paid unofficial taxes afferent to various procedures regulating businesses in the amount of 16 million dollars. (1% of the GDP) We must add the bribes paid by students to university teachers, by patients to doctors, by parents to school teachers, by drivers to road police, by defendants to judges and others. We assess that the value of the bribes paid annually reaches 5-6% of the GDP in the Republic of Moldova.

We will not give details about the factors that generate corruption, because we deal with a whole bundle of dependencies and interdependencies. Nevertheless, starting off from the classical definition given by Robert Klitgaard to corruption (corruption = monopoly + discretion – responsibility), we can state that corruption in Moldova is generated by the following:

- Concentration of administrative resources for the assurance of an almost exhaustive control on the behalf of the state over private economic agents;
- The big discretion practiced by those who elaborate, apply and interpret the regulations (laws, governmental decisions, other normative acts);

¹³ For example, see the Decision of the Accounting Court: no. 47 from June 14th, 2004 “Regarding the report of the Accounting Court on the administration and use of public financial resources in 2003” (Monitorul Oficial no. 138-146/23 from August 13th, 2004), no. 53 from July 23rd, 2004 “Regarding the results of the control of the efficiency of expenditures for the maintenance of the Ministry of Transport and Communications and of the formation and use of the road fund in 2003” (Monitorul Oficial no. 181/30 from October 1st, 2004), no. 58 from July 30th, 2004 “Regarding the results of the control of the correctness and efficiency of expenditures for investments of capital allocated by the budget consolidated in 2003”.

- Small responsibility of public officials over the civil society and the lack of social responsibility of corporations.

In future the phenomenon of corruption will receive more accentuated transnational elements. Its efficient counteraction will be possible only by more efficient participation or adherence of Moldova to international organizations and agreements that aim at eradicating this phenomenon (UN Convention against corruption, OECD Convention regarding the fight against corruption among the foreign officials involved in international commercial transactions, UN Convention regarding transnational organized criminality) and the efficient implementation of the National Strategy of Corruption Prevention and Counteraction.

5.3. Foreign trade

The Republic of Moldova is a classical example of a small and open economy. It is a small economy because it cannot influence essentially the international prices of any products it transacts abroad. It is an open economy, because: 1) it does not restrict significantly the import and it is not in its interest to do that and 2) the export assures an essential part of the national income. The assurance of normal conditions for making exports and imports and of a favorable rapport of international terms of trade is vital for such economies.¹⁴

The normal progress of export and import implies the reduction of all kinds of risks that can affect the international trade, home risks, as well as foreign risks. From the home perspective, the risks are decreasing together with the structural diversification of products of export and import. Nonetheless, countries may accept an increase of concentration of export on account of some products with a high added value, this way gaining income that compensates the assumed risks. Countries may also accept a big concentration of import around some investment goods, because this will allow the assurance of a better economic growth in the future. From the foreign perspective, the economic and political risks are decreasing together with the geographical diversification of export and import.

¹⁴ The rapport of international terms of trade is the relation between the index of prices of the exported products and that of imported products (for an exhaustive definition see Sava, 1999). Generally the countries are interested in a rapport as big as possible, this kind of amelioration meaning that the same quantity of export allows the purchase of a bigger quantity of import.

Product diversification

Table 1 indicates the evolution of the structure of Moldova's export in the period before and after the Russian financial crisis from 1998. The export is split into sections, but the author has calculated the index of concentration of export on the basis of Herfindahl index and a level split into groups of merchandise.¹⁵

Table 1. Structure of exports classified into sections and groups of merchandise, % if not indicated otherwise

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	01-06' 2005
Export, total millions USD	874,1	631,8	463,4	471,5	565,5	643,8	789,9	985,2	507,4
Food products including drinks, tobacco	54,8	55,4	42,6	42,1	44,5	41,5	39,8	35,1	37,2
Textiles and articles of clothing	6,7	9,8	13,9	17,7	18,4	16,7	16,4	17,3	18,0
Vegetal produce	8,6	11,3	14,7	14,0	13,9	16,5	11,6	12,2	12,1
Raw leather, dressed leather, furs	1,4	1,7	2,8	2,8	2,0	3,6	5,7	7,9	7,5
Animal and vegetal oils and fats	1,0	0,6	0,5	0,8	1,5	2,6	3,7	4,2	3,7
Machines and devices, electric equipments	5,2	6,5	5,9	5,1	5,4	3,9	3,8	4,0	4,6
Mineral products	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,6	1,1	1,8	2,6	3,1	1,6
Common metals and articles made of them	1,0	1,5	3,5	2,5	0,5	1,1	2,5	3,0	3,0
Various	21,0	12,8	15,7	14,5	12,6	12,3	14,0	13,3	12,3
Herfindahl concentration index	0,361	0,373	0,301	0,328	0,354	0,348	0,348	0,331	0,342

Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author

The primary analysis of these data communicates us that, compared to 1997-1998, the degree of concentration of export has not varied significantly. More than that, even if it seems that the dependency of exports on the food and drink industry products has decreased, this happened not as a result of the intensification of other exports, but because the exports of food and drinks have

¹⁵ The Herfindahl index of concentration of export is calculated according to the following formula $H = \sqrt{\sum (\frac{x_i}{x})^2}$, where x_i – the export of the product, i , x – total export. The splitting has been made at the level of sections coded with 3 digits in the Classified List of Merchandise of the Republic of Moldova. Theoretically, the Herfindahl index has values between 0 and 1, higher values indicating a higher concentration of exports.

succumbed. Until now Moldova was not able to revert to the level of 1997, when it exported food and drinks with a value of 479 million USD. The interdictions imposed by Russia in 2005 on the import of vegetal and animal products from the Republic of Moldova will not allow the recovery of the difference compared to 1997 this year also. The given structure of exports bear very high risks, because major events that could affect the food industry (for example a draught that would destroy the local basis of raw material) could catastrophically reduce the export incomes, with severe financial and social consequences.

As to the imports, it could be stated that Moldova has reduced their product concentration at a level higher than in 1997. (Table 2)

Table 2. Structure of imports classified into sections and groups of merchandise, % if not indicated otherwise

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	01-06' 2005
Export, total millions USD	1171,3	1023,6	586,4	776,5	892,2	1038,0	1402,3	1768,5	1006,5
Fuels and mineral oils	34,6	31,2	38,8	32,4	26,6	22,3	20,5	21,0	20,2
Machines and devices, electric equipments	12,9	19,1	11,8	12,7	13,9	14,1	15,3	13,6	14,2
Chemical products	9,6	9,1	7,8	9,6	9,0	11,2	9,5	9,1	10,0
Textiles and articles of clothing	5,3	6,1	11,3	10,0	10,3	9,7	8,4	8,5	8,3
Common metals and articles made of them	4,4	4,0	4,3	4,1	4,2	4,7	5,0	6,3	6,4
Food products drinks, tobacco	7,5	5,5	3,1	9,2	8,8	7,0	6,6	6,0	5,9
Rubber, plastic materials and articles	3,1	3,2	3,4	3,1	3,8	4,8	4,9	5,7	5,9
Transport means and materials	3,0	4,6	2,1	2,0	2,4	4,9	5,4	5,4	5,4
Vegetal produce	3,2	1,6	1,9	3,3	4,2	4,2	5,9	4,2	4,2
Raw leather, dressed leather, furs	0,3	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,4	1,6	2,6	4,1	3,6
Wood pasta, paper, cardboard	4,1	4,5	3,7	3,6	3,9	4,3	4,0	3,6	3,6
Various	11,3	10,2	10,6	9,2	11,8	10,8	11,3	11,8	11,4
Herfindahl concentration index	0,372	0,361	0,408	0,355	0,305	0,272	0,265	0,263	0,254

Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author

Generally we can affirm that the present product structure of imports reflects the needs of an economy that lacks own natural resources and that passes through an intense period of economic growth.

Geographical diversification

Moldova has left the soviet period after fifty years of profound commercial integration with other states ex-members of the USSR. The foreign trade abroad USSR was permitted only with the consent of central control and planning bodies. The impact of the faulty administrative orientation of commercial fluxes is still noted by the national economic system.

This way, in the period between 1996-2004, the trade with the group of EU countries has increased much more rapidly compared to other groups (exports to the EU increased with an annual average of 16,7% compared to a general average of 5%, while the imports from the EU have increased annually with 24,4% compared to a general average of 11,8%). Despite the relatively fast commercial integration into the EU, more than half of the exports and over 40% of imports are destined/result from the CIS countries.(as Table 3 shows)

Table 3. Structure of the foreign trade on big geographical areas, %

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Export – total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
CIS	62,6	68,3	69,6	67,9	54,7	58,6	60,9	54,4	53,6	51,0
EU	11,6	9,8	13,4	15,7	28,1	26,3	24,9	26,6	26,7	30,1
ECE	21,3	16,3	8,0	10,2	10,2	8,8	7,5	9,6	12,4	10,7
Rest of the world	4,5	5,6	9,1	6,2	7,0	6,3	6,7	9,3	7,3	8,2
Import – total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
CIS	66,6	60,9	51,6	43,0	41,3	33,5	38,1	39,4	42,3	43,2
EU	13,5	16,5	24,5	33,8	32,8	36,1	35,6	34,4	36,0	32,9
ECE	14,1	13,0	14,1	14,7	15,8	17,5	13,2	11,1	9,5	11,3
Rest of the world	5,9	9,6	9,8	8,5	10,1	12,9	13,1	15,2	12,1	12,6
Commercial balance – total	-100	-100	-100	-100	-100	-100	-100	-100	-100	-100
CIS	-93,3	-39,5	1,3	-2,9	9,5	5,3	1,3	-14,8	-27,7	-33,5
EU	-26,5	-35,7	-57,3	-62,9	-50,6	-51,3	-54,1	-47,1	-48,1	-36,4
ECE	35,0	-3,5	-32,0	-21,9	-37,2	-31,0	-23,1	-13,4	-5,8	-11,9
Rest of the world	-17,4	-21,2	-11,9	-12,3	-21,7	-23,1	-24,1	-24,7	-18,4	-18,2

Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author

This stagnation is partly explained by the fact that Moldova cannot succeed in a commercial expansion to the countries of East and Central Europe. The lack of progress in commercial affairs with Central and East-European countries is determined by the following factors:

- During a good period of time Moldova had difficult affairs with Romania, the main commercial partner in Central Europe, affairs that

inevitably transferred to the commercial grounds as well. Romania banned several times the import of Moldovan products.

- The countries of this group are not as attractive from the point of view of the market potential as those from the Western Europe, do not offer the advantage of “checked” affairs, like those held by the Moldovan exporters with partners from Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine or the advantage of similar business cultures and mentalities.
- Many countries from this region have economic structures similar to that of Moldova and the import of Moldovan products is not an interesting variant for them.

At a more detailed scale of decomposition (from big geographical regions to countries) it can be found out that, as the Table shows, a spectacular reduction of dependence of exports on the Russian market, the 5 fold increase of the importance of Italy and the doubling of Germany’s importance. At the same time, we should mention that the decrease of dependency of export on the Russian market was not a consequence of “structural recovery”, but one of the absolute losses of positions held by Moldovan products. In 2004 the total value of Moldovan exports to Russia represented only 70% of the value of products sold in 1997. Besides, we should mention that, as in 1997 over 4/5 of the total exports were made only to 6 countries, the situation has not changed even until 2004.

Table 4. Concentration by countries of the exports of the Republic of Moldova, % if not indicated otherwise

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total, millions USD	874,1	631,8	463,4	471,5	565,5	643,8	789,9	985,2
Russia	58,2	53,3	41,3	44,5	43,7	37,1	39,0	35,9
Italy	2,7	3,5	5,5	7,7	8,0	8,8	10,4	13,8
Romania	6,7	9,6	8,9	8,0	6,7	8,8	11,4	10,0
Germany	3,7	3,8	7,2	7,7	7,1	7,2	7,1	7,2
Ukraine	5,7	7,7	7,0	7,5	10,1	9,5	7,1	6,6
Byelorussia	4,1	5,0	4,7	4,6	5,3	6,1	5,2	6,0
Total of quotas, %	81,1	83,0	74,7	80,1	80,9	77,5	80,3	79,5

Sources: NSL

Regarding the imports we can state that the Republic of Moldova has a more vast territory for possible maneuvers (Table 5). Unlike exports, 4/5 of the Moldovan imports are made not from 6, but 11 countries. A fundamental structural modification, which was made in 2000, was Ukraine surpassing Russia in importance to the imports of the Republic of Moldova. A good part

of the exports made by Ukraine to Moldova is a re-export of Russian merchandise, including electricity and oil products. Nevertheless, Moldova must avoid the risk of entering into an excessive commercial dependency on Ukraine or any other country.

Table 5. Concentration by countries of imports of the Republic of Moldova, % if not indicated otherwise

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total, millions USD	1171,3	1023,6	586,4	776,4	892,2	1038,0	1402,3	1768,5
Ukraine	18,0	14,8	13,5	13,5	17,1	19,6	22,1	24,7
Russia	28,4	22,8	23,6	15,4	16,1	14,8	13,0	12,0
Romania	8,6	11,0	13,9	15,4	10,5	8,7	7,0	9,3
Germany	8,1	9,0	10,5	11,3	9,4	8,3	9,7	8,5
Italy	4,1	6,3	6,5	6,3	7,2	8,5	8,3	7,4
Turkey	1,2	1,0	2,0	2,3	2,2	3,2	3,4	3,9
Byelorussia	4,1	4,9	3,9	4,1	4,4	3,9	3,6	3,6
France	1,1	2,2	2,1	2,6	2,9	2,2	2,5	3,0
Kazakhstan	0,4	0,2	0,0	0,4	0,4	0,9	3,4	2,8
Poland	1,1	1,0	1,4	2,0	2,0	2,4	2,8	2,5
China	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,9	1,1	1,5	2,1
Bulgaria	5,3	2,9	1,6	1,8	2,3	2,0	2,1	1,7
Total of quotas, %	80,7	76,3	79,3	75,4	75,4	75,6	79,6	81,6

Sources: NSL

Double risks

The evolution of foreign trade of the Republic of Moldova was marked by a stagnation determined by the Russian financial crisis from 1998 that had contagious effects in the financial and production spheres of the Moldovan economy. These effects transmitted through channels of foreign trade and demonstrated double risks to which the Republic of Moldova is exposed: a small number with a relatively small added value is exported to a limited number of countries. Essentially Russia gets 36% of the exports made by the Republic of Moldova and almost 80% of these exports are food industry produce, actually wines and cognacs. The interdictions on imports from the Republic of Moldova (on animal and vegetal products) introduced by Russia in 2005 in two rounds may be followed by a third round of interdictions oriented against Moldovan wines.

Moldova is already vertiginously losing positions that it held on the Russian wine market in the inferior and medium segments and any brutal intervention may lead to the irrecoverable loss of its place on the market. The dim diver-

sification of exports denotes also the weakness of the Moldovan private sector. Because of this weakness, the national exporting capacities cannot keep up with the imports and the commercial deficit is increasing continuously. (Table 6)

Table 6. Indices of the relations of international terms of trade and commercial deficit

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Index of physical volume, last year = 100%							
For exports	72	100	106	122	116	120	
For imports	92	71	128	118	118	129	
Index of average prices, last year = 100%							
For exports	120	147	111	96	99	104	
For imports	108	158	115	100	100	106	
Degree of covering imports with exports, %	61,7	79	60,7	63,3	62	56,3	55,7
Commercial deficit, % GDP	-23,1	-9,5	-23,8	-22,1	-23,6	-30,5	-30,4
Commercial deficit, millions USD	-391,8	-122,9	-305	-326,7	-394,2	-612,4	-783,4
Direct foreign investments + Transfers for the remuneration of work provided abroad, % of the commercial deficit		-104,9	-83,2	-101,7	-88,7	-51,6	-72,8

Sources: NSL and the calculations of the author

In addition, the prices for imported goods rise faster than those for exported ones, thus further complicating the task of accumulating currency resources for maintaining the commercial balance. During the last four years the imports have increased physically and in value faster than the exports. If the difference between the rates of growth of imports and exports will be maintained during the following months, the commercial deficit in 2005 will exceed the exports. It will be a bizarre situation, which we do not know if other countries face. Even if, during a short period, there probably won't be major problems with financing the deficit (the currency transfers from abroad were even bigger in 2005), this kind of development of the foreign trade is not good, even harms the consolidation of competitive advantages of Moldova.

5.4. Direct foreign investments and the security of national economic interests

Economical transformations in Moldova can continue only if they will be accompanied by the increase of actual income and by the amelioration of the level of life of the population for the assurance of social support of reforms. In order to fulfill these conditions the product sector has to recover and even to

overwhelm the performances gained before the beginning of transition. Substantial investments are necessary for this. In agriculture alone, according to some estimations, investments of over 2 billion dollars are necessary, for this sector to get back to the optimal level of production.¹⁶ As it is well-known, these kinds of capitals do not exist in the Republic of Moldova, and the income transferred from abroad serve and will serve for the assurance of consumption needs. This is why the attraction of direct foreign investments (DFI) is an indispensable condition. Especially because DFI can assure not only the necessary investments, but also a transfer of technologies and advanced management. Table 7 shows that the economic performances achieved by the enterprises with foreign stock in Moldova are much more superior to the relatively small balance these have in using the labor force. Local companies are requested to match such performance.

Table 7. Indices of the activity of companies with foreign capital

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
The ponderosity of employees in the total of employees from the national economy, %	1,4	1,8	2,2	3,6	2,3	7.6
Volume of production (current prices), thousands lei	311,4	749,6	795,6	1608,5	2587,7	3250.7
Ponderosity in the total production, %	5,3	12,5	11,1	18,4	23,9	33.4
Ponderosity in the total of exports, %	14,3	31,3	24,5	38,4	40,9	36.6
Ponderosity in the total of imports, %	27,4	31,6	36,7	43,5	45,8	37.4

Source: MIDA

The results of Moldova in attracting direct foreign investments are ambiguous. On one hand, the stock of direct foreign investments made in the economy of Moldova has increased spectacularly from 28,6 million in 1994 to 902,5 million in 2004.¹⁷ But this stock was accumulated not in a progressive way, the visible progress alternating with notable stagnations. The rhythm of annual entries of capital in 1997-2003 was instable, varying between US\$ 38 million in 1999 to US\$ 146 million in 2002, drastically falling to US\$ 58 million in 2003. Until 2001 the DFI fluxes were linked to a great degree to the privatization of attractive production of infrastructure objectives. After this, the foreign investors appear to have begun to explore with increased interest the possibilities of founding new companies (*de novo*), better than risk the placement of capital in former state companies. These attitudes are explained

¹⁶ CNFA.

¹⁷ NBM.

by two causes. Firstly, the great privatization is practically over, even if there still exist several public enterprises, which eventually could be attractive for investors (Moldtelecom, some wineries). Secondly, the notorious examples of “deprivatization” and harassment of some foreign investors discouraged those who previously considered Moldova attractive.

UN reports on global investments place Moldova in the category of countries that attract DFI at a level higher than their economic potential, by economic potential being understood the GDP.¹⁸ But Moldova is situated in the category of the countries that attract DFI under their economic potential immediately after the definition of this potential is expanded in order to include available labour force and exports.¹⁹ Indeed, as it is showed in Table 9, Moldova was above the average of countries in the region in the means of DFI and GDP, but definitely under the average as an amount of DFI per capita.

Tabel 8. ISD in Moldova as compared with other states in the region, 1995-2002 average

	% of GDP	USD per capita
Bulgaria	4,4	70
Lithuania	3,9	122
Moldova	4,8	18
Romania	2,7	46
Slovakia	3,7	233
CIS outskirts*	2,9	15
CIS nucleus**	2,9	39

Note: * – Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;

** – Belarus, Kazakhstan Russia, Ukraine;

Source: WB

In consequence, theoretically Moldova still has some reserves for increasing the flux of DFI. Still, in the context of preoccupations for economic security we have to ask ourselves if direct foreign investments represent a comfortable modality for the propagation of economic interests of foreign investors, and by their help and the help of political interests of their origin countries. In particular, the public is frequently disturbed by the fact that Russia is the main investor in the Republic of Moldova.

Similar questions arise not only in the case of our country. In all the small countries private foreign companies have means of influence for influencing

¹⁸ UNCTAD;

¹⁹ Chivriga and Prohnitchi.

policies. The aim of the government is to adequately administrate the interests of foreign companies, to balance the interests and minimize the chance of propagating fatal interests. More transparency and public responsibility in the affairs of the state with foreign investors would help in the way that latter will follow strictly economic interests and not political or other ones.

Evidently, the influence exercised by the foreign investors depends on the size of companies and their countries of origin. From the point of view of size, it could be told that only 3% of the amount of companies with foreign capital present in Moldova has a statutory capital exceeding US\$ 500 thousand. The majority of foreign companies (70%) have a statutory capital of under US\$ 10 thousand.²⁰ This kind of structure suggests that, even if there are influences, they come from a relatively limited number of companies with foreign capital.

Table 9. Geographic composition of DFI, %, 2003

	% din PIB
Russia	22,9
EU	32,9
Great Britain	6,4
Spain	6,2
France	5,3
Germany	4,5
Other EU	10,5
USA	10,0
Off-shore regions*	6,9
Romania	3,6
Other countries	23,6

Note: * – Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Malta, Caiman Islands

Source: WB

From the geographical point of view, the situation of DFI mainly reflects the composition of foreign trade (Table 9). In the category of countries, Russia has the first place with almost 23% of the DFI stock, followed by the USA, Great Britain and Spain.

It appears that Russia has an exaggerated growth, but still it is balanced by an even higher growth of the EU region, to our opinion. Also here, Russian companies have made the main investments until 1998, after what Russia's growth decreased drastically in the annual flux of investments.

²⁰ Interview with Sergiu Ghetiu, director of MEPO, for INFOTAG press agency, October 5th, 2004.

The main companies that ensure the high growth of capital from the Russian Federation, Spain, the USA and Great Britain in the total stock of DFI are:²¹

- Russian Federation – “Moldovagaz” (energetic sector), “Green Hills Market” (trade and services);
- The USA – “Mobiasbanca” (banking sector), “Moldova Agroindbank” (banking sector), “Dionysos Mereni” (wine-making industry), “Cricova Acorex” JSC (wine-making industry), “Dairy factory in Hancesti (Alba)” (food industry), “Sun Communications” (TV and communications services), “Jolly Allon” (hotel services);
- Spain – “Union Fenosa” (energetic sector), Glass Container Company (industry);
- Great Britain – “Compudava” (informational technologies).

It must be mentioned that the relatively high growth of investments in off-shore regions, which, to the opinion of some authors, could be exported and reinvested Moldovan capital, could have its sense in obtaining a better treatment, compared to the local investors.²² It could be stated that the foreign investments made in the Republic of Moldova have a rather balanced structure from the geographic point of view. They are not made in technologically “sensitive” sectors, because they are simply missing. It is true that the Russian capital is massively present in Moldova, particularly in the energetic sector. The question is would have Moldova benefited of lower prices for natural gas if, instead of Gazprom, another company from another country was the main share-holder of Moldova-Gaz. The answer would probably be negative.

In the next decades the chances of Moldova to attract direct foreign investments will grow significantly. These perspectives are determined by the following:

- The expansion of the EU towards Romania and Bulgaria, after what a part of the foreign companies present in these countries will seek new locations in the new neighbor countries of the EU, where the costs of labour and administration of businesses will be smaller;
- The expansion of Asiatic economic interests (China in the first place) towards Eastern Europe;
- The economic growth achieved by Moldova and the consolidation of the Moldovan private sector (foreign investors wish to have partners

²¹ Chivriga and Prohntichi.

²² WB.

in Moldova, who are consolidated from the financial, management and image point of view);

- The creation of a free trade zone between Moldova and the EU;

The growth of income of the population of Moldova, as a result of economic growth and of transfers of currency from abroad increase the potential of the local market. For the government of Moldova the challenge will reside in the capitalization of these favorable factors through adequate policies and attitudes for the foreign investors. The guarantee of rights to property, abstinence from administrative interferences in the private business, reduction of corruption and bureaucratic burden – these are the fundamental recommendations for Moldova to attract foreign investments at the level of some successful countries in the region.

5.5. Energetic security

Moldova does not have natural resources, which, at the present level of development of energetic technologies, would allow to assure its consumption needs integrally or in a significant proportion. Nowadays, the only combustible used in the Republic of Moldova is natural gas (which covers 80% of the necessities of the energetic sector) and which is almost integrally imported from Russia. This situation will not change in the predictable future, and that is why any strategy of energetic security must start from the premise that the primary bearers of energy will have to be imported anyway and that Russia will remain the main provider of natural gas for quite a time.

Energy in the equation of Moldo-Russian affairs

The energy imported from Russia is one of the two main factors (the exports to Russia are the second factor) that deeply anchor Moldova in a situation of unilateral dependency on the Eastern giant. Moreover we have to mention that the energy is alternatively the “pretzel” and “stick” frequently used by Russia in its affairs with other countries of Central and even Western Europe as well. The instrument was used recently, with the occasion of a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CIS countries, on August 25th, 2005, in Moscow. The easiness with which Moscow has managed until recently to project its influence in Moldova through the energetic sphere is explained by a vast series of factors:

- The Russian company “Gazprom” has been unofficially granted monopolist rights in providing natural gas to Moldova;

- The lack of similar or alternative energetic resources in Moldova or the neighbouring region;
- The technical and economic problems, which make the immediate diversification of providers impossible (the very high fixed costs, necessary for building some new trunk pipes);
- The accumulation of some historical energetic debts towards Russia;
- The lack of own technical abilities necessary for an adequate accounting of gas consumption.

Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is of little importance for the transition of gas to Europe. The Moldovan territory is traversed only by one important trunk pipe to Romania. Because of this, for Chisinau, unlike Kiev, it would be more complicated to annihilate the aggressiveness of “Gazprom”, threatening with the application of higher transit taxes. The lack of transparency and public responsibility in the energetic field of the Republic of Moldova, which not accidentally received the epithet of “state within a state”.

- Low technical and economic efficiency of the main producers of electric and thermal power in Moldova (and who are concomitantly the main consumers of gas and the most indebted);
- Superannuation of the transportation infrastructure maintained by the companies distributing thermal power, which causes great losses while transporting.

It must be kept in mind that the debts are the main channel of exercising economic and political pressures. If the consumption would be regularly paid for and the accumulation of great debts would not be admitted, there would be less possibilities of manipulation for Russia. Estonia and Slovakia, like Moldova, import 100% of the consumed natural gas and 100% of the imported gas is from Russia, but these countries do not allow blackmail and implication in their home affairs.

The governments of Moldova will have to take into account that the objective of integration of Moldova into the EU will even lead to the accentuation of the dependence of the energetic system on natural gas. One of the ecological rigors of European energetic policy imposes the rejection of heavy combustibles for the functioning of power stations and the gradual conversion to natural gas. This rigour will determine not only Moldova, but also other countries from Central and Eastern Europe in future to rely on the gas imported from Russia to a greater degree than in the past. Moldova must try to free its energetic affairs with Russia of any political element and to pay the bills regularly.

The increase of tariffs for methane gas provided by Gazprom, beginning with 2006, 2007 at most, is inevitable and the government must take that into account when elaborating its energetic strategies. This increase will be determined by three factors: modifications that intervened in the business strategy of Gazprom with all the countries from the so-called “near vicinity”, Russia’s acknowledgement of the fact that the obtained political benefits are smaller than the financial costs for supporting the global increase of prices for hydrocarbons. Moldova must prepare for this by balancing the tariff grid, modernizing TES-s and the infrastructure of transporting thermal energy. In fact, the increase of the gas tariff at the level of those collected from Central-European countries has an advantage as well: Russia will lose any possibility of blackmail for the future.

Electricity

The annual need of electric energy of the Republic of Moldova is estimated at 5-6 billion kW/h. Leaving Transnistria aside, Moldova can produce autonomously only 30-35% of the electric energy it consumes. According to the strategy of development of the electro-energetic system of the Republic of Moldova, local companies that produce electricity power must have capacities of covering 100% of the needs until 2007. Presently Moldova makes use of the electric power produced by TES-1 from Chisinau, the Hydroelectric junction from Costesti, the Thermoelectric Station from Cuciurgan and some is purchased from Ukraine.

For Moldova it is crucially important to re-obtain the control over the Station from Cuciurgan. The installed power of the 12 blocks of TES Cuciurgan is 2,52 MWt, while the needs of the whole Moldovan economic system are assessed to 1,1-1,2 MWt. According to the contract of privatization of the Station from Cuciurgan, the owner (which is now the Russian corporation “EES Ros-sii”) will invest in 2007 over US\$ 160 million for the development of the station. The allotment of such an amount is rational only if the investor considers export the main prospective activity. In these circumstances, Moldova will have a crucial role, because it has the necessary infrastructure for transporting electricity to the Balkans, the target of economic expansionism of the Russian corporation. But Moldova has to keep in mind that there are some economically strong societies in Kiev, which intend to control the export of electric power from Cuciurgan. With this purpose, it is planned to build a new trunk pipe of high pressure transport that would pass through Ukrainian territory and minimize the length of the path through Moldovan territory.

Several times Transnistria has used the “energetic weapon” against Chisinau. It is difficult to say if the change of owner will make it impossible for the Tiraspol regime to energetically blackmail Moldova. From the technical point of view, Moldova now has much better capacities for ensuring its electrical security. In case the situation from July-August 2004 repeats, when Transnistria has stopped providing energy from Cuciurgan, Moldova could import the necessary energy from Romania. Three lines with the voltage of 110 kV and one of 400 kV (Isaccea – Vulcanesti) link Moldova to Romania and one more, of 400 kV (Suceava – Balti), is to be built in 2-3 years. The beginning of function of the new line will allow Moldova to export electric power in normal regime.

The situation will ameliorate when the two regional electric stations (Balti and Cahul) will be built and when the II energetic project, financed by the World Bank, will be implemented. The electrical composition of this project earmarks US\$ 28 million for the purchase and installation of equipment of measuring electric power, of testing measuring transformers, of equipment for transforming stations and the modernization of the telecommunication and reception system. This will allow the liberalization of the market, the increase of activity for investors, and for big consumers – to sign individual contract with the best providers.

Emigration – fundamental risk for economic security.

Is Moldova overpopulated?

It is rather frequently that one can hear the argument of overpopulation of the Republic of Moldova as an explanation of the massive exodus of population, of low per capita income, of rampant unemployment and other social-economic problems we are facing. The argument has its right for existence, but it must be specified. As it is showed in Table 10, the density of population in a series of European countries is comparable or even higher than that of Moldova.

Table 10. Demographic indices in European countries

Country	Density of population, people/km ² , 2002	Level of urbanization, 2005	Annual average of the growth of population,%, 2000-2004	
			Urban	Rural
Belgium	337	97	0.24	-0.84
United Kingdom	243	89	0.38	-0.26
Czech Republic	129	74	0.02	-0.45
Denmark	124	85	0.34	-0.37
Albania	124	44	2.07	-0.39

Poland	122	62	0.04	-0.27
Republic of Moldova	120	41	-0,51	-0,03
Slovakia	110	58	0.49	-0.48
Hungary	110	66	0.14	-1.57
Armenia	108	64	-0.75	0.09
France	108	76	0.72	-0.34
Azerbaijan	97	50	0.62	1.16
Romania	88	55	-0.20	-0.26

Sources: NSL, United Nations Statistics Division

In our opinion, the problem resides in general not in the high density of population, but in the high density of rural population and in the low level of urbanization of the country. Not accidentally, in the structure of Moldovan emigrants taken on a residence average, overwhelm those from the rural area, with a growth of 70%.²³ Albania and Azerbaijan, countries with levels of urbanization similar with the Moldovan one, are other two examples of countries with intense emigration, mainly alimented by the rural population.

Thus, we deal with a profound structural factor, which can be truly determinant for a series of economic problems, faced by the Republic of Moldova. In particular, this demographic factor can be responsible for the low labor productivity in agriculture and low income gained in this sector. After almost 5 decades of repression of the normal demographic development of Moldova by unionist directives and policies, the impact of this factor manifested in an explosive manner immediately after the stopping of centralized subvention of Moldovan agriculture, and the salaries for social-professional categories that are remunerated from the public budgets (doctors, teachers) have succumbed. The problem gets more complicated if we take into account that the majority of small town in the Republic of Moldova are, in fact, pseudo-urban establishments, mono-industrial one decade ago, that is dependent on a single fabric or plant, which probably does not function today.

During the period of transition the problem of rural congestion has not become simpler. On the contrary, from 1997 until 2004 the growth of population from the right side of Nistru who lives in towns decreased from 42,2 to 41,4%. We conclude that Moldova in general is not an overpopulated country, but rather rurally overpopulated. The rural economic subsystem has not significantly diversified together with the advancement of economic reforms and has

²³ "Populația economic activă, ocupată și șomajul în trimestrul II 2005", Informative note, August 2005, National Bureau of Statistics.

not begun to offer more non-agricultural opportunities to residents from the countryside. The local and central government was not able to assure the economic diversification and development of small towns in Moldova and to open the “gates” for the movement of a segment of young population from villages to these towns. Moreover, on the background of worsening of the economic situation, the internal emigration from villages to towns was not a rational option for the countryside residents who were advantaged compared to those from towns by the fact that they could survive from agricultural subsistent activities. The natural result was the orientation of village residents towards other countries, initially Russia, and then more and more towards European countries.

5.6. Demographic crisis

The Republic of Moldova faces a serious demographic crisis, which began to manifest even in the last decades of existence of the USSR. The respective crisis manifests by the decrease of the birth rate, increase of mortality, crisis of the model of a traditional family and the incapacity of simple auto-reproduction of population. The accumulation of these factors resulted in a clear depopulating tendency of the Republic of Moldova. According to the forecasts of demographers, during 50 years the population of Moldova (on the right side of Nistru) could decrease with 400-500 thousands.

Only these factors taken separately will cause a quantitative and maybe a qualitative reduction of human resources necessary for a rapid and solid economic growth and development. But the negative consequence of the demographic crisis caused by social and natural factor are aggravated by the exodus of the labor force abroad, a relatively recent phenomenon, which began at the middle of the 1990s and got alarming proportions beginning with 2000. Emigration is a complex phenomenon with social, economic, cultural and political roots and implications. It is a rational strategy for individual survival and evasion from poverty. Nevertheless, it implies costs, as well as economic benefits for the country. The benefits have a short-term and impermanent manifestation: the reduction of pressure over the labor market, attenuation of the potential of social disturbance, assurance of higher income in families with emigrant members, assurance of bigger currency reserves on the accounts of the NBM and partial balancing of the commercial deficit. These benefits could gradually attenuate, together with the reintegration of families abroad.

The consequences of emigration for the economic security

The costs of emigration have to be supported for a long time and are burdening. The complexity of negative consequences makes us affirm that emigration is a factor that fundamentally threatens the economic security of the country. The quantification in monetary terms is difficult, but we can list the following risks that arise from emigration:

Quantitative reduction of human factor, illustrated in Table 11. This shows that emigration has intensified as an absolute number and as a percentage of the total population living in Moldova (without the Transnistrian region), as well as a percentage of the total of labor resources.²⁴ The latter tendency is explained by the absolute reduction of the number of employable persons, from 2,1 million in 1998 to 1,9 million in 2004.

Table 11. Evolution of emigration, thousands of persons, if not indicated otherwise

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 T2
Emigrants' stock (NBS)	-	-	-	138	149	234	294	367	383
Annual reflux of those who emigrate for the first time (CBS AXA)	11.4	17.4	26.4	52.0	33.2	60.2	76.9	71.1*	n.a.
Stocul de emigranți (CBS)	46	64	90	142	176	236	313	384	n.a.
Stock (CBS), as % of the total population on the right side of Nistru (NBS)	1,3	1,8	2,5	3,9	4,8	6,5	8,7	10,6	n.a.
Stock (CBS), as % of the labour resources (NBS)	2,2	3,0	4,3	6,8	8,4	11,6	15,9	20,2	n.a.

Notes: * – first ten months

Sources: CBS, NBS, the last two rows were calculated by the author

Qualitative reduction of the human factor. As the existent studies show, the educational profile of emigrants is very high: 25,7% have higher education, 51% have technical or special education.²⁵ Only 1/3 of the emigrants did not have income-bringing activities before their leave, the rest being those who had a place of work. In other words, the ones who left are citizens with an education and work experience higher than the average in the country.

²⁴ In conformity with the definition used by NBS, the labour resources are constituted by the total number of persons with intellectual and physical abilities necessary for carrying out an activity useful for the national economy, which contains the population of employable age (15-64 years) and economically active persons under and over the employable age.

²⁵ Gudumac and Ghencea.

Emigration generates negative social consequences, consolidating the crisis of the traditional model of the family. The number of children who live without one or both parents (who are abroad) is increasing. According to the official information published by the Ministry of Education, in February 2005 around 28 thousand children were living without both parents, who had emigrated abroad, 5 thousand more than in December 2003. Over 68 thousand children live without one parent (who is abroad). One third of those who emigrate think that, after labour emigration, the social and moral connections in families degenerate, and 14% (probably on the basis of own experience) have declared that the family disintegrates.²⁶ We think it is not by accident that the general rate of divorce has increased from 38 per 100 marriages in 1999 to 59 per 100 marriages in 2003. Disintegration of families complicates the socialization of children, and, when they grow up, it impedes their harmonious and plenary integration with the economically active population.

Emigration produces patterns of behaviour followed by emigrants' children. Many of them don't even try to find a place of work in the Republic of Moldova, but orient towards the countries where their parents are. In several countries of destination of Moldovan emigrants formed Diasporas or other similar networks of mutual help, which considerably facilitate the arrival, settlement and finding jobs for the second generation of emigrants.

All these lead to the conclusion that the pattern of economic growth of Moldova, in which prevails the labour factor in comparison to the capital factor, which is and will be undermined by the emigration of the labour force. The quantitative reduction of labour resources undermine the growth in intensive working sectors, and the reduction of quality and training of the labour force impedes the consolidation of more advanced technological sectors. The quantitative and qualitative degradation fundamentally impedes the placement of bigger direct foreign investments in the national economy, elementary because the technological lines cannot function without people.

²⁶ Gudumac and Ghencea.

Chapter VI.

THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: CHALLENGES, PARTNERS AND PERSPECTIVES

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It is obvious that security represents a complex field which cannot be exhaustively analyzed in a single study. However we consider possible and useful, at the same time, to make an outline of the security of the Republic of Moldova by military, political and geo-strategic means. We will give a special consideration the subject of temporally occupied Eastern territories and the threat from the Russian Federation, the international legal instruments that contribute to the consolidation of the national security, the partners, with whom there should be made privileged affairs and the policies for realization of the objectives related to the consolidation of the National Army and implicitly of the Republic of Moldova.

6.1. Temporally occupied Eastern territories and the threat emanating from the Russian Federation

Currently, the Eastern region of the Republic of Moldova is under temporary occupation by the Russian Federation's which led to a limited war during 1992. When it comes to the armed intervention and political objective, this being shown by the very Cease-fire Agreement from July 21st, 1992¹, signed by Presidents Eltsin and Snegur, that clearly indicates who were the parties of the conflict. The political and military, as well as strategic inability, to treat openly the Transnistrian conflict as an anti-constitutional military rebellion, generated and supported by Moscow, created an ambivalent situation to the disadvantage of the Republic of Moldova. Such an erroneous approach also made its way into some Western academic societies, that treated this conflict as a fratricide civil war, without mentioning where the "indigenous brothers", Smirnov and Antiufeev, came from². Until lately, opinions regarding the war led by the Russian

¹ Which should be annulled, as some observers mentioned.

² Look, for example, "From Ethnopolitical Conflict to Inter-Ethnic Accord in Moldova", Flensburg, Germany, ECMI Report # 1, March 1998.

Armed Forces against Chisinau, despite all the evidence, were taken as extremist anti-Russian ones, but the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum created the right momentum to phrase a clear thesis about the realities from 13 years ago that in turn, hopefully, will lead to the setting-up of new policies by civil and political societies, that are meant to consolidate the statehood and sovereignty.

The Russian national chauvinism in the Republic of Moldova was powerful enough to discourage the transfer of Soviet military units under the State's jurisdiction, while officers and sergeants were refusing to make the oath of allegiance to the new Republic. This way, unlike in other ex-Soviet states, Moldova managed to maintain just a little part of the military infrastructure and weaponry, this undermining the ability to solve the problem of the Russian Armed secessionism in the Transnistrian region. The Soviet/Russian conventional weapons played an important role regarding the way political and security situations evolved in the Republic of Moldova. To elucidate the connection between the military and political elements, and in particular the way the independence of the Republic of Moldova was undermined by the implication of the armed forces of the 14th Army, it is necessary to see how the Soviet and Russian holdings evolved in those five categories, in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

Period	Location	Tanks	ACV	Armored transporters AVLL	Artillery	Attack helicopters	Support helicopters	Aviation	Troops
11.1990/ 02.1991	Chisinau		13						
	Tiraspol	155	246	294	230		13		
	Bender			3					
	Dubasari			9					
	Ribnitsa			5					
	Chisinau		124	37	18				
	Rezina		10						
	Cahul		9						
	Chisinau						7		
	Marculesti							33	
Total		155	402	348	248	0	20	33	
07.1992	Tiraspol	126	198	215	127		12		9.254
	Chisinau		124	37	21				1.624
01.1993	Tiraspol	124	181	131	133		12		9.225
01.1994	Tiraspol	121	175	113	129		7		7.708
01.1995	Tiraspol	120	166	103	129		9		6.356
11.1995	OGRF	120	130	103	129		9		6.529
01.1996	OGRF	120	130	103	129		9		6.529

07.1996	OGRF	120	130	103	129		9		6.285
01.1997	OGRF	119	129	100	129		9		4.923
07.1997	OGRF	119	129	101	129	2	7		3.004
01.1998	OGRF	119	129	101	129		7		2.824
07.1998	OGRF	117	129	98	129		7		2.620
01.1999	OGRF	117	133	98	128		7		2.642
07.1999	OGRF	117	133	98	128		7		2.642
01.2000	OGRF	108	131	83	125		7		2.346
07.2000	OGRF	108	131	83	125		7		2.641
01.2001	OGRF	108	131	83	125		7		2.571
01.2002	OGRF	0	0	75	0		7		2.597

The table was elaborated by the author on the basis of the analysis of the quantity of CFE Limited Equipment in Moldova, according to the annual information provided to the Joint Consultative Group by the Member-States of the CFE Treaty. (ACV stands for Armored Combat Vehicles; AVLL for Armored Vehicles-Look-Like)³.

As it can be seen also from the analysis of the quantity of conventional equipment, the basis of secessionists' army was set up by the 14th Army's transfers, in most of cases deliberate ones. The consolidation of separatists' armed and paramilitary forces was made with the assistance of the Russian military experts, by means of establishing weaponry manufacturing capabilities on the spot, as well as by joint maneuvers with the Russian military units. Beginning September 1991, the Russian military forces conducted the process of setting up the National Guard, Workers' Self-Defense Units; established training centers for troops. Since November 1991, the officers of the 14th Army transferred weaponry, ammunition, communication equipment, facts acknowledged by Lieutenant-General Iakovlev, the Army's commander. In March – April 1992 the separatists began to receive armored vehicles, although the corrected version of Russian military exchange information in accordance with the CFE Treaty, made in February 1992, leads to a plausible assumption that the transfer of weaponry began earlier. At that time Tiraspol received the equipment of the 237th de-mining brigade, and on May 19th 1992 it received 10 T64B, 10 armored transporters (BTR 70), 6 pieces 120mm mine launchers etc. On May 24th 7 armored transporters (BTR 70) with crew have moved from the rocket brigade in the Bender's fortress to Dubasari.

³ Details in Iulian Frunțașu, *O istorie etnopolitică a Basarabiei, 1812-2002* (Cartier: Chișinău, 2002), pp. 314-333.

Since spring of 1992 the 14th Army has been preparing for major military operations. The Russian Defense Minister Graciov instructed General Netkaciov as follows: "Due to the worsening of the Transnistrian situation and starting from the point that this is a Russian land, we have to defend it by all means and methods at our disposal. We have to fill the units of the 14th Army with reservists and to bring the 14th Army to military action status level."⁴ The order of engagement of the 14th Army in Moldova was given by the Commander-in-Chief from Moscow, though the aim was just to show the power but not to wage a full scale war. We can certainly state that the military intervention of the Russian Federation had a limited character, just to change the military balance in favor of Russian separatists. However, the combat possibilities of the 14th Army in 1992 were sufficient to launch operations on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova. On February 2nd 1994 the official paper "Rossiiskie Vesti" has confirmed the Presidential Advisor Serghei Stankevici's acknowledgment that Lebed wasn't acting on his account while sending the 14th Army against Moldova, a fact confirmed also by his promotion to Lieutenant-General in September 1992 and the "decoration, in October 1992 by the Eltsin government, of 200 soldiers and officers who participated in military operations against the Government of Moldova."⁵

Russian secessionists were fully supported as well by the Unions of Cossacks from the Russian Federation, by political parties and by Russian local and central executive bodies. "Cossacks and other similar categories of fighters for the independence of the phantom-republic were recruited by the "Union of Officers" from Sankt-Petersburg, by the National Republican Party, by "Faterland" ("Otechestvo"), "Revia Union" ("Soyuz Vozrojhdenia") and "Union of Don Cossacks" movements, as well as by the bodies of the Russian Defense Ministry. On 27.02.1992 there were about 2 thousand Cossacks in Tiraspol, 500 of them coming from Rostov-on-Don, Kuban, Altai; the rest of them representing the Cossack groups from Dubasari, Grigoriopol and Slobozia, established in a hurry. In "Dnestr" battalion were registered over a thousand Russian volunteers."⁶

⁴ The intervention (obobščionnaia spravka Ministerstva Oboroni Respubliki Moldova o počatpnom vmešateljstve ciastei 14-oi armii Rossiiskoi Federacii vo vnutrennie dela levoberejnih raionov Respubliki Moldova i peredaci boievoi tehniki, orujia i boepripasov antikostitučionnim voorujennim formirovaniam, Nezavisimaia Moldova, 04.06.1992.

⁵ *Helsinki Watch – to Russian authorities*, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 1, 1993.

⁶ Ion Guceac, "Military Operations and the right", The Transnistrian Conflict: the truth as it was, the Reports of the Scientific-Practical Conference "State interests and the role of home bodies in ensuring the constitutional order, human rights and freedoms in the Eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova, January 12-13 1993 (Chişinău: Logos, 1996), p. 97.

Although from the beginning of the 90's Russian separatists produced small amounts of less sophisticated weapons, the basis of Transnistria's industrial military complex was set up in 1995 with the assistance of Russian Federation. The plants involved in the production of weaponry and ammunition are Machinery Plant from Tighina, "Electromas" from Tiraspol, Metallurgic and Pumps Factory from Ribnita, which produce *grosso modo* the following types of weaponry: multiple reactive systems BM-21 "Grad"⁷; 82 and 120mm mine launchers; antitank grenade launchers SPG-9; portable grenade launchers RPG-7; 9mm automatic rifles; 5,45mm PSM pistols; antipersonnel mines.

The CFE equipment is deemed unaccountable (UTLE) if it is not controlled by the constitutional authorities. Additional to other types of weaponry in the separatist region of Transnistria, there is the following quantity of UTLE: tanks – 18 units; armored combat vehicles – 49 units; 100mm artillery – 32 units, which were transferred, like the other equipment by the 14th Army/OGRF:

Type of weaponry	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998-2000
T-64	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
BTR	30	30	40	40	40	40	40
BRDM			6	6	6	6	6
BMP	12	12	3	3	3	3	3
SAU 122mm "Gvozdica"	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
85mm artillery	8	8	8	8	8	8	12
PTM MT12 100mm	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
BM-21	–	–	–	–	8	20	20
82mm mine launchers			30	30	30	30	30
120mm mine launchers	18	18	39	39	39	39	45
ZU – 23-2				24	24	24	24
ZAC S-60				12	12	12	12
Anti-aircraft artillery AZP-100, 100 mm							10
ZRK "Osa" (launching units)	–	–	–	2	2	2	2
ZRK "Strela-10"				2	2	2	2
PZRK ("Igla", "Strela-2")				13	13	13	13
PTUR "Fagot"				30	30	30	30
SPG				9	9	9	9
Light weapons	15000	15000	15000	15000	15000	15000	15000
MI-8T helicopters	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
MI-2 helicopters				1	2	2	2
AN-26 aircraft				1	1	1	1

⁷ Voennâi balans na Dnestre vosstanovlen. Armia Pridnestrovskoi respubliki polucila na voorujenie reaktivnîe ustanovki sistemî "Grad", Pridnestrovie, 05.10.96.

AN-2 aircraft (cons.)				2	2	2	2(4)
IAK-18 aircraft				2	2	2	2
IAK-52 aircraft							10

The table composed by the author according to OGRF sources (T-64 – tank; BTR – armoured vehicle; BRDM – reconnaissance armoured vehicle; BMP – combat vehicle for infantry; SAU – self-propelled vehicle; PTM MT 12 – anti-tank launcher; BM-21 – system for launching multiple shells “Grad”; ZU – anti-aircraft defence installation; ZAK – anti-aircraft defence artillery complex; ZRK – anti-aircraft rocket launching complex; PTUR – guided anti-tank rocket; SPG – anti-tank mine launcher).

The close cooperation with military structures of Russian secessionists in the Eastern regions ensures not only the possibility for fast recruitment of locals, but also the increase of the military efficiency by means of interoperability, because many military objectives, as it is Tiraspol military airport, are run by the Russian Army alongside with the Armed Forces of Russian separatists in the Transnistrian region.

Therefore, taking into account the above mentioned facts in a summarized way, we can state without hesitation that the Russian Federation led a war against the Republic of Moldova, limited in its aim and military intervention. Due to the fact that Moldova can't afford an open conflict with Moscow there is nothing to do but to wait for more favorable international circumstances for the constitutional bodies to regain control over the Eastern regions and to end the occupation. Until then, though, it is necessary to voice with determination the respective truth, without suspending the political dialogue with Russia which should be based on clear principles.

The first step towards the consolidation of statehood should be the Parliament's statement in which the military conflict from 1992 is called as it really was: a Moldovan-Russian war and to ask the Government to launch the procedure of compensation requests and to promote this status within the UN. Such statements and diplomatic initiatives will most probably be taken by Moscow as hostile ones, but since it shows anyhow irritation concerning less serious things, then it doesn't make any difference, because it is neither possible nor necessary to indulge a country which is violating the Republic of Moldova's sovereignty for 13 years. With some cold blood, determination and spirit of civilization from the side of Chisinau, Russia, *nolens-volens*, will have to cooperate the way it cooperates with the Council of Europe which was quite explicit regarding the Russian Federation's responsibility for the occupation of Eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova.

6.2. International legal instruments

International legal instruments are extremely important to the states with a minor political and military weight, like the Republic of Moldova. Even the states with significant economic, political and military potential are trying to avoid the situation of being criticized for the violation of international law, while the state's image becomes increasingly important in the period of globalization and means of mass communication, when an eventual undignified action comes right through and has noticeable effects. In such circumstances Chisinau should pay more attention to this field, which comes as a "natural" ally. For the time being we will consider just two of them that have a higher profile: the decision of the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) in Ilascu case and others against Moldova and Russia⁸, and the adapted CFE Treaty.

The case of Ilascu and others against Moldova and Russia is important because the Court has ruled out that Russia exerts "jurisdiction" over the separatist "Nistrian Moldovan Republic" where the Russian troops keep their presence since the declaration of independence by Moldova in 1991, the responsibility being extended upon the actions of local administration which survives thanks to its support. The Court has also mentioned that the Russian Federation supported the separatist authorities through its political statements, that its troops participated to the fight, and that it continued to offer its military, economic and political support after the Cease-fire Agreement. More than that, the applicants, namely Ilascu and others, were arrested with the participation of Russian troops and were held under arrest at their facilities, afterwards being transferred into the hands of separatist regime, knowing pretty well that this regime is illegal and unconstitutional.

It is worth mentioning that the Committee of Ministers has adopted an intermediary decision on July 13th 2005 regarding the ECHR Decision from June 8th 2004⁹, in which it is insisted upon the Russian Federation to spare efforts in order to free the prisoners, beyond paying the financial penalties. The Committee of Ministers has also reminded Moscow that the obligation to respect the Court's decision is unconditional.

⁸ Case of *Ilașcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia* (Application no. 48787/99) Judgment Strasbourg, 8 July 2004

⁹ Interim Resolution ResDH (2005)84 concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 8 July 2004 (Grand Chamber) in the case of *Ilașcu and others against Moldova and the Russian Federation* (*Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 July 2005 at the 935th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies*), <http://www.coe.int>

It is necessary to efficiently and faithfully cooperate with Strasbourg in the context of ECHR decision and subsequent decisions on monitoring, the substance of which should be used in other international circumstances, as for instance, in the OSCE framework, in order to counter-balance the attempts to constrain Moldova to some unjust solutions, as it was in the case of the war led by Moscow against this post-Soviet country.

Another legal instrument which is also political-military refers to the CFE Treaty that represents one of the corner-stones of European security¹⁰. Following the disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty and the disintegration of USSR, the Member-States initiated the process of adaptation of the CFE Treaty to new political and security realities on the European continent, adopting the adapted Treaty on 19.11.1999 in the framework of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul. In this adapted Treaty it was strengthened the indispensability of the host-state consent to the temporary deployments and terms of Russian forces' withdrawal were achieved. Istanbul's success was not a surprise for those directly involved in the process of adaptation, though we cannot deny a certain benefic influence of the international circumstances like the pressure of the Western Member-States of the Treaty upon the Russian Federation for the violation of the ceiling for holdings in the Flank Zone, namely the North Caucasus, where the Russians launched operations with a massive use of conventional armaments.

Therefore, the Final Act which is a part of the agreement package alongside with the adapted Treaty¹¹, contains the following references about Moldova: “[Member States] ... Have taking note of the statement by the Republic of Moldova, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its renunciation of the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory¹²” and have wel-

¹⁰ To see in details Iulian Frunțașu, ”Retragerea trupelor ruse din Moldova în contextul Tratatului FACE adaptat: percepții, interese și natura schimbătoare a securității europene”, ADEPT, <http://www.e-democracy.md/comments>

¹¹ In the adapted Treaty the following reference clause is present: “Having taken note of the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty held in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999, as well as of the statements made by certain States Parties concerning their political commitments”. OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, PCOEW389, p. 119.

¹² This says: “The Republic of Moldova renounce the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions that control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.” OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, PCOEW389, Annex 13, p. 250. The author's dilemma who, by the way, prepared and read the Statement at the Conference was the contradiction between the short term objective (ensuring the withdrawal of the Russian troops) and the medium term one (the accession to NATO which will need temporary deployments).

comed the commitment of the Russian Federation to withdraw and/or destroy the Russian conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty by the end of 2001, in the context of its commitment referred to in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration.¹³

It is important here to make a distinction between the adapted Treaty which by the way contains clauses regarding the consent of host-State¹⁴, including the Final Act, that in turn contains strong political commitments because they had been undertaken in the package with the Treaty, and the Istanbul Summit Declaration which has a political implementation regime as any other OSCE document. Although on the other hand it could be argued that the cross-references between the Final Act and the Summit Declaration strengthened the mandatory character of the latter. The Summit Declaration says the following relevant things regarding Moldova in the first two paragraphs: “Recalling the decisions of the Budapest and Lisbon Summits and Oslo Ministerial Meeting, we reiterate our expectation of an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. In this context, we welcome the recent progress achieved in the removal and destruction of the Russian military equipment stockpiled in the Transnistrian region of Moldova and the completion of the destruction of the non-transportable ammunition. We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willingness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, within their respective abilities, by the agreed deadline.”¹⁵ The web of legal and

At that time the first objective was the more important for the Moldova's security. It is also significant and hilarious at the same time that during the negotiations in Vienna the Moldovan statement regarding the temporary deployment was received with hostility by Russia that tried to insist that we can't renounce a right.

¹³ OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, PCOEW389, pp. 48-49.

¹⁴ A couple of examples where is mentioned the host country consent. In the Preamble: “State Parties, recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose principles of the UN Charter”. In the Article I, p.3: “Conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party in the categories limited by the Treaty shall only be present on the territory of another State Party only in accordance with the international law, the clear consent of the host member state, or with a relevant resolution of the UN Security Council. Explicit consent must be provided in advance, and must be in effect as provided for in the Article XIII, p.1 *bis*”. Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, January 2000, PCOEW389, pp. 119-120.

¹⁵ Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, January 2000, PCOEW389, pp. 48-49.

political documents, as well as the existent relationships convey the substance of the relevant commitments undertaken with regard to Moldova:

In the package		Cross-references
Adapted Treaty	Final Act	OSCE Summit Declaration
The consent of the host State is present in several Articles.	1. Withdrawal of Russian TLS by the end of 2001. 2. Renunciation of the right to temporary deployments in the Article 13.	Paragraph 19. The complete withdrawal of armed forces by the end of 2002. The ammunition and armaments are not obviously in the 5 CFE categories, but these also fall under the authority of the Treaty because they are in the armed forces' use and their excess is not relevant in the document's terms. This somehow tautological distinction was accepted to speed up the withdrawal of combat equipment and it explains the differences between the deadlines of 2001 and that of 2002.

It is true that Moscow's approaches vary, depending on the Russian perceptions regarding the threats and challenges it faces, Russians exerting political pressures following which the NATO offered guarantees of no deployments in the new Member-States, which were credible enough for Russia to move fast from the idea of leaving the Treaty to its ratification. In a wider context, though, it is clear the fact that the adapted CFE Treaty is more convenient to the Russian Federation than to the Alliance because NATO anyway was treating for many years with some sort of understanding the violation of the North Caucasus' ceiling, as well as Moscow's behavior in the so called immediate neighborhood. Now things are starting to change, meaning that the toleration of the illegal presence of the Russian forces is diminishing, although Moscow tries to stress the stipulations in the adapted Treaty which are more convenient to it and to minimize the commitments concerning Moldova and Georgia, stating either that these are political and without a deadline, or that are bilateral and with no effect on third parties.¹⁶ But if we imagine a hypothetical situation in which Poland would state that its commitment annexed to the Final Act regarding its limitation of holdings for tanks at 1,577, for Armored Combat Vehicles at 1,789 and for artillery at 1,370 are not valid any longer because they are political, officials in the Russian MFA and Defense would hit ceilings in their offices.

In the case of Moldova and the CFE Treaty it is important to keep in mind that from the perspective of many Western chancelleries this Treaty maintains a system of relations that affects the security of the entire continent and that it

¹⁶ "Ministr oboronî RF: Stambuliskie obiazatelistva Rossii iavliaiutsa politiceskimi i ne imiut srokov", Interlik, 13.07.04; "SŞA obuslovili ratificaţiu DOVSE vîpólneniem Rossiei Stambuliskih obiazatelistv", Interlik, 07.12.04.

solves more important issues than just the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Moldovan territory. This situation should keep the Moldovan diplomacy on the alert and to lead to additional political and diplomatic initiatives in consultation with Washington, London and Ankara on one hand, and on the other to negotiations with Moscow. It is not the best idea of self-gratitude in a reduced capacity, as it was shown by the 1996 Flank Agreement, to block the ratification of the adapted Treaty when this is decided to by important member-States of the Alliance. Without serious diplomatic initiatives regarding the complete withdrawal of the Russian Army and that of Russian separatists the assertion from "The Defense Monitor" has a high chance to become true: "As it was with its predecessor, the adapted treaty regime will likely be plagued by illegal Russian actions in the North Caucasus and the former Soviet Socialist Republics. Moscow views noncompliance as consistent with its security interests and therefore is willing to risk the ostracism while the NATO states are deterred from punishing Russia because they are not harmed by the Russian actions.¹⁷"

Despite that, at this moment it is clear that the CFE adapted Treaty in Istanbul had a positive impact upon the security of the Republic of Moldova, because Russians withdrew and/or destroyed, on Western money by the way, a significant part equipment¹⁸ (see the table with Russian TLE). It is also significant in this context the fact that Moscow keeps its equipment involved in so called peace-making mission, hoping that these will be exempted from the CFE if its troops will receive an OSCE mandate. This is why it necessary to insist upon the unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops, weaponry and ammunition in accordance with the Decisions of the Istanbul Summit, without the ratification of the CFE adapted Treaty before the implementation of above-mentioned decisions. It is also necessary to launch diplomatic actions both within the CFE Treaty context, and using as well political mechanisms, as for example, the NATO-Russia Council, in order to assign clearly to the Russian Federation the responsibility for the UTLE from the occupied area which must be withdrawn and/or destroyed by Moscow.

Certainly, the legal and institutional international tools are not limited to those represented by the Council of Europe or the CFE Treaty mentioned above.

¹⁷ "Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion", The Defense Monitor, December 1, 2000.

¹⁸ Thereby, on November 16 the MFA of the Russian Federation has announced the completion of the retrieval process of ELT's in conformity with the Decisions of the OSCE Summit from Istanbul.* The Russian headquarters from Tiraspol has reported the destruction of 239 units of TLE and the withdrawal of other 125 to Russia.

We could also recall the NATO-Russia Council, PfP, Stability Pact, BSEC, or GUAM. Altogether or separately, all these make a good opportunity to promote the legitimate security interests of the Republic of Moldova, in particular PfP, which normally could lead to the situation when the Republic of Moldova will request the full membership of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

6.3. Partnership as a long-term strategic decision

The “natural” partners of the Republic of Moldova are the USA and EU member states that do show a more responsible attitude towards the development of the democracy and the consolidation of security and stability on the European continent. However, such an attitude implies taking more open and engaging positions towards the Russian authoritarian tendencies at home and imperial ones abroad. The USA, for instance, has fully supported the radical political transformations in Georgia and Ukraine, despite the Kremlin’s irascibility. Poland and Lithuania have saved the appearances, pleading on behalf of the EU for the same democratization objectives through the “chromatic” change of regimes. Also, Great Britain displays a more principled attitude towards the support of the integration efforts of the Eastern and Central European countries, taking into consideration their sensitivity emanating from a legacy of not-so-friendly relations with Russia.

Therefore, the Republic of Moldova should assume certain responsibilities regarding the long-term strategic orientation that covers the Eastern and Central European countries and Washington with London’s intermediation when the UK supports the ex-Soviet and ex-Socialist countries. Moldova’s hopes concerning the involvement of the Euro-Atlantic community to solve the Transnistrian problem and to consolidate the security in this area could be connected to the increasing of the interest of Washington towards the Black Sea region. This very interest was generated not lastly by Romania that expressed its readiness to contribute to the security and stability in this region.¹⁹ There is also a noticeable increase of interest towards the countries from the Black Sea region from the academic community and NGOs.²⁰ This very trend should be fully supported by the Republic of Moldova which could also support Romania’s efforts in

¹⁹ Traian Băsescu, “The Black Sea Area: Advancing Freedom, Democracy, and Regional Stability”, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, March 10, 2005, www.cfr.org

²⁰ See, for example, Ronald D. Asmus, “Anchor the Black Sea Region to the West”, *The Nation*, 8 September; Bruce P. Jackson, “The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region”, March 8, 2005, www.newamericancentury.org

this regard, but also could develop own initiatives regarding the consolidation of democracy and security in the region. Undoubtedly, a trustful policy in this field could be managed only by professionals and here it is necessary to ensure an appropriate level of Moldovan diplomatic presence in Washington and also the improvement of communication with the US Embassy in Chisinau.

6.4. The “blood for friendship” policy and upgrading professionally the National Army

Theoretically, the Republic of Moldova has the chance to bypass certain existent clichés, analyzing the substance of what could be called the foundation of long-term cooperation with the USA. It is true that forwarding the request of accession to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and accepting the NATO standards are important steps in this direction, like the border security and management, the reform in the military sector, the democratic monitoring of the planning in the military sector and the transparency of the decision-making process regarding armed forces. Each Membership Action Plan is crucial for the reformation of the National Army and of the structures responsible for the national defense. With all that, as we mentioned above, there is a theoretical chance to bypass the models offered by Moldovan neighbors from Eastern and Central Europe, namely the engagement in unconditional combat (with personnel around or more than 10-15 battalions) in every armed campaign led by the USA from this moment of in the future. Beyond the structural changes, democratic reforms etc, what is important for the political decision-making factors from Chisinau is that this fundamental change may occur only after the unambiguous and substantial commitment shown by the number of soldiers sent to Iraq, Afghanistan or any other geographical destination where Washington deems necessary the American involvement. Any other way is an attempt to make theories or a half measure.

As never before the USA needs active partners for antiterrorist campaigns and Moldova has the chance to join the Central and Eastern Europe and even over-compete these countries by the extent of its effort. The “blood for friendship” policy could be deemed by certain left observers as one without principles and harmful due casualties that would occur in the Moldovan army. But the fate of underdeveloped countries is to have bad choices – if principles could be debated by some French intellectuals who are narrowing the European political and economic horizon due to their socialist positions, than Moldovans, leaving aside certain theoretical remarks about the side-effects of the American military campaigns, should do nothing but just associate with the mission of establishing

democracy that is managed by Washington. This commitment of the intellectual and political elite should be irreversible and without any doubts – “the old Europe” can not serve as a model because of its economic and political impotence, the fact shown many times in the past years, like the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other post Yugoslav regions. The “blood for friendship” policy could be deemed, as we mentioned above, to be harmful as it comes to casualties, – an argument that apparently is concerned with human lives. However, it could be stated that the Russian continuing aggression and the treatment of Moldovan citizens who migrated to Russia are leading to more casualties than an eventual participation to the USA led military campaigns. The death toll in the context of relations with the Russian Federation is and will continue to be bigger, as the past time has shown and the present is showing, because this country is and will continue to be a messenger the European civilization failure, regardless of the political and economic developments on the continent.

A certain “blood for friendship” policy would suppose, in concrete terms, the American expertise regarding the training and establishment of more infantry battalions of rapid reaction (with helicopter and transport aviation support) to back the USA in military campaigns (in Iraq, for example) or the EU in peace-making effort (in Bosnia, for example). This expertise would include the respective studies like those for the junior partners new in Alliance (NATO Defence College or NATO School (SHAPE) from Oberammergau) and the involvement of the American instructors in the field, by the example of Georgia.

We could suppose with a high degree of probability that Moldova’s irreversible commitment on the “blood for friendship” way will attract the financial and logistic resources of the allied members. Based on these trained units it could be possible to create the future professional Army of the Republic of Moldova. Currently, in accordance with the general structure, the Army’s personnel is 7.227 people. The military form 3 infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a special force battalion, a brigade of anti-aircraft missiles, an aviation base, an escadrille of mixed aviation, as well as support and technical units. The equipment, according to the CFE Treaty (information from 01.01.02), consists of: tanks – 0 (limit 210), ACV – 209 (limit 210), artillery – 148 (limit 250), combat helicopters and planes – 0 (limit 50 and 50). The “blood for friendship” policy could represent an opportunity to modernize the equipment, changing to the standards of the Alliance, the number growth of personnel and the professional up-grade of the Army that could be capable to run the mission of defending the constitutional order when it is necessary.

Chapter VII.

TRANSNISTRIA: MILITARY, POLITICAL AND OTHER RISKS AND CHALLENGES

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Doing an analysis of the main risks and challenges determined by the existence of anti-constitutional enclave from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, first of all, we have to distinguish them from the point of view of their character. Thus we distinguish two main categories of risks: risks linked with the transparency of structures and interests of the separatist regime; risks linked with the increase of the international contradictions.

7.1. Terrorist elements and structures under the protection of separatist regime.

- a. Legal transfer of weapons and the control upon the Russian military armory in the region

The armories of the Operative Group of Russian Forces, the stocked weaponry and the ammunitions, extremely vulnerable to paramilitary groups and criminal structures from the region exist in Transnistria. In 2000, the quantity of weapons and ammunitions, belonging to the Russian Federation, stockpiled in the Transnistrian region consisted 42 000 tones. According to the public reports of the OSCE mission in Moldova, between 2000 and 2004 from the territory of the Transnistrian region of Republic of Moldova were evacuated or destroyed on the territory about 50% of weapons, military equipment and ammunitions. In the mentioned period a total of 56 suites with military equipment were evacuated. The evacuation and the use of goods of Operative Groups of Russian Forces (OGRF) from Tansnistria were financed from the voluntary Fund of OSCE. The from weapons left on the territory, according to the OSCE reports consisted, approximately of 19 916 tones of: cartridges, bombs, rockets and air bombs, kept in the armories on a territory of about 100 hectares, near Cobasna railway station. After a detailed analysis of the specifications and the list of these ammunitions we can state that the total of explosives from within the armories in Cobasna make up for more than 10.000 tones.

The OSCE reports about the quantity of stocked ammunition cannot be considered to be exact, as the documentation presented in different periods by the representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, is not a transparent one. We can suppose that in the armories of OGRF exist 25 tones of weapons and ammunitions. A possible explosion of the armories from the neighborhood of Cobasna station could be compared with the explosion of an atomic bomb of 10 kilotons that represents the equivalent of the bomb which was thrown upon Hiroshima in August 1945. The force of the wave of shock of such an explosion could completely destroy brick and reinforce concrete buildings within a range of 4, 5 km from the epicenter.

The crater would have a radius of 1, 5 km and a depth of 75 m. However in the case in the case of explosion in Cobasna, the local factor will also have an impact caused by the rural character of the place, the range of action of the first wave of shock could be of 40-50 km and more. The consequences of such an explosion can be compared with an earthquake of 7-5,5 degrees on Richter scale, in the region of Vrancea. The triggering of an explosion the armories from Cobasna can lead to an ecological and human disaster in the North-Eastern region of the Republic of Moldova and the adjacent territory of Ukraine on a territory of 500 square km to 3000 square km, affecting the places from the very neighborhood of the explosion epicenter (Ribnita, Haraba, Slobodca (Ukraine) and Varancau), as well as Slobodka, Krasnâe Okni, Balts, Kotovsk (Ukraine), to Rezina and Soldanesti on the territory of Republic of Moldova, as well as faraway zones from Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania.

The acute danger is also acknowledged by the representatives of the so-called "Ministry of Defense" of the separatist enclave, namely General Atamaniuk, who affirms that "the explosion of these ammunitions can destroy dozens unless hundreds of localities not just in Transnistria but as well in Moldova and Ukraine". But the declarations of high officials and the leaders of illegal formations of the criminal regime about the scale of dangers the OGRF armories for frightening the Transnistrian of locals by spreading around imaginary threats about terrorist attacks from the Secret Service of the Republic of Moldova. It is to be mentioned that the armories of OGRF are dubby encircled by the posts of the so-called "Transnistrian State Ministries of Security and Defence". The forces of these posts were increased in the summer of 2001, and since then did not decrease. The armories of weapons and ammunitions are just a pretext for the Russian Federation to go against its commitment to evacuate the arsenal and the troops of the OGRF. The statement according to which the leaders of the regime are stopping the evacuation are ill founded as Vladimir Antiufeev, the general-major, the head of the enclave and the employee of the Russian Fed-

eral Service of Information (FSB) is reporting directly to the chief of this special Russian service, Nicolai Patrushev. However, according to “our information”, even if the illegal military formation “transnistrian army” possesses enough and different systems of weapons, it does have a lack of ammunitions. Because of this MGB pays a great attention to the armories OGRF.

b. The security services

Under the control of the military formation of the so called “Ministry of State Security” (MGB), there are mobile groups with special destination: “Delta”, with a personnel of 500 to 1000 troops, as well as the existence within the “ministry of home affairs” of the formation “Dnestr”, with a personnel of 700 to 1000 troops. These military formations may be used to participate in different conflicts on the territory, as to well as commit terrorist acts on the territory of Moldova’s and on other separatist enclaves from Georgia (Abkhazia and Southern Osetia), whose leaders are in good relationships with the criminal regime leaders in Transnistria.

The battalion “Dnestr” participated, supporting conservative forces, at the Moscow “coup d’etat” attempt from September – October 1993. Once MGB took control over the main political and military institutions from the region, it also took control over the financial resources, banking system and the privatization process, which assures unlimited resources to the special services of the separatist regime. Durring last years we could state the threat of creation of supporting groups of MGB even on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

For this aim, the MGB finances and works on changing the ideology of the Chisinau youth group entitled “National Bolshevik Party” that participated at many street riots, in the centre of the capital during 2002-2005. After the “orange” revolution from Ukraine, the same MGB initiated the foundation, organization and strengthening of the radical movement “Proriv”, which aim is to counteract any attempts of orange “revolution” in Tiraspol and eventually, to pass all these actions on the right bank, in order to organize in Chisinau a red-green “putsch” (the color of NMR flag).

c. Smuggling and unlawful trade, illegal process of privatization

Unlawful trade is possible due to the fact that the transnistrian segment of the Moldo-Ukrainian border, lacks appropriate control of the constitutional bodies Republic Moldova, as well as because of the policy of the Ukrainian Authorities’, which does not correspond to European principles. During Leonid

Kucima's leadership in Kiev, the conventional leader of the regime that administers Transnistria territory, Igor Smirnov, transferred monthly to his lobbies from Kiev, sums of money equivalent with 2 million US dollars. From those 1222 km of Moldo-Ukrainian border the Transnistrian segment constitutes 452km, which is not controlled by the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova's. Such circumstances create the best opportunities for criminal affairs, smuggling, illegal emigrants and weapon traffic are just as usual.

From the Ukrainian side, the guard of the Transnistrian segment of Moldo-Ukrainian border is assured by the Kotovsk and Maghiliiov detachments of Border State Service. The guard in this region consists of: 4 border patrols, 22 border posts, 6 departments of border control, 4 mobile divisions, 6 operative divisions, 19 customs (17- auto and 2- railway). The entire personnel constitutes just 1900 people. These forces have: 2 helicopters, 3 motorboats, 8 stations of radar-location, 6 projectors stations, 200 cars and motorcycles, 626 radio stations. In the first five months of this 2005, the number of caught illegal emigrants tripled. The number of people who were administratively trialed for trespassing the border line increased 2, 3 times, the quantity of confiscated weapons and smuggling goods increased 8 and respectively 3.5 times.

The plans of the State Border Service for the development of the frontier security infrastructure is to setup posts of supervision and control. This has never been done in the ex-soviet space on the Transnistrian segment. Till now, the Ukrainian competent bodies have had a selective attitude what concerns the detention of delinquents on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldo-Ukrainian border. The main way of smuggling from the Transnistrian region follows the old Nistru flow. The "transport" is organized as a convoy or caravan, which means 15-20 trucks at a time. The route on the old Dniester river flow was set up by the obscure structures in 1997. This happened after the settlement at the Pervomaisk Kuciurgan entry, of mixed Chisinau and Tiraspol customs that were eliminated from the enclave's initiative in 2000. Until then, smuggling of goods passed without any control. At the end of 1997 the path along the old Dniestr flow had already a gravel cover, meaning that smuggling increased greatly. The caravans that usually were accompanied by transnistrian multia cars, when reaching the border further were entrusted to their Ukrainian companions. After entering the Ukrainian territory at a distance of 35-45 km the trucks were unloaded. The main smuggled goods were cigarettes and alcohol. As a rule, the trucks belong to Ukrainian citizens, put the convoys were organized in Transnistria. The convoys were formed of military trucks of such models as: ZIL-131 and Ural-375. These were bought from the former 14th Army. It is to be stated that the Moldovan Custom Department and the Department of the frontier forces

have repeatedly requested explanation notes from the Ukrainian competent bodies. In 2004 Ukrainian border state service said they know about the route of old Nistru flow, but there were no criminal activities registered.

It is generally known that at least “Sheriff” group makes most of the illegal activities of import-export and has strong co-operation relationships with economic agents from Ukraine, they use this route for the transportation of their own fuel and motor oils to warehouses, that they rent on the Ukrainian territory. A proof of a extremely strong lobby for “Sheriff” group in Ukraine, is the fact that on the territory of Odessa region was registered and functions the GSM operator “Intercom”, that represents a subdivision of “Sheriff” group. Drugs are also a part of the smuggled goods. The control on the drug operations is done by the “state security ministry” as well as upon the illegal export of weapons. The drug and weapon smuggling is also done by the representatives of the criminal world controlled by the MGB and already got their own place in the structure of the enclave.

d. Illegal weapon manufacturing in the region

Additional to the fiscal facilities that the Russian Federation offeres to the separatist region, in the last decade they received considerable aid for the settlement and functioning of some autonomous systems of weapon manufactory, assamblage and trade. Under the control of the Russian Federation military security experts, a lot of companies on the separatist territory systematically manufacture different types of heavy and light weapons on orders received from some Russian agencies of weapon export (Rossvoorujenie). We are going to present the main military companies and the types of weapons manufactured by them:

The mechanic factory

It manufactures serial products since 1995. Here are some of the manufactured weapon systems: reactive systems for volley fire with 20 barrels (set on car platforms), antitank mine thrower (since 1995), 82 mm and 120 mm mine throwers (since 1996), mobile antitank mine thrower (since 1996), 5,45 mm caliber guns. Few dozens of reactive systems were delivered to Abhazia for illegall military formations. Given the location of the factory (on the right bank of the Nistru, in the heart of the security aria with special regime from Bender city), Tiraspol leaders complemented setting up the controll point of peacekeeping forces situated on the Bender bridge just with Russian and tran-

snistrian militaries. Since 1992, according to the decision of the United Control Committee (UCC), trilateral control points must be set on all bridges over Nistru. All further attempts by Chisinau to establish the trilateral charter of this control point, as well as the attempts to inspect this factory, according to the agreement from 1992 and UCC status have failed.

Moldova's Metallurgic Factories and its subsidiaries. In the spring of 1995 at MMF was launched the manufacture of mine throwers of 82mm and 122 mm caliber. The testing of the first mine throwers were made on May 17th 1997 with the presence of buyers from the Russian Federation. In the same period the factory manufactured the first lot of experimental antipersonnel mines, in wooden frame. Further the manufacturing of anti-attack mines was launched.

Pump factory. Manufactures 40 mm antipersonnel mine throwers GP-25.

“SELHOZTEHNICA” manufactures certain parts for the mine throwers produced at the pump factory.

“ELECTROMAS”. Manufactures: 9 mm machine-guns, 9 mm Macarov pistols, 5,45 mm pistols, hunting rifles and special items on command.

“ELECTROPARAT”. It manufactures parts and sub ensembles for different weaponry systems. Other companies on the transnistrian territory were also set up to manufacture weaponry systems for example the factory “Tocilitmas” manufactures mine launchers “Grom”, which have no equivalent in the CIS area. Weapon manufacturing from Transnistria constitutes one of the main factors that provoke instability in the South-Eastern region of Europe. The manufacture and the sale weaponry systems are under the control of the “Minister of State Security of Transnistria”, Vladimir Antifiueev. A greater attention must be paid to the manufacturing of reactive systems for volley fire which could become very dangerous once achieved by the terrorists. Camouflaged weapons (the so called special items) may be used to eliminate politicians of opposition as well as non-subordinating businessmen. Mine throwers “Grom”, which have no equivalent in the CIS area, are proof of ability of the criminal regime to set up a long-term production of different types of weaponry systems.

Acknowledging that there are anti-personnel mines produced in Transnistria, they have to be entirely destroyed according to Ottawa Convention. The Republic of Moldova fulfilled all the obligations set up by the Convention on the territory under its control. Criminal regime leaders reject Convention obligations. It is not a secret that Smirnov – Antifiueev regime delivered weapons to Abkhaz separatists. The representatives of this regime do also not hide the fact that they delivered a wide range of weaponry systems to bandit formations of “Srska Republic” led by Radovan Karadzic. The bandit formations of Karadzic

are officially recognized as being responsible of genocide acts against Bosnians, and Radovan Karadjic is in the process of general prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Again we are not excluding the fact that the transnistrian weapons could have been bought by Saddam Husein's secret services, as a series of Iraqi emissaries often visited Transnistria during 2002 and 2003.

7.2. Negative impact on the domestic political situation in the Republic of Moldova

a. The preservation of an ethnic intolerance climate, linguistic **exclusiveness** and terror

The first statement comprises the promotion of an obsolete concept, actually defined as national segregation; the second one comprises a concept qualitatively different, but not less negative, defined as "denationalization". The concept of national segregation means "separate development" whilst "denationalization" is the forced obstruction of antinational standards particularly in the educational process and in culture in general. The "target group" of the national segregation policy is constituted of Romanian transnistrian representatives, who adopted an active civic position and grouped around the Romanian lyceums from Transnistria. The "target group" of the "denationalization" policy is represented by Romanian people that lost the national ethnic belonging. They are an ideal "target" for the maintenance of combined criminal policy of combined socio-cultural treatment, operated in the region beginning with the 20s of the last century and intensified in 1937, along with the forced introduction of **Cyrillic** alphabet in Romanian language. The aim of this policy is to create an ethnic sub-group that would identify themselves as Moldovans, different of Romanians, to create an ethnic sublayer that would auto-identify itself as belonging to a claimed independent Moldovan nation, different from the rest of Romanians (the so-called "Stalinist-concept").

To be true, the majority of Romanian ethnics from the Transnistrian region are of transilvanian and not of moldavian origin, fact proved by the hystorical evidence and data about the region's population, as well as by the dialect kept by the Romanians that live in neighborhood of river Nistru-Bug. As a result of the implementation of the above mentioned plans of the leadership of this region, Romanians do not formally exist, with the exception of a little group of workers subdued to the complete socio-cultural treatment that were effectively "denationalized". The representatives of the ethnic majority in this region are, practically lowered to the status of inferior citizens; parallel to the triumph of

the “Russian only” concept. The declaration of Moldavian language as the official language in “TRM” means on one hand just a demagogy that became classic, and on the other hand a component part of the policy of socio-cultural processing of the majority Romanian ethnics. The development of the experiment of creating of a new silvic parallel to “Transnistrian nation”, the creation of some marginal organizations and the intensification of national, chauvinist, Pan-Slavic and anti-semitic tendencies.

This experiment was initiated in 1992, with the aim to put the people from the region against the Republica of Moldova. It is characterized by 2 types of approach.

The first resides in wearing away the feeling of nationality status of Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan ethnic groups with the aim to promote the ideology of “Transnistrian nation as a new community”.

The second one resides in the continuous development of the perverted feeling of pride of Russians and Ukrainians growth constantly accompanied by the invocation of “acts of imperial bravery” of Russian nation and those of “the Ukrainian “fraternal” one from the USSR.

The apparent contradiction is swept away by the aggressively propagated conclusion that the “Transnistrian nation” in only the objective result of the process of formation of the soviet man in a certain region, emphasizing that he belongs to the Slavic group. The Romanian-friendly population, subject to degradation is actively suggested by the propagandat that Moldavians, by the origin, are half-Slavic nation. The process that helps to form an aggressive awareness is accompanied by the provocation of the most mean infamous instincts of national intolerance, xenophobia and anti-semitism. The old generations are subdued to intense ideological processing based on “soviet values”.

b. Anti-semitism as an element of pan-Slavic ideology

A key-element of the pomoted policy is the creation of youth organizations in order to constitute elementary concepts of radical essence, about the present social processes. This presents a special danger, as it creates nationalist visions of the youth that is exposed to radical means of expressing their attitudes. On the territory of the enclave there were created and fostered such youth ultra-Chauvinist organizations as: “Transnisrian Union of Patriotic Youth”, “Viteaz”, “Slavic Youth League” and some smaller ones. Under the control of MGB, these organizations regularly called reunions based on the military model, at the training camp near village Ternovca. These actions regarded the intimidation and application of force against citizen in opposition to the re-

gime, including the deployment of a riot at the Jewish cemetery in Tiraspol in March 2004, “authorized” by the Transnistrian special services. The pogrom must be discussed in details.

The pogrom has no precedent in the matter of duration. It began on March 13th and continued until March 30th. The criminals have destroyed more than 20 funeral monuments and other 50 were desecrated practically. On each monument there were left signs in the form of swastika, one of the SS symbols inscriptions of the word “skins” (skinheads), number 88, which taking into account the 8th position of the letter H in the alphabet, represents a codification of the famous “Heil Hitler”. The first signs were known on March 13th. On March 20th, the police was informed but only after the continuation of the acts of profanation. However, the pogrom continued for at least 10 more days. In spite of the fact that the police and municipal administration were announced, no one took any measures in order to stop the profanation or arrest the criminals.

There are more than 600 hundred of public organizations on the territory of Transnistria. The most of them are fictitious and were created just to imitate the process of formation of the civil society in Transnistria in front of the international public opinion. Nevertheless, some of them are functioning, and rather well. The most dangerous ones are youth organizations “Slavic Youth League”, “Viteaz”, “Lutici”. They have many things in common. All these organization are considered “patriotic”, have hundreds of members and are closely linked together. They are propagating the so-called “patriotic” ideas wich in fact often border on ideas of national exclusivity. “Slavic Youth League”, “Viteaz”, “Lutici” are strongly supported by the Transnistrian authorities, and yearly, they are carrying out more and more reunions at the training camp from Tervovca, situated not far from Tiraspol. It must not surprise anybody that these organizations are generously supported by the authorities as each member of these organizations is treated as a potential worker at the state ministry of security. For this purpose there is an MGB officer delegated to each organization who patronizes them and has to choose the best candidates. The assignment of these “tutors” to methodically supervise all the actions of the above mentioned organizations and, depending on their opinions and convictions it is decided support or liquidate of the organization.

The so-called “patriotic” nationalist and Chauvinist organizations are supported by MGB, which is run by Vladimir Antiufeev, as well as by the Tiraspol municipal administration. In Transnistria the militia have no authority, they are under the constant pressure of MGB structures that regularly interfere in different situations as they like. The participation at the pogrom of the “patri-

ots” from the “Slavic Youth League” and “Lutici”, who have never hidden their anti-semitic visions and who expressed their readiness “to kill Romanians”, meaning citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

The activity of one of these organizations and namely their leader are worth analyzing.

We are speaking about the “Viteaz” organization, the leader of which is Ruslan Pogorletki. Known for his anti-semitic visions, Pogorletki has never had problems according to his organizations sponsorship or tutorship. Thus based on “Tirotext” sport club, “Viteaz” youth “patriotic” sport club was founded. The numerous minutes and reports of bodies of public order against Pogoretschi offer us many interesting facts: “Carrying out trainings without any control” on “Olimpiet” stadium, Pogorletki included the “skins” movement in “Viteaz” and provided it with new attributes (crosses, slogans, uniform, handshaking) and which later organized and carried out a series of terrorist acts (synagogue explosion attempt of blowing up the of the Jewish community president, acts of vandalism from the Jewish cemetery, etc.). All these facts were known by the workers of the law enforcement bodies long time before the events happened, but they have never taken measures of counteraction.

Why? The answer is: obviously they just did not want to deal with an organization which is under MGB control. As some ex-members of “Viteaz” say, R. Pogorletki never let the control out of his hands. They said that he was “blessing” each action, gave advice regarding security and organization, mentioning he that was a weapons specialist, that he was trained in “Delta” troops from MGB, that he had special training in a training camp from Montenegro. Every summer, the young transnistrian “Führer” organized military style reunions for the “patriotic” youth. MGB chiefs regularly attend reunions.

The Smirnov-Atiufiev regime was so interested to support these villains that it even accepted to create a special newspaper that would reflect the activity of “patriotic” organizations. For this purpose, “Youth March” newspaper was created, the founder of which is “Strateghia” centre, run by the chief of the MGB section for defence and constitutional order, Dmitri Soin. Oleg Elkov worked as an editor at this newspaper. The ultranationalist publication was youth-oriented, exalted the ideas of pan Slavism and of national and racial exclusivism. The newspaper regularly published articles about Satanism and violence, there were also offensive published articles about public persons who were against the policies of Smirnov – Atiufiev regime. These articles injured the dignity and honor of citizens, so that in 1999 and 2000 there were submitted 15 law-suit requests against the newspaper for defending dignity and honor.

Although it had great support, the newspaper could not avoid the sentence and was shut down at the end of 2000. The mass-media declared that “Youth March” publication was financed by Transnistrian MGB structures with the aim to keep the informational space from this region under control. Right after the liquidation of this newspaper, Oleg Elkov was hired by the official news agency “Olvia-Press”, specialized in misinformation, being an MGB structure and its main PR project. The ex-editor of the nationalist paper still continues to publish his provocative articles that have the aim to increase the hate of Transnistrian citizens to all that is related to the Republic of Moldova on the “Olvia-Press” site. We have the impression that, under the Smirnov-Antiufeev regime, Transnistria was transformed into a twilight zone, a reservation where experiments on the awareness of citizens are made. The programs processing socio-cultural awareness of the citizens, based on nationalist, Chauvin and misanthropic ideology, exported by some marginal groups from the Russian Federation, got deep roots in the “Nistrian Moldovan Republic”. The poisonous seeds of nationalism have already begun to appear. All this would not have been possible without the approvement from “the top”. The creation and functioning of the anti-semitist nationalist organization has become possible due to the ideological beliefs of Vladimir Antiufeev.

Vladimir Antiufeev never hid his beliefs. In 1995 he was on the 4th position on the list of the Liberal Democratic Party from Russia (LDPR), lead by Vladimir Jirinovschi. He stood for elections in the Russian Federation State Duma. As the head of the MGB, Antiufeev holds control upon Transnistria’s weapon manufactory and sales, other illicit financial fluxes and leads personally the system of political pursuit in the region. His visions may be known from the few interviews given by this major-general at that time. Some information may be found in the book “About land, people and war”, edited in Kiev by “Nezalejnist” publication, in January 1995. Antiufeev’s hate speech is most focused on Colonel Mihail Bergman. Colonel Bergman was the commander of Tiraspol garrison and one of general Alexandr Lebed’s companions in the fight against Tiraspol mafia, which at that time was just at the begging of illicit weapon smuggling. Bergman regularly unmasked bandits in military uniform. Antiufeev was very clear about Bergman: “Bergman is a bastard”, “Colonel Bergman is a Mossad collaborator”, “Bergman is a cheater in addition”. His real name is “Monia”; even the colonel’s name drew him crazy. By the way, the graves of colonel relative’s were also profaned. Also in this book Antiufeev launched declarations about “Slavic unity”, about international politics, with declaration like: “Romanians have a reservation here in the Balkans, the role that Israel has in the Arabic world”. There is no surprise that the leaders

of” patriotic” organizations feel completely safe and are allowed to do almost whatever they want as there is no surprise that militia bodies are afraid to take any measures against them. Thus, for example, when 4 years ago, after another pogrom at the same Jewish cemetery, on the 9th of May, when people came to the graves of their relatives, the Russian nationalists caught one of them and have burnt out the Star of David on his back. The police did not do anything to arrest the criminals.

c. The challenge and alimentation of the chauvinistic sentiment of the political elites from the states in the region

In relation to the Russian Federation, the effect of these threats is characterized through constantly made appeals of the leaders of the regime and the organizations controlled by them towards the Power and the public opinion in Russia, appeals with the request to “defend the compatriots”, “Transnistria – Russian land”, “NMR – Russia’s bridgehead”. The corruption of Russian politics and clerks. In relation to Ukraine, these are expressed in the determination of Ukrainian elites to degrade on the way of creating a new model, conventionally named “Russia II”, instead of the evolution to “European Ukraine” model. It is expressed through the control and speculation of the interests of the Ukrainian citizens who live on the territory of Transnistrian region, making problems for ensuring proper control on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, slowing down of the modernization and domestic reforms in Ukraine and, tolerating corruption and smuggling, especially in the region of Odessa.

This is manifested through the transformation of these elites into certain groups of lobby for the regime which administers the territory of the separatist enclave. It is expressed in fact by direct corruption of the political leaders, as well as by indirect corruption through the offers to operate in common a policy coordinated by Moscow, the nature of which is to confer financial and political advantages to these leaders and their groups. As an example serves the kidnap of the deputy Vlad Cubreacov, member of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and of the Parliamentary Meeting of the European Council, made by orders of the FSB of Russia Major-general Vladimir Antiufeyev, who is, in the same time “State Security Minister”, as well as the failed assault to the President of the Republic of Moldova V. Voronin in august 2004.

7.3. The process of illegal privatizations

The illegal privatization initiated in the Transnistria aims to attract financial means for the leaders of the criminal regime, as well as for the increase of interest of big Russian companies towards the existence of the enclave. In the view of the leaders of the regime and their protectors from Moscow, the Russian economic agents who have important properties on the Transnistrian territory will volens-nolens have to conduct a policy of hard pressure on the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Moldova with the aim to support their own interests and, thus, to maintain the existence of the enclave.

As a clear example can serve the “privatization” of the Moldovan Power Plant in Kuchurgan. The leadership of the criminal administration of the Transnistrian region owed a large sum of money to “Gazprom”. Only during the year 2004 the debt of Tiraspol for the consumed natural gases has increased by 32 million US Dollars. As the total debt, meaning the applied penalties and sanctions, was about 1 billion US Dollars. Today Transnistria is able to pay for half of the currently supplied natural gases. At the same time the “Tiraspoltransgaz” company, has to pay the last one 10 million dollars in sanctions because of the systematic illegal bonding to the gas pipes of the monopolist company “Gazprom”.

The illegal theft of natural gases from the pipe line has suddenly increased with the drastic cutback by “Gazprom” of the deliveries to Transnistria and especially to the Moldovan Power Plant for the low level of a quittance and for the fact that it didn’t have a direct contract for the delivery of natural gases. Artlessly, Tiraspol doesn’t have and doesn’t plan to have the means to pay the debt in the near future. The sale of property is the only possibility left to make even with the creditors. That is why, during the last two years, the Tiraspol authorities have proceeded to selling the companies situated in the region. These companies are purchased mainly by citizens of the Russian Federation. We’re talking about the “Pribor” factory from Bender, the companies “Moldavisolit” from Tiraspol, “Buket Moldavii” from Dubasari, the wire factory from Bender and the shoe factory “Tighina”. The only objective that is able to ensure Russia with geo-political as well as with economic advantages is the Moldovan Power Plant on the bank of lake Cuciurgan. This one has been sold to the obscure “Russian-Belgian” firm “Saint Guidon Invest NV”, at a very low price of just 29 million Dollars.

According to the estimations of experts, the Power Plant costs not less than 200 million dollars and at a full exploitation of its capabilities it could bring an annual income of 2 billion dollars to its owners. The Moldavian Power Plant continues to be the economic foundation of the enclave. In the period of the

USSR, when all 12 power blocks were functioning, the Power Plant provided the necessary electricity not only to the Moldavian SSR but also to a considerable part of Ukraine. More than that, a third part of the produced energy was being exported to Bulgaria. In the period of the disaster, the plant stopped working. Today there are being used just 2 blocks in the summertime and 4 in winter. But even this is enough to make the electricity for 40% of the territory of the Republic of Moldova including Transnistria. With the aim of buying the Moldavian Power Plant, the companies “Gazprom” and RAO EES have envisaged the creation of a consortium which would have to invest into the reconstruction of the Power Plant and, after the growth of the delivery capacities, to make a sort of energetic expansion in Europe. It was considered that with an investment in the Plant of 30 to 50 million dollars, the capacity of production would increase in two years, making it possible to export the electricity, meanwhile the Transnistrian region would be integrally ensured with electricity.

The exports would have assured a financial flow which would have further been invested in the modernization of the Plant. The consortium made by “Gazprom” and RAO EES is planning to increase the amount of investments to 100 million dollars. “Gazprom” and RAO EES were those who will persuade Russia to give a “humanitarian credit” of 100 million dollars to the leaders of the regime. This credit, would have paid the Transnistrian debt for the delivered natural gasses through “Gazprombank”. It has to be mentioned that the debates regarding the sale of the Plant began a few years ago. We have the information that in 2000 the American “Exsson power investment company” had offered the Transnistrian leaders a redemption for the Moldavian Power Plant.

Besides, instead of Russian gasses, the American company was offering the use of Colombian coal (!). Interested in buying the Moldavian Power Plant were also the British, German, Italian businesses, the bureau of attorneys “Binnetsky and associates” from Moskow, and even the US Agency for International Development (USAID). “Seabeco” was also interested in the Power Plant. In 2003 Boris Birstein has brought to the Power Plant the representatives of the American firm “BK Group”, who promised to invest not less than 100 million dollars into the Power Plant. We have to remark that “Saint Guidon Invest NV”, leaded by Daniel Goldenberg has forwarded the same investment offer. There is information that Boris Birstein is the head of the “Saint Guidon Invest NV” administration. As a matter of fact, the lobby for the Russian-Belgian company has been made by the ex-governor of the Tiumen region, Leonid Roketsky, the son of who, Andrey Roketsky is one of the directors of the “Saint Guidon Invest NV” company.

Notable is the extremely small period in which the privatization of the Moldovan Power Plant was operated. On December 5th 2003 the competition for investors has been announced and on December 19th the privatization committee requested all the necessary documents to be presented. In this febricity, the people that were making lobby for “Gazprom” and RAO EES simply didn’t make it to finish the judicial and economic evaluations of the Plant. The auction has been made in a private way. The majority of the members of the privatization committee, after a secret voting, decided to sell 100% of the state owned shares of the Moldavian Power Plant to “Saint Guidon Invest NV” company. According to the affirmations of Elena Cernenko, minister of economy in the Smirnov administration, also the head of the privatization committee, “the offer of the Russian-Belgian company was the optimal one for the “Nistrain Moldovan Republic””. As regarding the other candidate for the privatization of the Moldavian Power Plant Cernenko said that “Gazprom” and RAO EES have presented unacceptable conditions: the Russian companies intended to sell the Plant on the account of the debts for the delivered natural gasses.

The secret of this rush is hiding behind the fact that Boris Birstein has been supported by the director of the Moldavian Power Plant Gheorghii Jeliabov. This fact has also been confirmed by the words of the head of “Saint Guidon Invest NV” company Daniel Goldenberg, who promised to leave intact the “head administration of the Plant”. According to certain intelligence the “Saint Guidon Invest NV” company is a joint project of Boris Birstein and Igor Smirnov and, not in the last case, this explains the preference showed by the members of the privatization committee. In 2005 the situation around the Moldavian Power Plant has changed, because of the qualitative changes in the process of regulation of the Transnistrian conflict. The administration of RAO EES began an open lobby regarding the acknowledgement of “NMR”, but on the other side the position of Ukraine towards the criminal enclave by its south-west border has changed. The anxiety to “fix” the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova for the intervention of Russian funds has lead to the diminution of the influence of the “administration of NMR” and to the increase of the influence of their chiefs from Moscow. As a result of these processes, the Moldovan Power Plant has been transferred into the hands of RAO “North” company, which is a subdivision of the Russian RAO EES structure. At the same time, we have to mention that companies privatized by the “Sheriff” group are practically lost for the Russian business, because of the policy promoted by the administration of this very group. If wisely approached this circumstance, could further be efficiently used.

7.4. The caused insecurity: threats and tested scenarios

a. Threats towards the security of the citizens: From the point of view of their origin, these threats are separated into two basic categories. The first one is about the threats to the security of citizens who adopted an active civic position. It manifests itself through constant threats to use violence upon those who request the demission of Igor Smirnov, as well as upon those who appeal for the re-attachment of Transnistria to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova, but first of all upon those who are actively manifesting in the field of developing the activity of youth NGO's.¹

The second category is about the increased criminality in the region. Despite the fact that in the middle and the end of the 90's some serious excesses took place regarding the division of the spheres of influence resulting in the elimination of an important number of leaders from the criminal world, the region is mainly characterized by an extremely high level of criminality, much higher than the recorded level on the rest of the Moldovan territory.

With the absence of any tools of supervision and responsibility, with the pretext of "constant war" against those who haven't accepted the "Transnistrian state", the secessionist regime is interested in maintaining certain conflicts on the territory, and feeding the meaning of the "besieged citadel" to the locals of the region. It is to be noted that in the framework of this combat tactic, the authorities from Tiraspol constantly appeal to certain challenges which have the aim to bestir conflicts and further to use the Russian peacemakers to conserve the obtained "tactic victories". As examples serve the siege of the railway building in Bender, as well as the occupation of Vasilievca village, establishment of customs points even on the territory of the villages from the left bank that are under the jurisdiction of Chisinau, the blockage of traffic on the freed territory of Copanca village (on the right bank of Nistru river), etc.

¹ Examples: threats of physical elimination made by the MGB officials towards the leader of the Union of the Liberal Youth in Transnistria Mihail Korobelnikov have lead to the fact that he had to request political asylum from the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which has been satisfied; the murder attempt of Andrei Ponomariov, the leader of "Pilgrim-Demo" organization, which collaborates with the Embassy of the United States of America, incident that made Andrei Ponomariov leave the Republic of Moldova; non-stop challenges towards the leaders of the opposition Alexandr Radcenko and Nikolai Buciatsky, the first one had undertaken physical violence and the second had been attacked using chemical weapons.

7.5. The fake challenges of the transnistrian separatist regime:

In order to further assure their pivotal role of mobilizer of the material and human resources in the region, MGB authorities have elaborated certain operative plans of implication or so-called “operational response” to an attack from the Republic of Moldova in a “virtual” military conflict. Each of these plans follows a set of scenarios depending on the further evolutions. The main accent in these plans, as we can see, is put on the challenges from villages Dorotcaia, Copanca and Cremenciug. One of the plans contains the forced transfer of one or more villages under the jurisdiction of the enclave’s administration and the extremely callous treatment of the officials of constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova. This aims at challenging the units of the MFA of the RM to take actions in response, which will be qualified as “intrusion into the NMR” with the further declaration of war, call for mobilization and the request for help to the Russian Federation.

Another plan contains the employment of a special initiative with the help of the special expedience detachment of the “Delta” brigade. Dressed up in the uniforms of the Moldavian police (“Scut” battalion), the armed group should make attempts at the representatives of the peace-maker troops of the Russian Federation. But before that, it is mandatory to maximize the tension of the situation in the region of action (it could be Dorotscaia village), to cause the stressing of the relations between locals and Russian peace-makers. Again, after the challenge, comes the declaration of the status of war. But in this case the stakes are on the fact that in such an development (the attack on Russian peace-maker forces) the reaction of the administration of Russian Federation would be faster than in the case of the first scenario, thus making it easier for such a plan to be applied, in other circumstances this being more difficult for the regime. Another plan contains the formerly formulated idea about the organization of challenges in the region of Varnita village (a suburb of the Bender City). The constant challenges in the Severnii region on the border of Varnita village and the city of Tiraspol show that it is available for further application. One of the variants of this plan regards the explosion of ammunitions in a vehicle with the Chisinau registration mark. After the application of such a challenge, this will be proclaimed by the representatives of MGB as an act of terrorism done by the Moldavian special services, the fact that will also bring, as in the previous stated plans, to the declaration of the status of war and the help of the forces of the Russian Federation will be called upon.

We cannot exclude also the eventual challenges regarding the organization of a terrorist act at one of the armories of the SGRT. A certain terrorist act could

lead, around the region of its development, to a rather difficult situation, that could bring to a big catastrophe. This terrorist act could be easily done by a group of the special expedience detachment of the "Delta" battalion of MGB. The responsibility for this act could be placed upon the special services of the Republic of Moldova, after that, as in the previous plans, the status of war is inducted and it is appealed to the help of Russian Federation. As a result of the realization of one of these plans, the inevitable and immediate introduction of additional military forces of the Russian Federation into the Transnistrian region will follow, the fact that will lead to the creation of a qualitative new situation and, in consequence, would make the process of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova more difficult. In case of such a development it is possible that the troops of the countries of the European Union would clash with those of Russia.

As we are approaching the final solution of the Transnistrian conflict, the MGB administration would consider any challenges with the aim to extend the existence of the enclave. Making terrorist acts is one of the means regarding the achievement of this aim, which is seriously regarded by Vladimir Antiufeevev. There are three real terrorist threats, not directly linked with the challenges to start an open military conflict. The first and the most important threat is the possible attempt of the MGB to eliminate the President of the Republic of Moldova Voronin. As we are approaching the final solution of the Transnistrian conflict, the risk of an attempt of murder of the President of the Republic of Moldova would rapidly increase, because the policy promoted by Vladimir Voronin seeks to completely eliminate the criminal regime from Tiraspol. We have to remark that in the situation when certain groups from Moscow are really interested in the existence of the enclave, this policy makes the President of the Republic of Moldova an undesired figure for the conservators from FSB, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the representatives of the Russian criminal business world. Such a terrorist act could be realized with the forces of the special expedience brigade "Delta" from MGB, as well as with the help of another group of MGB.

The realization of a "classic" terrorist act (blowing up a strategic object) in Chisinau, with the aim of a psychological hit for the Moldovan authorities could be realized by officers of the "Delta" brigade. In case when we approach the final solution of the Transnistrian conflict, for the realization of terrorist acts the groups of extremists from the "National bolshevik party" could be used. Targets for the terrorist acts could be politicians and state officials from Moldova who are undesired by the administration of the Smirnov-Antiufeevev regime, as well as the objectives with a strategic importance. Also, there is the possibility for fake attempts or other actions with a shocking character meant, as terrorist acts, to

unbalance the socio-political situation in the Republic of Moldova and, eventually, to paralyze the functioning of the objectives with an economic importance.

The enclave's negative influence upon the Ukrainian policy is in correlation with the actual threats towards NATO. In case if the administration of the Russian Federation insist upon its destructive position regarding the enclave, this fact will inevitably lead to the use of additional efforts regarding the wrap of Ukraine into the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. A degraded and Russia – controlled Ukraine would present a risk for the south-eastern responsibility zone of NATO, because this will brake the supposed extent of the Coalition towards East. We cannot exclude also that variants of the scenario when the Ukrainian authorities will continue in words to imitate the process of becoming an independent state; meanwhile in the reality this one will follow the path of "Russia II" model and will be fully controlled by Moscow.

This fact presents a certain danger, being that, applying to the tactics of imitation and mimicry, this Ukraine could be affiliated to NATO, and therefore the Coalition would have a new member, thievishly controlled by Moscow and highly exposed to the destructive influence of the French and German elites, namely Shirac and Schroeder, who promote a policy foreign to the real interests of their countries, especially, and to NATO in general. This way or another, the existence of a "black hole" in Europe with its entire negative potential (especially the existence of huge amounts of weapons and ammunition sold gradually) is not in conformity with NATO's interests and, in the case of the slowing down of the process of integration of the Republic of Moldova, the Coalition will have to eliminate the enclave using the method of forced intervention. Such a case could be used by the destructive French and German elites to trigger the anti-American and anti-British hysteria. In the situation when the French and German elites will be in the opposition, there will be also criticized the Euro-Atlantic liberal-patriotic elites governing these states. Anyway, the decision to eliminate the enclave using the method of forced intervention could bring to unwanted excesses, although in a certain situation this kind of intervention could be the only acceptable method.

7.6. Recent tendencies in the policy of the separatist regime:

a. "Russia's influence": The policy promoted by the actual administration of the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Moldova becomes more aggressive and less responds to the actual objective processes following the tendencies of globalization, characterized by the spiral evolution. The attempts to re-es-

tablish the lost influence in Moldova are followed by convulsive tactic attacks, characterized through a policy of sanctions and through an open involvement into home affairs. If in conditions of globalization, the involvement into the home affairs of the totalitarian states, where the human rights are violated is considered normal, because it has the aim to install the democratic standards, then the involvement of a totalitarian state like Russia into the home affairs of a state with a higher degree of democratic development means a challenge to the whole international community. The non-perspicacious policy of the Russian Federation will contribute to the gradual bordering of its administration on the European and on the international level. The pressures upon the Republic of Moldova, which will continue as long as Vladimir Putin is the head of the state and till the elites that are behind him will lead to the fact that the US and EU will promote a much tougher policy towards the Russian Federation and to the acceptance of the Republic of Moldova into NATO.

It is necessary to remark that the actual administration of the Russian Federation is betting much on its military presence in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova and on regaining its influence. In order to consolidate their positions, the presidential administration of the Russian federation and the administration of FSB envisage appointing in the position of “president of NMR” the chief of MGB Vladimir Antiufeev, major-general of the Federal Intelligence Service. The Russian citizen Vladimir Antiufeev is being prosecuted by the General Court of the Republic of Moldova and the Interpol, being suspected of committing a series of very serious crimes. He is practically the real moderator of Transnistria because Igor Smirnov has the role of a “parade general”. The acceptance of Smirnov in the position of the leader of the separatist enclave was made by the KGB of USSR, as well because of its criminal past. Here is a short profile of Smirnov family:

Nikolai Stepanovici Smirnov, father of Igor Smirnov, during the Second World War has been behind the front, working as a prime-secretary of the regional committee of CPSU from the city of Zlatoustie, Sverdlovsk. During this war he formed a gang which terrorized the city, killing and stealing. In 1946 he was sentenced to capital punishment through shooting, but just after 15 years of imprisonment which he had integrally expiated. Igor Nikolaevich Smirnov followed the same path: has formed a gang that was also stealing and killing. In 1956 has been sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment, but he stayed there just 3.5 of them. Later on, thanks to his collaboration with the KGB, he gained the possibility to hide this fact in his biography.

Today the citizen of the Russian Federation Igor Smirnov and the groups linked with him control a fund of more than a billion US Dollars. The next one

in the criminal regime's hierarchy after Vladimir Antiufeev is Grigori Maracuta, the president of the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria. The Transnistrian referendum for the introduction of the right for private property over the land, which took place in 2003 and failed because of the weak presence at the ballot, has been organized by Maracuta with the aim of further buying the best land (!) through some interposed firms. The following situation shows us how big the real power of Maracuta is. In 2002, after the meeting of Igor Smirnov with Rudolf Perina and Pamela Hide Smith from July 27 in Vienna, Smirnov decided to leave Transnistria. Smirnov flew to Austria with his oldest son, who leads the customs department and a part the business of "Sheriff" corporation. Analysing the situation, Maracuta requested that Smirnov gets back to Transnistria, if not he will eliminate his second son, who is in charge for "Internestrkom" company. A lot of times Transnistria has been brought to the edge of introducing an exceptional situation, and in the military units and subdivisions of MGB has been announced first degree of military alert.

Igor Smirnov is needed as a puppet for legitimizing in the eyes of Transnistrian citizens the criminal regime that has been imposed to them. The advance of Vladimir Antiufeev in the position of the "president of NMR" will signify that the actual administration of the Russian Federation is willing to continue and to intensify its confrontation with the Republic of Moldova. Even if they are painful, all these actions of Russia are meant to fail. But this calls for the involvement of the international community, because the small Republic of Moldova will not be able to oppose long enough to such a big country like Russia. On one hand, the involvement should be materialized into offering the Republic of Moldova of certain preferential clauses by the EU, but on the other hand into a progressive application of pressures upon the administration of the Russian Federation in order to bring the foreign policy of this state to the today's realities. For the Republic of Moldova the situation will change into a better one when Mihail Kasianov is elected the head of the Russian Federation. If the Kremlin doesn't start to modify the Constitution and organize the operation "electing Putin for the third mandate, but as the president of the single state Russia-Belarus", Kasianov has got important chances of success, because he will be supported by the international community. If Kasianov wins, the influence of Russia in the Republic of Moldova will diminish, and after the inevitable retrieval of the SGRT it will be minimal, limiting just to certain cultural projects. But if the actual elites continue to be at the head of the Moscow administration, the situation will continue to be tensioned and just a rough position of NATO will be capable of influencing the solution of the Transnistrian conflict in the favour of the Republic of Moldova.

b. “The union with Ukraine”: We have to remark that without the support of Ukraine it is very difficult to solve the Transnistrian problem. Regarding this fact, the process of the reintegration of Republic of Moldova also depends on the evolutions in Ukraine. If Yulia Tymoshenko continues to be the prime-minister we can hope for a faster solution of the Transnistrian conflict, considering the fact that in September it is envisaged the distribution of authorizations in the favour of the prime-minister. Anyway, we have to consider that the presidential administration from Moscow and the administration of FSB examines the figure of the secretary of the National Council of Security and Defence as one that should be advanced in the position of prime-minister. Regarding this fact, the challenges towards Yulia Tymoshenko have a constant character, including through the pressures from the Russian oil producers. A government subversion in Kiev and the advance to the posture of the head of the state of Petro Poroshenko will certainly mean a catastrophe not only for Ukraine, but for the Republic of Moldova as well, because Petro Poroshenko, as a Russia – influenced agent will not admit the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova in rightful conditions. The peak of the challenges against Yulia Tymoshenko will be in August.

There is also a big probability that Yulia Tymoshenko will stand against the Russian pressures and become the number one politician in Ukraine. In favour of this fact speaks the degree of her popularity, which is higher than that of Yushchenko and that of the new joint power, as well as the fact that after the mass re-privatizations, on which Yulia Tymoshenko insists, the representatives of the European and American businesses could be between the owners. In a situation like this, the representatives of the Russian business could participate in the process of re-privatization especially just as western partners, which will lead to a policy of lobby for the Russian interests of business in the West. If Yulia Tymoshenko maintains her function of prime-minister, – but considering a series of processes (ethno genesis, geopolitics, tectonic processes, as well as other processes linked with the objective process of globalization) which are not the objective of this study, this could be very possible, – the “PRM” will discontinue to exist in its actual shape in not more than a year time beginning with the moment of empowerment of the prime-minister and her team.

This factor is in correlation with the real threats against NATO. The first threat is about the fact that a degraded and Russian controlled Ukraine would present a risk for the south-eastern responsibility zone of NATO, because this will brake the process of integration of the Ukraine into the Coalition. The second threat is about the fact that the Ukrainian authorities which follow the path of degradation, meaning the creation of the “Russia II” model, will be fully controlled by Moscow, and even if Ukraine is admitted into the NATO after imitation at

all levels, then the Coalition will have a new member, which is thievishly controlled by Moscow and highly exposed to the destructive influence of the French and German elites, namely Shirac and Schroeder, who promote a policy foreign to the real interests of their countries, especially, and to NATO in general.

c. “The mechanism of coercion”: In order to constitute new democratic principles and standards in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova it is necessary to determinate a model of “a mechanism of coercion of democracy”. It is absolutely clear that the regime that administers the Transnistrian territory is not capable of starting and finishing authentic democratic processes because of its immanent totalitarian character. “The mechanism of coercion” could be a mission invested with large special empowerments. Such analogies exist in Bosnia Herzegovina, where the function of the head of the state is practically carried out by the High Commissioner of the UN (At the same time in Bosnia he is a special representative of the European Union). It could also be a mission of military and civil observers in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy. As one of the variants, it could be possible to apply to OSCE, but just in the case if this organisation follows the provisions made by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. The mechanism of coercion could also be elaborated during the application of pressures by Ukraine upon the criminal regime.

7.7. From the logic of the accomplished deed to pro-active policies of changing field realities

In relation to the European Union and the Republic of Moldova we notice a deceleration of a series of aspects in the process of integration. In relation to Ukraine, the appearance of legal department clauses and hesitations upon the sincerity of the European values and policies promoted by Ukraine. In relation to the Russian Federation – the economic interests come in contradiction with the political and humanitarian ones, regarding the conformation of human rights. Launching methods and means for the diminution and overwhelming of the risks and challenges to the security that are coming from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, we have to consider the following aspects:

a. Neutralization of the MGB leaders:

The counteraction of the policy promoted by the MGB is a fundamental aspect for the reasonable and successful completion of the process of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova. Two persons from the MGB have to be targeted. We're talking about the chief of the institution Vladimir Antiufeev and the head

of the department for the protection of constitutional order, Dmitry Soin. It is necessary to intensify the relations with Ukraine regarding the creation of conditions for persons that have key functions in the structures of the enclave to be forbidden to enter on the country's territory, analogically to the countries that have adopted such means. Actions coordinated for the development of activities regarding the involvement of the administration of Ukraine and of the civil society of this country into the process of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova.

The accent should be put on coordinating the joint efforts with the prime-minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko hasn't got any economic interests in Transnistria, thus, making her more available to participate at the rightful solution of the Transnistrian conflict. Along with the implementation of the envisaged reform in Ukraine, the function of the prime-minister will become more important in this country, because of the gained authority. We have to remark that Yulia Tymoshenko was the one who lead, in November 2004, the operation in the Lvov region of intercepting the vehicle with coins destined for the banking system of the enclave and that she was the one who personally gave the order to the commander of the regional subdivision of the special expedience unit "Berkut" regarding the neutralization of the MGB officers who escorted the vehicle. Yulia Tymoshenko is the most perspective Ukrainian politic, she is certainly its next leader and her popularity is higher than the actual joint power. The next official that is necessary to cooperate with is the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, Boris Tarasiuk. He is known as a firm adept of the pro-Euro-Atlantic options. He was one of the authors of the plan for the regulation of the Transnistrian conflict.

All the negative clauses from the plan presented by Victor Iuscenco have been revealed after the estimation by Tarasiuk, under the pressure of the secretary of the Council for National Security and Defense, Petro Poroshenco. Another person convenient for establishing tight relations is the minister of defence of Ukraine, Anatoly Gritenco, who is also pro-Euro-Atlantic oriented. It is also mandatory to intensify as much as possible the coordination of joint actions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and with the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). This is necessary for to be able to organize prosecutions on the territory of Ukraine of people prosecuted by the Interpol, especially the chief of MGB, Vladimir Antiufeev and his subordinate, Dmitry Soin, the head of the department for the defense of constitutional order. We have to remark that the collaboration with the SSU could not be so fruitful, because this organisation is lead by Petro Poroshenco, who is one of the lobbyists of the interests of the criminal regime Smirnov-Antiufeev in Kiev. Such actions of Poroshenco are motivated by its interests in Transnistria on one hand, and on

the other hand by the fact that Poroshenco is an agent influenced by Russia in the surroundings of Victor Yushchenko.

Chisinau has to support Yulia Tymoshenko in her clash with Poroshenco, especially because there are possibilities in this direction: Petro Poroshenco holds the majority of shares of "Gemenii" J.S.C from Chisinau, but obtaining the control package of this company has been made possible by violating a series of articles of the penal code of the Republic of Moldova. An important thing to do is to unfold adequate actions for attracting certain respectable notorieties from Ukraine to the process of solution of the Transnistrian conflict. A special accent should be put upon the interaction with Ukrainian mass-media, especially with "Zerkalo nedeli" (The mirror of the week) and "Stolicinãie novosti" (The news of the Capital), as well as on the work with the most influent experts, like Olexandr Sushko, the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy, Reace and Conversion. Separately, it will be necessary to establish relations, which will increasingly intensify, with the organisation "Pora" and with its leader, Svistovich, because with the support of this organisation, ready for an "export of revolution", it will be more easy to realize the necessary transformations in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

The next thing is to establish contacts with the mayor of Odessa, Eduard Gurvitz. The previous mayor, Ruslan Bodelan, was one of the head representatives of the criminal world in Ukraine. He was just covering the entire economic activity of the regime on the territory of Odessa region, where the Ilciovsc port is situated, being one of the key transport channels, to the well functioning of which the existence of the enclave depends. Eduard Gurvitz was also the mayor of Odessa, but had to leave this posture after, on the indication of Leonid Kucima, the elections have been invalidated and one hundred thousand ballots (!) expressed in the favour of Eduard Gurvitz have been burnt. Gurvitz is now one of the most important opponents of Kucima, because at that time the Ukrainian ex-president has deprived him from the chair of mayor of the city, simultaneously bringing him a serious business prejudice. The conflict between these Ukrainian politics appeared when Eduard Gurvitz attempted, with the help of the representatives of Chechen criminal world, to take control over the oil terminal in Odessa. In the case of preliminary contacts with Gurvitz there is a big possibility to reach to an agreement so he will ignore the requests that inevitably will be formulated and the contacts that will also be inevitably established with him by the emissaries of the criminal regime from Tiraspol.

b. Forming an adequate lobby towards the political elites
in the Russian Federation:

Regarding the unfriendly policy of the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Moldova and the openly made brake in a lot of fields of the reintegration process, including by systematic interference in the home affairs of the Republic of Moldova we have to establish contact with the forces that are in opposition to the actual regime from Kremlin, meanwhile continuing the diplomatic activities to show the Russian administration the wrong and the non-perspicacious character of the chosen path regarding the RM. Those from the opposition would be Boris Nemtsov, Irina Hakamada, Grigori Yavlinskii, Garry Kasparov, Vladimir Ryzhkov. The last is one of the deputies with a liberal orientation from the state Duma of the Russian Federation and could be of a special help. Taking into account the consolidation of democratic forces at the 2008 elections, the resonance of the declarations and actions made by the opposition will continue to grow. Starting from now on, we have to establish relations with Michail Kasianov, the main candidate of the opposition for the 2008 elections. The criticism of the actions of the authorities of the Russian Federation from within the country, on the background of pressures from without and of the intransigent position of the Republic of Moldova, could have a relatively benefic effect, which could be used with the aim of propaganda in favor of the reintegration process of the Republic of Moldova.

A special attention would have to be given to the relations with Russian mass-media from the opposition. There is a slight progress in this direction, but only the interest of the oppositional publication "Komersant" and the radio station "Eho Moskvi", in the processes in the Republic of Moldova and treating them more or less objective is clearly not enough. At the same time inhibited remained such publications like "Novaya Gazeta" and "Moskovskie Novosti", known for their oppositionist sights. It is necessary that the interests of the Republic of Moldova are promoted including through the creation of a positive picture of the reintegration process and through forming in Russia of an objective attitude towards the criminal regime Smirnov-Antiufeev using the means of the television channel Ren-TV, whose news blocks are making it the most oppositionist of the Russian television channels. Other than that, a project should be launched to open in Chisinau a representation of the RTVi channel which, even if not received on the territory of the Russian Federation, it is being watched in all the post-soviet countries, in Israel and in USA.

c. The constant intensification of the NATO – Republic of Moldova relations:

We have to realize that the security of the Republic of Moldova could be guaranteed only by NATO. In order for the Republic of Moldova to make its way to the European Union, some security guarantees are necessary, which only the Coalition could offer us. The conditions of adherence to the NATO are more facile than those of adherence to the European Union and could be carried out in an immediate perspective. The only impediment is the presence in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova of the obsolete provision about neutrality. This article has been included in 1994 with the aim of preventing by law the fixation of presence of the Russian military bases on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Today this problem is already not actual and to further advance into the building of a modern democratic state, the Republic of Moldova has to integrate into NATO. One of the most important assignments, immediately after the completion of the Republic of Moldova – NATO Plan of Actions, is to exclude from the Constitution the article about neutrality and starting the implementation of the Plan of Actions as a member of the Coalition. The adherence to the NATO will permit the Republic of Moldova to further avoid the Russian attempts to bring it back under its protectorate and to feed the separatist tendencies on its territory.

The Coalition is able to offer the Republic of Moldova the help critical for solving the Transnistrian conflict. Despite the declarations of partnership with NATO the administration of the Russian Federation has considerable fears regarding this organization, because it realizes that in case of a conflict Russia doesn't stand a chance in the clash with the forces of the Coalition. The consolidation of the relations of the Republic of Moldova with NATO will lead to an inevitable increase of pressures from the Coalition upon the Russian Federation with the aim to determine the administration of this country to end the effective occupation of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

d. A special policy of promoting the territorial reintegration of the Republic of Moldova:

The elaboration of a complex Plan of creating the mechanisms of coercion to democracy or the elaboration and implementation of means to support this process for the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova; the concentration of the efforts of the Parliament, the President and the MFA of the Republic of Moldova in promoting the idea regarding the imperative need to cancel the

main debtor obligations of the Republic of Moldova, including those of the Transnistrian region, including the penalties owed to the states and economic agents referred to.

A special and obligatory clause would have to be the elaboration of a special policy to actively promote the idea of reintegration of the Republic of Moldova between the citizens in the Transnistrian region. It is advisable that the made efforts are promoted differentially in two basic directions:

Creating certain oppositional groups and movements of different orientations in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, as well as adopting ample means of supporting them.

Carrying out a series of actions for attracting to the side of the adepts of the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova of deputies at all levels elected in the representative bodies of the enclave, directors of companies, middle-sized and small entrepreneurs, all types of officials.

We can also point out to a series of means justified under practical aspects, like: the elaboration of a special joint policy of the Republic of Moldova and Romania regarding the bilateral relations with the accent on the amplification of efforts to solve the Transnistrian conflict; the intensification of accents on the application of penal legislation in the directions related to smuggling, illegal economic activity, as well as terrorism; the elaboration of a plan to create a Zone with a special fiscal regime in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

Chapter VIII.

THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE BLACK SEA AREA: STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA

Dr. Dan Dungaciu

“We want Russia to get bored with NATO and NATO enlargement”

Madelin Albright,
US Secretary of State, 1996

“Keep in mind that Romania’s approaches are not strictly in the interest of Romania. We have commitments to our European partners, our NATO partners. As a frontier-country of the two structures – European Union and NATO – we have to promote the interests of these structures, not only our interests...: the Black Sea will become secure when it becomes internationalized, when the solutions that were adopted at the Mediterranean Sea are adopted. To become an area of peace it must be taken out from the unique influence of Russian Federation and I am convinced that president Putin will accept a process more or less rapid for the internationalization of the Black Sea, given the strategic importance that the extended area of the Black Sea has already achieved.”

President of Romania, Traian Basescu,
Bucharest, July 2005

“We consider the elaboration within PARP of objectives of the partnership for the realization of the national army reform and of measures regarding the amelioration of the capacity of our armed forces to operate together with NATO forces of special expedience.”

President of the Republic of Moldova,
Bruxelles, June 2005

I underline that Moldova had a positive and close relationship with NATO during the last 10 years, being member of the Partnership for Peace Programme. This relation, which was encouraged by us, is a part of the vision of president Bush in the case of Europe, which is seen united, free and peaceful...Article 10 of the North-Atlantic Treaty stipulates that any European country that shares the principles of the Treaty, wishes and is able to contribute to the assurance of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, can become a member of the Alliance, if it is invited to do this by the countries which are already members. Moldova could become a member someday, too.”

Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USA in Moldova,
Heather M. Hodges, August 2005

The analysis provided in this paper attempts to explain the variegation of security aspects and geopolitics in what is called 'the extended region of the Black Sea area'. The main idea behind this text is that, although the interest for the region has massively increased lately, this far there exist only the *premises* for the outline and implementation of a strategy in this area. The text below has to be read because of this, too: it aims at outlining the premises and mainframe of such a strategy.

The arguments will be exposed in several levels. The first one regards the geopolitical interpretation of the space in question, respectively the fixation of mainframes to a *geopolitical analysis*, which would permit the understanding of evolutions and dynamics that marked this space. We will then proceed to the evaluation of the region from the perspective of *security* dimensions, with the statement of the ample signification that the concept acquired after 1990 and that, naturally, has to be regarded in the case of the respective region as well. After these two steps we will conclude that the need to delimitate the Black Sea area, as a security region, imposed almost with necessity.

Recently, these favorable premises that regard the geopolitics and security of the region were joined by another one, as well as important and with a potential that is impossible to ignore. We are talking about the *European political context*, which makes today, and especially tomorrow, the interest for the Black Sea area to grow – in addition, the need for a regional strategy to be even more pressing. We will review these political evolutions which announce significant strategic changes at the scale of our continent with direct impact on the region we are interested in.

In the second part of the study we effectively outline the elements that may generate a strategy at the Black Sea, beginning with the premises and eventual similarities that can be detected on the continent. The stress will be put on Romania and its role in the region in the context of its double membership – in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and, after 2007, in the European Union. Thus, the pattern is taken over from two older Euro-Atlantic initiatives – NEI and NDI – which proved to be efficient in relation to the advance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier to the North Sea and Baltic countries. The important actors and mainframes of such a strategy at the Black Sea will be evident in this section. In this context, we will also insist upon the strategic options of Romania and the Republic of Moldova in the context of advance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier to the extended region of the Black Sea. A whole section will be dedicated to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, the importance, of which to our opinion is crucial in the present strategic conjuncture at the Black Sea. Finally, we will draw some conclusions and will warn about the

threats that can lead to the blocking or canceling of such a project – the most obvious: *the fallacious solution of the Transnistrian conflict* which is looming today in some gestures and declarations coming from the East and West, including from Bucharest.

8.1. Geopolitical context:

Black Sea – the space of Euro-Atlantic frontier

All the significant (geo)political events – evolutions and stagnations – that took place around the Black Sea have, to a greater or smaller degree, the mark of a global geopolitical progress. More precisely, they are determined by the *advance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier to Central Asia*, by the indecision of these institutions to establish the border ample enough to include nations that wish to be part of this space.¹

Here we are talking about the Euro-Atlantic space, suggesting, between lines, an *institutionalized* definition of Europe. In fact, it is the definition that explicitly and implicitly explains the affiliation to Western institutions, especially EU and NATO. Here the stress falls not on the cultural or geographical Europe, but rather on the institutional Europe. Parenthetically, the oratory of American officials on the subject of “coming back to Europe” has methodically marked these elements after 1990. The idea of America to create an “integral and free Europe” practically meant the expansion of the Western institutional framework illustrated by NATO and EU towards the East. In April 1997, for example, the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright considered that the central reason of NATO expansion “is the correction of the mistakes of the past. If we don’t expand NATO, it would mean that we validate the Stalin vector imposed in 1945 and which was fought against by two generations of Europeans and Americans” (Browning 2002:6). Also, president Bush, addressing to the students from Warsaw, on June 15th, 2001, outlined the idea that the new democracies of Europe must have the chance to join the European institutions, and about NATO he stated that “we must be interested in how much we advance on the way of freedom.” The idea is clear: the will to eliminate the interior borders of Europe was becoming synonymous to the expansion of NATO (Bush 2001).

Getting back to the “technical aspects” of the approach, it must be said that *frontier* would mean, in the theoretic mainframe used here, the dynamic aspect

¹ The conceptual mainframe used in this analysis was developed in another work. See Badescu, Dungaciu 1995.

of a geopolitical evolution, respectively the totality of processes through which a historical expansion, a nation, a civilization or an empire etc. manifests itself. The frontier, as a dynamic aspect, causes and maintains a wide variety of spiritual and institutional processes, which we call *frontier processes*. *The border* is the static, stable (established) aspect of the advance of a frontier. The advance of a frontier is set somewhere, on a border. But this does not automatically mean that, once the border is set, the dynamics of the frontier advance process disappears or is suspended. On the contrary, when we deal with an artificial (political, geo-strategic) setting of a border we as well assist at the perpetuation of frontier manifestations, and the area where such evolutions take place is called *frontier area*.² These frontier spaces, respectively those zones that forward – justified or not – claims or affiliation to a certain area and inclusion in the interior of a border to which they do not have, as yet, access, are frequently, geopolitically speaking, areas of *crisis*, of *geopolitical turbulence*, which cannot be decrypted or understood right without taking these aspects into consideration.

This kind of frontier area is the region of the Black Sea today. There is nothing clear there if the advance of the Euro-Atlantic frontier and the consequences that this advance – and especially the setting of the artificial border on Prut – generates are ignored. Today the Black Sea is, geopolitically speaking, an Euro-Atlantic frontier area.

8.2. Two geopolitical axes: East-West and North-South

It was sometimes too much spoken about “axes” in relation to the area of the Black Sea, and not only. Nevertheless, the abundance of the discourse had only one effect: it left the problems unsolved, and the reader confused or convinced that everything is only a political speech, lacking substance and field relevance.³ But the term “axis” has importance and signification, and two explanations should have been offered at the time of its launching. On one hand, that its significance is firstly *geopolitical*, and only in the second place *political*, and on the other hand, that the sense of the “axis” is not the *West* – as

² Only in case if the setting of the border of advance of a frontier process is natural, thus organic, the frontier area stops its existence. The typical case here is, for example, the advance of the protestant frontier in Europe. This advance stopped, organically, at the border of the orthodox area, so the setting of the protestant border happened by itself (it is not adequate to mention here why the things are namely this way).

³ The way in which those assigned with the explanation of the significance of the presidential declaration have acted contributed only to increase the climate of confusion and to diminish the prestige of the subject.

it was abundantly and mistakenly speculated –, but the *East*. The geopolitical signification of the axis results from what is described in the previous section, respectively the advance to the East of the Euro-Atlantic frontier. This advance to the East of the Euro-Atlantic frontier has structured the geopolitical space on two major geopolitical (strategic, economic etc.) axes, namely the **North – South** Axis (Russia – Armenia – Iran) and the **East – West** Axis, which includes, via Caucasus and the Black Sea, the essential energetic resources from Caspian Sea and intended for the Western countries.

The mentioned axes only delimit a region – the “point” which could be Azerbaijan – of fundamental security also on the agenda of great common rooms with interests and influence in the region.⁴ It is not the case to describe here the so-called “extended area of the Black Sea”, because a description was made elsewhere. This area should include all the three Caucasian states – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan –, the Euro-Asiatic energetic corridor, which links the Euro-Atlantic system to the energetic reserves from the area of the Caspian sea and to the states from Central Asia. In addition, it is about a stable system of the Black Sea North of Transnistria, Odessa and Sokhumi, because a stable system supposes the solution of “frozen conflicts” along the North-East curve and the access to big commercial rivers that flow into the Black Sea: the Danube, the Nistru and the Nipru. At that moment, the concept of extended area of the Black Sea will be so broad and varied that the area of the North Plain of Germany or the area of the Baltic Sea/North (see: Ron Asmus and others: 2004). These political axes have become visible especially after 2000, when in Moscow president Putin comes to power. Finally, the geopolitical context and area has to be marked more frequently by orange landmarks or stakes with flower scent. The result of this geopolitical confrontation is what we see today around the Black Sea. Now let us set the mainframe in which the security problems of the area must be perceived and assessed.

8.3. Analytical mainframe of the regional security

Walker Connor, one of the most important American historians, commented somewhere on the main drawback of the domain which is called “foreign affairs”: these specialists tautologically tell us that the states make war because of “state reasons”, but do not bother to explain what does this *raison*

⁴ For a general presentation in terms of security context, see Herzig 2000; for a presentation of foreign policies and conflicts in the region, see Bertsch and others... 2000; for a geopolitical analysis of the area, see Thual 2004.

d'état mean, who and how legitimates it. And he was right, at least regarding the approach of foreign affairs or the security that prevailed until not long ago. For understanding the significant evolutions from this field, until the matter of identity becomes, for Copenhagen for example, a crucial item on the security agenda, we have to rewind, even if concisely, the movie of the evolution of the domain we are concerned by in this work.⁵

After World War II, the doctrine of realism *Ineo-realism* – with stress upon the bipolarity of the system – was dominated. One of the characteristics of this doctrine from the perspective of our immediate interest is the distinction between “*high politics*” and “*low politics*”. The issue of security is related to the first aspect – “security” regarded mainly the “politico-military” problem. The issue of environment, economy, social and “home” problems belonged to the second field. “*Low politics*” was becoming interesting only in the moment of a direct impact in the diplomatic or military field.

This dichotomy was to enter a crisis after 1990, as well as the definition of “security”. The collapse of the USSR has lead not only to a crisis of the world political system, but also to a crisis of the theory that supported it. As Edward Kolodziej shows, the security of the Soviet Union was totally compromised not by the lack of military capacities – enormous at that time –, but because of socio-economic reasons. The observation has decisive consequences, and mainly for the distinction of “*high*” and “*low politics*”, which progressively diminish their relevance. The failure of the “traditional” definition of security opens the perspective of a new debate which does not make itself expected and which in fact undertakes some of the trends detectable already before 1990.

Barry Buzan is a fundamental author here. His work from 1983, *People, States, and Fear* marks the most pregnant reconsideration of security problems. The idea that security must be reduced to the “study of threats, use and control of military forces” (Stephen Walt) – the classical definition-, irremediably enters into crisis. The target of Buzan’s work – the 1991 edition of which will have a greater impact than that of 1983 – is the redefinition of the concept of “threat” and the achievement of a useful connection between “threats” and “vulnerabilities”. Crucial questions now become: “*Namely what must be secured?*”, respectively the *object* of security, and “*Against what threats should the reference object be secured?*”. To a great degree these questions were those

⁵ Here we will use McSweeney 1996, 1999, Terriff... 1999; Bird and Croft 2001. See Dungaciu 2004 as well. For an excellent analysis of the evolution of security problems in the 20th century, see Hough 2004.

around which the security debates are centered from now on. For Buzan, the “security of human communities is affected by various factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. *The military security* regards the game in two levels of offensive and defensive capabilities of the states and the perception of states regarding the perceptions of each one. *The political security* regards the organizational stability of states, systems of government and ideologies that confer them legitimacy. *The economic security* regards the access to resources, markets and capital, necessary for supporting acceptable levels of welfare and power of the state.

The *societal security* regards sustainability, in acceptable conditions of evolution, of traditional language, cultural and religious patterns, as well as patterns of national customs and identity. The *environment security* regards the maintenance of the local and global biosphere as an essential support on which depend all the other human activities. These five sectors do not operate separately. Each one defines a focal aspect in the mainframe of the security problem and a method for ordering priorities, but all of them are linked together by a strong linking network” (Buzan 1991: 19-20). After this Buzan delimits the “international system”, the “states” and the “individuals” as “objects of reference” and the military, political, economical, societal and environmental spectrums as potential sources of threat for the respective “objects of reference”. However, for Buzan, at least in this work, the main object of reference of any security analysis must remain the *state*.⁶

Besides the a roused criticism and disputes – or maybe namely because of that! –, the book has become one of reference in the study of international relations. A commenter, Ken Booth, wrote in 1991 about the volume: “...remains the most complete and complex theoretical analysis of the concept of security in the literature of foreign affairs until now and, since its publication, we, the rest, still write its footnotes” (Apud Bird and Coft 2001). The 90s mark the appearance of a true reflection school, in which other researchers wish to undertake and continue the model joined Buzan. The group will be called “Copenhagen School”. The culmination of these efforts is the work from 1998, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, in which the authors continue the analysis of security in military, societal, economic, environmental and political terms. These dimensions operate at different levels: states, groups of individuals (nations), regions or global contexts. The model is willow and suffi-

⁶ Critiques were present, of course – why not the “individual”? –, and this option of Buzan was attributed to his “neo-realist” past.

ciently subtle to include issues ignored for too long: poverty, migration, human traffic, environmental risks, economic or political threats.

The conceptualization of security has gone further within the school. Ole Waever, for example, in 1995 opens the problem of security to its approach as the “state’s” “discourse”, from here comes the ambiguous relation between the two. Waever talks about the “existential” threats addressed to the states and individuals, from here comes the appearance of the concept of “securing” – with reference to the *object* and *strategies* of security –, crucial in the analyses of this polymorphic school, which comprises researchers coming from neo-realism, as Buzan, or post-structuralists, as Waever. The importance of the school, despite the criticism over years, is enormous, and not only on theoretical level (see McSweeney 1999). A fundamental fact for our goal is that it was felt in the strongest military alliances of all times.

In 1991, at the *summit* in Rome, NATO decreed – in a language that conspicuously reminds that of Copenhagen School –, that the security now has five dimensions: military, societal, political and environmental. It is the most durable and concrete performance of this perspective: it put its mark on the highest level of global politics. One more reason for being assumed at its real magnitude.⁷

8.4. Political context

The political context appears to become a favourable one for a more consistent and efficient approach to the Black Sea’s agenda. We are talking about the change of stresses in the European politics, from the so-called “Euro-continentalism” (*neo-gaullism*) to “Euro-Atlantism”. As all commentators of the area have unanimously observed, “during the last years the German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, together with the president of France, Jacques Chirac, have opted for a *neo-gaullist* concept about Europe, which tends to build its political and geo-strategic identity in opposition to the United States of America” (Vieregger 2005).

⁷ Romania, in its turn, is today a NATO member state, obliged to conform its security apparatus to the requests resulting from this adherence. We refer to the elaboration of *national security doctrine* and, accordingly, to the definition and elaboration, depending on this doctrine, of all the logistic apparatuses – military forces, special services, legislation, intellectual and academic centres, research institutes, conferences, publications, encyclopedias etc. – for putting it into practice, with all its components. In addition, all the complexity of the security problem is one of the elements which make the Black Sea, including the Republic of Moldova, a target of maximum interest for Romania.

But the electoral changes outlining in Berlin suggest changes in the *German foreign policy strategy*. This is what interests us the most here. The pre-election polls each time show consistent advantages for Angela Merkel (around 15-20%) compared to the candidate of the Social Democratic Party. Angela Merkel will be, in the eventuality of her election, the first German chancellor from Eastern extraction from the post-Nazi period. This detail must not be neglected, if we take into account that the Christian-Democrats from the East of Germany regard America much more positively than the average of the country, and share at least reticent ideas regarding the Russian Federation – according to other opinions, the Russian Federation would be the main threat for Germany's security. In addition, Angela Merkel represents a new type of politics in Berlin – a new type of “right”, with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon people, especially for the British model. The similarity with the French minister of Home Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, from this point of view is important. (Bordonaro 2005).

Signals in this direction were numerous as well. Regarding the presence of Germany in Iraq, Merkel is not content by the absence of Germany in the area – in addition, in Berlin and Washington there were discussions about the positive opinion expressed by Merkel in relation to the American president George Bush and his policy in Iraq. There are many opinions that affirm that an “eventual victory of Merkel will bring Germany to the Kohl period, when Germany was the main partner of the USA in Europe. Secondly, Germany's interests for newcomers to the EU will be synchronized with those of Great Britain, particularly in the extended area of the Black Sea. Even if the Berlin – Moscow energetic partnership will continue, Merkel will be much more cautious with this partnership, in order not to be in opposition with the targets of Washington in the Middle East or Central Asia (Bordonaro 2005).

This is the reason why in Washington “everybody concentrates on what comes after Schroeder”, affirms Stephen Szabo, specialist in European problems at Johns Hopkins University (apud. Ibid.). If “what comes after” is Angela Merkel with her vision about Germany as an “honest broker” between different players within an Atlantic community affected by conflicts, she will have to work hard for the amelioration of relations with America. Angela Merkel knows this and probably she will try to do it – even if she hesitates to include clearly this point in the electoral platform of her party.

These evolutions will influence the relation of Germany with Russia, on one hand, and that of Europe with Russia, on the other hand. As it was already mentioned, Germany had a “complex foreign policy”, in which it tried to balance the expansion of the EU to the East and its privileged relations with Russia (Russia as a commercially and energetically strategic partner). However,

the complexity of this policy, which is talked about recently, cannot ignore the Paris – Berlin relation as a crucial axis of foreign policy. The most important aspect here is, however, the decrease of the role which the Paris – Berlin alliance will have in future. If the foreign policy of Schroeder or Chirac was one of detachment from the foreign policy of the USA, this time might predominate the *principle of complementariness*, together with the changes from Paris and Berlin. Indeed, while Schroeder is busy with the declaration of his firm confidence in this reliable mechanism, Nicolas Sarkozy, the holder of the Ministry of Home Affairs of France and the potential successor of Jacques Chirac in 2007, has already expressed his feeling that this Franco-German cooperation is outdated. On June 27th, he declared to the French press that “an expanded Europe cannot continue to be alimented only by the power of an engine in cycles” (apud. *ibid.*) Therefore, there exist the premises for the re-definition of the foreign policy of those two countries, if not radically, then at least significantly, in case of major changes in Paris and Berlin. The switch of Europe’s foreign policy – in case something like this will be brought about – from “neo-gaullism” to “Euro-Atlantism” will be a good thing for a strategy at the Black Sea and, implicitly, for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the states in the region.

8.5. The East is the epicentre of responses of the earthquake in the EU or the need for a strategy in the Black Sea

Besides these favourable contexts, we must also approach the elements which make the strategy at the Black Sea an unquestionable necessity. The failures of referenda for the European Constitution in France and Holland for some European commentators transformed into a true “earthquake”. An earthquake the responses of which where most acutely felt in the Black Sea, and Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are the most affected countries (Emerson 2005). But the effect will be felt in Belgrade, the whole South Caucasus and in Moscow, too. Not all virtual or actual partners of the EU have felt the shock in the same degree. *The effect of the shock was directly proportional with the will of the respective states/regions to finally integrate in the EU.* From here comes the idea that the partner states included in the so-called Process from Barcelona do not feel acutely this shock since the Arabic states have never really had expectations or wishes to integrate in the EU (*ibid.*:1).

But the situation is different at the Black Sea or in the Balkans. This valve sticking which occurred at the level of Western Europe has short- and medium-term effects and these must be identified. As we have already mentioned, we deal with a gradual effect of the European earthquake. For example Roma-

nia and Bulgaria, which have already signed the Treaties of adherence, must pass through the ratification process through the parliaments of the EU member countries. Given the fact that the ratification is made by parliamentary vote, the chances of success are big. Nevertheless, how some commentators suggest, there may be emotions, especially if the integration of Romania and Bulgaria will be delayed until 2008, and the ratification will take place in the middle of the election campaign for the presidential elections in France. Turkey comes on the second place, with the date for starting the adherence negotiations set on October 3rd. The pros and cons debates have began again, and grey clouds may gather upon Turkey, especially if the elections will accredit the Sarkozy and Merkel couple in France and Germany. The above mentioned are followed by the Baltic states, members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), including Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, with Macedonia being the applicant state. From June 16th-17th, 2005, the Council of Europe has encouraged these states regarding the adherence to the EU, some significant groups of European level even suggesting 2014 as target year. (ibid.2)

Now comes the turn of states included in the "Policy of Neighbourhood" of the EU, namely the Ukraine, Moldova, and the three states from South Caucasus, the most affected by the "earthquake" from the EU and which now see their chances of integration in more and more dark colours. The shock is even bigger because, in the meanwhile, new regional initiatives appeared, among the most significant being the so-called "Baltic – Black Sea axis", respectively the "club of Georgia's friends", to which have adhered four new member of the EU (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland), together with Romania and Bulgaria (February 2005), the resurrection of GUAM (the Summit from Chisinau in May 2005 being an important element) or the particular interest which Romania, through president Traian Basescu in the first place, show for the area of the Black Sea.

Under these conditions, the question that surprisingly arises today is related to the moment which was reached in the field of relations between these countries and the Western institutional area: *which are the risks that arise regarding the democratization of this area in the context of a blockade of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration?* Namely: was the critical mass of the democratization process reached in that region to a degree that a blockade/reduction of integrationist processes would not affect the already triggered democratization? (Ibid.:4). Our answer is no! More than that, we think that a slowing-down of the integrationist processes will generate a massive set-back of the democratization of the area and will trigger a short- and medium-term crisis which will be handled with difficulty by the EU. The need of an *update* of European policies and of some signs that the area was not abandoned is

imperative. Moreover, the need of an authentic strategy at the Black Sea today asserts more pressingly than ever. Before approaching this issue directly, we will mention a few more moments in its premises: what are the precedents on which this kind of strategy could be based?

8.6. Elements for a strategy in the Black Sea Area: The Baltic Sea case

So far, despite the initiative launched in 2004 by German Marshall Fund, by institutional networks or by the debates with this vector (Asmus... 2004), there does not yet exist an authentic strategy at the Black Sea. The field political and geopolitical realities are and at the same time are not the most favourable premises for such an adventure that had already entered the horizon of expectation of at least the countries bordering on the Black Sea. The divergent interests, the sometimes contradictory affiliations make this region with few collaboration traditions, historically speaking, hardly to place under a single efficient institutional cupola. In 2003-2004, the years when the mainframes of the future strategies were being created, the Black Sea presented itself, institutionally speaking, in this eclectic form (Aydin 2004:21)

Participation of countries from the extended area of the Black Sea in international and regional organizations⁸

	BSEC	EU	NATO	OSCE	GUUAM	CIS	Collective Defence Treaty from Tashkent	SECI	Stability Pact	WTO World Trade Organiza- tion	Council of Europe
Albania	X	SAA	EAPC	X				X	X	X	X
Armenia	X	PCA	EAPC	X		X	X			X	X
Azerbaijan	X	PCA	EAPC	X	X	X				O	X
Belarus	X		EAPC	X		X	X			O	
Bulgaria	X	A	EAPC	X				X	X	X	X
Georgia	X	PCA	EAPC	X	X	X				X	X
Greece	X	x	x	X				X	X	X	X
Macedonia	AC	SAA	EAPC	X				X	X	X	X
Moldova	X	PCA	EAPC	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Romania	X	A	EAPC	X				X	X	X	X
Russia	X	PCA	EAPC	X		X	X			O	X

⁸ X – Member State; A – Accession Country; N-NA – Non-Negotiating Accession Country; AC – Applicant Country; EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; O – Observer State; PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; SAA – Stability and Association Agreement.

Serbia & Montenegro	AC	SAA		X				X	X	O	X
Turkey	X	NNA	X	X				X	X	X	X
Ukraine	X	PCA	EAPC	X						O	X

For integrating these countries with diverse affiliations – some of them contradictory! – there is needed imagination, commitment and persistence in the project. There are no standardized formulae and no guaranteed solutions. Among the projects circulated and implemented on the continent, with relevance for the area of the Black Sea, we consider that two deserve the most profound attention, exactly for offering a number of suggestions for what should be an Euro-Atlantic strategy at the Black Sea. Their acronym is NEI and, respectively, NDI.⁹

The Northern European Initiative (NEI) is a political strategy launched by the USA in September 1997, during the second mandate of President Clinton. The fact that it was so little written about it and that it was discussed relatively seldom, makes it one the most interesting American initiatives, especially for the expanded area of the Black Sea. Its origins are found in an article of RAND analysts, Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick (the first one will become the Second Secretary of Stat, USA), appeared in 1996 in *Survival* periodical (Asmus and Nurick 1996). The target of the article was to find a solution for solving the problem of Baltic States and of the affairs with NATO regarding the expansion to come. The relation between NATO and the USA was evident in this case. In 1998 the US-Baltic Countries Charter is signed, and NEI becomes an option of future.

The adherence to NATO in 1999 has not included the Baltic countries, only Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. The exclusions were made firstly thanks to Moscow’s opposition, generating the idea that the expansion from 1999 may be cited under two aspects: on one hand the USA are favoured by the expansion and Russia by blocking the Baltics. In this case some had spoken about passing from geopolitical games with a null sum to a “win-win” game situation (Tassinari 2004: 198-201). NEI tended to be placed somewhere in between. The idea of cooperation with Russia in Northern Europe is a geopolitical event and change of attitude. The cooperation covers many of the fields that are part, after the NATO Summit in 1991, of the category called “soft se-

⁹ We will base our analysis on the most ample work that exists today on this subject, namely on that of Fabrizio Tassinari: see Tassinari 2004. In addition, for the problems of Baltic countries and security in the area, see: Lieven 1993, Bildt 1994, Brundtland 1994, Asmus and Nurick 1996, Conference... 1996, Lejins and Ozolina 1997, Burke and Cilluffo 1997, Puheloinen 1997, Jopp and Arnswald 1998, Brzezinski and Larrabee 1999, Browning 2002.

curity". The NEI agenda is based on 6 priorities: *promoting trade and business, promoting the rule of law, building the civil society, energy, environment and public health*. The applicability area was, as we mentioned: Baltic countries, North countries and Russia. The target was not any more a formula of "games with zero sums" type, but a "win-win situation". Nevertheless, the articulation of NEI with NATO, from here the inherent *realism* of the project, is an essential element for the comprehension of the American strategy in the area. (See Browning 2001 and 2002 also).

The initiative has never disappeared with the political changes at the White House. In October 2003, Bush launched the so-called *Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe* (e-PINE). This new American initiative was built on the experience of NEI and regarded the continuation of the basic pattern and philosophy – in addition, it claimed a possible export mechanism in other similar areas. What this policy really meant was seen later: a temporary and softer substitute for the actual presence of NATO in the area (Tassinari 2004: 200). In fact, it is about the illustration of the fact pictured concisely by Colin Powell: "NATO is the fundament of our affairs with Europe. It is something inviolable. Weaken NATO and you will weaken Europe, that will weaken America" (apud. Browning 2002). In conclusion, NEI and its "eyeball", e-PINE, have opened new paths of action and collaboration for the North dimension of Europe, especially between the Baltic countries and Russia. No matter what the initial intentions were, the interpretations were almost never similar or convergent, from this result the syncopes and malfunctions.

The *Europeanization* of this collaboration on Northern scale of the old continent will not be delayed and will get the allure of an applied and consistent policy, even if it is not free of syncopes. NDI or the EU *Northern Dimension Initiative* was launched in 1997, but its roots are more distant (Tassinari 2004: 201-204). In order to understand the premises of this European initiative, two previous elements must be brought into discussion: the regional policies that had begun to be promoted in the "Baltic Sea Regional Initiative". In 1995 was launched the idea of a regional mainframe of dividing Europe into seven regions, one of them being the region of the Baltic Sea. The *Baltic Sea Regional Initiative* is launched in 1996, and the two initiatives become, as we were saying, the premises of the project to come.

NDI is launched in September 1997 through the discourse of the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen – Finland's initiative remains since one of reference regarding foreign affairs. In his speech, he stated: "a policy dedicated to the Northern Scale must be based on the definition of the interest of the Union in the area". It must be mentioned that, for understanding this initiative

and its success “the Finnish label that existed in the periods before the project was submitted and implemented must not be neglected.” (apud. Tassinari 1994: 205) As it was well observed, the EU was now becoming not an actor, but *the actor* in the area. The European dimension of the initiative was outlined in the speech of the same person: “the Northern dimension of the EU is not a regional initiative, but regarding the politics of the whole Union.”

The plan forwarded by the Finnish minister confirms this modification, because the initiative pursued five main problems: *economical cooperation, infrastructure, natural resources, environmental cooperation, frontier cooperation*. In essence, it is about the non-military security issues exposed in the initiative of the EU Commission in 1996. Regarding the relations between this project and the expansion of the EU, the Finnish prime minister has outlined not only once the fact that the two are not at all exclusive: “in fact, NDI is always ahead, supporting and completing the expansion process.”

The initiative from 1997 has caught attention rapidly, because it already came from a constituted horizon of expectative. Rather fast, it achieves recognition of EU scale. In November 1998, the Commission issued a Release regarding NDI. The three Northern presidencies of the EU are constituted in favourable factors of promoting the project. There were organized Ministerial Conferences on this issue and a Plan of Action was forwarded, which was supported at the Council of Europe in June 2000. The Plan of Action followed the initial project of the Finnish minister, and indicated clearly a series of priority targets, namely the environment, energy – more specific, the access to the immense resources of the Russian Federation –, human and scientific resources, health, criminality prevention and the issue of Kaliningrad. The financial aspect was to be regulated by the community framework: TACIS, PHARE and INTERREG.

As the commentators of this project mentioned, the main problem is that the ambiguity of the Plan of Actions was, equally, the force and weakness of NDI. The addition of Russia to the program was an element that made the project less efficient and introduced synopes. The ambiguity functioned, because it was left at the discretion of the parties to decide the limits or the depth of implication in the relation with the Russian Federation.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the openings offered by the Plan of Actions must not be underestimated, and the energetic dimension of the project – that generates the importance of the Russian Federation – was a significant initiative in a moment in which Moscow was not so important on

¹⁰ For the perception between the Baltic countries and Russian in matters related to the security problem see Jaeger 2000.


the oil market as it is today. The thing that lacked more was, according to Fabrizio Tassinari, the “lack of political view”. The lack of clarity and foresight of Bruxelles – there is no fixed budget, administrative flexibility, lack of centralization – made the project not reach the ambitions of its initiators.

Nevertheless, the project was not abandoned, and at the European Council in Bruxelles from October 16th-17th, 2003, during the Danish presidency, was adopted the Second Plan of Action, for the period of 2004-2006 (Ibid.:213). The Plan of Actions was centered on five sectors: economy, human resources, environmental problems, trans-frontier cooperation. This time there were accentuated two points rather ignored previously: regional cooperation and the addition of Russia (one of the targets was Kaliningrad.)

The result of these projects is not the object of this study. It is sufficient to remind here that the Baltic countries were included in NATO during the second stage of expansion and, after that, in the EU (2004). Which was the contribution of these projects is too soon to be told. There is no sufficient proof for evaluating such a thing. But it is certain that they had an important role in these evolutions and – because of this! – can be used as patterns for other areas. The area we suggest is the extended area of the Black Sea, which nowadays needs a “Finland” the most!

8.7. Black Sea – comparative analysis

The extended region of the Black Sea can be understood best in a comparative context, the comparable elements being the two European seas already included, even if partially, in the Euro-Atlantic area: the Mediterranean and Baltic Sea. Generally speaking, Fabrizio Tassinari identifies three analytical framings for the description of cooperation at the Baltic Sea from the fall of Iron Curtain until the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries, as it can be seen in the image below.



The first framing coincides with the appearance of what Tassinari calls “*regionalism from below*”, namely a natural regionalism, historically located, revived and now promoted by a small number of Scandinavian intellectuals.¹¹ This group had an extraordinary logistic importance, because they were the voice that expressed and systematized a number of field initiatives in this direction. They have become real “regional actors” and have indicated the potential for the subsequent regional construction. “The common experience, the new feeling and life altogether characterized the North, they told, can be reformulated with regard to the Baltic Sea also”(apud. *ibid.*:274). The Baltic Sea has a sufficiently rich history, own myths and mythologies capable to generate a consistent regional identity. The idea of debates was not opposed to the state initiatives that intended to build a regional identity, on the contrary, a “*top-down*” approach was welcome, but with complementary function, and never as a main accelerator of the project. The intervention of institutional actors marked this first stage, and the creation, in 1992, of the *Council of the Baltic Sea States* (CBSS) has finished it. For the “founder parents” of this institutional structure, this formula was “a symbolic step for building a new, united Europe.”

The second framing, which lasted until 2004, is characterized by foreign and security policies that may be put under the title of *Europeanization*. In fact, at the Baltic Sea there existed three categories of states situated under this regional cupola, with different agendas. Namely, the “Old Europe”(Germany and North countries), the “New Europe”(Poland and Baltic countries) and Russia. Given the institutional location or different interests, the three agendas were not every time similar, especially regarding security problems. In Tassinari’s opinion, there can be identified two discourses that regard security problems. The first was prominent in the first half of the second framing, and regarded the expansion of NATO and the EU. Its terms were confrontational, traditional, namely hulling a geopolitical game of null sums. The Baltic region (BSR) was placed in that period at the border of two “quasi-empires”, the EU (plus NATO) on one side and Russia on the other. For the first camp, the expansion of the EU and NATO meant the expansion of the Western military complex to the East and the achievement of a more secure and securitized Europe. For Russia this was a loss, an invasion of the “near neighborhood”and threats for its own security.

The second discourse more probably marked the second half of the second framing and was identified as “dimensionalism”. Here are included NDI and

¹¹ It is an aspect that never existed at the Black Sea, which was and still is important in the economy of developing a cooperation process in the area.

NEI. Together with these initiatives was introduced a mainframe of increasing the interdependence by securizing the non-military aspects, a different one in relation to the first framing in which the stress fell on the military dimension. This dimension was accentuated in the third framing, *post-2004*, in which the discourses related to security/securization went together with the political one. It must be outlined here that the security problems related to environment, for example, were extremely important. From this point of view, the Baltic Sea is an exception, not a pattern. The gravity of the environmental problem in the Baltic Sea has forced this regional collaboration. (From this point of view, the similarities with the Black Sea are obvious, and one of the “engines” of a collaboration at the Black Sea should be the problems of environment – disastrous in the region.)

8.8. The Baltic and the Mediterranean Sea

There is significant literature that tries to compare the type of cooperation at the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea (Maestro 2001). Firstly, it was outlined that both are “closed seas”. Both regions “benefit” from the presence of EU states – France, Italy, Spain, and Greece etc. in case of the Mediterranean Sea –, applicant countries – Turkey and the Balcanic area – or non-member states – Northern Africa or the countries of Middle East. In addition, in both cases the presence of the EU regarding the coordination and activation of the regional collaboration was massive.

Beyond similarities, it seems that the differences still prevail (Tassinari 2004: 282-283). The experience of regional collaboration has not gone through the same chronological order – if in the case of the Baltic Sea the post Cold War period was that in which the collaboration had practically begun, in the case of the Mediterranean Sea the things were clarified long ago from this point of view. “*Tabula plena*” is the syntagm used to mark this case. Secondly, the initiation and promotion of the region of the Baltic Sea was inspired by what happened at the Mediterranean Sea. NDI was inspired by what was called the “Barcelona process”, the framework through which the EU is involved in the Mediterranean Sea starting with 1995. The differences are important here also. Thirdly, the Mediterranean dimension of the collaboration was deficient with regard to the collaboration of actors from the region. The reasons are obvious: the extraordinary diversity around the Mediterranean Sea defies any tentative to put all the actor under firm control. It is more natural to speak here about sub-regions, as the Adriatic, Egee Seas etc.

8.9. The Baltic and Black Sea

Even if more quantitatively and qualitatively limited, there still exists literature that tries to compare the Baltic case with that of the Black Sea (Vahl 2001: 9-10, Emerson 2001). The latter is also surrounded by states with diverse affiliations: future EU members – Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, non-member states – Ukraine, Georgia, Russian Federation. For now, the poor collaboration at the Black Sea has taken shape in the *Black Sea Economic Cooperation*, about which we will discuss in one of the following sections.

The differences greatly surpass the similarities. The EU presence is incomparably reduced, the same as that of NATO. If in the Baltic case the security problems accentuated the non-military aspects, namely the *soft-security*, in case of the Black Sea the challenges are (also) of other nature. The so-called “frozen conflicts” from the region bring forward concrete threats and of *hard* type (Tessarini 2004, 283). The region starts to catch the Western interest by an initiative that was little talked about (it is true that it did not have a resultful path.) The so-called *Eastern Dimension* is one that begins to make its way to the agenda of interests of the Euro-Atlantic political actors and regarded the “new” EU neighbours, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Russia etc. The initiator and main “sponsor” of the initiative was Poland, a country that entered the EU in 2004. Poland has discussed about these issues since 1998, and in 2003, a “non-paper” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland starts to circulate in the Western common rooms. The Polish suggestion invoked the experience of NDI, specifying that the ED does not intend to become a competitor of NDI, but rather complementary to it. It should be built on the experience of the Northern Dimension and on that of the process from Barcelona” (apud. *ibid.*284).

Regional differences are significant, of course. The so-called “frozen conflicts” from the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh, the dictatorship from Belarus, the poverty from Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova, the massive dependency on Russia of the states from this region etc. In addition, unlike other cases, the regional idea of the Black Sea has appeared only sporadically and inconsistently at local elites.¹² Unlike the region of the Baltic

¹² In Romania an exception is the temporary appearance of the consistent publication named EUXIN, Magazine of Sociology, Geopolitics and Geo-history, Editor: Euxin group, trimes-trial publication, no. 1-2, 1997, p.328. In the program of this publication it could be read, among other things, that: “The gordian knot of NATO is the euxinian society, with its limits, its multitude of relatives and its invincible Orthodox Christianity. Euxin wants to answer this challenge which makes the Euxin Griff a centre of the world and Romania a trio confinium of the three big regions of problems: Atlantic, Russian and German.”

Sea, that from the Black Sea includes countries that have no immediate chances to adhere to the EU. The Polish suggestion indicates from this point of view the fact that these countries must not be denied this possibility. The door has to stay open, irrespective of the fact how far is this perspective. It is interesting to apprehend that “the ED strategy regards four East-European countries, among which Poland does not figure. This is a different situation from that of Finland, for example (or even that of Poland), which was included in NDI” (ibid.: 285). The philosophy changes: “it is not about inclusion or participation, but about the identification of one another and securization, which NDI (in part) and the region of the Baltic Sea wished to get over. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are threats that have to be solved, problems that must be settled, unlike the challenges that would arise if their incorporation was regarded”. In addition, as it was noted, the Polish non-paper referred to the Russian Federation only *en passant*, without discussing the distinct status of this country or the enormous influence regarding other countries. The influence of this initiative, which did not explicitly regard the Black Sea, was reduced.

8.10. Romania – Finland at the Black Sea

The premises set at this point are, of course, as a rough guide. With regard to the capacity of exporting the “Baltic pattern” or its compatibility with the Black Sea, things must be taken with precaution. If there exist similarities between the region of the Baltic Sea and that of the Black Sea, however, they are more probably of morphologic or geopolitical nature.

The main difference relies in the different degree in which these regions were affected by *Europeanization*.¹³ The Baltic Sea is by far the most privileged region, because the other regions were almost not at all affected by the expansion from 2004. Secondly, there are no “hard” security problems at the Baltic Sea anymore, which would slow down the processes, which is not the case of the Black Sea, where these are priorities. Thirdly, the aspect of “inclusivity” has dominated the cooperation at the Baltic Sea since its very beginning, was visible and efficient, while in the rest of the cases, especially in the case that interests us here, this element was not present. (Tassinari 2004: 286). The conclusion, according to which the Baltic Sea is an exception in this context, and not the rule, seems to be right.

¹³ One of the broadest – but worn out – definitions of Europeanization would be the degree in which the domestic/home changes were caused by the European integration.

Nevertheless, the “Neighborhood Policy” of the EU, which regards states from the mentioned region (as well) in concrete Plans of Actions (2004) cannot be ignored (Emerson 2004). It is a step, and a significant one. Besides this, however, there were gathered a series of evolutions that make things impossible to stay at this stage. The idea of a strategy at the Black Sea, which has some consistent premises, as we have already seen, has become an imperative today.

Firstly, in order to avoid a project crisis in this area, specified by the skepticism settled at the level of the EU population and also at the level of some important political leaders, the EU will have to *upgrade* its integration policies so that it would compensate the European effort regarding the adherence to the union of the countries from the area. The CEPS researcher, Michael Emerson, considers, for example, that such a reevaluation based on the idea forwarded by Romano Proddi, according to which the spaces must “accept anything but institutions”, is necessary, reiterating the mainframe already launched by the former Chief of the European Commission: I. *Politics* – democracy and human rights and education; II. *Economy*: macroeconomy, market economy and economic networks; III. *Security* – justice and home affairs and foreign security (Emerson 2005: 5; see also Emerson 2004). In addition, it is suggested to change the name from “Neighborhood Policy” to “*European Integration Policy*”, which would better suit the interests of the respective governments and states.

Which would be the role of the Black Sea area in these evolutions? As we have already seen, without being fully assimilable, the Baltic pattern offers some suggestions. We must start off from the idea that the Black Sea is today the only European natural “outskirt” which was ignored by Bruxelles (Aydin 2005). The resurrection of this problem in Bucharest, especially together with the integration of Romania and Bulgaria in the EU, may reopen the file. The old existent structures which have influence at the Black Sea must be re-calibrated and coordinated, and some of them adjusted to the realities. The case of *Economic Cooperation at the Black Sea* is the most important. The actual format of BSEC is insufficient, and Romania has to fight diplomatically for its change and adjustment. In autumn this year, Romania will receive the presidency of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which “is extremely important from the point of view of promoting our strategy on the extended area of the Black Sea” (president Basescu, September 2005). This institutional framework is insufficient.

The EU was initially invited by the BSCE, but refused to participate, and Russia has then declared the high officials of BSEC that “the active implication of the EU will *not* be well received”. In May 2005, the USA was denied the status of observer, *what placed America somewhere below Slovakia, a country that has the status of observer*. (Russia is considered the country that blocked

the implication of the USA, a fact that infuriated 8 post-Soviet countries at the Black Sea, which publicly declared that the USA must be admitted at the debates. Turkey did not comment on the event, even if BSEC is its “product” and it could have influenced the decision. In addition, the amelioration of relations between Russia and Turkey will make BSEC more unfunctional.

Under these conditions, the initiative must be taken urgently. As it was already suggested, Romania and Bulgaria could be committed to what was called by a commentator the “Black Sea Forum” (Emerson 2004: 6), namely an institutionalized framework based on the initiatives described above and eventually co-sponsored by the EU. All members of CEMA should adhere to this mainframe, plus, mandatory, the United States of America. What should come after this is a Plan of Action at the Black Sea, supported financially by the European Union. The relation with Russia should be negotiated in this new mainframe – situation similar to NEI or NDI. An important point of the agenda must be NATO, which under the conditions of relative recoil of the EU in the area must take over the Euro-Atlantic integration. If we should resume the several ideas that are now on the market and expect a regional actor – a Finland! – capable of giving them coherence, these would be the following:

- The crisis of referenda from the EU are to be compensated with fresh initiatives, because the risk of dropping from the processes already initiated by the Euro-Atlantic area should not be underestimated in the conditions in which the *critical mass*¹⁴ for integration has not yet been produced in the majority of countries from the extended area of the Black Sea;
- The EU has to *upgrade* its policies in the area, respectively to pass from the “Vicinity Policy” to the “European Integration Policy”;
- The need of a new strategy at the Black Sea is imperious. Romania (together with Bulgaria, eventually) would have to take an initiative and try to formulate an inspired coherent project probably inspired by initiatives of NEI and NDI type; the idea of a “Forum at the Black Sea” in which the

¹⁴ When we affirm that *the critical mass for the North-Atlantic option was not reached yet* it means that we are not at the moment of reaching the institutional and human (functioning of institutions, level of education and orientation of the persons from political and civil administration, economic, cultural or social trade, political agreements etc.) after what *the process of Euro-Atlantic integration becomes irreversible* or, at least, that *it is impossible to come back to the former Soviet area (CIS etc.)*. This aspect – reaching the critical mass – is the thing that differentiates most firmly the Republic of Moldova from Romania or Bulgaria for example. (If this critical mass is reached with the sincere agreement of the political leaders who generate it or without their agreement is of no importance, after all.)

EU and the USA will be represented at the top, must be brought, together with the BSEC members, to discussion more frequently and applied.

- NATO has to become a fundamental actor in the region, especially in conditions of a relative temporalization of the EU expansion in the region (Emerson 2004: 7).¹⁵

Therefore, the strategic directions of Romania, together with its European integration, must stay oriented especially towards the Black Sea, because only this way it can bring significant ideas and contributions to the table of foreign policies of the EU. The Black Sea is, as Gheorghe Bratianu said during the inter-war period, the actual area of Romania's security.¹⁶ It is now appropriate to write some words about the (geo)political actor who needs, in our opinion, to take over a good part of the initiative on this area in the conditions when the EU, respectively NATO has pushed the stop button. Anticipating, we already suggest that the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization should be the only main strategic option for the Republic of Moldova.

8.11. NATO and the Black Sea

Besides the suggestions made above, there exist some concrete *foreign* and *home* solutions that make the adherence to NATO of countries from the region imperious.¹⁷

Failure of the EU constitution and its effects for the Eastern area

One of the effects of the blockade apparently reached by the EU is *the spiritual state of the population* from the "grey area" of adherence, namely those states that have made revolutions (or evolutions) (also) for contiguity, then for integration in the EU. Faced by a refusal, we can expect that, gradually, they would go

¹⁵ Before elaborating a strategy, Bucharest has to proceed to immediate action of *early warning* regarding the Transnistrian issue. The initiatives circulated nowadays risk to compromise not only the solution of the conflict, but even a Euro-Atlantic strategy in the extended area of the Black Sea, a part of which is the conflict from Transnistria (we will be regarding some issues in the last part of this material).

¹⁶ For an evaluation of Bratianu's analyses dedicated to the Black Sea see volume I of Badescu, Dungaciu 1995: 103-110; Dungaciu 2004a: 292-298).

¹⁷ Including the Republic of Moldova, because the perpetuation of the "neutral" status of this country – artificial anyway, given the fact that foreign troops are still on its territory, despite its own will – is a mistake. Of course, the management of this process must be made with determination and intelligence and with an eye on the events from the East region of the republic (Transnistria).

back, i.e. to where the “colourful revolutions” got them out from for a big period of time... Signs of satisfaction in this sense were already recorded in the capital of the Russian Federation. Alexei Makarin from the Centre of Political Technologies in Moscow declared on June 7th, 2005, according to RIA Novosti, reacted this way after the failure of the EU referendum: “in this situation, Russia has an opportunity window. Unlike the EU and the antagonisms between the states from which it consists, Russia exercises only one political will. Russia offers its neighbours concrete and lucrative economic projects, not only hope of integration in a far future. In the same time, Russia asks for much less in return from its neighbours. On the contrary, every step towards the European integration, even the most primary, is accompanied by numerous economic and political conditions. This is why, after the wave of colourful revolutions, the pendulum can go in the contrary direction. The labour parties from Georgia, the Progressive Socialists from the Ukraine and Rodina Movement from Moldova, which support the integration with Russia, could benefit from a big chance.”

This opinion was not the only one. According to *Russia up to date Agency*, under the title of “The failure of the European Constitution – a chance for Russia”, Alexander Dughin, geo-politician, the leader of the Euro-Asiatic International Movement, created on the basis of the pro-presidential movement, “Euro-Asia”¹⁸, publishes a significant article in *Rossiiskaia Gazeta* at the beginning of June. The voice of Dughin is not the only one in this matter, but he is probably the most articulated. We give his text to indicate a clearer style of thought and approach.

In Dughin’s opinion, “the European integration represents a geopolitical process, a result of two rather different vectors. The increasing confrontation of these two vectors was the factor that generated the present European crisis. The problem resides in the fact that, in the first stage – 60s-70s, the process of European integration was prepared exclusively in the mainframe of Atlantism strategy – under the control of the USA and in the interests of NATO.” We are talking about the consolidation of the Western world before the “Soviet threat”. This was a stage of a strategic plan in the spirit of the dual logic of the “Cold War” – “*capitalist Atlantism versus socialist Euro-Asiatism*. The stagnation of this NATO version of Europeanism still exists today. This phenomenon can be named “Euro-Atlantism”. In this process, “a primary role is reserved, as always, to the United States and their close ally on the Old Continent, Great

¹⁸ Alexander Dughin was one of the founders of the National-Bolshevik Party (the holder of the party member card no. 2, and no.1 was reserved for the leader of national-Bolsheviks, Eduard Limonov). The “Euro-Asiatic” ideology of Alexander Dughin is based on the priority of the state’s interests, counteract of the world globalization and “fighting Americanism”.

Britain, as well as to the newly entered states (not without pressures from the USA) from Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. Euro-Atlantism anticipates the NATO subsequent expansion to the East and follows the traditional line of the “Cold War” geopolitics, even if one without ideological significance.”

Euro-Atlantism insists on accepting former soviet republics, now “orange” – Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, to NATO and the EU. It stands for the admission of Turkey, makes pressures on Moscow with regard to “human rights” and Chechnya, attentively and tolerantly observes the separatist tendencies from North Caucasus and Povoljie. Euro-Atlantists count on liberal ideology, called on to make the European economy and socio-political system closer to the ones in the USA.

Rejected by the French and Hollandaise, the project of European Constitution was elaborated by Euro-Atlantists and reflected their major priorities – equality in rights for all the countries, orientation towards the acceleration of including the CIS countries and Turkey in the EU. After the collapse of the USSR, another vector was observed in the European Integration, embodied in two giants of Europe – France and Germany. These two countries, with the most evolved economies and industries, with profound social (anti-liberal) tendencies. During the European integration, around the Paris – Berlin axis there gradually began to form a second alternative – the identity, nucleus of “another Europe”. This phenomenon can be called *Euro-continentalism*. The essence of Euro-continentalism resides in the fact that the unified Europe is not thought of as a satellite of the USA and not as part of the Western world in the middle of vertiginous globalization, with a unique system of values, but as a geopolitically and historically independent subject with its own agenda, interests and with its own cultural, social and economic specific. Euro-continentalism refuses the logic of “Cold War” and anti-Euro-Asiatism, especially because the ideological motives are history. In the opinion of Euro-continentalists the “community of values” between Europe and the USA means less today, and the difference in interests of the Middle East and Eurasia is, in its turn, more and more evident.

As a conclusion, Dughin states: “Totally unexpectedly, after its colossal failures in geopolitics in the post-soviet area, Moscow has got a chance. The strike made by the French to Euro-Atlantism is especially advantageous for Russia. From now on, the chance of fast integration in the EU of the “orange” opponents from CIS has fallen out, Euro-Atlantism has weakened and, in consequence, the positions of Russia consolidated. Now Moscow has only to correctly and efficiently use the failure of its opponents.” The Republic of Moldova must evaluate correctly the situation created and to decide firmly the direction it will follow in the far or near future.

Internationalization of the Black Sea

President Traian Basescu has recently appreciated in a public intervention that the Romanian-American partnership is based on two elements active: legal and military presence of the American forces at the Black Sea “by establishing new bases in the Black Sea area” and the *internationalization of the problems of this area*, which is one of the mechanisms that guarantee peace in the area. We can mention here a comparison with the Mediterranean Sea, former area of conflicts, until its internationalization was achieved and the final establishment of the VI American Fleet and other forces in the area. This would be the solution for the Black Sea, too. Today, the Black Sea is under the control of the Russian Federation (with its 6 bases), but the latter does not assure the type of internationalization of the Black Sea that would generate stability and democracy in the area by itself. (Dungaciu 2005).

There would be something more to add to this topic. It regards an extremely interesting news. Lenta agency announced, on June 12th, 2005, that the Italian vice admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, commander of the united military marine forces of NATO in Eastern Europe, warned that, in 2006, the “Active Endeavour”, antiterrorist mission that has been carried out for several years in the Mediterranean Sea, will expand to the Black Sea, too. Here the position of the Russian commentator after hearing the news is interesting, too. This is what the cited agency writes: “The way of carrying out the *Atlantization* of the Black Sea will be seen by the way in which the *Active Endeavour* operation evolves in the Mediterranean. On the background of this operation there was applied, for the first time, article 5 of the status of NATO: on September 12th, 2001, on the day after the attack on WTC. Formally, *Active Endeavour* has begun on October 26th, 2001, at the same time with the issue of formal order, in the Southern perimeter of the Mediterranean. At that date, NATO ships have proceeded to the actual course of the operation, supporting the international campaign against terrorism. Officially, Russia cannot forward any requests to the Organization. With the exception of Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine have access to the Black Sea. Even if they are not member yet, Georgia and the Ukraine strongly support NATO. As to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, they are already members of the Alliance. Russia is practically alone. There is only one thing left for it: following the British saying – *If you can't beat them – join them*, to sign for the mission. This way, Moscow will be able, to a certain degree, to protect its interests in the region.

And let's not forget that there is the problem of Crimea, of Sevastopol Ukrainian harbour – the main base of Russia's fleet from the Black Sea. According to the same comment, Kiev is so eager to join NATO as Tbilisi is, and they will un-

doubtedly try to use *Active Endeavour* in their own favour. "It is more than sure that the presence of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol will be stopped after 2017. If until that date Ukraine and Russia will keep the same political direction, in 2018 Sevastopol will become a NATO base." The "internationalization" of the Black Sea is a process from which the Republic of Moldova won't stay away. The access to this crucial process for the area can be made only by the firm and total opening to the process of joining the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Why NATO? Home arguments

Integration in the EU and NATO cannot be seen as two different processes, at least at first. The idea of NATO as a *political project* is essential. This is the reason why, for example, the declarations of some Ukrainian officials according to which "if we would take care of the Ukraine's military aspect it would have the possibility to join NATO in 2-3 years" must be read with seriousness. The Ukraine does not have clear chances for joining NATO this soon, and the elections from 2006 may be decisive. The reason? NATO is not only a *military* project (Iceland, NATO member country, has no army, and North Korea, even if one of the most advanced armies in the world, with this regime, will never join NATO), but a *political* one, as well. The democratic values, in the first place, must be defended and *politically* exported. So, at least for the first instance, we can talk of *complementarity* between joining the EU and NATO.

Therefore, we refer to the "*non-military*" functions that NATO carries out and which, although left aside by some authors, are crucial for any regional evolution. These functions are extremely important, especially in the area that belonged to the USSR and where societies had not found the balance necessary for a functioning adequate to their objectives. These societies lack the *mainframe* in which they would function adequately. Now we come to the crucial function that NATO could fulfil: that of *rationalising* a society. The obvious *systematic* crisis suffered by the states in the area – crisis of functioning of the institutions, democratic deficit, elite selection etc. can be passed over only by *changing the rationality regime* of the system in its integrity. These major modifications – as in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, for example – are not taking place (only) in the interior – they happen much faster and more efficiently when the *mainframe (form)* of the evolution of processes is established from the exterior. NATO could function as such a *mainframe*, the most plausible by now and that could generate the necessary change of the system of functioning (social, political, economic etc.) of the states from the area of the Black Sea that have not yet integrated, including the Republic of Moldova. More than that, the Republic of

Moldova and other states from the region do not need to direct their projects of Euro-Atlantic integration only towards the EU. They have to try alternative solutions as well, and the most accessible today is NATO. In addition, it is more realistic as well, in conditions in which the EU seems to be more aggressively going to the *closing* of doors and not their *opening*.

8.12. NATO – a strategic course of the Republic of Moldova

When, in 2003, during the big manifestations of protest organized by the CDPP, in the Great National Meeting Square were fluttered – for the first time in the Republic of Moldova! – the flags of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, the reactions were contradictory. Some were amazed, other saluted them tacitly, and the majority stood concernedly, not saying a word, expecting the consequence with fear. To the relief of the latter, the continuation did not take place. Not a single political debate – as yet the CDPP is the only political party that continuously supports the adherence of the Republic to NATO –, not a single public debate have taken place in the Republic of Moldova. The journalists, political commentators, analysts etc., with rare exceptions, have kept the silence with regard to the subject. The very recent political signs have broken the ice and have promoted comments that appreciated the NATO option positively. This is very good, even if regrettable afterwards.

The debate is more necessary today, when it becomes more and more clearly how fluid is the situation of the Republic of Moldova from the security point of view, how little it depends on itself and how much on others, who do not necessarily wish its good. The AP OSCE resolution (Washington, July 1st – 15th 2005) plus other so-called plans of solving the conflict from the East of the Republic of Moldova have already provoked the stupefaction and irritation of the political leaders from Chisinau.¹⁹ This was well deserved – to *systematically* ignore the

¹⁹ Beginning with the so-called Iuscenko Plan and continuing with those that put the idea of elections in Transnistria in focus, before the demilitarization and decriminalization of the area. In addition, here comes the intolerable passing-by of what the parliament of the Republic of Moldova has already accepted, namely the organic Law on the principles of solving the Transnistrian difference, adopted on July 22nd by the Parliament of Moldova. A stupefying example took place at the beginning of September, when the representatives of the Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, the USA and the EU have approved the suggestion of starting the preparations for creating an international mission for organizing free and democratic parliamentary elections in Transnistria. Vladimir Ogrizko, prime vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine, has made a statement about this during a press-conference in Kiev, specifying that the respective decision was adopted in conformity with the result of negotiations that have taken in place in the “3+2” formula, in which participated representatives of the Ukraine,

declarations of the parliament from Chisinau from June 10th, this year and to force Transnistria into elections when Chisinau walk more and more firmly towards the EU and NATO means, for a short term, to *write the electoral campaign of separatists* – the “Nazis from Chisinau unite with the Nazis from Romania and join the camp of American imperialism!” –, and for a long term, to *place the whole Republic of Moldova under the direct and indirect control of Tiraspol* and its protectors; more than that, to definitively block the Euro-Atlantic adherence of Chisinau. This causes the imperativeness of a discussion of this kind.

Republic of Moldova and NATO – significant steps towards a decision that was too long delayed

A fast review of the documents issued by NATO clearly indicates the fact that the functions, attributions and effects of joining the Alliance are today different from those resulting from this deed before 1989. The assumptions are total, the actions of the Alliance as well. Hence the insistences of the Western officials that the *political* dimension of joining NATO is crucial, or the stress on “unconventional threats” which threaten Europe or NATO from within the area of the Black Sea: drugs smuggling, illegal migration, arms and human trafficking etc.

The Republic of Moldova is already a part of the security system at the Black Sea and must realize this fact as fast as possible. There are already signs that she had done it. On September 9th, 2005, an important official of the American State Department has announced that the expansion of NATO will not be possible before 2008. The adjunct undersecretary for European and Asiatic problems, Kurt Volker, has declared that the candidate countries are not yet ready for joining NATO. The candidate countries, Albania, Macedonia and Croatia hope to adhere at the end of the next year. The American official has mentioned, however, that the “situation is not favourable for an expansion of the Alliance this year or the next one.”

The news is not at all favourable for a country like Moldova (unlike the Ukraine, which had bigger requirements), which anyway had not signed the necessary documents for a so complex association. In addition, it is a sign that the doors of the alliance are not closing and that, in 2008, new members can

Russia and OSCE on one side and the USA and EU on the other. The priority issue of negotiations was the organization of free parliamentary elections in Transnistria. The official from Kiev has declared as well that the Ukrainian MFA is satisfied by the course of consultations, which was also attended by the EU representative for Moldova, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged. The Republic of Moldova did not participate in the discussions!

join the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is a tacit invitation that must be ignored by Chisinau, continuing the series of positive measures taken until present. They exist, and *the actions made by the political leaders of the Republic of Moldova with regard to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization are extremely significant. A significant event in the post-soviet history of the republic and was not properly outlined.*

From this point of view, the most important event taking place in this period is by far the concrete and solid approach that Chisinau continues towards the North-Atlantic Alliance through the Declaration from August 17th of Martin Fedor, Secretary of State at the Ministry of National Defence the from Republic of Moldova, that came after the conclusion of the Moldo-Slovakian agreement of military collaboration, in which the representative of a NATO member country has spoken about the creation of a mixed military contingent of Slovaks and Moldavians is *essential*. On their way towards the Alliance, all the states have made their way through bilateral cooperation – Romania, for example, has made up a common battalion with Hungary, a NATO member country at that time. The event from August is, in fact, a top of an iceberg for a series of positive evolutions of Chisinau on the direction of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Chisinau, for example, has requested political support and assistance from NATO for elaborating an individual plan of actions of NATO-Republic of the Moldova partnership and its implementation in parallel with achievement of Republic of Moldova – EU plan of actions. In his speech from Tuesday, June 7th, in front of the North-Atlantic Council, in Brussels, president Vladimir Voronin has declared that the Republic of Moldova has irreversibly optioned for its integration in the EU and, despite an unfavourable geopolitical conjunction, attributes a major importance to the development of relations with NATO. “For the Republic of Moldova participation in activities of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and of the “Partnership for Peace” Program is not an academic exercise. The actual problems we deal with – terrorism, aggressive and intransigent separatism, organized crime, human trafficking, corruption, smuggling – represent a threat to the democratic essence of our states and can be solved only together”, has declared Voronin, mentioning that for the Republic of Moldova cooperation with NATO represents the best method to join international efforts regarding the creation of a common security system in the Euro-Atlantic area and of consolidation of stability in the world. President Voronin says that the Republic of Moldova want to value to the maximum the potential of cooperation offered by the Partnership for Peace and the Council of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, at the same time, to increase the dynamics of its relations with NATO. “We consider the elabora-

tion within PARP of the objectives of the partnership for the achievement of the reform of the national army and measures regarding the amelioration of the capacities of our armed forces to operate along with the NATO forces to be of a special utility.

On June 7th, 2005, the collaboration between the Republic of Moldova and Romania in the military field has constituted the main subject of the long discussions between the Minister of Defence, Valeriu Plesca, and the Ambassador of Romania in Chisinau, Filip Teodorescu. According to the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence, there were elaborated all the premises for such a collaboration – the parts have agreed that this can be achieved within the Partnership for Peace Program, and “directly” as well, the bilateral Agreement signed by the military institutions from Chisinau and Bucharest being the legal basis. This year, on June 18th, upon his return from the Reunion of the Ministers of Defence within the Euro-Atlantic partnership, the Minister of Defence, Valeriu Plesca, has declared, in an interview given to “Europa Libera” radio, that in future *the adherence of Moldova to NATO is not excluded*. When he was asked if the conclusion of the individual Plan of Actions for the Republic of Moldova – NATO could constitute a first proof of the intention of authorities to give up the neutral status of the Republic of Moldova as a first step towards adherence to NATO, Plesca answered that the conclusion of a document of this type does not mean the adherence to a military-political bloc, but, at the same time, *does not exclude this fact*. In the opinion of the Minister, this fact “remains in the attention of the future of our country, civil society and especially of the political elites, which have to mark out the European policy of the Republic of Moldova.”

In addition, the official visit of the Minister of National Defence of Romania, Teodor Atanasiu, to Chisinau, on June 21st, this year, has become a new stage in the more efficient achievement of the common plan of cooperation between the armies of the two states. In other words, the cooperation of the Republic of Moldova with NATO, because this is what means the relation of the Republic of Moldova – Romania in this respect. At the end of July, this year, a delegation of the Republic of Moldova, lead by the Minister of Defence, Valeriu Plesca, has visited the USA, where they have met representatives of the Pentagon. The discussed issues were: the Moldo-American bilateral collaboration, problems of global and regional security, the fight against terrorism etc. According to a press release of MD service, Plesca has had meetings with the vice-regent adjunct of the Secretary of Defence of the United States, Gordon England, and with the adjunct of the assistant of the Secretary of State in politico-military problems, Robert Loftis, for identifying the “priorities of the

next year's collaboration" and for marking out the "ways of achieving these goals within the Moldo-American military relations".

On August 4th, 2005, President Voronin has assembled a meeting with the participation of the decisive factors within the Government and Parliament, dedicated to launching the process of elaborating the Individual Plan of Actions of the Republic of Moldova – NATO Partnership. According to "Moldova Suverana" official publication (No. 124 of August 5th, 2005), "the chief of state has reminded the participants of the meeting that he has requested the signing of an Individual Plan of Actions of Partnership (IPAP) with NATO on June 7th, this year, during the participation to the meeting of the North-Atlantic Council in Brussels". Vladimir Voronin has announced that, recently, "he has received a positive answer to this intercession from the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who informed the government of Moldova about the decision of the North-Atlantic Council to sign such a document with our country already in the first semester of 2006." The president has exposed in detail a series of arguments in favour of the elaboration and implementation of the Republic of Moldova – NATO IPAP. The participation to the NATO "Partnership for Peace" Program, since March 1994 and until now, "has brought Moldova numerous political, economic and security benefits and determined the approach between our country and the Alliance."

In an interview given to "Moldova Suverana" periodical from August 17th, 2005 (no. 130), the Minister of Defence, Valeriu Plesca, has reiterated these ideas: "the experience and the positive results of cooperation within the Partnership for Peace, the expansion of the Alliance up to the borders of the Republic of Moldova, the conclusion of the Moldova – EU Plan of Actions, the increase of the political dimension in the activity of NATO – all these dictate the necessity of passing to another stage of political dialogue and cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization."

The interventions of the minister have the look of a true campaign. He has come back to this issue in *Moldova Suverana* again (No. 138 of September 1st, 2005), stating: "In my opinion, the parallel achievement of the two plans, Moldova – NATO and Moldova – European Union, will accelerate the achievement of our main objective – joining the EU... Together with the beginning of the elaboration of the Moldova – NATO Individual Plan of Actions, the Ministry of Defence has practically become one of the main bodies of state, on which depends the success of this action. Starting from this point, a special section of Euro-Atlantic integration, which will deal exclusively with this problem, was created within the already accomplished reform of the central body of the military department. It will coordinate and elaborate all the basic

documents in the military field which will be stipulated by this plan.” From the perspective of evolutions from the Republic of Moldova with regard to the North-Atlantic Treaty, these declarations are extremely spectacular. They must catch consistency as soon as possible. On the other hand, some unofficial voices coming from the top of the government try to accredit the contrary, namely that these signs do not mean what some would interpret as: “So, what does Moldova want? To join NATO? Categorically not. Voronin did not want, does not want, will not want us in NATO. The CDPP adepts, i.e. those of Iu. Rosca, would want us in NATO. But the power is in Voronin’s hands, who, since 2001, has wanted to unite the countries. (Moldova Suverana, July 2005).

Organized into a comparative grid, these last voices have more probably a strategic importance than an actual one and have the appearance of muting certain declarations which may irritate home and foreign groupings for which the NATO option of the Republic of Moldova is unacceptable (as it was, probably, in the case of the Baltic republics, too...). We have to wait and see which opinion will be the winner and in what direction will the actions of Chisinau authorities be going.

8.13. Conclusions

In any debate regarding the positioning of a country in a security area, the reaction of the population, society, leaders of opinion remains the crucial factor. From this point of view, *a more consistent debate in Chisinau on the matter of security options of the Republic of Moldova imposes itself*. Today, it is obvious that the so-called “neutrality” is an anachronism without importance and value. The alternatives must be researched, and the only viable option – NATO – is one that was not explained and debated enough. The decision must be based on a serious debate, not on political labels and patterns apodictically formulated. The media and the civil society must open a dialog through the afferent channels at the end of which the security option of the Republic of Moldova would appear more clearly. Today it is not clear at all. The pro-European declarations of the leaders are not necessarily a warranty – *the critical mass for the North-Atlantic option was not yet reached* in the Republic of Moldova.

Not a single country of those saved from the former soviet camp has joined the EU without first joining NATO. It is not difficult to understand why. NATO integration is a process. This very process is the one that modifies almost radically the institutional configuration of an area (changes at the administrative, human, selection criteria levels etc.). This means the capacity of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization of rationalizing the social systems. The present state

of society of the Republic of Moldova, crushed by corruption, systems of relatives in selecting and promoting any kind of staff (political, administrative, academical level), the institutionalized and state corruption, administration and allegiance of the sub alternates through files and blackmail etc. does not have yet any relation to the functioning of a society which wants to join the EU. Because of this, the initial integration into NATO was a fundamental condition – and still is! – for the subsequent integration into the EU of the societies from the East of Europe, including the Republic of Moldova.

The idea of NATO as a political project is crucial. Democratic values must be protected and politically exported in the first place, as we have already mentioned in our analysis.

The situation from the Ukraine must be avoided, where the discrepancy between the political elite and the population with regard to integration into NATO is today almost impossibly to be managed. If the acceptance of integration into the EU exceeds 50% at the level of population, NATO receives the agreement of approximately 20% of the Ukraine's population, despite the favorable declarations of the political government. Today, political parties avoid approaching the subject, because of obvious reasons. It is one of the effects of the Kucima regime, which, even if making significant steps towards the approach to NATO at some moment (at least in comparison with the Republic of Moldova that systematically sabotaged the process – see “Partnership for Peace”), has not done a national debate from it (let us add that namely this approach of the Ukrainian army to NATO was one of the elements that assured the success of the Orange Revolution – a pervert effect that was not sufficiently taken into account by the Ukraine!).

Now we are assisting a paradox in the Ukraine: civil society, the only one that can freely talk about NATO, does not have the right to debate over the subject, and political parties do not have electoral motivation. This kind of evolution must be a lesson for the Republic of Moldova – the debate regarding the North-Atlantic Alliance must start now, especially because the political support of this organization today is more consistent in the Republic of Moldova than in the Ukraine. The difficulties met now by the Republic of Moldova in its efforts of orienting towards the EU and – especially – towards NATO must be evaluated with calmness and lucidity. The domestic effects of the declarations favorable to NATO of president Voronin and of Minister Plesca cannot be unobserved. And they were observed! The breach introduced by these in the (still) compact bloc named PCM could be fatal for the unity of the party after a period of time. One thing gets more obvious: *with regard to the Euro-Atlantic integrity,*

*the enemies of declarations similar to those cited above are not in the opposition, but in... the governing party*²⁰.

8.14. Instead of conclusions: the Transnistrian conflict – aim of the strategy at the Black Sea

This study aims to open a debate that has been delayed for too long. In consequence, it provides as yet more questions than answers, and does not aim to conclude anything. Nevertheless, there are some specifications to be made, and they regard the risks that have accumulated in present for the problems of the Black Sea to be left without solution for a significant period of time from now on. The risk refers to the mistaken solution of the “transnistrian conflict”, the meaning of which becomes today more summoning. The bet of Transnistria is, in fact, the bet of a strategy at the Black Sea. Before showing what should Bucharest do under these conditions, in our opinion, we will review some significant evolutions in the Transnistrian file, taken place in the capital of Romania.

The Cypriot solution for the Republic of Moldova?

After the publication of the report made by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Ion Naval, How we can help Moldova to help itself, SAR Policy Brief No. 16, Bucharest, August 2005, it is the turn of “Ovidiu Sincai” Institute to publicize a Report of political analysis: Transnistria: Evolution of a frozen conflict and perspectives of solution, Bucharest, September, 2005. Both materials have something in common, namely the so-called “Cypriot solution” for solving the Transnistrian conflict. Among other things, the last Report affirms that “the actual integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union can be made applying the same mechanism used in Cyprus. The part from the West of Nistru will be integrated into the European Union, the rest will be under an international protectorate of the UN.” The resurrection of the “Cypriot solution” as a kind of *deus ex machina* is surprising for Moldova. Firstly because those who forward it suggest, even if tacitly, that they had discovered the “solution” and finally deliver it to a public in Romania, Moldova and further on, who was giddily wandering, without a saving clue.

²⁰ The Talibans of the Communist Party are sufficiently numerous. The pro-NATO declarations are as Damocles sword above the head of the president of the republic. The bet is the party’s unity and the political position which Vladimir Voronin will adopt in future.)

1. This is wrong, too, at least because of several reasons²¹. The first is related to deontology. It is incorrect to suggest pretensions to originality. In reality, the comparison with Cyprus was made two years ago, in Chisinau or other Western environments. The one who has given it the most eloquent form was Nicu Popescu, in the capital of the Republic of Moldova, who published in 2004 a text called “Cyprus’ lesson for the Republic of Moldova” (Eurojournal.org, Moldova AZI etc.) In the mentioned article, Nicu Popescu has written about five lessons that Moldova can learn from the Cypriot case with regard to the combination of two processes that overlap, namely the European integration and the regulation of a secessionist conflict²²;
2. The process of negotiations with Transnistria is not as important as the home transformations in Moldova and the approach to the EU, which in time may positively influence the process of Transnistrian regulation as well.
3. Democratization, reforms and Moldova’s approach to the EU are the keys of success for the problems of Transnistria;
4. “Rush ruins the deal”: South Cyprus concentrated on its own development in the first place, and after more that two decades has come back to the table of negotiations in a position of force and has dictated to a greater degree the conditions of reunification.) In Bucharest, within a more ample discussion dedicated to plans of solving the Transnistrian issue, this text was mentioned and commented as well. (See Lumea, no. 12, 2004).

The text had the benefic role of an accelerator for a necessary debate, and some of the questions forwarded then were left without answer even until today. Together with the resuscitation of this idea in the reports that were already mentioned you can feel the atmosphere of a remainder with at least two years ago. The reason: none of the questions forwarded then by the critics of the Cypriot scenario are not approached nor solved today. In addition, in the absence of clear answers to these questions, the plans from Romania risk to turn against the interests of Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

²¹ We do not have here the pretention to exhaustivity, so we will leave aside the confusions existent in the two reports, including that illustrated by comparisons with areas with which Transnistria is incomparable: Cyprus, Kosovo etc.

²² A divided state can join the EU. Therefore the argument that “as long as Moldova is not able to solve the Transnistrian problem – the adherence to the EU is impossible, is not valid, at least formally.

What does Transnistria mean?

To speak in terms of a “Cypriot plan” of solving the conflict means to ignore the fact that the premises of the two situations are radically different. In case of the Republic of Moldova, the off cut between the two entities is today deprived of any criteria, with the exception of that related to military power. Those who suggest a Cypriot solution must firstly define what does “Transnistria” mean and how do they “separate” it from the rest of Moldova (even if temporarily), in comparison with which there are no significant ethnic or religious differences. Even the data of the census – questionably – organized by the Transnistrian “authorities” and broadcasted this month indicate a structure of population in which prevail the Romanians/Moldavians with approx. 32%, followed by Russians 30% and Ukrainians – 28%. In addition, there is a significant religious homogeneity, over 80% declaring themselves Christian-Orthodox.

Where comes then the differentiation from the rest of the country? Those who suggest a “Cypriot plan” probably think about “historic” territorial off cuts – Transnistria would be the region from the left bank of the Nistru. This kind of suggestion has nothing to do with the reality. Today, the territory controlled by separatists makes significant bites from the right bank of the Nistru, so that this river is not a border anymore. What will happen to Tighina, for example? Where will be placed this important city in the opinion of the supporters of a Cypriot plan: in the Moldovan part, thus towards European integration, or in the “expanded Transnistria”, thus the territory will be “frozen”? What if it is chosen that Transnistria should stop on the Nistru frontier, how will it be done? Through military actions for pushing separatists “home”? This would cause armed conflicts which on one hand would be unacceptable for everybody, and on the other hand would finally mean exactly the recognition of the separatist regime, since you want to push them to “their place”, that is beyond the Nistru! If it was opted for negotiations with the separatists for “vacating” the right bank of the Nistru, which is occupied by Smirnov, it would get to recognition again. If only the passing of smirnovists over the Nistru is negotiated, then you have legitimized the regime from Tiraspol and recognized the independence of Transnistria. This is exactly what the promoters of the “Cypriot plan” want to avoid...And what if the negotiations will regard the status of the whole region controlled by separatists, what sense does the “Cypriot plan” have?

Romania is not the "Greece" of Moldova

The plan elaborated for the Southern part of Cyprus was subsidiary based on the presence of a firm and strong actor who would promote that area towards the EU, by lobby actions, international pressures, plans and projects of economic, social and other type of development. That actor, crucial for the comprehension of what has happened in the case of Cyprus was Greece – NATO and EU member state. Without it, the solution would have been impossible. Is Romania a Greece for Moldova without Transnistria? Obviously not. It had not been and it does not seem possible in the near future as well. Under these conditions, to speak in Bucharest about a "Cypriot plan" means not to understand the profound springs and the main "engine" of the present success of the Southern part of Cyprus. In addition, it means to completely abandon Transnistria on one hand, and on the other to leave the Republic of Moldova (minus its Eastern part) without a solid partner on the presumed way of European integration.

Why shall we neglect the diversity of the population in Transnistria?

The "Cypriot plan" abusively suggests that there is a homogenous Transnistrian "public opinion" that would be identical to that of the puppet regime from Tiraspol. Since everybody thinks in soviet terms, refusing with hostility any approach not only to Moldova or Romania, but to the Euro-Atlantic area as well, everybody should be abandoned and ignored until they "reconsider their position". The idea is both mistaken and unacceptable. On one hand, as we have already mentioned, it suggests homogeneity of the population from the territories occupied by Smirnov et. comp., which does not really exist. Secondly, it ostentatively and impermissibly ignores what those people believe or say; and they are not few. Some of them even try to speak Romanian publicly as well...

To ignore this population and its diversity, to ignore methodically the opinion of a population of 500-600 thousand people means not giving a penny for the democracy you promote so much. And in order to find out this opinion, you do not need the "Cypriot plan", but the democratization of the region, which cannot be actually made without its demilitarization and decriminalization... Thus, we come back to the Strategy of the three Ds or to the Law adopted by the legislative body from Chisinau.

The problem of refugees from the Eastern part of Moldova

Beginning with 1992, the Eastern part of the Republic of Moldova – qualified by the Council of Europe as “zone de non-droit” – was left by approx. 100 000 – 130 000 people, Romanians in majority. It has been estimated that more 50 000 thousand people have left the right bank of Nistru still occupied by the separatist forces. In addition, the Russian Federation has encouraged the transfer of thousand of allogenes, especially Russians, to whom there are distributed or sold, through “Sherif” company (belonging to Smirnov family), the houses left by the Moldavian refugees.²³ The problem that appears in the idea of a Cypriot plan which supposes the dumping of the Eastern part of the Republic of Moldova, is what will happen with the refugees who are practically invited to integration into the EU on one hand, and separated from the area where their material goods, relatives, friends etc. are. What will happen to them?

A Cypriot scenario is tardy and useless

If two years ago a suggestion of “Cypriot scenario” for the Republic of Moldova had a certain sense, at least for attracting the attention of the West around this “frozen conflict” or the revitalization of debates on this issue and that seemed to take an extremely dangerous direction of a federation that would have definitively blocked Chisinau in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, today this kind of suggestion has no reason. It comes late and does not move anything from its place.

Now the problem is not the non-involvement of international instances, but the manner in which they do it. A plan of Romania for Transnistria seems to come too late. The OSCE, as well as the EU, the USA, the Ukraine or Russia seems to be decided to “solve” the conflict. The problem is how? If things go in the direction they are evolving now, we will find ourselves again in years 2001-2003, meaning in the middle of anti-federalization fights that took place in Chisinau or Washington and where the supporters of certain federalization projects with serious consequences for the Republic of Moldova have been forced to give up because of the rejection of the Kozak memorandum. Then the civil society from Chisinau has carried out an extraordinary action of early warning and has succeeded – not easily! – to convince the great European capitals not to accept the federalization of the republic. The pro-federalization camp was

²³ A considerable part of these colonists come from the extra-European area of the new Middle-Asian countries.

numerous: it was found in the OSCE, in Washington, Kiev, Moscow, Tiraspol or Chisinau. Those who opposed were practically in the same places, in Chisinau – in the streets or in the democratic press, in Washington and in Brussels.²⁴ Finally, the clarification was made, but today there is a risk that the status of Transnistria will be discussed again above the citizens of the Republic of Moldova or the legislative initiatives of Chisinau. (The most important of which is the “Law on basic stipulations of the special legal status of the establishments on the left bank of the Nistru – Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”).

The Transnistrian stake is the stake of the credible and pro-Western strategy at the Black Sea

Here Romania could eventually intervene, too. Not in suggesting “solutions” that no one takes seriously, but warning that a failure or mistaken strategy in Transnistria blocks the entire process of elaboration of a strategy at the Black Sea and, in consequence, ruins the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the states in the area. The Transnistrian stake is the stake of a coherent and credible strategy at the Black Sea. If the “solution” will be made without taking into consideration the elementary norms of democracy that the West wants to introduce in the area, then there will be given the signal that the region is abandoned and left to reside in the situation it is encountered today. The consequences are extremely negative and it is upon them that the regional actors, including Bucharest, must concentrate, because the failure of the policy of expansion of the EU to the Black Sea will generate a period of instability at the EU frontier because of several reasons:

1. The public pressure of generations from limitrophe countries oriented to the West and which do not have the nostalgia of “welfare of the former USSR” any more, these grew, educated themselves with the “European idea” (to which they attribute even more significations) and which cannot be turned back any more since the aspirations had been unleashed. In addition, these generations do not longer speak Russian satisfactory, because the significance attributed to the Russian language is not the same.
2. Even in case of a massive tilting over to the East of these states abandoned by the Euro-Atlantic area, the inter-state collaboration with the Russian Federation will not be possible: the failed state status of these countries impedes them to collaborate efficiently and normally with

²⁴ See this issue in detail in Dungaciu 2004b.

Moscow – the elites with (economic) connections in the capital of the Russian Federation will totally and immediately control these states, because the economic/political separation in these weak and non-functional states does not function at least as it does in normal states. As soon as they are abandoned they will become Russian colonies, not states capable of economic or political collaboration with the Russian Federation – a thing that would be normally desirable for any state.

3. The appearance of “torn countries” in the area – discrepancies between generations and flaws within population as a consequence of blocking the access of these states to the Western area – and the perpetuation of the state of insecurity in the region.
4. Because of this there will appear waves of emigrants and a constant pressure at the doors of the EU, doors which countries like Romania will be called to block. It will be a true “impossible mission”.
5. The securitization of energetic routes is crucial; the EU cannot base on an area providing energy in case the routes of combustible are not politically secured. In case of politico-economic abandon of the area, securitization is an illusion.

Getting back to Transnistria and keeping in mind the above mentioned, it becomes clear that what we call today “frozen conflicts” will perpetuate and that they can be solved only by global strategies at the Black Sea, intelligently promoted by local actors and introduced by international actors. If the West follows a “solution” that would legitimize the Transnistrian regime and the foreign military presence in the area, then this will become a clear sign that what happens with the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea will not happen to the Black Sea, i.e. the Euro-Atlantic integration of this area. The “frontiers of freedom” will transform in frontiers of failure and crisis.

Chapter IX.

THE BLACK SEA REGION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE "OIL AND GAS" DIPLOMACY

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Introduction

Before going to the actual subject of this study, with a topic that was so craved and approached in the last period, with so many prognoses, anticipations, speculations, illusions etc., we should explain in short the theoretical principles that formed the base of our analysis. In other words, we want to observe from the very beginning that, setting off from the same data of the problem, many annalists have reached totally different results and conclusions, that would make the reader understand that each approach can only be relative and subjective.

Lately, very many studies on foreign affairs outlined the fact that the analysis was mainly based on the economic aspect. A fast review of the international life suggests that the economy dominates the stage in the detriment of the public. Nevertheless, a true economic diplomacy relies in something else: and namely in following the economic objectives by different means (economic, military, juridical, political). The economy is, therefore, far away from dominating without a division of the finalities of the diplomacies. Moreover, the importance economy is given appears to be cyclic sometimes or only a cause of some circumstances. Even if the economy appears to be the basic concern in the studies on foreign affairs, there still exist some "hypotheses" that have to be re-evaluated:

- "The loss of sovereignty of politics in comparison with the growth of the economic factor". Still, political authorities are, in the majority of cases, the ones form the markets, define their conditions of functioning, fix their geographic limits, by a political choice with serious consequences (i.e. "Until what point can the EU expand?");
- Another hypothesis shows that diplomacy has become the tool of companies for assuring their expansion abroad. Or, the tree should not hide the forest. The identification of a foreign policy with a company or a product that is practiced only in the states where the economy is not diversified;

- Another frequently circulated idea is that the economy has such an important role in the international context, that it generated a new form of conflict, namely the economic wars. An eloquent example shows that the things are not exactly this way: does there exist an economic war between the aeronautic industry of the two giants, “Airbus” and “Boeing”, which use engines and equipment manufactured by the other? The disappearance of one of the two companies would have a disastrous effect on the other one, this way becoming victims of the anti-monopoly law. We have to remark the mistake of regarding the economy from a conflict perspective, the logic of functioning of the economy not being the same with that of politics.

We think that it is exaggerated to affirm that the economic factor has monopolized the international life. It is true that nothing would happen in the foreign policy that would negatively and directly influence the economy; there are no political moves without economic implications. But we cannot talk about the dictatorship of one aspect over another; it is more probably an interaction between the two dimensions, political and economic. In our study, we will insist more on the economy from the Black Sea area; we tried to regard the economy and politics in permanent interconnection.

The second empirical aspect of this work refers to the way of analyzing the “actors” (states) from the Black Sea region. We should outline from the beginning that the vision about this problem will be put closer to that of constructivists. We remind that after constructivists the “Interests of states have their roots not in the configuration of the relations of force as the realists, nor in an approach based on the calls expressed by the “actors” of the society as well as the liberalists, but in the states’ identities, in other words, in the representations the states make for themselves and for the others, for the own role and that of the others in the context of the international system.”

In the context of international relations, these geopolitical self-representations of the states count as much as their actual situation. For picturing this idea we will take the case of Russia (one of the main actors in the Black Sea region), for which the pernicious vision of the Russian ruling groupings of “encompassment”, despite the actual situation, gives birth to dissensions in foreign affairs. For understanding this attitude of Moscow, it is necessary to explain the reasons that generated it. For the West, Russia is a geopolitical reality that has occupied the centre of the Euro-Asiatic space during one thousand years, having clear intentions to control the outskirts of Europe, as well as those of Asia. Here is where from comes the certainty of Moscow that the Western powers seek Russia’s isolation for impeding its expansion.

It is not important if the surrounding of Russia is real or not, or that it is only partial, what is, paradoxically, very obvious is that the Russian political and military elites are absolutely convinced that this “surrounding” exists, and the consequences of this obsession were always disastrous (the history has showed that); no matter if it is about strategies of counter-“surrounding” or other sorts of actions. Other actors from the basin of the Black Sea (and Caspian as well) had built certain images configured by their political, economic and cultural identities and the images of the surrounding states. This is valid for relatively big countries like Romania and Ukraine, which see themselves at the outskirts of Europe and the Russian “Empire”, and for post-soviet states as Moldova or Georgia, for which the perception of colonial and post-colonial states still persists. The paradox relies in the fact that it does not matter if the reality corresponds to the image which the respective state has formed, but that the political elites act guided by their own picture about the country and the area. In consequence, neither the activity of the diplomatic bodies can be other than a reaction to this perception. This is why it is difficult to expect economic, geo-strategic or other types of miracles in these states in the near future.

9.1. The economic problems of the Black Sea

Today, after 15 years from the collapse of the communist regime, the countries from the basin of the Black Sea still have not got over the multiple historical discrepancies that separate them. The national objectives of these states are not compatible – and this may be because there are no affinities between the new states in the area, this fact having global consequences on the security in the area. Today the security risks must be regarded deeper, surpassing only the military risks. Taking these into consideration, too, we should orient more towards stringent problems: terrorist acts, loss of sources of raw materials and, especially, of energy (the victims of which could be the majority of states from the region); the modification of migration waves and unaccepted demographic pressures, as the case of tatars who returned to Crimea and, of course, the problems related to the control of the routes of transportation of oil and gas; etc. In fact, the number and reasons of potential conflicts in the area are much bigger than we imagine. Michel Foucher, in his work, “Fragments d’Empire”, identifies 173 possible causes of conflicts at the outskirts of Russia in 1993.

This is, in general, the heritage of the Cold War and particularly of the policy of Moscow in this region during half a century. Today we realize even better that this part of Europe will be further facing problems of security. Speaking in strategic terms, this area is located on the “outskirts” of two great forces,

Europe and Russia. Besides, Brussels is aware of this fact, too, a proof of this being the fact that the *Strategy of Common Security* gives priority to the idea of *Common Neighborhood*, which, according to the opinion of foreign analysts as well as of those from the region, will be at the base of a new architecture of security on the old continent, today under construction (maybe because it has been superficially regarded by Europeans for a long time).

In this study we will examine these things in movement, referring only to oil and gas, which are not the only basic energetic resources in the world economy, but only a very important element which will influence the new architecture of security in Europe. In fact, the importance and relevance of this aspect results more probably from the fact that their logic is often different from the political one, but every time they are dealt with from the perspective of their real consequences. For a state like Russia, the centennial wish of which is to be treated as a great power, even if its GDP today does not exceed that of Holland, the energetic policy becomes an essential advantage (if not the only real one) in its foreign negotiations and here we refer especially to those with Europe. This way, the small countries from the area are in a double captivity generated by the energetic policy of Russia – on one hand, by their dependency of the Russian oil and gas and on the other hand, by the ascendant dependence of Europe on this oil and gas. In the lines below we will try to analyze the state of things in this area today, from the perspective of hydrocarbons, as well as the way they could develop in a short term. Especially that today, after a strong come-back of pro-Europenism in the former soviet republics, the desiderata are much more clear. The desire of these states to jump out of the Russian influence, whether political, economic or of security, became obvious, and on the other hand it is obvious that they greatly depend on the “agreement” between Russia and Europe with regard to this area.

9.2. The Black Sea as an option for exporting oil and gas from the Caspian Sea

After the collapse of the communist regime we have assisted to a continuous growth of geo-economic and geopolitical problems around the Black Sea – this increase has two major causes: a) the appearance of eight new states in the former soviet area, seven of which are enclaves; b) re-discovery of oil and gas at the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea is one of a closed type¹ and because of this the Black

¹ A fact that generated great debates between the states on the shore, i.e. those that claim that it is a lake want a re-distribution of its natural resources according to the rights on the closed waters, while the opponents, meaning Russia and Iran, consider that it is a Sea and its distribution must be made according to the sea rights of dividing waters, i.e. any shore state can make use of its submarine resources in neutral waters.

Sea becomes the quasi-obligatory passage for accessing the European market, as well as the American one. After the discovery of Caspian oil and gas, the main problem was the control over transport networks. This kind of control offers the beneficiary more than economic advantages. Because of this many analysts were tempted to speak of a new «Big Game»² for emphasizing the attraction of some multinational companies and Western states for an area considered for a long time a closed field left in the Russian sphere of interests.

The fights for transport networks and those of exploiting natural resources are linked between them. It is obvious that a drilling company, for example a Russian one, will seek to use ways of exploitation from the territory of Russia and will collaborate with Russian companies, something like Lukoil-Transneft tandem. In these cases all methods are permitted: destabilization of partners, fight for price *dumping* credits, and overcharge of projects without the ability of distinguishing the realist suggestions of bluff strikes... After technical debates on the best trajectories and ways of transportation (routes, railways, oil pipelines...) there quickly appeared a series of political and strategic issues. A simple proof in this direction is the period between '96-'97, when the oil was very cheap, unprofitable for depth exploitations where the great reserves from the area were discovered (during the first years there were speculations about figures comparable to the resources from the Persian Gulf, or the real situation was different...). Exactly from this period the Americans have begun to invest massively and to be very seriously interested in this area (even leading to the designation of a Secretary of State for problems of the Caspian Sea area), it could be clearly seen that oil was more of a pretext to infiltrate into the region. Of course, today when we look at the region through the price of US\$ 50 for a barrel of oil, we can hardly remember the amazement related with those investments when a barrel was less than US\$ 15.

9.3. The great projects of transiting oil and gas

Before speaking about the important projects of evacuation of oil and gas from the region of the Casian Sea *via* the Black Sea, we should mention the fact that there existed and still exist a great number of projects, but most of the

² It is about the reference to the first Big Game from the Caspian region, i.e. the strategic war between the British and the Russian Empire from the 19th century.

times these could not be fully implemented. However, the geopolitical analyses regarding these areas have often granted them an important place.³

In Azerbaijan, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Aboufaz Eltchibey is elected, in June 1992, president of the Republic. Member of *intelligence*, passionate nationalist, convinced anticommunist, he wanted to interrupt all relations with Russia in order to form new strategic alliances with Turkey, the USA and Israel. One of his priorities was the economic development by using the oil potential. Big international companies have used this opportunity to implant themselves in the area they were kept away from until then. These foreign investors could not be stopped by the Russian-Azery legal provisions about the status of the Caspian Sea, but only by the difficulty of choice between routes of evacuation. This was the essence of the problem. The whole area of Apseron in Baku should have been providing 700.000 barrels a day (35 million tones) in 2006, compared to 7000 barrels in 1996. Thus, the future of the balance of forces in the area is regarded as a total perturbation.

In June 1993 a pre-agreement between an international consortium and SOCAR (Azery oil company), was concluded which, ironically, will never be finalized. Given the fact that, during several days after the conclusion of the pre-agreement, president Eltchibey was overthrown by a military strike secretly conducted by Moscow and directed by colonel Suret Husseinov, a hero of the war from Karabakh. The Russians could not tolerate the fact that none of their companies will participate at the extraction from the gigantic extraction field of Azerbaijan. Heidar Aliev, an old machinist, replaces Eltchibey. Ex-chief of Azery KGB, Heidar Aliev had also been prime-secretary of the Communist Party of the Azery Republic. Immediately after his return, he decides to dissolve the pre-agreement signed by his predecessor and to restore relations with Russia.

Thus, Moscow takes advantage of these favourable circumstances in the area for consolidating its authority in Caucasus and Central Asia. Firstly, Russia takes advantage of the chaos from this area – one well maintained by Moscow (the legal agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding Kara-

³ For this reason we will not insist on the cases, in which the progress moves much more slowly (not to say it is inexistent) than imagination. A relevant case in this direction is constituted by the diverse projects that were speculated in case of GUUAM, but we repeat – there still do not exist cases that would overwhelm imagination. Because it is not so correct to «annex» the Traceca project to GUUAM, and nothing else was specified. Thus the reader should not be surprised that he/she will not find GUUAM on the route of big projects (even if many of the recent analyses regarding this organization use only superlative characteristics and I wonder what is the actual reason).

bah, the secessionism of the following republics: Adjaria, Southern Osetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, the “gas” diplomacy in Ukraine. Under these conditions Azerbaijan has concluded a series of contracts of extraction of its oil and gas, which unified in an international consortium (called the “contract of the century”, the abbreviation being AIOC in English and AMOK in Russian), which comprises ten partners: Emoco, Exxon, Penzoiil, Unocal for the USA, Lukoil for Russia, Delta for Saudi Arabia, Socar for Azarbajian, TPAO for Turkey. Thus the total of investments initially stipulated rises to a figure of US\$ 14 billion. After the conclusion of these contracts, the immediate problem that appeared was the way of evacuating the black gold. The problem of evacuation is much more complicated and difficult to solve. Here were mentioned three problems: the quantities to be transported, the areas to be traversed and, finally, the costs of installation and the duration of use.

9.4. EU route projects

The EU is not limited to projects regarding its future member states (Romania, Bulgaria), on the contrary, one of the biggest projects financed by the EU refers to Eastern and Southern states of the Black Sea’s shore. It all began by accident. In 1990 – 1991, wishing to deliver food aid to the conflicting Soviet Republics in Caucasus and Central Asia, Europeans have discovered that they could do this only through Russian networks, which were difficult and insecure. Out of eight states that obtained their independence in 1991, Georgia is not an enclave – although this is a special case as well, it did not really have control over its entire shore, because Adjaria and Abkhazia had more than three quarters of the seashore.

Providing these eight states a credible alternative solution at the Russian monopoly from the existent great export axes is the aim of **TRACECA** program (Transport Europe-Caucasus-Asia), which is launched by the EU in 1993. Later it is extended for Ukraine and Moldova as well. The program stipulated only classical transport means: harbours, road and railway networks. In addition to the fact that the program is supported by the EU, another element of its success is due to the fact that at the beginning it did not “disturb” Russia with terms like oil pipeline and gas pipeline, which is vital to the mind of Russian strategists. Nevertheless, it was completed with an important project dedicated to oil pipelines (**Inogate**), as well as by a project of air route (**Southern Ring Air Route**), making a true “Euro-Asiatic corridor” from this anseble.

Even if they were not the initiators of this project, the US would have quickly offered their support, participating at its application and responding

to offers. At the end of 1996, with the purpose of strengthening the attractive power of the project, it was recorded in an old myth, changing the name of the route in “**The silk route from the 21st century**”, even if the so-called route has never used an axis this complex. The objective of occidentals is clear: the consolidation of the new sovereign states implies a greater possibility of manoeuvres for choosing economic partners and their introduction on the world market. It seems that this objective has succeeded. In any case, this far there hasn't been projected a more complex alternative for the former soviet republics. The adherence of this economic project to GUAM is for now the only real fundament for consolidation in practical terms of the projects of this organization. This organization, until now more probably lacking political coherence, now has got to the time of practicing more concrete things, if it does not intend to remain an eternal phantom, mentioned only in studies. Especially that the chiefs of member states of this organization are perfectly aware of the fact that the path to a security alternative (one of the fundamental targets of the organization) goes exactly through the solution of this problem of economic dependence on Russia, i.e. on Russian oil and gas.

9.5. Older projects of Russia

The transport of big quantities of raw oil implies the use of several routes. Even from the beginning, Russia thought of using a single route for transporting oil to the Black Sea, and namely the already existent one at Novorossiysk, for both the oil extracted in the first years or that produced in a long term. This oil pipeline had, in exchange, a great inconveniense, as it passes through Groznii, and the war in Chechnya has changed a lot the data of the problem. Even if during the first years Russia is affected by internal political fights for power over Kremlin (and not only, because everywhere in the region has occurred a change of all the elites), in the years that followed immediately after that it began to react in the manner that is specific for it. Moscow has launched again its own transport solutions that excluded the participation of foreign companies. According to the declarations of Vladimir Yakunin, the Russian minister of Transport, “in the period of globalization of economy, the importance of transport has grown for Russia. And we will not exaggerate saying that they had become the basic elements of our Russian geopolitical paradigm.”

Nevertheless, Russia must be aware of a great handicap, undoubtedly a fundamental one, because it refers to the complex strategy followed by Moscow in this region since 1991. **During many years, Kremlin counted on the acquisitions of its secular domination without assessing the complexity of**

changes and movements in process, be it about the bilateral relations or those within the CIS, Russia has followed a policy that was imprudently based on pressures and promises. This attention of Moscow regarding the crucial problems of transport that serves Russia and its openings towards the world does not surprise us. Organizing transport and flux networks in the soviet area and its outskirts was one of the essential factors of political coherence of the system, a determining element of manipulation on its own territories. In the same time, the new states formed as a result of the breakdown of the USSR were seeking opportunities for affirmation of their sovereignty and own territory, implicitly of their oil and gas pipelines, but a redefinition of the logic of space and fluxes that were entering a world open to competition processes.

Moscow has reacted by facilitating a new program of reorganizing its own network. The Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline was enlisted in this program and offered Russia a double advantage: a slightly bigger capacity than that of Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (6-7 million tones, and Transneft assures that it can be increased to 17 million tones) and the construction of the branch pipe that avoids Chechnya. These advantages have allowed the connection to a new oil terminal in Mahachkala. For Russians, the expectances for this project include the coverage of raw oil exports from Turkmenistan in their advantage as well. Another important project is the acquisition of the **CPC (Caspian Pipelines Consortium)** with a capacity that should increase during the next years until 67 million tones. It links the North-Kazakh fields of exploitation with the new oil terminal from Novorossiysk, Cheskaris, a terminal with a capacity of approximately 40 million tones, which practically doubles the traffic of the harbour.

In the meantime, Russia will build the crucial branch pipe of the Samara-Novorossiysk pipeline between Suhodolnaia and Radionovskaia, which will allow the avoidance of passing through Lisichansk in Ukraine. The realization of several gas pipelines should in short allow the Russians to definitively break the Ukrainian quasi monopoly in the transit of Russian gas, a fact that would have a great effect on the relations of interdependence between these two states. Considered for a long time a “sea snake”, the **Blue Stream** project advances rapidly. This submarine gas pipeline that links the Russian harbour Drugba with the Turkish harbour Samsun (with a capacity of 16 billion of cubic meters annually) through the Black Sea would allow the substitution of the present pipes to this country that neighbours Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria at the Black Sea.

Another totally unexpected project is the construction of a pipeline between Novorossiysk and Ceyhan (!), *via* Georgia. The reason of this is to avoid Bosfor and Dardanelle and the re-launching of transitting the Azeri and especially Kazakh raw oil through Russia, after BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) is ready. It could

bring Russian authorities up to US\$ 600 million annually. A problem of this project is that it has to transit a secessionist republic from Georgia – Abkhazia, and its relations with Tbilisi are still unsolved.

Even if it has a quasi-monopoly over the evacuation of resources from the Caspian area, in present Russia seems, nevertheless, to have only partial answers. Evidently, the history and geography of this country offers it major advantages in the game played in the Black Sea area today. The overlapping of internal contradictions with the lack of means, which oblige it to maintain cooperation/rivalry relations with the West, makes the future of its policy in the region rather unpredictable. This unpredictable future becomes one of the major risk factors at the address of security in the area.

9.6. Competing alternatives

Diverse constraints have lead to seeking other solutions to evacuate the Caspian oil and gas: the transport capacities, the insistence of Americans or the wish of Azeri (as well as Turkmen and Kazakhs) not to depend only on Russian routes. Under these conditions, from the very beginning the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, appeared as the most important alternative to Russia's projects until today. No matter what has been said, nobody, including the Russians, can doubt today the necessity of two main routes.

Besides, Georgia has been permanently seeking for other source of financing, especially from the USA, the Americans being very interested by an expanded regional network for valorising their contracts concluded with Kazakhstan, by Chevron regarding the exploitation of the Tenguz field (it is known that the American diplomacy has an unwritten rule, but tried in practice – *Flag followed travel*). The Caspian Sea is a way of diminishing the dependence of the USA on the countries from the Near East. The Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline has become an absolute priority for Americans in terms of opposition to Teheran and Moscow. This oil pipeline must become in fact the fundament of stability of the countries from the area. “It is not one more pipeline, declares in 1999 the Secretary for Energy, Bill Richardson, it is a strategic structure that promotes the national security interests of the USA.”

The next step of the USA was the support of a project of Trans-Caucasian pipelines which would be related to BTC. The hydrocarbons from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan avoiding, transition through Russia after passing Azerbaijan. In parallel, the USA gives the 8 riparian states of the Caspian Sea a more important military assistance, the amount of expenditures being assessed to approximately US\$ 1 million in 2000. In this context it was evident that Wash-

ington wanted to occupy the most instable state of the area – Georgia (with three secessionist republics: Abkhazia, Adjara, Southern Osetia). Under the pretext of helping the Georgians and, finally, under the pretext invoked by Russians of fighting Chechen Islamists infiltrated in Pankisi Gorge, the Pentagon establishes the first politico-military springboard, even though a modest contingent, this fact implying an intimidation of Russians (from the simple reason of not touching American soldiers⁴) as, contrary, offences or repercussions on Georgian land would start. We wish to mention that, even if this contingent has a small number of militaries, its presence here assures endowment with advanced military technology, including patience (besides, this kind of scheme contains nothing new: between 1962-1967, in the South of Vietnam, it came to several hundreds of instructors and 500 thousand American combatants).

Russia reacted immediately. The incidents on the Russian-Georgian border burst out immediately, while Putin was announcing the consolidation of measures of control at the border with Azerbaijan. The message of Moscow is clear: Russia has sufficient means for the destabilization of relations between the two states or for seriously impeding the application of the pipelines that it disagrees with.

Lately, it seems that Republic of Moldova has also gotten over the dead point in which the project from Giurgiulesti has been staying for several years, i.e. the construction of an oil terminal (and a sea mini-harbour) at the Danube. This is about a terminal that would have a capacity of exploitation of over 2 million tones of oil annually, but as well about the construction of a plant for processing raw oil. The company that deals with this investment, “Azpetrol”, is good for Moldova from the simple reason that it comes from a big oil producer/exporter country – thus it would have interests to lobby in favour of traversing the raw Caspian oil *via* Moldova. Even if the project is not great – it is advantageous, at least for local economy, in addition it diminishes the dependence on Russia’s oil, not to mention the geopolitical dream of any state – access to the sea, with all that it represents. Surely, the project does not reach the level of declarations of the local politicians regarding this (we remind you that the agreement was signed during an electoral period) and besides, how would we explain the fact that during eight years there was no serious investor for it and even BERD, as initial financier, did not manage to finish it. But we repeat that for an enclave state access to sea is the fulfilment of geo-strategic dreams, and regarding the

⁴ The results were not expected long, nobody can imagine today Saakashvili seizing power without the help of Americans.

economic effects it only should get rid of pompous declarations of “golden gate to Europe” type (if it starts from this kind of dreams any result is a failure). But it seems that this is characteristic for the majority of countries in the area – all small economic projects were politicized in all their aspects, and the result was the same each time: all that is just a façade.

It should be noted that all these alternatives to Russia’s projects should not be competing among them. As long as the major interest of these small states is getting out of the Russian influence, they cannot have a real influence unless working together, because today it is clear that Russia has won in the fight from the 90s. This thing has rather serious consequences, at least for a short term the map of oil and gas from the area will hardly change. Or, in the moment when comes up the problem of competition between Moldova and Romania, Ukraine and Georgia etc. for these projects it is difficult to believe in a redefinition of the geo-economic map in the area. Let us hope that after the wave of orange revolutions the political elite from these states will acknowledge this fact.

9.7. Romania’s expectations regarding the transition of Caspian oil and gas across the Black Sea

Among the new geopolitical actors at the Black Sea, the geo-strategic position of Romania is one of the most ungrateful – situated for centuries at the intersection of interests of the great powers “the position of Romania can equally represent a dead angle or become a zone of interference”. Today the geo-strategic position of Romania is consolidated by the Danube – Black Sea channel, which completes the Rhine-Main-Danube connection and which is consolidated by Romania’s control over the last 1000 km of the navigable course of the Danube.

The Rhine-Main-Danube channel, finished in 1992, creates a true navigable corridor between Rotterdam and Constanta (3000 km can be made in three days and a half). This allows the projection of a direct commercial flux between the North Sea and riparian states of the Danube and the Black Sea, this fact generating the hope to transform Constanta into an equivalent of Rotterdam for the Black Sea (hope encouraged by the recent Japanese investments in the modernization of waterside infrastructures). From all the countries traversed by the Danube, Romania is today the richest discourse in future projects related to this great river. In fact, this discourse is not new, it features in a great list that begins with the 30s of the 19th century, when Walachia and Moldova principalities were known under the name of Danube Principalities (the Moldo-Walachian elites managed to attract the interest and sympathy of

Napoleon III and Queen Victoria, who saw in the unification of principalities the creation of a friendly and allied state, the guardian of the entrance to the Danube, a logic that allowed the unification of the Principalities, and expunged Russia from this area). During the communist period, there were achieved two big projects: the construction of the Iron Gates I (1972) and Iron Gates II (1994) barrage and hydropower plant and of the Danube – Black Sea channel, which two branches, one in Constanta and the other in Midia.

With these advantages, during the last years Romania has submitted extremely ambitious projects, among which we mention only “Romania at cross-ways”. The aim of these projects was to attract a significant part of oil and gas from Central Asia and Caucasus to Eastern, Central and Western Europe through IV, VII and IX corridors of TRACECA. Let us remind the route of these three European corridors:

- IV Berlin-Bratislava-Budapest-Bucharest-Constanța;
- VII Rotterdam-Constanța on the Danube and on the Danube-Main-Rhin channel;
- IX Helsinki-Kiev- Egee See, through Constanța and Istanbul.

The importance of these corridors for Romania is explained by a big demand of oil and gas in European countries⁵, a request that will double in the next 20 years, increasing from 70 to 140 million barrels a day. Among other things, the World Council of Energy anticipates a consumption of 360 million tones of oil for the year 2020 in the countries riparian to the Black Sea and in those from Central Europe, with a population estimated to 111 million inhabitants.

9.8. Advantages and disadvantages of Romania

Constanta harbour is the most important in the country. It has an area of 3200 ha, having a double function: that of a sea harbour and that of a Danube harbour, at the end of Danube-Black Sea channel. Once the fourth stage of the harbour is finished, it will become the second European harbour in size after Rotterdam, with 260 operational compartments with a capacity of exploitation of 237 million tones annually. Nowadays the harbour can load and unload ships with a maximum capacity of 165 000 tdw, and annually there can be operated between 4000 and 5000 ships. Constanta has special terminals for raw oil (with

⁵ However, I think it is the case to talk about a big need on the home market of Romania, too: I would mention a figure that will make you understand the gravity of the problem (for gas and oil), today 53 % of Romanian people heat up with wood, which means that every year there are burned 40 000 ha of forest.


a capacity of 24 million tones annually) and for oil products (12 million tones annually). Of course, today, Constanta is one of the major advantages of Romania, but this advantage is still theoretical, because more than 60% of the water-side capacities of Constanta are not used. Namely this is today the problem of Romania – maximum exploitation of its possibilities as an important state at the Black Sea. It should be mentioned that until now, as we have already seen and will see below, the great projects kind of avoided and still avoid Romania.

Referring to projects, during a conference, “EU – the Black Sea area: expansion of cooperation between the two key-actors on the world energetic market”, representatives of 13 member states of BSECO (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization) have signed a memorandum for the achievement of 32 projects of energetic interconnection (oil, gas, electric power) of states from the Balkans, EU, Caucasus and Central Asia. These projects will be achieved and financed with the help of the EU within the Synergy program by using the already existent tools: PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, Interreg. Romania was excluded from the majority of oil routes because, as the coordinator of the operating group for Balkan interconnections, Cristos Papoutsis, had mentioned, “Romania had not presented any oil project during this meeting.”

The achievement of energetic interconnections between the East and the West will offer the producing countries and those that are present on the maps of transport the access to big European consume markets. It seems that Romania has lost its piece of the “cake” as no approved project figures Constanta as a network terminal, nor the petrochemical plants from Midia and Navodari are mentioned. In the EU perspective, the participation of Romania at the transport of gas and oil from the Caspian Sea and Caucasus to the Western Europe seems to be excluded. Bulgaria is preferred instead (as we have already seen, the country is preferred by the Russians as well), with its opening to Greece, ex-Yugoslavian area, Northern Italy, for avoiding the oil transfer through Bosfor and Dardanelle.⁶ Today, Romania has to finish a single project – the oil

⁶ *Note: The problem of Bosfor and Dardanelle straits.* The Turkish straits are practically the most used in the world, with over 50 000 ships annually. Rather narrow, they are among the most dangerous as well. Bosfor has a length of 31 km and a width of maximum 700 metres and Dardanelle a length of 70 km and a maximum width of 1,3-2 km. They are transited by over a hundred ships daily, among which 15 % transport dangerous merchandise. Turkey has permanently tightened the conditions of passing, and Russia, playing upon the Turkish-Greek rivalry, has forwarded the idea of building an oil pipeline between Burgas and Alexandropolis harbours. Turkey is not part of the *UN Convention on Sea Straits*, and, on the other hand, the straits are still under the jurisdiction of the Montreaux Convention

pipeline from Constanta to Trieste. The problem is that of the route to Constanta, i.e. what is the amount of goods and ships with real chances of reaching Constanta from the Caspian Sea, as long as there exist a multitude of alternatives: Bulgaria, Turkey, the Ukraine – with the same final destination (a simple look on the map shows, despite many speculations, that Bulgaria and Turkey are really better positioned from the geo-economic point of view), a lot of work is still to be done for successfully rivalling the competitors in other aspects.



from 1936, where art. 2 stipulates clearly that “commercial ships have complete freedom of passing and sailing the straits, day and night, no matter the flag or loading”. Thus Russia has strongly protested against unilateral restrictions imposed by Turkey, regimes that caused great economic losses to countries riparian to the Black Sea, by the simple fact that many ships were detained at the entrance to the straits. Of course nobody tried to think that these restrictions have environmental reasons. In fact, they are strongly related to the export of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, Turkey wishing them to transit its own territory, while Russia plans that up to 100 million tones of oil would leave Novorossiysk and pass through the straits.

9.9. Romania's partners and rivals for route projects

Georgia is one of the most important partners of Romania in the achievement of projects regarding the Black Sea (taking into account the fact that the Caspian raw oil in many cases passes through Georgia). Keeping in mind the interest of the two parts for establishing viable relations between the TRACE-CA corridor and the IV and VII pan-European corridors of transport, the two countries have agreed to take joint measures in this direction. They submit joint programs to the European Commission in order to obtain funds within PHARE and TACIS programs with regard to the achievement of these relations. With this occasion, the two countries have agreed to make efforts to draw up a global agreement in the field of transport between the countries of the Black Sea. This mission is not simple at all for these countries, given the fact that their main competitor is Russia.


This way, even from the period of Emil Constantinescu it was (very diplomatically) mentioned that the new corridors of transport are not aimed at competing with Russia (Constantinescu declared: "The problem of competing with Russia on these routes is out of question. Russia will play an essential role"). In expectance of new projects, it seems that Bucharest will be taken over by the Italians from the ENI, which is a member of the "Romania at crossways" Forum, or by its subsidiary office, Agip. ENI is present in Azerbaijan ("Cipco" consortium) and in Kazakhstan, where it operates in the Northern part of the Caspian Sea, as well as in Karachaganak. Thus, from this point of view, Romania seems to be well positioned to attract a part of the oil exported through pipelines from Novorossiysk, as well as through those from Poti.

Among all the competitors met by Romania in its projects at the Black Sea, the most dangerous one is, of course, Russia. We have to remind that, Gazprom and Lukoil Russian companies have important participations already at sources in the contracts of prospecting and exploitation of oil and gas at the Black Sea. We all know that today Russia is the main, if not the only provider for the countries at the Black Sea (with the exception of Turkey). As a consequence, exactly from this powerful position it negotiates with its partners from BSECO and supports the project of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline. Even if, according to the "famous" Romanian expert, engineer Dan Capatana (former councilor of Constantinescu)⁷, the costs of raw oil transport through Bourgas are 50% higher than those using the Novorossiysk route, then through the

⁷ We remind that the project of engineer Capatana envisaged an oil pipeline underneath the Black Sea, which until today remains in the field of hope in Romania.

Map no. 2

The gas pipelines infrastructure in the Black Sea Area



Constanta-Trieste oil pipeline (US\$ 3,5 a barrel in the first case versus US\$ 2,2 in the second one).

For the Romanian press and political class, the declaration of Alexander Misjulin (ex-president of BSECO and chief of the Russian delegation) given to Novosti agency, was enough: “Russia wants to pull Romania out of the oil routes.” But sometimes a piece of information regarding the foreign policy has the same connotation: “Bulgaria blames Moscow for economic blackmail”. However, such declarations remain isolated and the Romanian political class, as well as the press has adopted a more careful way of taking positions and making comments. The Romanian-Russian competition seems to evolve towards cooperation, too, if we judge following the logic line of majority participation in the Romanian refineries’ stock, which were bought by Lukoil and Holster Trading Ltd and through the prism of projects of massive investments which are planned by Lukoil for the Romanian industry.

Ukraine, at its turn, has its own expectances, wishing to fully exploit the capacities of transport it had created with Georgia on the Kiev-Odessa-Poti-Tbilisi route, in order to supply its refinery from Ilitchevsk. If extended to Baku, this route could serve for the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. The appearance of the Ukraine as an actor on the international stage has

brought two fundamental problems for Romania: that of frontier and that of minorities (it is not the case to stop at this problem in this work.) The problem of acknowledgement of frontiers is rather complicated, keeping in mind that Romania has done this twice until 1991, on February 10th, 1947, while signing the Paris treaty, and in 1975, through the conclusion of the Final Act from Helsinki, which declared the inviolability of the European frontiers through the use of force or by pressures for using it; the only accepted exception being the agreement between parties, as it was in the case of Czechoslovakia.

Regarding frontiers we will stop only at the case of Snake Island. Although the real problems refer, in fact, to the continental plateau (5000-7000 km²) and according to the international sea rights of the exclusive economic region – a region of strategic interest⁸ and a priori rich in resources (according to some experts there are oil stocks greater than in the North Sea and even the Caspian Sea). The continental plateau from around the island has been annexed to the USSR in 1946. Romania has very few chances to win in the case of this island and here we have to remind an element which seems essential to me, and namely that the Ukraine is well protected by the Budapest memorandum on the guarantee of security regarding the adherence of the Ukraine to the Treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (signing states: USA, Great Britain, France and China guarantee the independence, sovereignty and the existent frontiers of the Ukraine). Thus, the Ukrainian diplomacy has made clear from the very beginning that it will not accept any examination of the problem before instance of international arbitration, whether it is the International Court of Justice of the UN or other instances. Romania has managed to obtain the acknowledgment of Ukraine that the Snake Island is to be uninhabited, which in terms of international sea legislation means that the Ukraine cannot claim an exclusive economic region around the island.

After the orange revolution in the Ukraine the relations between the two countries, at least at the beginning, have changed in the direction of a rather serious collaboration and cooperation at all levels. We would not want to enter speculations regarding the future of relations between these two states, but it is certain that, even having a great desire to escape the big dependence that the

⁸ According to certain sources Moscow has transformed the island into a base of nuclear submarines, where there can stay, be maintained and provided for “Akula” class submarines. On the island there is equipment of control of medium range missiles launched from Crimea or Ural, as well as necessary equipment for connection with spy satellites placed above the Middle East. The radar equipment allows the surveillance of the sixth American Fleet: three cables link the island with the continent.

Ukraine has for the Russian gas and oil⁹, this thing seems possible only for a long-term. Thus, Kiev will be playing Moscow's game in the field of energy for many years to come, and Romania is not able to acknowledge this fact, having to accept, in its turn (hardly, in fact), the situation that was established in the middle of the 90s. It is true that today the economic aspects regarding the Black Sea area are resumed with great enthusiasm, but it is also true that the results of these demarches will not be seen in the next years.

The new president, Traian Basescu, has announced that a priority in his foreign policy is the **Black Sea project**, the idea of attracting the attention of Europeans that the Black Sea would become an entirely special frontier and that there should be actions made for its security is essential. The strong side of the project of Romania's president resides in the fact that it has very well acknowledged the relation of forces in the region, and especially the thing on which Romania can rely on to apply this foreign policy in the region. According to the remarks of president Basescu, Romania will export democracy and will import energy from this region that became the priority for its foreign policy. This fact is more creditable as it is being tried to value the potential of the country as an independent actor and not just as a supporter of the EU and NATO policy in the region. The export of democracy in the region is very useful today. For states like the Ukraine, Georgia and especially Moldova it is as important as this future own "ambassador" in Brussels.

We do not know how influent Romania may be in Europe, but this does not mean that its demarches are not good or utopian. We do not think that Greece was more influent when succeeding to defend very well the interests of Cyprus in Brussels. Even if we realize that the problem in the area is of another nature, today the taking into account of the energetic factor to this degree is not yet so exaggerated. It is true that the needs for oil and gas have substantially increased for Europeans. It is obvious that this dependence has increased in relation to Russia – Russia's gas is essential in a lot of European countries. It means that the majority of Europeans (as well as Americans) are very careful in relation to Putin. This fact is seen clearly in the case of Southern Osetia as well, when nobody supported Saakashvili in his plans solve the long-protected conflicts of secession in Georgia.

⁹ The Ukraine imports 69 % of its raw oil consumption from Russia, the Ukraine producing 13% and the rest coming from other imports. This country does not produce more than 17% of its natural gas consumption, the Ukraine being the first world importer of natural gas.

9.10. Conclusions

Even if the progress of democracy in countries like Georgia and the Ukraine consolidates USA position in the area in its dream to block Russia, in order to bring the oil resources from Central Asia to Turkey, this policy had contrary effects, too. Mobilized Russians made Europe to make a step back quickly. Thus, it is very difficult to think that Europeans will soon open new geo-strategic and geo-economic fronts that would go against Russia's interests – and this fact is also seen in the regular summits between Russia and the EU (where the EU has not obtained a big deal until now).

The former Soviet states from the Black Sea area, even if more seriously becoming dependent on the EU (in the perspective of a future expansion, the EU needs stable and well governed states on the outskirts of its Eastern frontier), they are still far away from leaving the Russian sphere of influence, this fact being a major impediment in forging a clear-cut pro-EU foreign policy. Thus, it is still difficult to speak today about them as rather independent regional actors. Their demarches still need a consistent foreign support. Even if boring and repetitive, the games from the region are explained through the prism of great actors.

There is something else clear today. The Black Sea countries, neighbours of Romania, need its help (similar to Poland offering help to the Ukraine and Belarus today) for stability and development. Of course, the recent Bucharest analysis is right, stating that Romania has not yet emerged as a generous donor and hasn't got the necessary power to counterbalance certain streams in the region. The fact that Romania wants to do is somehow related to the need that Europeans should change their attitude towards Russia. But Romania doesn't have the necessary power for such a foreign policy in Europe, even if it has some incontestable trumps.

On the other hand, neither Europeans stick together. Here we're talking about the idea promoted lately, that the British and the Americans are making by all possible means that a security project launched by Germany and France fails. Or in these plans of Americans, Bucharest has its own role. Lately the idea that Warsaw, Bucharest and Kiev will have a special role in this Euro-Atlantic (not saying that it is American) plan has been circulated. It seems that Romania and Poland will be used to balance the situation (as well as the votes) in the European Union, and East-European democracies from states like the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (with a possible adherence of Belarus) will gravitate on the orbits of these two states. Until today, recent events have showed that this idea is not that false (in this logic or axe there is not included,

to remain in strategic limits, “the plan of Yushchenco” for solving the Transnistrian conflict – where Romania is not among the participants...).

But we have to remind that Romania’s policy in this direction, although it is very good and courageous, needs more objectification and another degree of expectations. It could be supported, but we’ll have to expect the results much later. The objectification would be to show Europeans what Romania could bring to this region, otherwise Europe would regard Romania as a country that plays the US’s game and would avoid taking part in any rougher demarche against Russia (just because of Romania). This is not valid just for Romania but for other “small” states in the region – the actual direction is good, but needs more objectiveness and a longer period of realization. From the perspective of oil and gas, Russia has a clear advantage in this game, but the fact that, in the market economy, the factor of a solid and advantageous competition hasn’t got the last word, requires that Russia be competed against in other fields, too.

Annex No. 1. Routes of exporting Caspian petrol via Black Sea

Location	Route	Capacity	Length	Estimative cost
Baku-Ceyhan “Main Export Pipeline”	Baku (Azerbaijan)-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan (Turkey)	1million barrels/day	1660km	\$2,8-2,9 billion
Baku-Supsa	Baku-Supsa(Georgia) Western route	100.000 barrels/day capacity which will be increased up to 600.000 B/day	824km	\$600 million before the increase of capacity
Baku-Novorossiysk North route	Baku-Novorossiysk(Russia) via Chechnya	100.000B/day capacity which will be increased up to 300.000B/day	1389km out of which 144 in Chechnya	\$ 600 million for increasing the capacity up to 300.000 B/day
Baku-Novorossiysk, the route that avoids Chechnya with the link to Mahachkala	Baku via Dagestan until Thoret (Russia) linked to Novorossiysk	Capacity in 2000 120.000B/day, which is to be increased to 360.000B/day in 2006	327km	140 million \$
Gardabani-Batumi	Gardabani (Azerbaijan)-Batumi (Georgia)	-	Already existent oil pipeline in reconstruction	-
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)	Ternguiz (Kazakhstan)-Novorossiysk (Russia)	Maximum capacity 1,35 million B/day	1900 km	Approx. 4 billion

Source: Kellner Thierry “Geopolitique de la nouvelle Asie Centrale”, PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 203

Annex No. 2. Comparative table of costs for oil transportation (for an oil pipeline with a capacity of 50Mt/year)

Route	Price of transport through oil pipeline (\$/tone)	Price of transport by tanker (\$/tone)	Total cost (\$/tone)
Baku-Supsa-Bosfor-Trieste	4,86	5,46	10,32
Baku-Supsa-Kiykoy-Trieste	7,86	5,33	13,19
Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody-Gola-Sisak-Omishali	14,02	1,37	15,39
Baku-Supsa-Constanta-Trieste	12,15	1,37	13,52
Baku-Supsa-Constanta-Gola-Sisak-Omishali	12,15	1,37	13,52
Baku-Supsa-Burgas-Vlore-Trieste	11,14	3,12	14,26
Baku-Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan-Trieste	10,03	5,21	15,24
Baku-Ceyhan-Trieste	8,89	4,62	13,51

Sursa: Kellner Thierry "Geopolitique de la nouvelle Asie Centrale", PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 212

Annex No. 3. Routes of transport for Caspian oil that avoid the straits of Boford and Dardanelle

Location	Route	Capacity	Length	Estimative cost
Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria (AMBO) Oil Pipeline	Burgas (Bulgaria)-Macedonia-Vlore (Albania)	750.000 B/day	950-1000 km	\$1 billion
Burgas-Alexandropolis (Trans Balkan Oil Pipeline)	Burgas-Alexandropolis (Greece)	700.000 B/day	260-300 km	\$600 million
Constanta-Trieste Oil Pipeline	Constanta-Pancevo(Yugoslavia)-Omisalj (Croatia)-Trieste (Italia). Omisalj was offered as a terminus as well.	660.000 B/day	1400 Km	\$1,5 billion
Odessa-Brody	Odessa-Brody, with an option to the "Drujba" line to Plotsk in Poland or in Slovakia.	700.000 B/day	667 Km	\$600 million

Source: Kellner Thierry "Geopolitique de la nouvelle Asie Centrale", PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 215

Chapter X.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE NEIGHBOURS AND STRATEGIC GEOPOLITICAL PLAYERS

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Every state willing to be a player on the international arena must establish three levels of cooperation and partnership: international, regional and bilateral. Within this research, at the international level will be examined the relationships of Republic of Moldova with the United Nations (UN), at the regional – with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and GUAM; at bilateral level – with its neighbors and key actors: Ukraine, Romania, Russia, and the USA.

Transformed after 1991 into a periphery of the former Soviet Empire, Moldova tried to overcome its status by developing a broad network of relations with various states and international and regional organizations. Following the Wallersteinian developmental theory, Moldovan diplomacy has focussed on transforming the country from a periphery into at least a semi-periphery by weakening its relations with the former centre. For a country in transition that used to be almost all the time on one or another border of different Empires (Ottoman-Russian, Soviet-Western blocs), it was crucial to be recognized as a new international actor. In this respect, the new independent state pursued quite a complex foreign policy to diversify its relations with the Western countries, at the same time following the track of other former soviet republics towards a deeper integration into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However after more than a decade of balancing between East and West, the Republic of Moldova could acknowledge the failure of its foreign policy in preserving independency, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social security. Neither the Transnistrian conflict was solved, nor got Moldova integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. As result, the domestic socio-political and economic situation dramatically decreased, as well the social security and foreign investments, that lead to pavery, unemployment and high corruption, which favoured a deep gap between rich and poor people and a very high migration of population.

In the framework of the globalization process, Moldova's liberal policies proved to be inconsistent and ineffective in assuring economic security and people prosperity. Moldova's domestic policy failed to fulfil the expectation of

population also because of the weak support of Moldavian diplomacy in promoting the new country's image abroad, in attracting foreign investments and in building fruitful partnerships with the neighbours and other strategic actors within the new geopolitical order. On the contrary, the ambiguous character of Moldova's foreign policy has raised many obstacles in the relations with both Euro-Atlantic and CIS states. Because of this unpredictable policy, many of them couldn't understand what are the national interests of Moldova, and its geopolitical role. Lacking any strategic partner¹, Moldova confronted all this time with the false dilemma of belonging to two geopolitical areas – Eastern and South Eastern Europe. Looking forward to become a bridge between East and West, Moldova's political elite from the middle of 1990s, tried to develop the model of a small and open country mainly due to the historical background, old mentality and complex ethnic situation within the country.

10.1. The United Nations and Republic of Moldova

The United Nations (UN) has been created in order to ensure the stability of international environment by preventing main powers to act one against each other. According to the UN Charter, United Nations represents mainly a security organization, which has the duty to react to any type of conflicts². But one could not speak so far about any UN involvement in the Transnistrian conflict resolution and post-conflict building process. There is a general UN policy to not intervene in intra-states conflicts, excepting the cases when that conflicts become a threat to international security.

Starting from this point, the main task of Moldovan authorities should have been the internationalization of the conflict. Moldova should have designed its arguments in order to convince the international community that Transnistrian

¹ Tough, according to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova, priority was given to the bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, taking into account the historical and geopolitical situation. Upon: Concepția politicii externe a Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, 2 februarie 1995 Nr. 355-XIII.

² There are four ways of the UN peacekeeping management – so called “four generations of peacekeeping”: (1) *Traditional peacekeeping*, typical of the first forty years of UN peacekeeping; (2) *'second generation'* – multifunctional operations, have been associated with the end of proxy Cold War conflicts through negotiated settlements; (3) *'third generation'*, *'middle ground'* or *'humanitarian interventions'* operations started after success of *'second generation'* interventions, when UN decided to intervene more, especially in Human Rights issues; (4) *'fourth generation'*, *'task-sharing'* or *'wider peacekeeping'*, when UN peacekeeping role is to enforce global security on the base of regional complementarities.

case represents a threat to international peace because of the big stocks of weapons on this uncontrolled separatist region. Following the international law, the internationalisation of the conflict could be crucial for Moldova to have at least the UN Committee for Disarmament and International Security more involved in dealing with this security threat at the stage when conflict erupted. Cooperation with individual states and regional organisation in this view was indispensable for putting this new type of conflicts on the UN General Assembly and Security Council Agenda. Another possible option may be to build strategic relationships with France, United Kingdom and, especially, with the USA – permanent members of the Security Council, which are to some extent already involved in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process through other regional organizations. Romania the membership of which in the UN Security Council may be a new opportunity for making use of this important international forum.

If a necessary number of UN General Assembly's members would be convinced about the regional security benefits of addressing post-soviet frozen conflicts, a set of conflict resolution measures could be implemented and financed through the UN system mechanisms. But what is even more important, any UN Resolution on Transnistrian issue would offer the legal bases for taking more active actions by other regional organizations.

At this stage, it is still necessary that Moldova pays more efforts on getting international support for affirming, first of all, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic independence. UN membership offers the Moldovan diplomacy the necessary framework to present its vision on the way of solving Transnistrian issue. The only fact that finally, Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs succeeded to address the Transnistrian military threat on the UN General Assembly is emblematic for the effectiveness of UN-Moldova cooperation in the security field. Because of the unilateral approach of its foreign policy, Moldovan authorities failed to take the necessary measures to place the country in a more favourable framework by taking into account the international context. They have concentrated more on preservation of the existing regional relations, rather than on building new strategic partnerships with the international players.

10.2. Different approaches towards the Transnistrian issue

Taking into account the fact that the Transnistrian conflict represents the Achilles' heel of the Moldovan statehood, when addressing Moldovan foreign policy, one should keep in mind the role of each international actor and neighbouring country on this particular issue. Retrospectively, the contradictory

foreign policy of Moldova may be explained as well by the weak impact of the Transnistrian issue on the international and regional security agenda. Being well-known as a key actor in the Transnistrian problem, Russian Federation was allowed to play a very active role in this respect, and in such a way succeeded to stimulate regularly the rivalries between Chisinau and Tiraspol, by backing officially and unofficially the latter. As result, instead of promoting international involvement in conflict resolution, Moldovan diplomacy has looked forward to get the support of Russian Federation for putting pressure on Tiraspol secessionist leaders. Due to the close cultural, linguistic and economic ties, that some of the orthodox pro-Russian elites preserved into Moldovan society, Chisinau has tried all this time to improve its relations with this huge regional neighbour through various ways of reconciliation.

For example, after the Parliament of Moldova elected the Communist leader, Vladimir Voronin, as the new president of Republic of Moldova on 4th of April 2001, the pro-Russian government of Moldova set as main tasks to end the Transnistrian conflict and to re-establish the economic and political relations with Russia. In this respect, joining the Russian-Belarusian Union, giving to the Russian language an official status in Moldova, deepening economic relations with the CIS partners and reconciliation with the separatist region of Transnistria have been promoted as the key slogans of the new ruling party electoral platform. Due to this huge “progress” in the Moldovan-Russian relations, the Russian President agreed to guarantee a smooth solution of the Transnistrian issue and to repeat that Chisinau has become the Moscow’s “strategic partner”.

As a result, a big shift in solving the Transnistrian problem was noticed, on 16 May 2001 being announced the official signing of four important cooperation agreements between the conflicting parts: concerning the economic cooperation; free access for journalists to cover news on both banks of the Nistru river; coordination of taxation, removal of customs checkpoints, guarantees for foreign investors; and mutual recognition of official documents. But, when at the end of May 2001, the Russian State Duma addressed the Presidents of Russia, Belarus, Moldova and the separatist Transnistrian republic with a proposal for holding multilateral consultations and studying the conditions for the accession of both Chisinau and Tiraspol to the Russian-Belarusian Union, its negative echoes in Moldovan society and abroad seemed to dismiss local politicians from their mind. Though the proposal was discussed earlier during the talks between the Russian and the Moldovan presidents, this idea being shared also by the former Russian prime minister, Evgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Russian Federal Commission for the regulation of the Transnistrian issue, the social-political situation inside the country started to deteriorate

rapidly. During 2001-2003 years, Moldova became periodically the arena of mass demonstrations and joint movements of both civil society and political opposition striking against the Russian sphere of influence.

At the same time, Moldova had been accepted as a full member of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and of the World Trade Organization, which favoured a more specific approach of the Moldovan authorities towards the regional integration of their country into global community. Both the events have been characterized as a big success of the Moldovan diplomacy. Starting from this point, one may note that the Western/European vector of Moldovan foreign policy is being developed as its second pillar. At the beginning of 2002 a new Concept of Foreign Policy is being lunched by a group of young diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova. Although it could not be officially approved due to the opposition of the Communist ruling party, in fact this document became the unofficial Concept of the Moldovan foreign policy, establishing its new priorities and directions for the coming years. In such a way, the 2001-2003 years represented a period of big contradictions of the Moldovan foreign policy, similar to the 1994-1998 period, when the national interests of Moldova had been undermined, its independence and sovereignty sharply affected by initiating its further isolation from the regional trends of integration into EU and NATO. Consequently, promoting national interests within the traditional policies and the actual priorities of Moldovan Concept of Foreign Policy proved to be disastrous.

Only when Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan refused Moldova's accession to the eastern Common Economic Space in the late 2003 year; it became clear (for the Moldovan Communist ruling party, in particular) that the progressive integration of Republic of Moldova into the EU represents the best solution for assuring the stability, security, territorial integrity and a progressive transformation of the society. Having noticed the huge impact this regional trend on many neighbours and on other countries with similar past, until 2005 parliamentary elections, Moldovan politicians couldn't understand that promoting the European integration as such can not bring much success.

Addressing more thoroughly the main security issues Moldova confronts in the new geopolitical realities, the diplomats started to promote more actively its interests within the EU, NATO, OSCE, UN and other regional organization. The case of Russian military forces and stockpile munitions from the Transnistrian region has been addressed more regularly on both bilateral and multilateral levels. Though important progresses have been done during the last years, Moldovan diplomacy failed yet to find any important players as supporters of this idea within the NATO and EU. Romania solely is not likely to play a significant role in this regard, both in NATO, OSCE or UN. But if Romania joins

the EU in 2007, as planned, the problem will become a more pressing one for the EU. This means that, in the next few years, the European Union would have a common border with Moldova, which still represents a major source of insecurity because of the uncontrolled trafficking of arms and human beings. The illegal trade in this area often has its epicenter in Transnistria. It is not a casual matter that EU launched its first initiative towards Transnistria by sending a civilian monitoring Mission at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. If successful, this Mission may become a key instrument in encouraging a more cooperative behavior of the Transnistrian leadership towards Chisinau proposals. One would admit that the unexpected change of attitude of both Tiraspol and Moscow proves their weakness in preserving any more the existing status-quo.

Following the geopolitical landscape changes after both NATO and EU enlargements, it may be stated, using one of the Primakov' famous sayings, that: "the process of political settlement has come to a point in time when the monopolization of peacemaking efforts by any single side does not create favourable conditions for progress"³. That's why, after more than 13 years of "mediation and conflict resolution's efforts", Russian peace-keeping operation came to a fatal end, showing it's unwillingness to solve the existing conflicts on its "near abroad" area of interest.

10.3. Moldova and European Union: the partnership and neighbourhood policy

Moldova had signed a bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with EU in 1994, applicable only from 1998⁴, which formed until the beginning of 2005 year the base juridical framework of cooperation with European institutions and their member-states. But even before PCA started to be implemented, Moldovan authorities become keen on arguing that EU should change its approach towards Moldova by offering it a chance of "association to EU", as it happened in the case of other Central and South-East European

³ After Washington brokered the now-famous 1993 Israeli-Palestinian handshake on the White House lawn and the signing of both Oslo Agreements, Russia subsequently renewed its interest in the region, in opposition to U.S. efforts. Upon: *Itar-TASS* (Moscow), October 21, 1997.

⁴ The long period of time since PCA was signed and ratified 1998 by all EU member states and entered into force is due also to the failure of Moldovan diplomacy to promote its image abroad and to persuade European states about the will of Moldovan authorities to promote market-oriented reforms.

countries. Starting from the 13 December 1996, Moldovan President repeatedly addressed to the European Commission with the request to start the negotiations for signing by 2000 an Association Agreement.

After 1998 parliamentary elections, when the new political establishment of Moldova more clearly expressed the European integration objective of the Republic of Moldova, European Commission managed to convince the most reluctant European states to ratify finally the PCA. At that time, European officers only stated that the future of EU-Moldova relations will depend very much of the successful implementation of the PCA. Meantime, the launch of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was perceived by Moldovan diplomacy as a new chance for a faster integration into European initiatives. The National Strategy for South East Europe, written in 1999 both by some representatives of civil society and of the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, promoted the idea of deepening regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe as one of the best ways for lessening the dependence of the CIS states. Strengthening regional cooperation within the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the South-Eastern Europe Cooperation Initiative, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and other regional initiatives was seen also as a way of backing Moldova's economic interests in South-Eastern Europe. This kind of organizations included actual and prospective EU and NATO members that could offer their support for Moldova's integration into EU and solving other domestic issues.

But as far as Moldova has been included in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe only in June 2001, when many important regional projects started to be implemented, our country wasn't ready to be involved fully in all three Roundtables. Even the huge sums of money allocated for important projects, within "Gender", "Human Rights and National Minorities", "Media" and "Education and Youth" Task Force Programs, didn't bring any foreseeable result in Moldova.

Moldova has been also involved in four regional Quick Start Projects, for which has been allocated 600'420 ECU and in two other projects for building Moldova's infrastructure, for which have been secured other 36'27 mln. ECU⁵. Finally, many of these projects failed to be implemented, compromising the image of Moldovan state. Although other US\$ 299'500 have been allocated in 2001 year for implementing Moldova's action plan to fight corruption, the level of corruption dramatically increased in the last years. In such a way, one may notice that the effect of ethnic and development assistance offered through

⁵ *The Stability Pact and Moldova. Press Handout.* Source: www.stabilitypact.org

the Stability Pact to Moldova wasn't that officially expected by the Moldovan authorities. The irresponsibility and lack of transparency allowed some active NGOs and lobby groups with close links in the Government to benefit peculiarly from the offered assistance.

Though Moldova's European integration was proclaimed as the corner-stone of its domestic and foreign policy, the effectiveness of this policy may be proved by the set of policies the country is willing and able to undertake in various fields. Both the foreign and domestic policies of the state shall be adjusted to the European values and standards, in order to provide the necessary framework for progressive implementation of *Acquis Communautaire*.

The impact of EU policies on Moldova became more obvious as result of the accession of 10 new countries to the EU from 1 May 2004 and signing by Bulgaria and Romania of the EU Adhesion treaties one year later. The EU policy towards Moldova will increase more as soon as it will become a direct neighbour of the EU, most probably in 2007. Therefore, it is the core interest of the EU to have an independent, politically stable and economically strong Moldova as a neighbour. This is even a key condition for lasting peace and stability at the EU borders.

As it was stated already in March 2003, when Brussels presented a new policy of cooperation with whose 14 direct and indirect neighbours from East and South, the EU was creating through the New Neighbourhood Policy an opportunity to bring these states closer to the integration process that is taking place in Europe, at the same time avoiding new dividing lines. The Concept of European Integration of Moldova, presented in September 2003 in Brussels, clearly mentioned the importance of making a principle difference between that two concepts lunched within the Wider Europe EU policy: "enlarged Europe" and «neighbourhood policy». However, in the process of issuing «action plans» for seven partners: Ukraine and Moldova, as well as EU Mediterranean neighbours Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, all these states were treated almost similar. Looking forward to escape from being treated at the same level with Jordan and Palestinian Authority or even with Russia and Belarus, the Concept of European Integration of Moldova emphasised at that time on a specific way of integration into EU, by accepting Moldova as part of the Stabilization and Association Process signed with some Balkan countries. Because of this main focus it put on the regional integration within the Process of Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and other European initiatives, the Concept failed to fulfil the expectations of Moldovan authorities.

One shall notice that due to the missperception of the geopolitical realities and of its regional role, Moldovan diplomacy failed again to promote the national interests. This may be concluded from the fact that the EU-Moldova Action Plan refers very broadly to the EU support for the participation of Moldova within the Process of Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe. The Action Plan as such does not offer any perspective for Moldova as integration into EU. As clearly was mentioned by the EU Commissioner, Ferrero-Waldner, no EU neighbor is being offered the prospect of membership in the bloc⁶.

Consequently, the Action plans represents solely a key policy strategy of EU over the next five years as Brussels seeks to extend the zone of «peace, stability, and prosperity» to countries around the EU. By these plans, the European Union wish is to gain the benefits of a stable neighborhood. It offers the necessary framework for providing necessary assistance and support for these countries to pursue with their own economic and policy reforms, to spread “the benefits of prosperity and democracy”. To fulfill the European integration perspective, Moldovan authorities shall look beyond this Action Plan and take into account the following recommendations:

- To promote a new thinking into society and approach of all governmental-related bodies regarding the meaning and ways of achieving European integration.
- The visa regime policy of Moldova shall be made less burdensome to allow, at least unilaterally, a more flexible European flow in the movement of people and capitals.
- It shall be opened some new Embassies in other European capitals, and especially, new Consulates in the biggest industrial and commercial centers.
- Moldovan diplomacy shall promote a better image of the state, and to attract foreign support and investments in various fields.

⁶ Ferrero-Waldner: «Let me be clear about what the ENP is and what it is not. It is not an enlargement policy. It does not prejudge prospects for European countries that may at some future point wish to apply for membership, but it does not provide for a specific accession prospect either. What is it [then]? It is an offer. It's a substantial offer, it's a real concrete offer: the offer of much deeper cooperation, and a progressive integration – this is important – a progressive integration into certain EU policies and programs, depending, of course, on the fulfillment of commitments». Source: Ahto Lobjakas «EU: Brussels Unveils 'Action Plans' For Ukraine, Moldova, Mediterranean Neighbors, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/12/59bb8coe-008c-4440-81ff-11bb9b5b92d.html>

- To start urgently the process of harmonization of national legislation to Acquis and the redirection of their policies towards European standards, as Croatia did, without having any European perspective.
- To provide a stable, predictable and an open market-oriented policy, as well as affordable facilities for improving domestic investment climate.
- To ask EU for applying the Most Favorable Nation clause into practice, by opening European market to Moldovan goods, and meantime to waive from some of the CIS free trade agreements.
- Finally, Moldova shall be remembered that to reach its ambitions of European integration, the EU should be understood from two levels: as a unitary actor (both as an economical and political body) and as a conglomerate of actors, with their own interests, problems and fears.

10.4. Moldovan-Russian relations: beyond the “near abroad” doctrine

In what it concern the foreign, defense and security affairs, the EU relations with Moldova could not be developed without taking into account that stability and security in the region relies on the abilities of both sides to manage their ties with Russia. If EU and Russia are ready to share a co-decision making role in this part of Europe, as it was already stated⁷, the Transnistrian problem may become in the near future a testing area for a common crisis management operation Mission. One shall not forget that the Ukrainian factor counts very much in the EU-Russia relations.

The recent evolutions regarding the Transnistrian conflict proved that Russian interests in the region depend entirely from EU-Ukraine, EU-Moldova and Ukraine-Moldova relationships. In order to preserve its future statute of military Power, Russia needs to maintain its former military base from Transnistrian region (similar to that from Kaliningrad, Georgia, Armenia, etc.) as an effective instrument of political persuasion of former soviet republics. While we are speaking in terms of geo-strategic arrangements, it's obvious that the Russian military capabilities are too weak to influence the behavior of other geopolitical players in the region. Neither NATO, nor EU enlargement could be blocked because of the political harassment of Russia in the case of Baltic States, but also of new course of Georgia and Ukraine towards NATO.

⁷ Beatty Andrew “Russia may be offered bigger say in European security”, <http://www.eurojournal.org>, accessed: 26.02.2004.

Though it seems like Russia and EU (backed by USA) have reached an agreement on the Transnistrian issue, as USA succeeded to do in the case of Russian bases from Georgia, it is far enough until the Russian imperial ambitions in these two regions will decrease. Moreover, Russia had to accept the EU and USA involvement into existing five-side format of negotiations, after a series of commercial sanctions have been imposed to Moldova. In the aftermath of the most rigid Moldovan-Russian relations from their recent history, the Russian oil monopolist, GAZPROM, announced that starting from 2006 the exported gas to Moldova will be sold at the world prices. By this new treatment, Russia is still trying to keep the former soviet republics on its foreign policy track.

While building its new relationships with Russia, Moldovan officials shall try to persuade it to distinguish between the cultural, economic, political and security issues they have to deal with on the mutual benefits of both sides. A common approach of the cultural and economic bilateral relations may offer Russia the necessary framework for preserving its historical role as protector of Russian-speaking Diaspora from Moldova. At the same time, linking the economical influence that Russian minority is still benefiting in Moldova with their traditional ties on Eastern market, may help to maintain the necessary level of trade balance and labor migration with Russia. Meanwhile, the economic relations with South-Eastern, Central European and other countries shall develop progressively, securing the strategic economic independence of the country.

If one would analyze Moldova-Russia relations from the perspective of the EU-NATO and US-Russia set of relations, it may become clearly the complexity of international relations because of new factors, the international players shall consider in their foreign policies. Due to the traditional US-Russia rivalry, since the inception of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Moscow has pressed for greater involvement, viewing EU military development as a means of diluting NATO's primacy in Europe. At the same time, because of EU-US rows over European defense abating and the threat of regional instability moving up the agenda, the EU now looks ready to grant Moscow its wish, in return for more flexibility⁸.

As result, EU-Russian relations may develop in the near future with much more willingness than many politicians from their neighboring countries would like to admit. Especially, this is the case of small states, like Moldova or Georgia, which lack strong supporters in Europe, this change may bring

⁸ Beatty Andrew "Russia faces Europe" / ISS-EU, <http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=14592> , accessed: 26.02.2004

negative consequences for their national interests. As it was mentioned, this move could offer Russia to play a co-decision making role in EU crisis management operations and post-conflict stabilization. Transnistrian case may serve as a significant input for testing a new co-operation strategy together with OSCE – a setting that Moscow has repeatedly called for.

Though this common EU-USA offer to take part in the negotiation process on the settlement of Transnistrian conflict could move beyond the EU monitoring Mission of the illegal traffic on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border within the separatist republic of Transnistria and pave the way for a multinational stabilization Mission in Transnistria – led probably by OSCE – it might prove soon its inefficiency in reintegrating both parts of the Nistru river into a democratic and viable state. For the EU and USA is much more important to prompt Russia to withdraw its 2,500 troops from the area and to push the Transnistrian separatist's leaders to respect the international law and democratic values. As soon as these goals will be formally achieved, EU and, perhaps, USA would diminish their role in this region, unless new tensions will disturb the regional stability and security.

Taking into account that the issue of energy supplies represents a special topic on Russian-EU Agenda since Russia provides 21 per cent of the EU's oil and 41 per cent of its gas imports, the recurrence of internal instability in neighbouring countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus because of Russia, could hardly influence the European structures to put pressure on Russian Federation. Moreover, the EU might face big problems in the process of adapting to the need to take decisions if 30, because of the differences in attitude between the "old" and "new" European members, especially in what it concerns Russia.

In the meantime, the new Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine has recently revised its policy in the post-Soviet space, as well the mechanisms of its implementation. As general principle of the "near abroad" doctrine, it has been stated that «any country that would promote the doctrine of Russia's rollback will certainly create a conflict in the relations with this country»⁹. This might be perceived as a great threat to the national security of many former soviet republics, although it doesn't affect the new EU and NATO members. The conclusion that arises from these statements leads to a new dividing line and new spheres of influence across Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. As far as a more radical leader would succeed V. Putin, this policy may include also

⁹ "Russia: Kremlin redefining Policy in Post-Soviet Space". Sources: fednews.ru, RIA-Novosti, February 3, 2005.

the Baltic states within its area of interests, particularly on such issues as transit or the status of the Russian language and Russian community. As pointed out by G.Pavlovski, the tactic at this policy might consist of introducing those issues on the agenda of Russia's discussions with the EU, NATO, and some major West European capitals. More unpredictable could be Russian foreign policy towards Moldova, Georgia and other disobedient neighbours.

Would then EU and NATO try to tackle the issues on which Moscow seeks to regain a voice, or will encourage its neighbours to deal alone with that range of "bilateral affairs"? While the Republic of Moldova tries to identify its new place on the regional landscape, it has to look upon how to face its security dilemma. Being at the same time a small neutral country and facing very huge foreign influences and internal disintegration trends, Moldovan policymakers have to find new alternatives to the actual mechanisms of preserving national interests.

10.5. OSCE-Moldova cooperation: unfulfilled commitments and lost hopes

Starting with 1992, the partnership built with OSCE represents a peculiar way of solving the Transnistrian conflict. Because of the narrow mandate offered to the OSCE Mission from Moldova and to the consensus character of this organization, it could not perform an effective role in settlement of Transnistrian issue. Until the 1999 the relations developed by the OSCE with Republic of Moldova hardly can prove a coherent policy approach of how this specific conflict issue should be addressed.

After 1999 Summit in Istanbul, Russia has played redundant diplomatic efforts to overwhelm its counterparts from the OSCE. In order to misuse the Summit Declaration, which clearly stated Russian commitments to withdraw its military forces and munitions both from Moldova and Georgia, the diplomacy in Moscow succeeded to persuade and even to block the following OSCE Summits at which Russian interests were affected. The most recent Washington Summit of the OSCE proved once again that Russia may use efficiently its lobby and diplomatic means for vetoing any decision that could harm its geopolitical interests. As V. Socor pointed out¹⁰, some of the rejected amendments at the Washington Summit of the OSCE, proving that this organization has lost its potential to deal with frozen conflicts in post-soviet area, were:

¹⁰ Socor, Vladimir "OSCE Parliamentary Resolution Sets Stage for Recognition of Transnistria" / Eurasia Daily Monitor, Monday, July 11, 2005 – Volume 2, Issue 133.

- to urge Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova's territory;
- to define the conflict as an international one between Russia and Moldova, rather than an intra-Moldovan conflict;
- to require democratization efforts and civil-society building in Transnistria as a prerequisite to holding any internationally-supervised elections there and others;
- to assert/revive its credibility on the international arena, instead of losing efforts on conflict resolution; OSCE could better concentrate on monitoring of the elections, enforcing human rights and democratic freedoms on the black-sides and separatist regions of Europe.

The OSCE's failures in dealing with such frozen conflicts, as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Northern Karabakh may be easily explained if we take in consideration Russian's right to veto any decision of the Committee of Ministers. Even the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly may be threatened in the process of voting its Resolutions because of the Russian pressure to block the budget financing and adoption procedure and the pro-Russian lobby in the Political and Security Committees.

As result, a complex process of revising its statutory mission and prospective role started inside the OSCE during the last years. On one hand, Russia and other few CIS members are pleading for reaffirming OSCE role in conflict resolution and taking away from its mandate such functions as: monitoring of the elections, evaluating of the respect for human and minorities rights and other democratic freedoms. On other side, the US and some other European powers stand for offering a more active or even an exclusive role in promotion of human and minorities' rights, of electoral standards, etc. to OSCE. Moreover, this group of states have mentioned the role of other international organizations in conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization, offering to the OSCE a minimal role in this field. Like the UN, the OSCE represents an institution from Cold War times, which is still trying to find its new place on international affairs.

The "dynamic" and controversial policies the OSCE Mission to Moldova promoted during the last few years concerning the Transnistrian problem, proved that OSCE lacks a viable vision and the necessary will and capacities for solving this conflict. At the same time, the strong opposition of many political parties and civil society representatives, that OSCE confronted, has proved the old-fashion and unilateral character of this organization. Instead of bringing together the representatives of both governmental bodies and civil society from conflicting sides and show its readiness to accept all the proposals, OSCE Mission from Moldova acted sometimes against the will of the main civil society groups. Finally it succeeded to change its methods of work,

promoting a new strategy through development of civil society cooperation in the conflicting region.

Despite this, unfolding elections in the Eastern part of Moldova requires much more efforts to be done in order to promote democratic values, freedom of Media, independent political parties and nongovernmental organizations. It's very unlikely that OSCE may perform this task due to few funds available for civil society development. A more realistic alternative could be to allow Council of Europe and European Union to get involved directly in the process of post-conflict stabilization and rehabilitation measures, while preserving its mandate for the future monitoring of elections as soon as the necessary conditions will appear. Otherwise, a common OSCE-EU stabilization and/or monitoring Mission would mean more bureaucracy, less efficiency and better interference of other interested players in the Transnistrian region.

10.6. Moldova cooperation with NATO and GUAM: achievable perspectives

While speaking about NATO and GUAM cooperation, one should address these organizations in geopolitical terms. Although NATO and GUAM represent quite different perspectives for securing regional security, in the sense of this study, they are treated together, because of the specific set of relations promoted by the Moldavian authorities in this respect.

Starting from 1994, when Moldova joined Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and was invited to take seat in the Euro-Atlantic Council, it has repeatedly stated that this type of cooperation represents one of the most suitable ways of maintaining its military capabilities. At the same time, Moldova security dilemma, closely related to its neutrality status, was perceived more obvious after 2001, when Russia refused to fulfill its Istanbul commitments. Neither OSCE, nor PfP cooperation could help Moldovan authorities persuade Russia on this issue. It became clear that the neutrality status was good enough for keeping Moldova away from CIS militaries structures and securities affairs, but represents the worst possible mean for ensuring its national security. Having a foreign military base located on its separatist region, controlled both by foreign security forces and the local military elite, Moldovan neutrality could prove its usefulness if an international organization or some Great Powers would agree to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Instead of this, Moldova was still belongs both to the Russian sphere of influence, and partly to the Balkan region, where is quite difficult to speak about stability.

But after persisting domestic conflicts from this area have threatened international security, the South Eastern Europe succeed to became one of the most dynamic regions where the accession to the EU and the process of approaching NATO membership represent the dominant political tendencies of almost all these countries. The case of Croatia, but also of the neighbouring states, are quite emblematic for understanding the role of NATO and EU in promoting stability, security and prosperity in the region. If there where no NATO and EU involvement, one could hardly imagine how many of the Balkan region countries would became NATO and EU members. The Black Sea regional cooperation, Stability Pact, South Eastern Cooperation Initiatives and others couldn't solve so far the security, political and economic issues of theirs members.

Therefore, the Republic of Moldova shall realize that, within the actual geopolitical order, its neutrality may not guarantee the fulfilment of its national interests. As soon as this will be recognized, a fruitful integration in NATO may bring Moldova better perspectives for Transnistrian settlement, and as result, a further integration into EU. In political terms, as a prospective new NATO member, Moldova should¹¹:

- Demonstrate its commitment and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes and external territorial disputes or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means;
- Show its commitment to promote stability and well-being, economic freedom, social justice and environment responsibility;
- Establish an appropriate democratic and civilian control of its defence forces;
- Undertake its commitment to ensure that adequate resources will be devoted to achieving the obligations expected from a future NATO member, according to the principles stated in the Washington Treaty.

From military point of view, as a prospective new member, from Moldova are expected:

- to accept, as a minimum, the NATO doctrine and polices aiming at achieving a sufficient level of training and interoperability with Allied forces;
- to participate actively in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities and within the Individual Partnership Actions Plan (IPAP), including in Planning and Review Process of common operations.

¹¹ Romania's Westernization and NATO Membership: a Historical Approach, (Coord: Br.gen. Ionescu, M.E), Chapter 5: Study on NATO Enlargement // Occasional papers, No.3 (I)/2002, pp. 50-51.

- to be prepared to bring its contribution to the common security and collective defence and to pursue the objectives of standardization, which are essential to Alliance strategy and operational effectiveness;
- to establish a permanent political and military representation at Brussels and SHAPE HQs.
- to train and provide qualified personnel for participating in multinational and international missions; etc.

If we analyze what Moldova managed to undertake during its participation within PFP, it is surprising to note that many of the above requests have been or are going to be fulfilled. But, as far as Moldovan people are staying on further supporting the constitutional provision, on neutrality the national security strategy should take into considerations other means for ensuring national interests.

Although the PFP activities are enough limited in scope, until now Moldova's cooperation with NATO was mainly focused on providing and training available forces for participating in peacekeeping, humanitarian and SAR missions and exercises. This is why some experts argue that Moldova didn't succeed to use the entire PFP potential, lacking the necessary political will to identify the final goal of such cooperation. Assuming that the neutral status is offering enough space for manoeuvres, the Moldovan Supreme Security Council failed to adopt a military strategy at the national level. In this regard, the existing military Doctrine formulates quite general the existing means and capabilities for addressing the main threats and challenges Moldova faces. On the other side, as a neutral country, one could say that Moldova does not need any military strategy and even any national army to secure its interests. And its may prove right if Moldova would be in the case of Canada or Swiss. But unlike them, Moldova is confronting with both internal and external threats to its national integrity and security.

This is why that in 2005 Moldova has started high-level consultations with NATO officials to sign an Individual Partnership Actions Plan (IPAP). Current bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of the IPAP provide Republic of Moldova the minimal framework to define its basic interests and prospective fields of cooperation with NATO (economic, political, security, military, environment, etc.). As far as a more sincere dialogue with NATO and its member states will be developed, the IPAP may prove its effectiveness in addressing the most stringent security and military issues, Moldova is confronting with now.

Finally, one should keep in mind the existing rivalries within NATO because of the leading role USA maintains in the main decision-making struc-

tures despite the EU ambition to reach parity. After Russia had adopted a more positive stance towards NATO enlargement, it's more probably that EU may pledged for offering Russia a clearer format of involvement in both the EU and NATO crisis-management missions.

Concerning the cooperation within GUAM countries, there shall be discussed first of all USA and also Ukrainian role in the region. Depending on the level of US-Ukraine relations, the other states from the region may plan both their contributions and benefits. Between 1997 and 2001 years, when it may be stressed that GUAM appeared as an organization, with its stated goals (GUAM Charter), the evolution of this regional initiatives hasn't inspired any hopes. It was clear that at that time USA supported this forum of some of the Western CIS head of states to warn Russia against any imperial evolution in the post-soviet area. It was a symbolic way to show Russia that US strategic interests lay beyond the former USSR borders and that's all. From the other side, the basic interests of GU(U)AM members were economic and financial ones. Some of the GUAM participants (Ukraine and Moldova) were mainly interested in signing a free trade agreement, for the others – building of the necessary infrastructure, but for each of them the biggest challenge remains their effective participation in the construction of the new "Silk Road" Europe-Asia transport corridor. Indirectly, those countries interests were to obtain more independence by balancing the Russian sphere of influence.

When the orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine brought in power pro-Western politicians, the role of GUAM started to be reevaluated by both its members-states and the American diplomacy. At the Chisinau Summit, participants openly addressed a large spectrum of problems, ranging from promotion of democracy, strengthening regional security and stability, regulation of "frozen conflicts, up to combating terrorism and transnational organized crime, stepping up an intra-GUAM trade- economic cooperation¹². Moreover, Romania and Lithuania have been invited to participate as observers, while Ukraine affirmed its new role of regional actor by proposing a plan of Transnistrian settlement. It was a significant step that positively improved the regional security environment and challenged the future development of its relations with Russia, the EU and NATO. Beyond these positive input in launching a new Agenda of this organization, GUAM potential is quite limited due both to its consisting elements and the regional environment, dominated by Russia.

¹² *Declarația Comună a Șefilor de Stat ai Azerbaidjanului, Georgiei, Lituaniei, Moldovei, României și Ucrainei, Sursa: www.mfa.md*

Trying to preserve its geopolitical role in the region and to the diminished significance of the GUAM community of states, the Russian Federation still can use the economic, gasoline pipelines as levers to deter many of the GUAM unfriendly actions. The hasten measures both Ukraine and Georgia are taking to ensure their domestic electricity and fuel security demonstrate that GUAM is far from fulfilling its regional role. Thus a closer economic cooperation between the EU and Russia will definitely have an impact on the Black Sea-Caspian Sea regions as well. At the same time, the process of “Europeanization” of NATO is being reflected in continuing “its persistent campaign of clearing the relations with Russia from the “threat perception” to their countries’ security”¹³. This huge competition among the main international actors may affect both positively and negatively the further evolution of GUAM.

10.7. The United States interests in the region

After 1991 the United States of America represents the most important player on international arena that, actually, didn’t pursue any strategic interests in its cooperation with the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, the US diplomacy allowed Russia to maintain its military influence in the region, and avoided to focus on Transnistrian conflict resolution. The main achievement of American diplomacy regarding Moldova was to make pressure on the Russia to sign the Istanbul Summit Declaration from 2001, and to link up the fulfilment of the Russian commitments in this respect with the ratification of the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)¹⁴. Though the CFE treaty was signed in the last days of the Cold War (November 1990), and might look obsolete, it still represents an useful mechanism that limits the number of battle tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters deployed and stored between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia’s Ural mountains. Fearing that USA or NATO may transform some of the former Soviet republics into the outposts for nuclear arms or army bases, is still interested in its ratifica-

¹³ Black Sea Basin Regional Profile: The Security Situation and The Region –Building Opportunities, / Research Study 10 (April – June 2001), Edited by Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia.

¹⁴ After the Kozak Memorandum has been presented to Moldovan authorities, Stephen Rade-maker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control “underscored the position of the United States and NATO alliance that the adapted CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) treaty cannot be ratified until Russia fulfils its Istanbul commitments, including the withdrawal of munitions and troops from Moldova” in Tailgunner Joe *Russia must remove Moldova troops for treaty – US*, www.FreeRepublic.com

tion by all these countries. But as the 2002 and 2003 years deadlines have not been fulfilled, while the international environment has changed very much, the importance of CFE significantly decreased. It became more an instrument of persuasion between the USA and Russia.

At the political and economic level, the role played by the US in Moldova proved to be crucial for domestic democratic and market-oriented reforms. Different kind of assistance US offered during all this time lead to important changes in forming a new political establishment in Moldova. The symbolic messages of different US Ambassadors in Moldova had a big political and economic impact on its internal and external policies. Despite of this, US had focused on the regional stability, security and development. The main idea of this policy was to support a democratic transition in these countries in order to threatened Russian authoritarian influences in the region.

As far as the regional environment radically improved during the last few years as the result of NATO enlargement to East, new security options started to be considered in the US Department of States. That does suppose to enhance the regional role of Ukraine in order to balance Russian interests. Building a strategic alliance with Ukraine offered to the USA some strong reasons for becoming a more active player in the region. This may be noticed in the Ukrainian track toward GUAM, NATO and EU. Moldova can definitely benefit from these geo-strategic changes if will undertake more active diplomatic efforts towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. Nevertheless, this may lead to new tensions with the neighboring NATO members, and especially with Romania. The new threats the USA is facing around the world in its fight against terrorism represent another significant challenge for getting it more involved in the regional security politics. This might be also the case for being invited together with the EU to address the Transnistrian issue more directly. The role USA will be willing to play in this perspective is not yet clear. But it is obvious that a more US involvement in the Transnistrian settlement would have a positive impact as it might diminish the Russian influence in the region.

10.8. The Moldovan-Ukrainian relations

In what it concerns the Ukrainian factor, it shall be mentioned from beginning that Ukrainian neighbourhood represents both advantages and disadvantages for Moldova. This is why Moldovan-Ukrainian relations varied from one extreme to another. If Kucima's involvement in conserving the Transnistrian conflict proved to be disastrous for securing Moldovan interests, Yuscenko's recent plan marked a more pragmatic approach that stresses on the positive

potential of bilateral relations. But despite of the existing political will to solve the common-border issues, in both Chisinau and Kiev the separatists leaders may succeed to preserve their power in the region. The financial, technical and logistic support EU is offering both to Moldova and Ukraine in securing their borders may be insufficient to enforce the expected democratic changes in the region. Especially if the Ukrainian political and lobby groups will not manage to save their lasting relations with Tiraspol local elites.

While analyzing the perspectives of Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation, one should remember that Russia still supplies around 80 per cent of the required natural gas to Ukraine, as well as 67 per cent of its oil and 100 per cent of its nuclear fuel. According to Russian figures, Ukraine owes US more than \$2 billion for gas, and preserved quite dependent economic relations with Russia, mainly in the Eastern Ukraine. From this point of view, both countries are seeking ways of moving out of Russia's sphere of influence. In this context, many Western politicians and diplomats underlined the importance of a stable and prosperous Ukraine, oriented towards Europe and the Atlantic community. These regional trends give impetus for a more fruitful cooperation between those two neighbours. If the Euro-Atlantic integration will remain the main goal of new political elite from Ukraine, both countries will have to bring closer their bilateral policies, to share common values and to pursue similar interests. The success of one of them will give more opportunities for another. At the same time, it might be easier for NATO and EU to develop their new strategies for the whole region, rather than separately for each country. If the latter case, the costs would be much higher, because even if Ukraine succeeds in its aspiration of joining the NATO and EU on the long term, the social, infrastructure and economic ties will still remain strong dependent by Russia. This supposes to promote quite a contradictory policy for assuring both the economic growth and social-political stability. One of the perspective solutions could be the establishment of a regional free trade area, consisting from Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, similar to CEFTA. This type of regional cooperation may strengthen their capacities to meet EU standards. The expected economic growth and a more clear EU and NATO membership perspective will ensure that they not return to their political or economic past. On the contrary, their social-political stability and economic growth may represent a model for Russia, Belarus, and other developing countries, as it happened in the case of Balkan region¹⁵.

¹⁵ Commonwealth Conference National Intelligence Council 2020 Project – Scenario, p. 4.

Otherwise, the lack of political will of Ukrainian elites to solve the Transnistrian conflict may offer Russia new ways for enforcing its “new abroad” strategy as soon as the economical situation will allow. The economic recklessness, nostalgic political behaviour and pro-Russian movements in the Eastern part of the Ukraine and Moldova could give the way to radical fragmentation trends, political instability and insecurity in the whole region. This black-side and separatist perspective of one of the key geopolitical regions of Eastern Europe justifies the special interest the US, NATO and UE are paying to integrate Ukraine within the West.

10.9. Moldova-Romania case: a special relationship?

The relationships built by Romania and Moldova should always have a privileged character, due to the common culture, language and historical past. But actually, since Moldova got its independence in 1991, their level of interaction varied in intensity from romantic and close cooperation to much tensioned relations in the period of 2001-2002 years, when a huge diplomatic crisis was hardly overcome. As result, real pragmatic relations could not be established and the existing potential has not been developed so far. Instead of taking mutual benefits from the existing emotional relations, Moldovan politicians tried to politicize the cultural and linguistic values for their own benefits. On the other side, Romanian leadership didn't succeed to build a pragmatic relation with their Moldovan counterparts. The failure to manage professionally the complex set of bilateral relationships paved the way for an inadequate and arrogant treatment by the Media.

At the same time, Moldova failed to understand that good relations with Romania are important at least for two important aspects: the Euro-Atlantic integration and the Transnistrian issue. One should recognize that since Romania decided to follow the way of the Euro-Atlantic integration it behave as an advocate for lobbying Moldova's further integration in these structures. Building special relations with Romania should be the crucial task for all Moldovan politicians, as Romania has to be seen as a ‘long term ally’. Even if we have to admit that Romanian advocacy role in the regional and international forums did not always bring the expected benefits, it can not be underestimated.

After Romania will be accepted as a full member of the EU (as estimated – in 2007) it would have a key role in strengthening the regional stability and economic prosperity. As a messenger of Moldovan interests in the EU structures, Romania might try to advocate new proposals in European Commission and European Parliament for a better treatment of its citizens from Republic of

Moldova. Romanian may also pledge for a quicker solution of the Transnistrian problem and Moldova's progressive integration into European structures¹⁶. But getting European Union involved in post-conflict stabilization requires fostering the level of cooperation between Moldova, Romania and other European Union's members. Even if in the current situation, when Romania itself is hardly struggling to be accepted in the EU, it can not do so much for Moldova; there are still certain ways to support Moldova's European integration.

One of the main tools could be to engage both sides in a cooperative partnership starting from the experience, Romania acquired as a candidate EU member. There is a large scale for cooperation, including sharing the experience of translating and implementing the *Acquis communitaire*, organizing trainings and trans-border activities, institutional management, legislative reforms, etc. The common language, common problems and geographic proximity represent the main advantages to be taken into consideration during the adaptation period of Moldova to the EU standards.

As a NATO member, security management and conflict resolution measures may represent other significant fields, where Bucharest could share its experience to its Chisinau counterparts. There is also a vast area of cooperation within the negotiation and implementation of the Individual Partnership Actions Plan (IPAP). Until now, Romania failed to propose within NATO any initiatives for a better involvement of international community in post-conflict stabilization, small arms and light weapons, environment and "border security" fields. IPAP may offer such an opportunity as far as Ukraine and Georgia efforts towards NATO became more visible.

One would mention that until now that there is no real success of Romanian diplomacy for finding its track of involvement in increasing regional stability and trans-border security. Nevertheless, bilateral relation should be developed in terms of real strategic partnership, which implies commitment from both sides in dealing with the full range of issues. As soon as Romania will be integrated into EU, it could certainly play a key role in Moldova's integration, stabilization and conflict resolution processes and this is while Romanian perspective regional impact should not be ignored by any Moldovan Government.

In conclusion, it may be stressed that there is a stringent need for establishing priorities of the Moldovan foreign policy. The actual Concept of Foreign Policy should be radically modified, by defining and developing more clearly

¹⁶ "Transnistria – evoluția unui conflict înghețat și perspective de soluționare", / Institutul "Ovidiu Șincai", București, septembrie 2005. Sursa: www.fisd.ro

its strategic goals. Taking into account the above mentioned factors and the regional and global challenges Moldova is facing with, promotion of an active, efficient and realist diplomacy may prove to be more useful than continuing to build its military capacities.

Chapter XI.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN MOLDOVA: EXPERT VIEW

Contrary to the common opinion of the Moldovan citizens that their country is experiencing a steady stagnation (POB, 2005), indubitable improvements have emerged since the last parliamentary elections in March 2006. The most remarkable change was, according to the majority of the experts, the conditional cooperation between the power and the opposition. Another important change consisted in a surprising pro-Western discourse, so restlessly voiced by the authorities in Chisinau. How frank and substantial is this discourse? Or, in other words, is the Moldovan political class capable to prove the seriousness of its intentions in the implementation of the Action Plans (namely the Moldova-EU AP it has committed to? Will the political class yield in the short-run (the Moldova-NATO AP)? We tried to answer these questions by focusing on a sample of experts, selected by sex, age, education and nationality. The interviews had been carried out during June-July, while the answers were analyzed in August.

11.1. Political Developments:

11.1.1. To what extent does the current Parliamentary configuration reflect the pro-European aspirations of Moldovan society? What is the extent of popular support of the politicians? Does the Moldova-EU Action Plan reflect the conditions of internal stability in Moldova?

The experts' opinion is fragmented on this matter, as some sustain that the current Parliament reflects the pro-European aspirations of the Moldovan people, because EU is generally attractive. Thus, the political leaders have to follow the mainstream in the public opinion and back it up with the necessary decisions and policies. The other side of the expert group state that the turn towards Europe is just a race for the votes of the people, the radical change of the political discourse of some of the parties, like the Communist Party, right before the elections does not, therefore, reflect the change in the mentality of its leaders.

"I personally believe that the majority of the political forces support the idea of European integration because of opportunistic reasons; meaning that the political parties plead for European integration because they want the people's votes".

"The whole situation reminds me of the "independence parade" in 1991; then Chisinau was waiting to see what Kyiv will do, eventually proclaiming its

own independence a couple of days distance from the Ukrainian independence. Now the situation is the same: the Rose revolution, followed by the victory of the pro-Western Yushchenko in Ukraine, forced the politicians in Moldova to think about the national interest.”

“As opposed to the former Parliament, the structure of the current one is more optimal, more durable, because domination of a single party is always bad, but domination of a party like the one at power in Moldova is extremely bad, considering the priorities Moldova has put on its agenda.”

The experts say that, despite the vocal support for the European integration blared by the political parties, the latter are not ready for such a commitment; they do not know the rules of the game. That is why the politicians in Moldova display exclusively consumptive expectations towards the EU. Individually, the politicians speak of EU as just of a future perspective, this not damaging their position in the party, and not demeaning their popular support. However, among the experts there are skeptics thinking that the actual Parliament fits has slim and partial support in the masses. According to these skeptics, the citizens with pro-European expectations have strong doubts about the capacity of the ruling party to implement the objective of European integration. Public support would boost of our politicians were more consequent to defending the national interest regardless of the circumstances.

The experts also point out that the Brussels-inspired Moldova-EU Action Plan is a necessary document for the country. It is, in the meantime, not enough in terms of the society's expectations. Nonetheless, the fact that this plan was signed and the politicians committed to implement it, the people can still hope for the emergence of another plan, or another process of accession to the EU.

“Moldova-EU Action Plan responds to the Brussels' interests, rather than for the needs of Moldova”

“The Action Plan is viewed differently by the parties. For the EU it is just another subfolder in the long list of documents which make its Neighborhood Policy towards Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Georgia; whereas for Moldova, the Action Plan is a scarce ticket on the train to Europe. Of course, there is nothing tragic in the EU perceptions. The Moldova-EU Action Plan is good anyway, because its implementation would bring to overall improvements, even if the Plan neglects some of the desired aspects.”

The Moldova-EU Action Plan consists of a series of priorities, the realization of which would substantially consolidate the internal stability of the coun-

try. Among the priorities, the experts nominated the following: the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, on top of the list, will open a leeway for further reform. The responsible implementation of reforms would build a good image for Moldova before the eyes of the European institutions. The accomplished reforms would rise the attractiveness of Moldova in Europe. Stabilization and strengthening democratic institutions is the next priority in the list. Freedom of expression and free speech, poverty reduction, fostering a fair, transparent and predictable business environment, eradication of corruption and of the organized crime, assuring an efficient border control, including on the Transnistrian sector complete the next couple of years agenda for the Moldovan leadership.

11.1.2. Is there a satisfactory environment for the protection of public order, human rights and fundamental constitutional freedoms of the citizens in Moldova?

Some experts consider that the quality of the legal environment in Moldova is not necessary for the effective protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens. Moldova needs a sound reform, on of the security sector, on both conceptual and practical levels. The legislation of Moldova does not yet correspond to the EU standards. The state structures have not yet been adjusted to a level that would allow protecting a democratic order of the society, the rule of law and the market economy. Despite of the substantial efforts to diminish a number of risks such as trafficking in human beings, organized crime and smuggling, the results were slim. The structures responsible for tackling these risks are not yet keeping it up.

“No, we’re not even close to perfection. We need a sound reform in the system of maintaining public order and security and first of all on the conceptual level. Our legislation does not even correspond to the realities in our country. It is not being adjusted to the democratic principles set forth by the EU, both conceptually and structurally.”

“It is not a secret that, in Moldova, even the position of a judge is for sale. If you end up buying, you will later find yourself bought and sold in the same way as you did first. Corruption decides everything even before the trial. The same corruption makes the judiciary vulnerable before political intervention. As for the police, the main problem there is the insufficient professional level of officers, the poor endowment with the necessary equipment. This miserable state of the police is aggravated by another negative phenomenon: corruption. It is not a secret, as the police is being overtly corrupt; then no surprise the public can see it.”

Other experts think the legislative environment in Moldova is good. Moldova has been more than receptive to the calls of the international community to upgrade its legislation. A great number of active laws have been elaborated with the active support of the international community and according based on the international legal practice. The problem is not in the laws, but in their enforcement and execution. Several problems exist here: the problem within the judiciary and the enforcement institutions: the police and the prosecutor's office. These problems pertain to the low level of democratization of the country.

“The legal environment could be evaluated as satisfactory, but not the practice, as it depends on the culture and democratization of the society.”

“The problem in Moldova is not in its laws, but in their application. There are numerous institutions that parasite on the low capacity of implementation of legal projects: that is the situation of the judiciary, the law enforcement and the police.”

11.1.3. Are the elected Parliamentary officials capable of settling the Transnistrian conflict between 2005-2007?

The experts are convinced that the current Parliament will be able to settle the Transnistrian conflict between 2005-2007.

“The Parliament has a clear understanding of the situation around the conflict; it has a vision and a settlement plan. I would say that by the fact of establishing the real causes of the conflict, by having chosen an adequate set of instruments to settle the conflict, by redirecting the vector of foreign policy and by the coherence of domestic reform, one could say the Moldovan authorities have proven maturity.”

Nevertheless, the experts declared that the Russian factor is still a crucial variable in the conflict settlement equation and it could only be balanced by the US and the EU. In this case, we should mention that the quality of the conflict resolution process is the of the same importance as the timing. That is why it is important to plan very accurately the stages of this process, rather than be happy with a sudden and unprepared resolution.

“What does it mean final settlement? It could be that tomorrow a document is signed and a declaration will state the conflict is over; is that a viable solution? It could be “yes”, but could be “no”.”

“The conflict will remain unsettled until Russia wants it. Are the [Moldovan] parties capable of convincing Russia? At least the Parliament is showing an

unprecedented unity when facing two most important issues in the history of Moldova as an independent state: the Transnistrian settlement and the European integration.”

11.1.4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the political class in Moldova in comparison with the similar entities in Ukraine, the Baltic states and Romania?

The great disadvantage of Moldova is that its political class was born and brought up in the USSR. It still has not gotten rid of its Soviet heritage. Removing this heritage is not the easiest task either, the experts said. The revival of the political class is a priority for the development of the country. Only the emergence of new politicians will solve the problems in our domestic and foreign politics. However, the experts consider this experience is not singular, as all the former socialist states are facing this problem. The only exception are the Baltic countries, where the young leadership, free of past influences seized the power right after the partition from the USSR.

“Where did this class have to come from? We have always been a province, subject to a constant policy of Russification and de-nationalization put into practice with the help of the party staff from the right-bank [of the Dniestr River]. Here comes the expression: “If you want to be a Minister, you have to come from [beyond] the Dniestr.” Today, we see the power in Moldova is in the hands of Transnistrians, but we still talk about the Transnistrian conflict. Should we be interested in the political class as part of the elite, as a social locomotive, sorry, but here we see more vices than qualities.”

“It is a fact that the Moldovan political class is much weaker than the one in the Baltic countries. There are several explanation of that. It is a sure fact that the individuals who form our political class were born, brought up, educated and came into politics in the Soviet era.”

“Our political class has the disadvantage of representing a society that is very much fragmented, in political terms, and in the meantime ignorant of what is happening up there in politics.”

It is only now that people who understand the European regional policies entered politics in Moldova. These people do not have primitive and cynical interests of local inspiration. They have a vision of being part of the European region and exercise their policies in a European way.”

11.2. Neutrality and Euro-Atlantic Integration

11.2.1. Is neutrality a necessary and favorable condition for the development of Moldova as an independent, democratic and unitary state?

It is salient that all of the questioned experts gave precisely negative answers to this question. Their ideas converged in the fact that Moldova is not and has never been a neutral state and that the neutrality status does not correspond to the real status of Moldova. The experts state that the neutrality of a state should be confirmed by relevant international agreements and specific legal instruments. The actual conditions of Moldova are the following: the country is occupied by foreign troops, that are unlawfully and illegitimately stationed on its territory, while the security of the state is not guaranteed by any collective security clause.

“The so-called neutrality does not correspond to the internationally-recognized concept of neutrality. Moldova can declare itself a neuter state as much as it wants, but it will never be treated as such in the absence of any international agreement recognizing its neutrality.”

“The neutrality clause inserted in the Constitution of 1994 emerged with the help of Russophile forces, who aimed at eliminating the possibility of Moldova’s orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic or European structures. The clause has been widely used ever since by the Moldovan side as reason for getting rid of the Russian troops. Nonetheless, that proved to be inoffensive, as Russia hasn’t cared much about the stipulations in the Moldovan Constitution, as it has its own strategic interests which have to be followed, regardless of the cost.”

“It is clear that Moldova will not accede to NATO until the Transnistrian conflict is unsolved. This also provokes a small paradox: «Why will we need NATO when the Transnistrian conflict is solved?»”

“Ukraine declared that accession to NATO and the EU is a foreign policy priority for Ukraine. Looking back to the EU, it becomes clear that Ukraine will not get there before Moldova, and that will definitely not happen before 2013. This was relentlessly declared by the EU Enlargement Commissioner, when referring to Turkey, rather than to Ukraine, but, nonetheless, it was stated that the budget plan for 2007-2013 does not include a penny for new membership. I cannot see why the EU should change this vision for the sake of Ukraine, or, moreover, for Moldova. Leaving the EU aside, Ukraine could join NATO in the next 5 years. That would make Moldova a NATO enclave. Then, Moldova will get by default the security guarantees that it lacks today. If Ukraine should fail, then Moldova will have the only card left, and that is applying to NATO by itself.”

“Regarding neutrality, I cannot understand what it is, because, declaring neutrality means becoming a neutral party. Moldova was everything but neutral. I have been constantly asking, if there was any written specification or definition of Moldovan neutrality; neutrality in relation to what and, in fact what does it mean? I am actually speaking about the Concept of National Security.”

Some experts consider that Moldova could only be a neutral state only if Romania and Ukraine are NATO members and Moldova is a NATO enclave. This situation could favor Moldova even more than membership in the Alliance.

11.2.2. Is Euro-Atlantic integration a viable option for the Moldova? What should be the priorities and benchmarks for the political class in Chisinau?

The opinions of the experts diverged over this issue. The most of them, however, believe that the Euro-Atlantic integration is inevitable for Moldova. The reason is that there has been no developed country that has developed without previously getting security guarantees from NATO. The logics tells us that we should proceed immediately to the elaboration and ratification of an Individual Partnership and Action Plan with NATO, to the repudiation of the neutrality clause and to the immediate and energetic pursuit of pre-accession conditions for NATO, as well as to building lasting and trustful relations with the neighboring countries by fostering a dialogue on neighborhood, border security and interoperability among the various security structures.

“Yes, this integration is inevitable. The need for it stems from the national interest of Republic of Moldova, the regional geopolitical context and the geostrategic reality. If looking through the lens of the Partnership for Peace, then we can definitely state our obvious rapprochement to the Euro-Atlantic standards. If we look through the political lens of the integration process, then we should consider accession to NATO, EU and other organizations we’ve missed by now.”

Some experts believe that Euro-Atlantic integration is not an inevitable option for Moldova. This could be explained by the idea that Moldova would benefit much more from being sandwiched between two NATO members, namely Romania and Ukraine, rather than from acceding into the structure. That means Moldova will receive all the benefits of a member, but with minimum of commitments. That does not absolve Moldova from the imperative of corresponding to European standards. For that, the political class of Moldova shall have to cope with the following requirements: continuation of economic reforms up to a level, when Moldova will be the most liberal economy in Europe; a sound administrative reform affecting the central administration (the

Government, the Ministries and other central administrative agencies) as well as the local public administration; further reform in rising the livelihood, raising the standards of labor, etc.

“Such a small country like Moldova, should evaluate its dimensions and strenght, should define its place and not bravely navigate by the rules of political surfing through the changing context in order to be able to grab the vital opportunities.” ... “I believe that if we have exclusively good relations with Romania, a NATO member, we should not «play chicken» with the big bear, we should not disturb the great power that we have already disturbed a lot. That is why I believe the priority should evisage primarily reaching regional stability. The regional solidarity on the example of the Visegrad and the Baltic countries that have focused on the social-economic development by shutting down the old security issues...”

“The elaboration and the signing of an Individual Partnership Action Plan between Moldova and NATO as top priority objective, together with establishing mass-support for NATO accession and renouciing to the neutrality status. Along that, all the pre-accession conditions should be respected.”

It is to be noted that, regardless of the inevitability of Euro-Atlantic integration, reforms still have to be made. These reforms will bring Moldova closer to Europe.

“The polls show a discrepancy in the popular preferences for EU and NATO. If the popularity index of EU is 60-80%, than that of NATO is around 40%. It is unclear whether Moldova will ever join NATO, even if Ukraine will accede. I believe Moldova has a couple of important priorities: first – to reduce the social divisions referring to the quality of life and, second – the continuation of economic reforms, so that, eventually, the Moldovan economy could become the most open economy in Europe.”

11.3. Good governance

11.3.1. What are the strategic priorities for the economic and social rehabilitation of Moldova?

The experts generally approve the priorities formulated in the programme of the actual Cabinet (the Strategy of Economic Growth and Poverty reduction, the Moldova-EU Action Plan, the Declaration of the Parliament on the Legislative Priorities). Nevertheless, some of the experts point out that the Moldovan economy is growing, but not getting developed. This type of growth does not

bring long-term benefits, as, because it is not accompanied by qualitative and intensive development structurally. The following should be emphasized: raising the competitiveness of the Moldovan enterprises on the European market, improving the investment climate, decreasing the state's involvement into the private sector.

“The biggest problem facing Moldova is that we have wasted 15 years on everything but political consensus. We should note that the economic reform is lagging long from the other reforms. Why did it happen? Here is the question: Moldova has been the most affected by the European protectionism, because it is an agrarian country, and the agrarian sector is the most protected on the European market. This is one of the major causes of the steep fall of the Moldovan GDP.”

11.3.2. Are the neighbors of Moldova – Ukraine and Romania good examples to follow in terms of consolidation of administrative capacity? If yes, than in what specific sectors? Are you satisfied with the quality of the current relations between Moldova and its neighbors? If not, than why?

Some experts consider that, if responsibly followed by the politicians, any good practice is a good example to follow for Moldova. Other experts believe that neither Ukraine, nor Romania are good examples for Moldova, as these countries have been barely successful during the last 10-15 years. It is obvious that Romania has accounted for more positive developments than both Moldova and Ukraine. However, if talking about a sound administrative model, none of these two countries are good examples, as both have not pursued a serious course of administrative reform.

“No, we are not happy with the level of development in Moldova. Ukraine is a different story. We should carefully assess what we get from the East and what from the West, in business terms, of course. From the west, we have all the big brands, coming primarily from Romania. As for the East, we import various crooked schemes of how to trade our humongous energy debts. East winds also bring us all the shadow business, which became pervasive in the Moldovan economy. It has become true that the civil society is Romanian-speaking, while business is Russian-speaking. This double communication played the trick on us. The Russian-rooted business penetrates Moldova much more easily and freely. The people are going to Moscow or Ukraine, where they learn the skill of how to adapt the numerous shadow-business schemes to the Moldovan market. The west winds bring the sophisticated corporate culture. That is the difference between what we can learn from Romania and Ukraine.”

“I am not satisfied with the level of relations between these countries. The main problem is the weakness of the Moldovan state. Having its fundamental problems, such as the Transnistrian conflict and the shattered economy, Moldova cannot conduct a coherent foreign policy. Well, it is a past thing. However, we still haven’t reached a level that would allow us propel our interests.”

“Talking about the administrative capacity, then Romania could be a better example, especially after its integration into the EU. Ukraine is also on a good path, but there is still much to be desired. Ukraine still has a big lag behind Romania in this respect.”

All the experts, with no exception, have shown their low appreciation of the relations of Moldova with its immediate neighbors: Romania and Ukraine. There are, apparently, distinct political agendas that cannot be synchronized: on one hand is Ukraine, stuck in the CIS and its Single Economic Space, but with serious pro-European aspirations and, on the other hand, Romania, a NATO member, and holder of an EU Accession Treaty, but with serious shortcomings in the accession process. Along that, there are numerous myths and stereotypes that distract the attention of the elites and the population from the priorities of Euro-Atlantic integration and negatively affect the trade between the states.

„So the lack of synchronization of the agendas of the three states has both a positive and negative effect on the development of the relations among them. That is why I am unsatisfied with the state of these relations.”

11.3.3. What are the most useful models/institutions for the modernization of the public administration system of Moldova?

The experts say that ideal models and institutions, easily implantable into Moldova do not exist. However, some elements of them could be given a good consideration. First of all, the concept of the reform has to be indigenous, or at least comparable and applicable to Moldova. Secondly, best practices should be analyzed. These could come from anywhere: Brazil, China, Vietnam, Argentina. So, when the first territorial-administrative reform was enacted, examples of nearby countries have been taken into account: Romania, Slovenia, the Baltic states. However, this reform was inverted in Moldova and the present situation is described by a total dependence of the local powers on the central administration of the state. Every Government has had a different program, so were the work schemes of the central and local powers. The working model has not been found yet. That is why the power in Moldova is still searching for it.

“Today, Moldova is in a very favorable situation. In 2003-2007 the labor force will be invaded by the youth born between 1980 and 1983, the period of the highest birth rate in Moldova. This will ease the burden of social security system. The situation will change in 2007-2008 when less young people will enter the work force, but the number of people who will benefit from welfare alimonies and pensions and other forms of social assistance. That proves that the reform has to be done immediately.”

“The best model for us is the Scandinavian one. Because of the fact that the rightist and leftist ideologies, in its European form, free of radicalism, will both be present in Moldova; it is the job of the “leftists” to solve the social issues. From this point of view, the local public administration is the key element for materializing the Scandinavian model in Moldova. The refusal to continue the territorial-administrative reform and the fact that this reform was brought to the past, outdated standards deprived us of the advantage in the negotiation process with Transnistria on the state construction of Moldova. However, the question of state construction is still vital for Moldova.”

11.3.4. What are the priorities in for the economic and institutional cooperation between Moldova, Ukraine and Romania for the next 5 years?

According to the expert's opinion, the development of cooperation with Romania and Ukraine requires the creation of new instruments: treaties, agreements, trade facilitation, free economic zones, etc.). Here we come again to the idea synchronization of reforms and of new platforms of development priorities between the neighbors. Other experts consider that the cooperation with Romania and Ukraine requires different approaches. The only cooperation among the three countries is the one within Euro-regions, which is a tri-lateral cooperation and needs enhancement.

“The priorities of economic cooperation between the tree countries are numerous and elusive. A great attention should be drawn to improving and modernizing the infrastructure in the countries. Romania is way ahead, Ukraine already started the process, while in Moldova is seriously lagging behind the both.”

“If Moldova determined a group of products to be primordial, these products should be getting real attention. It would be desirable that Moldova penetrates the Romanian and Ukrainian markets with a group of products that it has a real advantage in.”

11.4. Regional developments in the Black Sea area

Is there any recognized concept concerning the prospects of transforming the Black Sea area into a region strategic importance and wide involvement of Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security institutions?

There are many institutions which declare their concern for the development of the Black Sea area: EU, OSCE, NATO, the Economic Organization of the Black Sea area countries, GUAM. Their involvement is still slim, because of the lack of a locomotive for cooperation. As for the involvement of political, economic and security institutions, then the involvement of the countries from Black Sea area is crucial. Cooperation in this area is less active than expected at the moment when the entire process of cooperation was initiated in the Black Sea area. That happens because of the diversity of immediate priorities of each country in the Black Sea area.

“BSEC exists for many years, but its efficiency is pretty low. There are a lot of explanations and theories proving its inefficiency. Being part of this context is a very important problem for our country, as it is a strategic zone of interest for global actors, but there isn’t enough substance in these structures”.

“Regarding the geopolitical context, I consider again that we should draw a parallel between Baltic and Black Sea areas. Yes, I agree that this axis has to be formed, as it is in our interests to do so. The lack of such coordination and cooperation, and, exactly, the lack of the security element slows down this evolution. We have to learn a lot from the experience of the Baltic States and to what is now regarded in the European Parliament as the “Eastern Dimension”. I am a supporter of this dimension, because even the previous polish initiative comprised the most important aspects and determined very important tools and mechanisms for stabilizing and developing this region. I can only welcome these points.”

“Time will prove whether this hot spot on the defense and security maps of the European and American specialized structures will form a plausible concept recognized at international and regional levels.”

Nonetheless, some experts have mentioned there is a long-term American strategy also called “the strategic ellipsis of Black Sea”, which later could be formed as a plausible concept, recognized on international/regional level. The strategy regards six principles that lead to a strengthening democracy around the Black Sea: supporting Romania and Bulgaria and, as well, the new democracies around, to reforming the institutions from Black Sea, involving Turkey,

giving priority status for the frozen conflicts, harmonize US's and EU programs of democratization focused on Ukraine's future.

11.4.1. What is the role of Moldova's neighbors: Ukraine and Romania in the larger context of the creation of a new security architecture in the Black Sea region?

“Different, but positive. First of all there are elements of antagonism, the attempts of Romania and Ukraine to play the role of regional leaders in a number of certain political, economic and security problems. In the same time, there exist frameworks allowing their cooperation: the North Atlantic Treaty framework, The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council framework, the UN, with an enough visible role at certain levels”.

The experts consider that for the moment the role of Moldova's neighbors is very different. Both Romania and Ukraine would like the role of “regional leader”, but it looks like Romania is more active in achieving it than Ukraine. A NATO member, Romania would like to be considered a security provider to its neighbors. Romania's lately initiatives show that this country could become a critical actor for the process of transformation of the Black Sea area into a stable zone. Ukraine's situation is different, but with the change of power in Kiev it is possible for it to become more active in this area.

“Those three countries can become together a bridge between Europe and the Caucasus, and can easier eliminate the hot spots of instability from the region, with Western help, of course”.

“I would like to warn our Romanian friend about the euphoria, and they shouldn't relax and count on Kremlin's friendliness, because this could come at a very high cost to them. I have talked to Russian politicians, who openly declare that: “well, the majority of Romania's complaints are against us, but against Ukraine”. The Russians will act nervously on Romania. They will try to minimize its influence in the region by maximizing the contradictions between those 2 neighbors, Romania and Ukraine. That is why we were looking forward to Yushchenko's visit to Bucharest so that these questions are settled down. The possibility that someone can make Yushchenko change his mind regarding the commitments he had agreed on with the Romanian president is a warning signal. All of them, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine have to strengthen themselves. This also concerns regional security”.

All the experts confirmed the fact that these regional evolutions contribute to the stability of the region. The revolutions were nothing more than just

democratic processes, but every democratization process is a generator of stability. These revolutions had benefic effects on those countries, but also on the entire zone and were sure signs of good regional stability.

11.4.2. What priorities should the associate states to GUAM set? Is GUAM membership benefic or not for the process of South-East European integration for Moldova?

The main objective of GUAM countries is: the economic dimension and the security dimension. Each country as a member of this organization has its own advantages, but an efficient way of cooperation in this structure hasn't been found yet. The fact that the funds offered by the American Congress have not been used for common projects, the fact that GUAM has not been able yet to produce something in the benefit of its members, something real that would be evident in the activity of the CSI structures, proves that these organization is weak, that its weakness is natural.

“Burying the Soviet past and allying with the West. Being a GUAM member means South-East European integration. This organization is sponsored by the US, supported by Romania. Some day, GUAM will become an enormously important structure with a decisive role in the settlement of frozen regional conflicts.”

“We definitely have to create and strengthen GUAM-like instruments. We should, however, not repeat the story of the CIS; thank God CIS proved to be so weak. We should learn from our mistakes. I believe the Orange revolution has taught us something”.

GUAM membership is favorable for Moldova. Moreover, it does not affect our pro-European aspirations, nor does it hamper our South-East European integration. The EU encourages all kind of cooperation among states in the region, aspirants to EU accession, as long as the goals of these cooperation initiatives don't contradict the goals of the EU.”

11.4.3. What position should Moldova take towards Russia in its foreign policy?

Some experts say Moldova should not refrain from declaring openly that Russia is an occupant, unlawfully occupying a part of Moldovan territory and should be treated accordingly. Other experts consider Moldova cannot take such a stand towards Russia.

“Russia is obviously involved in and guilty of the most of the frozen conflicts in the ex-Soviet space by being one of the parties in each of the conflicts.”

“The Transnistrian conflict is a type of conflicts, the settlement of which is one or two levels higher, from the point of view of multi-level international conflicts. The settlement of the conflict has to be complex: that is the regional level, the geopolitical level; the external context is very important for the resolution, but not a deciding factor. The government in Chisinau is pervasive at all levels. Chisinau’s stand is the weakest point in the conflict resolution process. In other words, Chisinau lacks any pragmatic idea of statehood and state-building. The Chisinau-Tiraspol relations are a set of governing subjects.”

In this case, we should declare that, on the Eve of the 21st Century we have a situation of illegal occupation of a territory belonging to a recognized state; therefore, the whole foreign policy of Moldova should be conducted based on this idea. Moldova should use all possible instruments to make Russia cooperate towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and also make Russia withdraw its troops and munitions. There are lots of possibilities to do that. One of them is tackling Russia’s long time desire to join the World Trade Organization, in the ranks of which, Moldova holds membership. This chance should not be missed. With that, Moldova should make good use of any tool to force Russia comply with the commitments determined at the OSCE summit.

11.5. Frozen Conflicts: Strategies to follow

11.5.1. What are the background similarities and discrepancies between the ex-Soviet states? Are the EU enlargement limits rigid and clear?

According to the experts’ beliefs, the background discrepancies pertain to the geopolitical vectors of the states in the region. Russia has its own orbit of gravity, which is radically distinct from those of the states in the region. The first vector being the Russian one, which is headed towards hampering the EU enlargement, by preserving this zone of “exclusive Russian interests” in the detriment of other vectors. The second vector is that of the NATO states, with a far larger strategic agenda than Russia. These states have the interest of extending their influence and interests. On the border of these two system of values, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan are situated. All this countries have adopted mild pro-European agendas driven by the reshaping of the power architecture in the region. This shift brings along important changes that would have been otherwise far from coming.

“The issues based in historical divisions create problems and sharpen the trade-off between intensive cooperation and rivalry. The solution of these di-

visions can only be reached by the installment of new rules, by fostering unprecedented cooperation, which would diminish or settle both the old the new conflicts.”

„The majority of countries in the Black Sea area share the option of integration into the EU, save Russia, the only diverging opinion. Russia is trying to block by all possible means this process of enlargement.”

„The intention of Ukraine to re-position itself in a new reality, dimensions and instruments is more that welcomed. However, reserves remain on the concrete steps Ukraine has planned to take. The Ukrainian plan reflencts primarily the interests of the government in Kyiv. It is not impoartial and synthetic.”

According to the expert's oppinion, the limits of EU enlargement are nwither rigid, nor clear. Brussels is still dominated by uncertainty about enlargement. The failed referenda in France and the Netherlands proved that further enlargement is not going to come soon.

Eight experts have been interviewed. Among them were:

Viorel Cibotaru, Bogdan Cibotaru, Sergiu Burca, Tatiana Lariusina